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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Asymmetric Warfare: Warfare in which opposing groups or nations have unequal military 
resources, and the weaker opponent uses unconventional weapons and tactics, as terrorism, to 
exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy. 
 
Brigade: A subdivision of an army, made up of different sized sub-units with different military 
roles.  A Brigade typically consists of around 5000 personnel. 
 
Chain of Command: The chain of command is made up of leaders with varying levels of 
seniority and responsibility, from those with overall day to day command and control of the 
Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force through to battalion leaders (~600 personnel), company 
leaders (~120 personnel), platoon leaders (~35 personnel) and section leaders (8 personnel). 
 
Combat Medical Technician (CMT): CMTs are army personnel who provide medical support 
to deployed military personnel.  They have advanced first aid skills through to advanced medical 
skills normally associated with the paramedic role.  They deploy alongside the infantry providing 
direct combat support and also provide medical support in depth through to the point where 
injured personnel are evacuated from the theatre of operations.  The RAF and Royal Navy have 




Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (CIED-TF): The C-IED TF is made up of 
small teams comprised of personnel with various roles whose activities include searching for, 
destroying or recovering IEDs for intelligence, generating counter-measures and forensic 
purposes. 
 
Check Point (CP): A facility established in an operational area that can be semi-permanent or 
transitional which is used by personnel to mount forward patrols in tactically important areas. 
 
Deployment: Undertaking military operations, most often overseas, for lengths of time up to six 
months.  Deployment missions can take the form of peace making, peace support, peace keeping 
through to combat operations.  They can sometimes incorporate humanitarian missions. 
 
Forward Operating Base (FOB): Forward operating bases are areas where military personnel 
mount operations in a distinct area within the overall area of operations.  FOBs are usually 
medium sized and provide a transitional logistic support facility between main operating bases 
and patrol bases. 
 
Formed Unit (FU) Personnel: Personnel who deploy as part of a unit which exists in peacetime 
and transitions into an operational area.  FU personnel usually deploy with peers, colleagues and 
friends. 
 





Forward Psychiatry: This term relates to psychological therapy and treatment carried out in the 
operational area where mental health support is delivered as close to the operational unit as 
possible using the principles of PIES (see below). 
 
Harmony Guidelines: Harmony Guidelines are the guidelines which state how long military 
personnel should be deployed within a given timeframe.  Although there are small differences in 
how Harmony duration is calculated between the three branches of the Armed Services, the 
guidelines generally state that individuals should not exceed around 13 months of cumulative 
separated service in any continuous period of 30 months. 
 
IAPT: Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) is an NHS programme of talking 
therapy treatments recommended by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) which support frontline mental health services in treating mainly depression and anxiety 
disorders. 
 
Individual Augmentees: IAs are those personnel who deploy alone or with small numbers of 
other military personnel rather than formed unit personnel who deploy with known members of 
their peacetime unit. 
 
Married Quarters: Living accommodation provided by the UK Armed Forces for personnel 




Military Occupational Fitness: All military personnel have a medical grading which 
determines their ability to deploy.  The categories are, not deployable, deployable with 
limitations, fully fit for deployment and medically unfit for military service.  Military grades are 
awarded and administered by a military doctor. 
 
Main Operating Base (MOB): The main operating base is a large base area within the overall 
area of operations which acts as the main logistics hub. 
 
OROSM: Overarching Operational Stress Management.  This is an inclusive process that sets 
out the activities that must be put in place from point of entry into the military through to support 
immediately post-discharge from the Armed Services. 
 
Overstretch: Overstretch is a colloquial term applied to the activity of breaching the guidelines 
for the maximum time that military personnel can be deployed within a specified period of time. 
 
Patrol Base (PB): A patrol base is a semi-permanent or transitional location which sits between 
check points and forward operating bases.  As the name implies, it is used to mount patrols into 
tactically important areas.  Patrol bases usually support a number of check points. 
 
PIES (Proximity, immediacy, expectancy, simplicity): Proximity, mental health treatment 
close to the combat area, immediacy, treatment conducted as soon as possible after the point of 
breakdown, expectancy, the expectation that personnel will return to their operational unit 
following treatment, simplicity, keeping any intervention as simple as possible.  
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POSM: Post operational stress management is comprised of a series of processes that take place 
after a person has been deployed.  It starts with third location decompression, then a period of 
normalisation and post-deployment leave, and a commander-led interview twelve weeks post 
deployment.  Mandatory psychoeducational briefs take place during decompression and are 
repeated during the return to steady state. 
 
Rank: Military ranks are a system of hierarchical relationships in Armed Forces. Usually, 
uniforms denote the bearer's rank by particular insignia affixed to the uniforms.  In the UK 
Armed Forces, commissioned officers have ultimate command responsibility at two levels; 
senior and junior. 
 
Rest and Recuperation (R&R): Personnel deploying for six months or more receive a single 
continuous 10 day period of rest and recuperation (R&R) at some point during their deployment.  
The stated aim of R&R is to ‘provide those who have been mentally and physically challenged 
by continuous service, usually in an operational area, time to rest out of the line and ‘recharge 
their batteries’ in order to sustain operational effectiveness’. 
 
Third Location Decompression (TLD): TLD is a post deployment activity which has become a 
mandatory process for the majority of military personnel who have taken part in operational 
deployments.  TLD aims to allow military personnel to begin to psychologically ‘unwind’ after 
operational deployment through the provision of a brief period of structured rest.  Currently, for 
UK AF personnel, TLD is conducted in Cyprus, the ‘third location’.  TLD aims to ensure that 
formed unit (FU) personnel who have deployed together are able to unwind together, the 
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rationale being that it enables individuals to make use of support from their peers in a neutral and 
stress-free setting. 
 
United Kingdom Armed Forces (UK AF): The three Services which comprise the UK military 
are known as the UK AF and are composed of the Royal Navy, including the Royal Marines, 
Army and Royal Air Force. 
 
Welfare Support: The general support delivered to military personnel which aims to maximise 
their mental health and social wellbeing.  It is a command responsibility and authority for 






Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention of mental ill-health among UK military personnel 
was evaluated pre-, during and post-operational deployment.  Primary prevention studies 
examined whether rest and recuperation taken during deployment promoted better mental health 
(n=536).  R&R was highly satisfying but did not promote better mental health.  Psychological 
benefits occurred only when R&R was used to mentally disengage from operations and to access 
social support.  Mental health outcomes were compared in a sample of personnel attending a 
brief structured post-deployment rest period (Third Location Decompression or TLD) (n=1407) 
and non-attendees (n=1664).  TLD attendance benefited mental and physical health, reduced 
alcohol misuse following deployment, but had no demonstrable effect upon transition from 
operations to the peacetime environment.  Psychological effects were related to levels of combat 
where greater combat exposure was associated with reduced TLD benefits.  Primary and 
secondary prevention activity was assessed during deployment (n=2794).  Receipt of pre-
deployment psycho-education, experiencing good leadership and satisfactory support for families 
were associated with substantially better deployment mental health.  Medical consultation for a 
physical condition was associated with poorer mental health, suggesting that mental ill-health 
detection might take place during medical consultations.  Secondary prevention was assessed 
pre-deployment (n=484) and post-deployment (n=1636).  Greater mental health stigmatisation 
was associated with reduced help-seeking.  Changes in psychological symptom levels were 
associated with synchronous fluctuations in stigma levels.  New mental disorder caseness and 
remission from caseness were both associated with significant increases and decreases in 
stigmatisation respectively.  For tertiary prevention, mental healthcare delivered during 
operations (n=611) returned around 75% of personnel to full operational duties.  Over a four year 
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follow-up period, around a third of study participants were consistently unfit for deployment.  
Pre-deployment clinical care (n=2979) returned around 75% of personnel to full duties; during 
prolonged follow-up, around 33% of personnel experienced reduced occupational fitness.  
Recommendations for improving current mental ill-health prevention practices and avenues for 
future research are described.  
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Contribution of the Author and Other Researchers 
 
1.  R&R Study  I developed this study with two co-researchers.  I provided logistic support for 
the initial interview and pilot phase of the development of the R&R experiences scale and 
provided ongoing advice about both the structure and content of the scale and the survey in 
which it was embedded.  I played an active role in the revision and compilation of the final scale.  
I played a major role in collecting and cleaning the study data and I am solely responsible for 
transforming the dataset and the subsequent analyses.  I collaborated with colleagues to produce 
a short academic paper for which I was first author and which was published in The Journal of 
The Royal Society of Medicine and I am solely responsible for the chapter as it appears in the 
thesis. 
 
2.  Third Location Decompression (TLD) Study  I was not directly involved in the design and 
data collection element for phase one of the KCMHR cohort study from where the TLD dataset 
was drawn.  I was however part of the team that designed the phase two questionnaire and acted 
as a military advisor during the data collection phase, the collation of the final dataset and I 
contributed to the journal submission describing the general findings arising from the cohort 
study.  I developed the dataset for the TLD study from the cohort dataset myself with advice 
from my supervisors.  I am solely responsible for the analyses and the production of the chapter.  
I was first author of a short academic paper describing the findings which was published in the 
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. 
 
3.  Operational, General, Welfare and Medical Support  This thesis component was based 
upon two pieces of research.  I had a major role in the development and implementation of the 
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first operational mental health needs evaluation (OMHNE) study conducted in 2010 and I was 
the team leader solely responsible for the development of the study protocol and collection of the 
second dataset in 2011.  I carried out the provisional analyses of the second of the operational 
datasets compiled in Afghanistan and wrote an internal report based upon the outcomes.  I was 
solely responsible for the amalgamation of the datasets, the subsequent analyses and was first 
author of a paper detailing the results which was published in the British Journal of Psychiatry.  I 
subsequently wrote the thesis chapter. 
 
4.  Non-deployed Stigma and Help-Seeking Study  I played a major role in the development of 
the data capture tool used in the stigma reduction comparative study from which the non-
deployed help-seeking study is derived.  I collected the completed surveys, entered and cleaned 
the dataset.  I developed the study hypotheses, aims and objectives and I undertook the 
secondary analyses with advice from my supervisors.  I produced a short academic paper based 
upon this study which was published in The Journal of Psychology and Psychotherapy.  I am 
solely responsible for the chapter as it appears in the thesis. 
 
5.  The Post-deployment Stigma Study  With my supervisor and other team members, I 
formulated and helped in the original RCT study design from which the thesis chapter dataset is 
derived.  I then assisted the study coordinator in designing the materials used in the study, in 
delivering the intervention and finally assisting with data collection.  The content of the chapter 




6.  Deployed and Non-deployed Clinical Studies  I led the development of the data capture tool 
used for both the operational and non-operational clinical studies, compiled the datasets, 
performed the data linkage, carried out the analyses and wrote both chapters. 
 




CHAPTER 1 - THE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT CYCLE AND THE PREVENTION OF 
MENTAL ILL-HEALTH 
Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Prevention – Definitions and Descriptions. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the promotion and maintenance of mental health among UK 
military personnel.  The conceptual model within which the various mental health interventions 
are embedded is characterised by three levels of preventative activity.  Progression from mental 
health to mental illness is disrupted and/or reversed by targeted activity at each level of 
prevention. 
 
Primary Prevention (Prevent) 
Primary prevention is mostly concerned with averting mental breakdown through activities such 
as risk reduction or building resilience.  This can be a passive process, where general strategies 
or policies are applied at a population level to deal with specific risks, while active practices 
require behaviour change by individuals.  Primary prevention is principally the responsibility of 
line managers who develop and implement organisational strategies under the direction of senior 
managers who set out rules and policies; healthcare professionals further assist in the promotion, 
development and evaluation of their efforts (Arends et al., 2010). 
Secondary Prevention (Detect) 
Secondary prevention is concerned with the identification of the early signs of mental health 
disorder so that by timely effective intervention, further progression or worsening of symptoms 
and problems is inhibited and normal daily living is maintained (Arends et al., 2010). 
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Tertiary Prevention (Treat) 
Tertiary prevention is mostly concerned with providing timely and effective treatment for those 
suffering with established mental health disorders to return them to full fitness or to minimise 
long term disability (Arends et al., 2010). 
 
The Potential Adverse Impact of Reduced Occupational Fitness and Restorative 
Interventions 
 
The adverse personal impact of reduced occupational fitness arising from mental ill-health 
symptoms is potentially considerable and impaired health appears to have a substantial negative 
effect upon productivity and financial health at an organisational level.  The UK economic 
burden of workplace ill-health is thought to be sizeable, with one study estimating the combined 
annual cost of lost productivity and sickness absence payments to be £100 billion (Layard et al., 
2007; Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. 2007; Black, 2008; SAMH. 2011).  The overall fiscal 
consequences of sickness absence aside, the personal burden of reduced workplace psychological 
wellbeing and associated absences can be devastating and far reaching.  While occupational 
impairment has a range of adverse mental health consequences, productivity at work appears to 
be good for both mental and physical health (Waddell, 2006, Claussen et al., 1993, Department 
of Work and Pensions. 2010).  With this in mind, a range of processes have been devised to 
promote presenteeism, however, achieving optimal workplace mental health is a complex 
undertaking with well-intentioned interventions often producing variable outcomes at best 
(Harvey et al., 2009).  The problem of reduced occupational fitness has been deemed to be such 
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an important and widespread phenomenon that the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) (NICE, 2009) has developed public health guidance for achieving improved occupational 
mental wellbeing.  In addition, the IAPT programme (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies) is a UK government backed initiative intended to reduce the personal and economic 
burden of psychological illness through the facilitation of effective self-management and the 
engagement of affected people with evidence-based therapy (de Lusignen et al., 2012; NICE. 
2009).  Although published outcomes are somewhat sparse, recent studies suggest that at least 
half of those treated within IAPT arrangements achieved pre-defined criteria for recovery (Chan 
and Adams,2014); fiscal benefits related to implementing IAPT have yet to be clearly 
demonstrated, though some studies suggest a marginal positive financial effect (Mukuria et al., 
2013).  A meta-analysis suggested that functionality at work might be improved for those with 
symptoms of common mental disorder through the provision of timely access to high intensity 
interventions delivered within the workplace with the intention of arresting or reversing 
symptom deterioration (Pomaki et al., 2012).  The available data, therefore, suggest that 
delivering workplace mental health support is feasible and although the evidence for 
effectiveness is not strong, that some personal and organisational gains may result from having 
structured interventions and strategies in place. 
 
Military Occupational Mental Health 
 
The main purpose of the United Kingdom Armed Forces (UK AF) is to undertake worldwide 
operational deployments to protect the nation and its dependent territories against threats to its 
security and national interests (Ministry of Defence, 2011).  Military deployment can take the 
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form of fighting wars where combat exposure is thought to be the main psychological threat 
(Cigrang et al., 2014).  Counter-insurgency (COIN) operations are different in character to war-
fighting and are said to require a unique mindset of military personnel due to the asymmetric 
nature of the enemy threat (Kiszely, 2006).  Various forms of peace-keeping and peace support 
operations encompass distinctive exposures such as humanitarian interventions and both can be 
associated with the development of common mental health symptoms for some participants 
(Hotopf et al., 2003, Greenberg et al., 2008).  In order to embark upon military operations, UK 
military personnel undertake a progressive series of phases or steps.  The ‘deployment cycle’ 
describes the process through which personnel prepare for deployment, undertake operations and 
then return home.  Deployment therefore has three discrete phases; preparation, which is 
characterised by training and entry into a high readiness state; deployment, where military 
personnel undertake operations lasting from one month to one year, most commonly between 
three and seven months duration and post-deployment recovery, recuperation and return to 
steady state.  Although the psychological consequences for military personnel undertaking 
operations are increasingly well documented, the effectiveness of the various preventative 
measures used by UK AF to support the mental health of military personnel while they navigate 
the phases of deployment is less well understood.  Given that prevention is preferable to 
intervention when a disorder has developed, the UK AF utilise a broad prevention strategy 
described as ‘Overarching Operational Stress Management’ (OROSM) (Ministry of Defence, 
2004, Ministry of Defence, 2005).  This programme has six distinct steps: 
1.  Working with pre-service beliefs and attitudes during recruit training. 
2.  Stress management strategies taught during in-service developmental training and promotion 
courses undertaken for career progression. 
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3.  Pre-deployment mental health support and interventions. 
4.  Psychological support delivered to military personnel while they are deployed. 
5. Post-deployment recovery interventions. 
6. The maintenance of good mental health following discharge from the Armed Forces.   
Attempts are made at each stage to prevent mental ill-health, to detect its precursors and to treat 
those personnel who develop mental disorder as a result of their military service. 
 
Occupational Fitness in the United Kingdom Armed Forces 
 
The UK AF are a comparatively small organisation with finite human resources.  Although it is 
constantly reducing, the combined strength of the Royal Navy Army, and Royal Air Force was 
152440 in 2014 (Defence Statistics, 2014), occupational fitness and associated deployment 
readiness among individual Service members is crucial to maintaining an effective fighting 
force.  Military personnel are often asked to engage in demanding, dangerous and potentially 
traumatising work that has been linked to adverse mental health outcomes for some (Sundin et 
al., 2014; Hoglund et al., 2014), particularly among those sustaining battle injury (Heltemes et 
al., 2014); workplace mental health support is therefore a potentially important way of 




All employers who knowingly place their employees in harm’s way have a moral obligation to 
enhance workplace wellbeing whilst complying with legal requirements (Tehrani, 2002).  For 
mental health, this is often achieved by providing psychological support systems and processes. 
 
Hardiness, that is, good mental health in the face of adversity, is a desirable characteristic among 
military personnel and some evidence suggests that it might be partly innate (Orme et al., 2014), 
though some empirical data suggests that it might be promoted by specific psychological 
interventions such as through the provision of mindfulness-based practices delivered in the 
workplace (Johnson et al., 2014).  In the field of mental health, interventions are complex and 
rarely risk-free; inculcating psychological ‘toughness’ for instance may have unintended 
negative consequences in terms of higher rates of mental disorder symptoms among those 
endorsing greater levels of toughness.  Some evidence suggests that tough individuals can 
operate to a high level while harbouring substantial mental ill-health symptoms. (Jakupcak et al., 
2014). 
 
A Prevention Model 
 
The World Health Organization defines mental health as ‘a state of well-being in which every 
individual realises their potential, copes with the normal stresses of life, works productively and 
makes a contribution to their community’ (World Health Organization, 2014).  This definition is 
thus not merely about the absence of disease or infirmity, but rather encompasses a range of 
positive behaviours and outcomes.  To achieve optimal mental health, a well-established public 
health preventative medicine process uses primary, secondary and tertiary prevention strategies 
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to intervene in and minimise the effects of a wide range of both physical and mental health 
disorders (Bloom, 1979).  Although conceptualised as having three well-defined categories, in 
practice, preventative interventions may not be unique to each level of the model and often cross 
blurred boundaries (Vicary, 1994).  Preventive measures in mental health disorders are not only 
relevant before conditions take hold, but can be introduced at any stage of development in order 
to arrest or retard progression. 
 
Promoting Occupational Fitness in Military Settings 
 
Much of the available research has been conducted among civilian cohorts and on a cautionary 
note, although this may be equally true of civilians, outcome data suggest that military personnel 
appear to be rather difficult to engage in structured mental health support or therapy and may 
have difficulty adhering to treatment (Hoge et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2010; Brewin et al., 2011; 
Garvey Wilson et al., 2009).  Because of differences in the way that the UK AF are structured 
compared to the majority of civilian organisations, being rigidly hierarchical, and the prevailing 
attitudes to receiving external support, where self-reliance and hardiness are much prized 
(Bartone et al., 2013), the approaches that may be successful in a civilian context may require 
modification if they are to be effective in military settings. 
 
In addition to specific workplace-based interventions to promote occupational fitness, there may 
be some psychological benefits to be gained from ensuring that routine military training 
acknowledges and incorporates mental health support principles so that mental health literacy 
and symptom recognition is improved.  The preparation of military personnel to deploy and 
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undertake combat missions enshrines the key principle of tough, realistic training.  Over and 
above the potential psychological benefits of increased physical fitness, there may be a direct 
benefit to be gained from simultaneously acquiring self-management strategies that may help to 
offset the development of mental health disorders resulting from adversity (Figureley and Nash, 
2006).  Challenging pre-deployment training seeks to promote a sense of cohesion that 
encompasses mutual reliance between individuals and aims to foster important group processes 
such as social support (King, 2013).  Meaningful social support in particular has been cited as 
being crucial in helping people to be resilient and overcome the potentially negative 
psychological effects of exposure to potentially traumatic events (Ganster and Victor, 2011).  
Some have argued strongly that the most meaningful psychological support for military 
personnel is best achieved, as military doctrine often states (Mora,. 1967) by promoting group 
cohesion and morale while others advocate the use of empirically derived preventative or 
supportive interventions.  The latter approach encompasses activities such as pre-deployment 
psycho-educational briefing (Greenberg et al., 2009).  Other forms of intervention are those 
derived from systems with a broad evidence base such as stress inoculation training (SIT) 
(Meichenbaum and Cameron, 1989), which is a highly structured, exposure-based training 
approach that appears to have some utility when conducted as a pre-exposure measure (Flanagan 
et al., 2012; Hourani et al., 2011; Hourani et al., 2012). 
 
More recently there has been a drive to develop complex multi-component strategies based upon 
resilience building, such as the comprehensive soldier fitness (CSF) programme (Casey, 2011) 
currently being implemented widely in the US Army (Lester et al., 2011
a
).  The CSF programme 
attempts to capture all hypothesised aspects of resilience, extends to a spiritual component 
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delivered via a web-based package (Pargament et al., 2011) and includes a Global Assessment 
Tool (GAT), which is a self-report survey measuring psychosocial fitness in emotional, social, 
family, and spiritual domains (Peterson et al., 2011).  The CSF is an example of a well-
intentioned psychological intervention that has been delivered to substantial numbers of 
personnel with little or no pilot testing or early evaluation of its effectiveness.  Although non-
peer reviewed, technical reports give early indications that certain programme components may 
be potentially effective (Lester et al., 2011
b
).  However as some commentators suggest, unless it 
is systematically evaluated, it may yet transpire that CSF has unintended adverse consequences, 
perhaps including iatrogenic effects (Steenkamp et al., 2013). 
 
Some evidence for the effectiveness of non-specific group level intervention to promote mental 
fitness has been published; effective leadership style (Davidovitz et al., 2007), high levels of 
cohesion (Brailey et al., 2007) and improved morale (Lapierre et al., 2007) have all been shown 
to have positive mental health benefits.  In addition to directly impacting upon mental health, 
leaders may play an important role in fixing the broken.  In order to maximise mental health, 
treatment may sometimes be necessary and effective leaders appear to be able to promote a 
greater willingness to access psychological services when symptoms of mental disorder are 
present (Wright et al., 2009). 
 
During deployment, UK AF provide a variety of support measures which aim to minimise the 
potential negative effects of undertaking combat operations.  At a primary prevention level, these 
include family support for loved ones at home and welfare interventions.  During deployment, an 
central component of psychological wellness is related to the social support provided to the 
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service member by families at home in the form of communications, be they by telephone, letter, 
care package (Carter et al., 2011) or digital means (Lewandowski et al., 2011).  As is often the 
case with all forms of mental health support, a cautionary note is probably required.  Despite the 
best efforts of loved ones to support the military person throughout their period of deployment, 
communication with home can sometimes have disastrous effects (Greene et al., 2010), for 
instance when the consequences of problems occurring at home are communicated to the 
deployed person (Mulligan et al 2012; Erbes et al., 2008) who may well be powerless to 
intervene or help. 
 
In addition to welfare support, medical services are made available across the spectrum of 
deployment in an attempt to provide a consistent approach to promoting mental health through 
primary and secondary prevention and allowing access to therapy services.  Throughout their 
military careers, commanders receive instruction which aims to ensure that they facilitate access 
to available support, including therapeutic intervention, for those in their care.  It is hoped that, 
by feeling supported by their commanders and peers, help-seekers will not perceive that they are 
prejudiced in any way for having declared a potential mental health problem.  Additionally, 
commanders are required to ensure that psycho-education is made available at key points in the 
cycle of deployment.  Stress briefings are a component of a comprehensive system of stress 
management which are delivered pre-deployment, immediately post-deployment and during 
leadership courses throughout the military career (Ministry of Defence, 2004).  In a military 
context, facilitating timely access to medical and welfare support, colloquially known as 
‘signposting’, is fundamental to effective leadership.  As well as facilitating access to support, 
prior research suggests that leaders are pivotal in promoting morale and unit cohesion, which in 
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turn can be associated with psychological health (Jones et al., 2012).  The spectrum of 
deployment support is undoubtedly well intentioned; however, research suggests that some 
components of welfare and medical intervention have positive but somewhat marginal effects 
upon mental health (Greenberg et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2013). 
 
Regulating Military Occupational Fitness among UK Armed Forces Personnel 
 
To effectively manage military occupational health, a system of medical classification (Ministry 
of Defence, 2006) allocates medical employment categories to individuals which govern the way 
in which they deploy on operations or are debarred from doing so according to the overall impact 
of their current health.  Broad categories of deployment restriction are assigned to personnel 
(fully deployable, limited deployable and not deployable) so that the person is protected while 
their illness or mental disorder is managed effectively.  For some personnel, discharge from the 
UK AF is arranged on medical grounds when the restrictions are enduring and are such that the 
person cannot be employed in any military capacity (Ministry of Defence, 2007).  The rate of 
medical discharge varies over time, between Services and by military role.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The preceding chapter detailed the stepped prevention model as it is applied to the promotion 
and maintenance of mental health among military personnel.  Although the prevention model 
was generated for use in a variety of non-military occupational and healthcare settings, the extent 
to which it has been evaluated in a military context is largely unknown.  The discussion laid out 
in the previous chapter suggested that various unique aspects of military service and military 
healthcare arrangements might impact on how prevention activity is delivered within military 
organisations.  A literature review was therefore conducted to assess the extant literature relating 
to prevention activity within various international military forces. 
 
While carrying out the literature review process it was apparent that, in relation to mental health, 
there is potentially a great deal of activity in the three areas of prevention which may not have 
been captured by the search strategy.  ‘Mental health’ was one of the main search terms; adding 
the terms ‘psychological’, ‘mental and illness’ and ‘mental and disorder’ either in full or 
truncated form did not increase the number of articles retrieved.  When the search was limited to 
military personnel, few studies purport to examine primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, 
rather, with a limited number of exceptions, studies were often titled according to the specific 
area of enquiry rather than being categorised as a preventative activity.  In addition, few abstracts 
used the primary, secondary and tertiary prevention nomenclature.  This was particularly true for 




The Literature Review 
 
A literature review of preventative measures for promoting mental health among military 
personnel was carried out.  The literature search was initially conducted in April 2012 at the 
outset of the period of PhD study and was updated in February 2015 using the electronic 
databases, MEDLINE and EMBASE with PubMed, OvidSP and ISI Web of Knowledge search 
engines.  The search was limited to human adult subjects.  Freetext terms were used with 
Boolean operators.  The search terms and number of candidate articles retrieved at each stage of 
the search were: 
 
Serial     Search Term  Number 
1. Mental Health  456381 
2. Military  161511 
3. Prevention  1223512 
4. 1 AND 2  7032 




All abstracts relating to preventative mental health measures among military personnel were 
eligible for full-text review (n=503).  Exclusion criteria were applied to limit articles to the study 
area.  An initial screen of identified abstracts and titles was conducted and articles were 
eliminated if they were not directly related to primary, secondary and/or tertiary prevention 
within the field of military mental health.  Articles relating to suicide and self-harm were 
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excluded as suicide has a low prevalence among UK AF personnel (Pinder et al., 2011), is not 
always associated with mental disorder (Hines et al., 2013) and was not a central pillar of this 
thesis.  Family studies were excluded as the search was intended to explore prevention activity as 
it relates to military personnel located at various points of the deployment cycle not their 
families.  To ensure that candidate articles were of sufficient quality to justify inclusion in the 
literature review, opinion and editorial articles, books and book chapters, proposed programmes 
of research and case studies were excluded unless the publications contained descriptions of data 
derived from pilot or test phases.  The exception was when a review constituted expert panel 
opinion or was a Delphi study design.  Original papers containing descriptions of outcome 
studies, systematic reviews and meta-analyses were included.  Mild traumatic brain injury 
(mTBI) research was excluded as this is a controversial area (Nelson et al., 2015) that is beyond 
the scope of the current research.  Although alcohol misuse was included and comprised a small 
number of the candidate articles, substance misuse was excluded as it is a prevalent offence in 
the UK AF which invariably meets with discharge from the Services on disciplinary grounds and 
is not subject to preventative measures in the manner of alcohol-related and mental health 
disorders.  Veteran studies were excluded as the thesis relates specifically to serving personnel.  







Proposed Studies 7 
Reviews or Books 102 
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 13 
Veterans 22 
Substance Misuse 5 
Case Study 2 
Duplicates 120 
Military Sexual Trauma (MST)  4 
Low Relevance 44 
Total 464 
 
Following the application of exclusion criteria, 39 candidate articles remained.  The reference 
lists of the articles were subjected to a secondary search, as were relevant citations contained in 
articles generated by the secondary review.  126 articles were identified as being relevant to the 
literature review, giving an overall total of 165 candidate articles. 
 
The following discussion is related to the three areas of prevention, primary, secondary and 




Primary Prevention (Prevent) 
 
Military Sub-groups 
The literature suggests that the primary prevention of mental health disorders may have to take 
account of special populations which might arguably include the military.  Although general 
prevention may be useful for most occupational groups, interventions may be required that are 
tailored to the unique needs of occupational groups with specific characteristics such as high 
levels of potentially traumatic exposure, high levels of risk or other workplace stress (Sajatovic 
et al., 2010).  Some research suggests that some military sub-groups may require modified forms 
of preventive activity.  For instance, prevention activity may need to take account of the 
distinctive needs of certain sub-categories of military women.  Deployed US servicewomen who 
experienced combat or who reported high levels of deployment stress were found to be at greater 
risk of reporting mental health conditions compared to men with similar exposure (Seelig et al., 
2012).  This is a theme that appears to run through the literature and suggests that a ‘one size fits 
all’ approach to prevention may not be the best policy for military personnel. 
The Use of Technology 
A comprehensive exploration of the activities of deployed US mental health support personnel in 
Iraq revealed that common primary prevention interventions included the provision of psycho-
educational classes (n=3,900), traumatic event-related interventions (n=535), command directed 
mental health evaluations (n=750), while casual walkabout face-to face contacts were 
substantially more frequent than any other form of activity (n=80,400) (Hung, 2007).  While 
opportunistic face-to-face mental health contact such can be exploited for prevention purposes, 
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developments in the field of telemental health could potentially expand the numbers of personnel 
who might benefit from primary prevention during deployment.  An expert panel concluded that 
technological advances could be used to support activities such as stress inoculation training and 
could potentially promote social connectivity among deployed personnel with psychological 
symptoms (Spira et al., 2010).  Emerging evidence suggests that mental health-related stigma 
reduction might be achieved through specific CBT-based coping skills and peer-to-peer support 
could be facilitated when it is delivered or hosted using a web-based platform (Van Voorhees et 
al., 2012). 
Early Career Interventions 
Although not directly relevant to the thesis subject matter, primary prevention has been used 
early in military careers to increase the proportion of trainees completing initial training.  At the 
US West Point Academy, where prospective US military officers receive schooling and pre-
service training, cadets seeking support for mental health problems, those hospitalised with 
physical illness and those tendering resignation received increased levels of mentoring.  
Consistent application of the principles of primary and secondary prevention appeared to be 
effective in reducing the rate of resignation among those with potential psychological symptoms 
(Conrad et al., 1976). 
Physical Interventions 
Prevention programmes have incorporated physical interventions which may have an indirect 
mental health effect, for instance improving physical health and fitness to maximise mental 
health among military personnel (Gubata et al., 2013).  Other treatments with no obvious mental 
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health features have been shown to be of psychological benefit.  In a study of combat injured 
personnel, early morphine administration during trauma care appeared to promote better mental 
health by significantly reducing the risk of developing PTSD during rehabilitation (Holbrook et 
al., 2010). 
Psycho-education-based Approaches to Prevention 
As noted by Sandler et al. (2014), across the articles included in this literature review, the 
margins of effectiveness for primary promotion in particular can be quite small, although when 
primary preventative measures are integrated into an overall strategy, they may have a more 
profound cumulative effect (Barrett et al., 2001).  Prevention strategies sometimes use welfare-
based or supportive managerial approaches in an effort to increase resistance to the development 
of mental health disorder.  There is some precedence for adopting such approaches; in a study of 
12,756 US military personnel deployed worldwide, higher levels of general stress in the 
workplace were statistically significantly associated with higher rates of mental health symptoms 
and productivity loss.  The authors argued that primary and secondary prevention efforts should 
target individuals experiencing general subjective work-related stress in order to identify and 
access those who require definitive mental health support (Hourani et al., 2006).  The UK AF 
often make use of group level measures to promote resistance to stress.  In preparation to 
undertake military operations, pre-deployment training incorporates a wide range of military 
activities and training designed to maximise deployment readiness.  At a point just before 
deployment, a mandated primary prevention strategy includes the provision of psycho-education.  
In the military context, psycho-education seeks to promote self-help for lower level distress and 
encourages timely help-seeking in the case of unremitting symptoms or mental disorder (Murphy 
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and Sauter. 2003).  Education-based approaches often span primary, secondary and tertiary 
prevention levels (Gordon, 1983).  Self-help is a common alternative to formal help-seeking and 
is often a reflexive response to indicators of deteriorating mental health (Morin et al., 2006).  
When submitted to rigorous evaluation, the provision of self-help in the form of written 
educational materials has been shown to have equivocal (Ehlers et al., 2007; Scholes et al., 2007) 
or even negative effects (Turpin et al., 2005), however, providing a self-help manual with some 
therapist assistance fared moderately well when used to self-manage depressive symptoms 
(Williams et al., 2013).  It is perhaps inevitable that some personnel will develop psychological 
problems despite adequate pre-deployment preparation; this may be related to overwhelming 
levels of combat exposure during the subsequent deployment (Rona et al., 2009) or the effects of 
non-combat operational factors such as witnessing atrocities within a peacekeeping context 
(Sareen et al., 2007).  A continuously evolving, evidence-based approach to early preventative 
intervention is therefore necessary. 
In an attempt to improve their effectiveness, psycho-education-based interventions have been 
incorporated into multi-component strategies.  The Defender's Edge (DEFED) programme was 
grounded in a strengths-based philosophy and was delivered by a psychologist embedded with 
US Special Forces (SF) personnel.  The programme was based upon two assumptions, firstly, SF 
personnel are inherently resilient and healthy and secondly, that combat is not a risk factor, but is 
akin to a challenging athletic event.  The programme was delivered in five educational modules 
included fatigue countermeasures (sleep hygiene, stimulus control measures and limiting 
caffeine use), adrenaline management (stress management, relaxation and mindfulness 
measures), mission focus (goal-setting, identifying clear values, accepting adversity and 
cognitive restructuring), controlling responses to killing (cognitive restructuring, cognitive 
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flexibility and grief work) and mind tactics (social support, cognitive restructuring and distress 
tolerance).  192 participants reported that embracing the programme messages and contact with 
the psychologist in particular helped them to challenge mental health-related stigma (Bryan et 
al., 2011).  However they are structured, engagement with preventative strategies on the part of 
the recipient is arguably the single most important determinant of successful outcome.  Among 
782 soldiers taking part in post-deployment resilience training, positive endorsement of two 
factors reflecting attitudes to training content and engagement with the training process were 
linked to improved mental health-related attitudes and positive changes in mental health six 
months after programme participation (Foran et al., 2012). 
Warrior Resilience Training (WRT) is a multi-component, education-based resilience 
intervention which sought to promote posttraumatic growth among US Army personnel deployed 
to Iraq.  The intervention used a combination of rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT), a 
variant of cognitive behaviour therapy, leadership principles and positive psychology.  Feedback 
from 1168 participants suggested that incorporating senior commander, leader and chaplaincy 
input into WRT may have helped to promote engagement with the process and to reduce barriers 
to care (Jarrett, 2008). 
Military commanders can be resistant to intervention by mental health practitioners.  30 mental 
health professionals from 23 countries shared the view that military leaders were frequently 
ambivalent about the use of mental health support especially within the operational area (Adler et 
al., 1999).  Within the UK AF, stress management training (SMT) is often delivered by mental 
health practitioners and, despite the apparent resistance to mental health practitioner input, is a 
form of psycho-education that is popular among leaders as it can reach large numbers personnel 
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simultaneously, is largely passive and requires minimal time commitment on the part of the 
person delivering the education session.  When scripted, it has the advantage of delivering a pre-
rehearsed and standardised message, which is helpful for any subsequent evaluation.  The 
education session (often termed a ‘briefing’ in a military context) often takes place in isolation 
with little or no follow up practice and frequently lacks a skills acquisition element.  Stress 
inoculation training, a structured form of SMT, cannot be said to have been delivered unless 
skills practice and confirmation takes place (Meichenbaum, 2007). 
Briefing activity is not just confined to deployment preparation in the UK AF, being repeated at 
various times throughout the deployment cycle (Joint Service Publication 770).  Despite wide 
implementation, few robust studies report a reduction in workplace distress through the provision 
of education-based SMT (Taylor et al., 2011; Rose et al., 2012).  In a systematic review of the 
military psycho-education literature (Mulligan et al 2010), two surveys and seven intervention 
studies were identified, three of which were randomised controlled trials (RCTs).  Overall there 
was some inconsistent benefit for psycho-education when it was embedded in complex post-
exposure psychological interventions.  Positive outcomes in this context were related to reduced 
levels of alcohol misuse (Deahl et al., 2002; Adler et al., 2008) and there was some evidence that 
occupational functioning could be improved (Greenberg et al., 2010).  Some researchers have 
however questioned whether one-dimensional measures of psychological symptoms are a useful 
index of effectiveness and suggest that multiple measures of functioning, perhaps including 
organisation level outcomes might be more appropriate (Deahl et al., 2001).  A US study that 
assessed psychological debriefing with an overt interactive psycho-educational component 
reported a positive effect upon posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms (Adler et al., 
2009) though this was only apparent in a specific sub-group of heavily combat-exposed 
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personnel.  Debriefing is a popular vehicle for delivering psycho-education despite little 
evidence for its effectiveness.  When examined closely, studies purporting to show a positive 
benefit for debriefing-based approaches often base their conclusions upon subjective opinion and 
anecdote.  For instance, a deployed crisis-intervention team used a critical-incident stress-
management model to provide supportive services, including psycho-education, to 100 members 
of a US rescue squadron responding to a terrorist bombing.  Although no effect upon mental 
health was demonstrated, the critical-incident stress management model was considered as an 
important component of post-incident support (Budd, 1997). 
Other non-debriefing based interventions with a clear psycho-educational component, such as 
mental health first aid (MHFA), report only satisfaction and efficacy ratings in those trained to 
deliver the intervention rather than psychological or behavioural outcomes in recipients (Jorm 
and Kitchener, 2011).  The lack of robust evidence regarding the general effectiveness of 
psycho-education notwithstanding, some studies have found specific benefits in providing pre-
deployment psycho-education for military personnel who subsequently experienced higher levels 
of exposure to potentially traumatic events during their period of deployment (Iversen et al 2010; 
Mulligan et al., 2010). 
 
In summary, brief preventative interventions with a simple psycho-educational component are 
not always rigorously evaluated and tend to show limited effectiveness or differential sub-group 
effects (Taylor and Schatz, 2011).  Briefing or psycho-education alone seems insufficient to have 
a substantial effect upon mental health and more prolonged, immersion or follow-up training 
may be needed to ensure that self-management skills are assimilated (Ferdos and Sayed-Hossein, 
2007).  Recognising the shortcomings of brief psycho-education, researchers have suggested that 
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primary prevention might helpfully include interventions that require active participation such as 
formal anxiety management training that includes a discrete behavioural skills practice 
component (Bouchard et al., 2011). 
Given the apparent shortcomings of single episode brief interventions, it is probably wise for UK 
AF commanders to emphasise the role of effective leadership in supporting military mental 
health.  Substantial evidence suggests that mental health is associated with good leadership 
(Jones et al., 2012; Du Preez et al., 2012; Whitesell et al., 2012; Dickstein et al., 2010; Noy et al., 
1984) whereas negative views of leadership have been found to be linked to the development of 
PTSD (Castro et al., 2009).  Leadership is thought to be essential to operational effectiveness 
where it functions as a primary prevention activity but has a part to play in all levels of 
prevention.  In a review of coalition partner’s mental health provision during deployment to 
Afghanistan, common areas of practice included attempts to foster mental resilience, self-
regulation and psychological empowerment at various stages of the deployment cycle.  Effective 
leadership and peer support were cited as being crucial to the delivery of such interventions, to 
military mental health generally and to reducing perceived barriers to care (Vermetten et al., 
2014). 
 
Primary Prevention During Deployment 
 
Turning to primary prevention activity undertaken during deployment, in an effort to support 
deployment mental health, for many years, international Armed Forces have attempted to 
mitigate the cumulative fatigue arising from military operations overseas by providing a period 
of prolonged rest at some point during deployment.  Currently, UK AF personnel deploying for 
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six months or more receive a single continuous 10 day period of rest and recuperation (R&R) at 
some point during their deployment.  This includes travel to and from the place of departure 
which is often a military airport established as a logistics hub, but can be a maritime port within 
or close to the operational area.  The stated aim of R&R is to ‘provide those who have been 
mentally and physically challenged by continuous service, usually in an operational area, time to 
rest out of the line and ‘recharge their batteries’ in order to sustain operational effectiveness’ 
(Joint Service Publication 770).  In this sense, R&R may function as a primary preventative 
mental health measure as it is mostly concerned with averting mental breakdown.  During recent 
campaigns, UK AF have provided R&R at home, although R&R can take place within a purpose 
designed safe location close to the operational area.  Previous studies suggested that R&R is 
popular (Jones et al., 2011) and it is provided by most coalition nations (US DoD, 2004).  
Despite widespread and routine implementation of the strategy, there is no current empirical 
evidence of a primary preventative mental health benefit for R&R among UK personnel.  The 
only published research investigating the mental health benefits of R&R evaluated US personnel 
undertaking peacekeeping duties in Bosnia Herzegovina in the 1990’s.  In that study, no long-
term mental health promotion benefits were found among personnel taking R&R (Bell et al., 
1997). 
In civilian settings, taking rest and holidays are much cherished and are thought to boost morale 
and reward employees, particularly those in high stress occupations.  There is however, only a 
small amount of research suggesting that there is an enduring positive psychological effect for 
vacationing.  In a pre-post vacation study conducted among industrial workers, immediately after 
vacation, physical complaints, sleep and mood had improved compared to baseline.  Physical 
wellbeing improvements persisted five weeks after returning from holiday (Strauss-Blasche et 
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al., 2000).  In a study of the experience of holidaying and its impact upon work, mood gradually 
improved mid-holiday with the maximal psychological effect occurring just before returning 
home; travel was reportedly the most stressful part of the holiday (Nawijn, 2010).  High levels of 
working overtime have been linked to adverse health outcomes (Taris et al., 2011).  Although 
holidaying appeared to help with physical recovery and general wellbeing when people were 
working hard (Gilbert and Abdullah, 2004), the effects were often short-lived (de Bloom et al., 
2010).  The process of recuperation from occupational stress appears complex and may require a 
comprehensive solution that goes beyond the simple provision of rest (Zijllstra and Sonnentag., 
2006).  A review of UK offshore oil worker’s schedules noted that whilst the typical offshore 
work rota allowed for over 26 weeks onshore, taking less frequent but longer breaks was 
associated with difficulty re-adjusting to oil platform work routines upon return, whereas having 
more numerous shorter breaks was not (Parkes, 2010).  Clearly, the pattern of rest taking may be 
an important consideration when planning rest and recuperation strategies. 
 
Third Location Decompression 
 
At the end of a period of operational deployment, a brief pause occurs some 24-36 hours after 
leaving the operational area; this is known as third location decompression (TLD).  TLD is 
thought to function as a primary preventative intervention in that it is intended to promote better 
post-deployment readjustment to homecoming and by implication, better mental health.  TLD 
aims to allow military personnel to begin to psychologically ‘unwind’ after operational 
deployment through the provision of a brief period of structured rest (Hacker-Hughes et al., 
2008) and is a discrete component of the comprehensive post operational stress management 
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(POSM) process (Joint Service Publication 770, Hacker-Hughes et al., 2008).  TLD formally 
marks the transition from being deployed on operations to peacetime duties.  During recent UK 
AF deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, TLD took place in Cyprus; this constitutes the ‘third 
location’ in that it is geographically removed from the area of deployment but is not the home 
location.  TLD has been mandatory since 2007 for the majority of personnel who are members of 
formed units that deploy (Fertout et al., 2011
b
).  When initially established as a routine 
component of the POSM process, TLD aimed to ensure that formed unit (FU) personnel who had 
deployed together were able to unwind together, the rationale being that it would enable 
individuals to make use of support from their peers in a neutral and stress-free setting.  However, 
the popularity of TLD among commanders as a brief and ready-made stress-reduction 
intervention resulted in a change in policy.  From early in 2011, following an evaluation of the 
experience of TLD for those deploying as individuals without the support of their peers (Fertout 
et al., 2011), it has been Ministry of Defence policy that all personnel who deploy for periods in 
excess of 30 days will undertake TLD.  The standard TLD package lasts for approximately 24-36 
hours during which time attendees undertake a structured programme of activities including 
social events; these are mostly centred on and around a local beach and a communal area 
developed within a secure location to encourage participation in a range of relaxing social and 
leisure activities.  In addition, two short, distinct and mandatory psycho-educational briefings are 
delivered prior to an evening barbeque followed by an optional social event.  The briefings take 
two forms; the first is a ‘coming home’ brief usually delivered by a padre or faith leader who 
discusses common readjustment problems and potential ways to overcome them.  The second 
briefing is characterised by formal psycho-education which seeks to help personnel to identify 
mental health disorder symptoms both in themselves and in others.  This briefing effectively 
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‘signposts’ those whose initial symptoms fail to remit to appropriate sources of help.  The two 
briefings aim to assist post-deployment re-adjustment, including reintegration with family and 
friends and to facilitate the homecoming transition. 
 
The UK AF recognises that it has a problem with excessive alcohol use (Fear et al., 2007) and as 
operational deployment is ‘dry’, early attempts are made to provide an opportunity for the 
limited consumption of alcohol so that its effects can be experienced in a controlled environment 
following a prolonged period of abstinence (Burdett et al., 2011).  During the early development 
of TLD, the provision of unlimited alcohol had unintended adverse consequences (The 
Scotsman, 2014); a token system was subsequently introduced to restrict personal intake and 
consumption was carefully monitored by designated unit leaders and TLD staffs.  Controlling 
alcohol use appears to be universally important and post-deployment alcohol misuse similarly 
affects other NATO forces.  Combat deployment may be a precipitant of alcohol misuse; among 
568 US soldiers taking part in a post-deployment survey, 35% of participants were drinking in a 
problematic manner.  In this study, risk factors for post-deployment alcohol misuse included 
greater levels of exposure to potentially traumatic and combat events (Cheng et al., 2012).  
Among a sample of 7849 US soldiers, a third screened positive for alcohol misuse and just under 
half of those screening positive also reported risky behaviour related to alcohol misuse (Clarke-
Walper et al., 2014).  Given the potential for alcohol to adversely impact post-deployment 
readjustment, the intention of UK AF commanders is to intervene early during TLD to 
demonstrate alcohol’s powerful effect so that returning personnel understand the requirement to 




Other nations such as the Netherlands, France and Canada all make use of decompression in a 
variety of forms, but only Canada has published a review of their decompression arrangements 
(Zamorski et al., 2012, Garber and Zamorski. 2012).  Canada currently delivers a three to five 
day package in Cyprus where personnel are accommodated in hotels and are given spending 
money; French arrangements are for three days in Cyprus; the Dutch provide three days in Crete; 
Australia provides rest within the operational area with a psychologist interview when 
deployment is over and the US provide a period of ‘normalisation’ in the home garrison prior to 
taking post-deployment leave. 
 
Most decompression-based post-deployment interventions are delivered during a brief window 
as personnel transition home.  In research examining different models of post-deployment 
support, returning from deployment by sea appeared to provide a longer period within which to 
deliver comprehensive psycho-education and ‘decompression’ of combat stress compared to 
those who returned by air.  Therefore, the timing and duration of this form of preventative 
activity may need to be taken into account when refining current decompression models 
(Johnston et al., 2009). 
 
The content of TLD briefings require comment; combat invariably involves the death of 
colleagues and friends although grief and loss during deployment appears to be an under-
researched area of primary prevention.  The recent death of someone close can be an independent 
risk factor for poorer mental health among military personnel (Fink et al., 2013).  Despite this, 
otherwise comprehensive primary prevention strategies such as TLD, SMT and psycho-
education rarely contain a distinct griefwork component or indeed any advice about dealing with 
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loss.  To date, no evidence about the effect of TLD upon mental health and post-deployment 




Most coalition forces seek to promote post-deployment readjustment using interventions which 
are intended to ease the return to garrison life (Fertout et al., 2011).  In its various forms, the US 
Army Battlemind training system contains an overt psycho-educational component which 
requires those in receipt of the intervention to actively engage with the instructor and is therefore 
an interactive process.  This is particularly true of the post-deployment element of the Battlemind 
system.  Modules have been developed to include the unique requirements of the military spouse 
(Sayers, 2011), the needs of children within military families, psychological debriefing and 
Battlemind further extends to top-up components that aim to promote resilience across the 
deployment cycle (Bowles and Bates, 2010).  The US system has been subject to assessment 
among US military personnel and the outcomes suggest that it has a specific limited but positive 
effect upon PTSD symptoms in those reporting the highest levels of combat (Adler et al., 2011).  
A UK research team developed an anglicised version of post-deployment Battlemind and 
conducted a cluster RCT in over 2400 UK AF personnel returning from operations (Mulligan et 
al., 2012).  Receipt of Battlemind was associated with less binge drinking but had no statistically 
significant effect upon other mental health measures compared to receiving a standard mental 
health briefing. 
Recently, US researchers have concluded that there is a lack of clear evidence for many of the 
military primary and secondary prevention activities conducted in both the deployed and non-
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deployed settings (Slomski et al., 2014).  Despite comparatively low levels of efficacy for the 
various primary preventative mental health interventions, across four nation’s militaries, more 
than 70% of surveyed personnel indicated high degrees of satisfaction with the content of and 
time allocated to mental health support training.  The study authors noted that, despite cultural 
and organizational differences, mental health training programmes can be adapted for use across 
various nation’s Armed Forces (Foran et al., 2013).  In the context of weak evidence of general 
effectiveness, the latter study findings confirm the view that perceived utility and subjective 
satisfaction are no guarantee that a positive mental health effect will come about as a result of 
primary preventive activity. 
Secondary Prevention 
 
Secondary prevention is primarily concerned with detection and risk reduction in those who have 
yet to experience formal disorder, but are at risk of developing a formal or diagnosable mental 
disorder.  During deployment, the US military makes use of operational stress control (OSC) 
which, rather than being a single intervention, is more a package of measures.  Successful 
delivery relies on the responsiveness and composition of the stress control team as they attempt 
to reduce mental health-related stigma and other barriers to care in an effort to bring about rapid 
and sensitive early intervention (Pincus et al., 1998).  In a study of a US OSC-based secondary 
prevention programme delivered to military personnel serving in the Western Pacific, the 
multidisciplinary ‘Outpatient Crisis Prevention Program’ sought to teach coping skills to 
distressed personnel.  The programme appeared to be effective in reducing depression and 
anxiety symptoms among participants although the ability to attribute positive outcomes to the 
any single aspect of the programme was limited by the study design.  Nevertheless. follow-up 
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data indicated that gains were maintained one month after treatment (Jones et al., 2008).  Early 
detection in a military context is vital as research suggests that mental health treatment outcomes 
can be less favourable overall for military personnel than for their civilian counterparts and the 
avoidance of chronicity is therefore important (Creamer and Forbes. 2004). 
Screening 
 
In a military context, an example of detection activity is formal psychological screening, which 
has been used as a tool to deliver both secondary and tertiary prevention.  Post-deployment 
psychological screening attempts to identify military personnel who may be at risk of developing 
psychological symptoms on return from operations or following exposure to potentially 
traumatic events.  In addition to having some level of proven utility, any secondary prevention 
activity such as screening is best delivered within a supportive occupational environment in 
order to maximise acceptability (Rona et al., 2004).  Furthermore, field workers suggest that both 
screening and other detection-based interventions will invariably benefit from oversight by a 
coordinating body to maximise effectiveness and reduce duplication of effort (Dodgen et al., 
2002). 
 
Although secondary prevention is primarily the concern of line managers, in an occupational 
context it requires increasing levels of support from healthcare as inevitably recipients may 
require some level of therapeutic intervention, especially post-screening.  Routine mental health 
screening is undertaken by a number of nation’s military forces, most notably the US.  This has 
been carried out both pre- and post-deployment (Hoge et al., 2006).  Empirically, there is little 
evidence for the efficacy of mental health screening (Rona et al., 2005) and there is some 
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suggestion that reliable symptom reporting may be affected by many factors, perhaps most 
importantly anonymity considerations as screening requires the use of personally identifiable 
information so that cases can be offered further help (Ong and Wiss, 2000; Fear et al., 2012; 
Warner et al., 2011; McLay et al., 2008).  Pre-deployment screening may be particularly 
ineffective for low prevalence disorders (Rona et al., 2006) which, in a UK military context, 
includes symptoms of PTSD.  Low prevalence of mental disorder is found among a number of 
coalition partner forces with perhaps the exception of the US.  In screening conducted among 
Canadian Forces personnel, symptoms of mental disorder were detected in 10.2% of those 
screened (Zamorski et al, 2014).  It is broadly accepted that successful screening programmes 
must engage the right people with the right services at the right time.  There is some evidence 
from military studies that this may not necessarily occur and that engagement with helping 
agencies may be particularly problematic among alcohol misusers.  In a substantial review of 
screening outcomes, 29% of regular US Army personnel were classified as problem drinkers and 
6% had AUDIT-C scores ≥8.  In follow up interviews, 62% of those who initially screened 
positive and 75% of those with initial AUDIT-C scores ≥8 were assessed as having alcohol 
problems.  Only 29% of problem drinkers and 36% of those with AUDIT-C scores ≥8 were 
referred for further help.  The authors conclude that opportunities to offer a comprehensive 
secondary prevention intervention may have been missed despite providing screening services 
(Larson et al., 2014). 
 
Among 3,852 Canadian Forces personnel who took part in a screening programme, both mental 
disorder symptoms and personality factors were significantly associated with alcohol use.  The 
risk factors for alcohol misuse identified in this study and which might form part of a screening 
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programme could pose a dilemma for commanders.  A number of the characteristics representing 
risk factors for alcohol misuse were potentially desirable military characteristics.  Commanders 
would probably not wish to see potential recruits with such characteristics debarred from entry 
into military service and for serving personnel, restrictions placed upon continued service and 
further promotion.  These limitations notwithstanding, the authors argue for the use of 
preventative interventions for mental distress during early military service that might help to 
promote resilience and protect against later alcohol problems thus minimising the requirement 
for screening (Skomorovsky et al., 2012).  Given the uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
screening, and that it is mandatory among returning US service personnel thus rendering 
comparative studies all but impossible, the US Department of Defense has now funded a 
randomised controlled trial of psychological screening and stepped care among UK AF 
personnel (www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/research/kcmhr/post.aspx). 
Informal and Alternative Forms of Screening 
 
Although it does not constitute screening in the formal manner described above and takes place 
later in the deployment cycle, one form of detection used within the UK AF is the low level post-
deployment psychological interview conducted by a line manager some three months after 
returning home (LFSO. 2006).  Here, individuals are asked about their deployment experiences 
and whether they have any unremitted symptoms of mental ill-health.  More proximal to 
experiencing a potentially traumatising event, peer-led support programmes use military 
colleagues who are trained to detect early problems and signpost those affected to potential 
sources of help (Keller et al., 2005).  In a military context, peer support is often focused upon 
those exposed to combat (Frappell-Cooke et al., 2010) or severe training accidents.  Although 
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peers carry out a formal risk assessment, the process is not screening in its traditional sense as it 
forms just one element of post-exposure support and is more akin to a mentoring process.  A 
number of peer support programmes exist, some using peers as ‘counsellors’ (Levenson et al., 
2003).  The UK AF Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) programme is a form of peer support that 
is well accepted and may well have some organisational occupational benefits (Greenberg et al., 
2011
a
).  Although most peer-led programmes do not constitute counselling as such, encouraging 
self-disclosure by affected personnel is at the heart of many such interventions.  Disclosure has 
been suggested as a method of ameliorating psychological distress following exposure to 
potentially traumatic events.  In a study of 426 U.S. military personnel who served as 
peacekeepers in Somalia, adjustment to the peacekeeping mission was said to be significantly 
related to self-disclosure; such disclosure was helpful when made to both peers and supportive 
significant others (Bolton et al., 2003).  Some commentators have cautioned that forced retelling 
of unpleasant experiences might well be the prime reason why critical incident stress debriefing 
apparently fails (Watson and Shalev, 2005) and there is clearly a fine balance to be struck when 
using interventions with a disclosure component including peer support strategies. 
 
Mental Health Stigmatisation and Perceived Barriers to Care (Stigma/BTC) 
 
Successful secondary prevention relies on being able to detect the early signs of psychological 
distress and emerging mental health disorder so that symptomatic individuals can be engaged 
with appropriate help.  Among the proposed causes for failure to engage with potential sources 
of help (Vogt, 2011) and to participate fully in mental health screening programmes (Keeling et 
al., 2012) are the effects of stigmatising beliefs (Stigma) and perceptions that barriers to care 
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(BTC) are present (Paykel et al., 1998).  Although mental health stigmatisation is complex and 
defies a simple definition, researchers suggest that it is a social/cognitive construct that, in the 
context of help-seeking, incorporates behavioural attempts to avoid the label of mental illness 
and the perceived harm that it brings.  Mental illness is inferred by cues that elicit a stigmatising 
response such as psychiatric symptoms, social-skills deficits, physical appearance and labelling 
whereby the person is thought to be consulting a psychiatrist, taking psychoactive medication 
and so forth.  The presence of mental illness is widely viewed in a negative manner and 
subjectively diminishes a person by way of potential negative occupational, social and financial 
effects (Corrigan, 2000).  Fear of the perceived consequences of mental illness promotes the 
avoidance of help, support and treatment and non-adherence to therapy (Kessler et al., 2001).  
The available research suggests that stigma is commonplace among military personnel (Britt et 
al., 2007; Osorio et al., 2012; Osorio et al., 2013; Iversen et al., 2011) and that it may be 
particularly high during deployment.  In a survey of US marines, stigmatising thoughts about 
having developed combat stress reaction appeared to act as a barrier to seeking help or support 
from deployed combat stress control practitioners (Momen et al., 2012).  Furthermore, stigma 
appears ubiquitous and comparable in character within various national Armed Forces (Gould et 
al., 2010), although this may be partly related to the use of similar stigma measures across 
various military studies.  Although the greater proportion of the research literature deals with 
mental health stigmatisation, it appears that stigmatisation is not uniquely related to mental 
illness symptoms; it is said to be a substantial impediment to help seeking for physical illness 




The Effect of Stigma/BTC on Help-seeking 
 
Some researchers have suggested that the presence of stigma/BTC may limit the willingness of 
military personnel to disclose symptoms (Seal et al., 2008); however, others suggest that 
stigma/BTC may be weakly or wholly unrelated to decisions about seeking help (Cooper et al., 
2003).  Alternative explanations for failure to engage with help include simply failing to 
recognise psychological symptoms.  Research conducted among Canadian military personnel 
suggested that non-help-seeking may have resulted from just such a cause.  In this case, stigma 
was not the prime driver of non-help-seeking.  Early recognition of symptoms may be crucial to 
operational effectiveness as the Canadian research further suggested that sub-threshold mental 
health symptoms were often associated with varying degrees of occupational impairment that 
may have benefited from intervention in order to restore effective functioning at work (Zamorski 
et al., 2011).  Of course, the problem of engagement with help does not end with stigma 
reduction, when military personnel do enter treatment, premature treatment cessation is 
problematic (Seal et al., 2010) although this seems to be more of a problem among older people 
(Sirey et al., 2001). 
 
Despite the alternatives listed above, the consensus view appears to be that there is a moderate to 
strong association between stigma/BTC and help-seeking.  Negative attitudes about the outcomes 
of mental health treatment and the causes of mental illness may be particularly important 
determinants of failure to engage in therapy among military personnel (Kim et al., 2011; Pietrzak 
et al., 2009).  Researchers have theorised that reduced help-seeking occurs when military 
personnel predict that seeking support will lead to being ostracised with an accompanying loss of 
social position, or that occupational restrictions might ensue (Langston et al., 2007).  The net 
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result may, therefore, be a potentially highly detrimental effect upon one’s military career and a 
loss of military standing.  Help-seeking inhibition appears to be particularly marked within 
certain occupational groups such as the military whose culture may unintentionally foster mental 
health stigmatisation (Britt and McFadden. 2012).  Fear of receiving treatment appears to be 
widespread (Kushner and Sher. 1989) and when coupled with a desire to overcome mental health 
problems without external support further acts to inhibit treatment seeking.  The latter is thought 
to be particularly strong in younger people (Gulliver et al., 2010) who constitute the bulk of 
military personnel.  Stigma/BTC may not always have a straightforward inhibiting effect; recent 
research suggests that military personnel frequently report negative views about mental health 
counselling but in some circumstances appear able to effectively override such beliefs in order to 
access care (Elnitsky et al., 2013). 
Components and Characteristics of Stigma/BTC 
 
Although not always easy to categorise, stigma/BTC can include self-imposed concepts such as 
viewing mental health symptoms as being somehow ‘self-induced’ and may incorporate rules 
such as not being allowed to admit to having a problem, which appears to be associated with a 
strong sense of pride, or needing to deal with difficulties oneself (Stecker et al., 2007) rather than 
utilising healthcare providers.  Indeed, self-management has been reported as the preferred 
mental health pathway for military personnel (Kim et al., 2011) and that the desire to self-
manage may be a component of the help-seeking decision making process that may rank 
alongside stigma/BTC as a help-seeking inhibitor.  Most mental health-related stigmatisation 
appears to fall into three broad categories (Rusch et al., 2014); self-stigma, related to self-
perception, which is the prejudice that people with mental illness internalise (Corrigan and 
Watson, 2002); public stigma, referring to the outside world (Pepin et al., 2009), which is 
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characterised by concerns about the reaction that the general population might have towards a 
person with mental illness and structural discrimination, which comprises rules and regulations 
in society that intentionally or unintentionally disadvantage people with mental illness.  Among 
the published studies, some report little or no association between help-seeking and public 
stigma (Golberstein et al., 2009), whereas others suggest that self-stigma may be a substantial 
determinant of help-seeking (Vogel et al., 2006); indeed, self-stigma has been reported in some 
studies to be the greatest contributing factor to both engaging in and continuing with mental 
health treatment (Schomerus et al., 2009).  To the three categories of stigma, a fourth element 
can be added which is related to practical barriers to care which have been cited as discrete 
impediments to help-seeking.  The possibility that mental health treatment might impact upon 
future employability and income is thought to be an important component of perceived BTC 
(Clement et al., 2012) and there is some suggestion that BTC may be related to socio-economic 
status, since income might influence such factors as practical transport arrangements, childcare 
and other aspects of affordability rather than stigmatisation per se (Alvidrez and Azocar, 1999). 
 
Military Stigma/BTC Interventions 
 
The military of many nations, including the UK, have sought to reduce stigma/BTC, mostly 
through group-based, public health activities such as psycho-education (Zinzow et al., 2012).  
Educational interventions often incorporate mixed media campaigns and peer support 
programmes (Ben-Zeev et al., 2012).  The effectiveness of adopting such approaches is at best 
mixed with some outcome studies reporting substantial and durable positive effects upon stigma-
related knowledge (Dalky, 2012), while others suggest that background levels of stigmatising 
beliefs remain largely unaffected (Abraham et al., 2010; Luty et al., 2007).  As a counter-point to 
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the overwhelming opinion that stigma should be reduced wherever possible, Osorio et al (2012) 
argue that stigma can sometimes help to foster military fortitude during deployment and there is 
some evidence that at times of increased exposure to potentially traumatic events, many people 
who choose not to seek help may well recover without formal treatment or therapy (Richards, 
1999).  Deployment may not therefore be the best circumstance in which to attempt stigma 
reduction.  Some personnel may not recover from reduced mental health; US forces in particular 
appear to be experiencing a substantial trend where for many, symptoms of PTSD become more 
frequent as time since deployment increases (Sundin et al., 2010), stigma/BTC reduction may be 
more crucial in such circumstances. 
 
The Use of Peer Support to Reduce Stigma 
 
One possible solution to overcoming stigma and engaging military personnel with support 
services is to use TRiM practitioners within a secondary preventative context to mitigate risk 
factors (Jones et al., 2003).  There is as yet no definitive or even strong evidence for a positive 
effect for peer support programmes upon either mental health or stigmatising beliefs.  Novel 
stigma-reduction strategies have been tried; the ‘One Shot – One Kill’ (OSOK) intervention, a 
military culture sensitive programme, sought to reduce stigma and improve help-seeking among 
320 personnel during their deployment to Iraq in 2008.  The outcome of the programme 
suggested that it improved rates of help-seeking among attendees although it was unclear 
whether stigma-reduction was directly responsible for this effect (Lunasco et al. 2010).  Other 
interventions for military personnel include integrating the stigma-reduction strategy into a 




The Difficulties of Reducing Stigma/BTC 
Stigma seems to be a substantial and resistant problem (Brown et al., 2011); however, it seems 
that it can be influenced by the attitudes and behaviour of middle tier military commanders who 
may have a central role to play in stigma reduction (Britt et al., 2012).  The available evidence 
appears to suggest that there is a complex interdependent relationship between stigma/BTC, the 
recognition of symptoms, the occupational and social impact of psychological symptoms and the 
prevailing level of mental health.  Furthermore, providing an effective occupational secondary 
prevention strategy focused on mental health is challenging as the available research suggests 
that people may often not recognise that they have a problem (Kessler, 2000).  Although an 
empirically derived link between stigma/BTC and prevailing mental health has been 
demonstrated, longitudinal studies are uncommon and it is difficult to know whether changes in 
mental state are associated with corresponding fluctuations in stigma/BTC over time (Zinzow et 
al., 2012).  Some military research suggests that self-stigmatisation is determined by current 
levels of subjective stress, substantial work overload and mental health symptoms (Britt et al., 
2008).  PTSD symptoms in particular have been cited as being strongly related to greater levels 
of perceived stigmatisation and reduced help-seeking (Ouimette et al., 2011).  The available 
research therefore suggests that the relationship between current mental health status, prevailing 
levels of Stigma/BTC and help-seeking is complex.  Furthermore, it appears that stigmatisation 
may differ in character to perceived barriers to care and each factor may well exert both 






Mental Health, Work and Sickness Absence 
 
As described earlier, reduced occupational fitness is commonplace among the UK working 
population with musculoskeletal conditions and common mental disorders cited as the main 
reasons for sickness absence from work (Henderson et al, 2005; Stansfield et al., 2011).  Military 
personnel, while carrying out a unique role are merely a product of the social milieu from which 
they are recruited.  In order to understand military tertiary prevention activities, it is important to 
examine the argument that many tertiary measures developed for the UK general population may 
apply to military personnel.  In a civilian context, poorer mental health status appears to increase 
the likelihood of sickness absence; UK studies suggest that employees with mental health 
conditions are twice as likely to be absent from work than those with physical health conditions 
(Black, 2008).  Although having a diagnosed health condition increases the likelihood of 
sickness absence, studies suggest that perceiving that one is ill is an additional vulnerability 
factor for sickness absence independent of a firm diagnosis (Henderson et al., 2013).  In a 
longitudinal study, baseline levels of mild to severe psychological distress predicted the award of 
a disability pension later in life (Rai at al., 2012) and more frequent sickness absence appeared to 
be predictive of future sub-optimal health including mental ill-health (Ferrie et al., 2011), more 
physical complaints and reduced ability to work (Gustafsson and Marklund, 2011).  The 
economic cost to employers of reduced occupational fitness and sickness absence is substantial 
(Goetzel et al., 2004) as is the financial burden upon individuals.  Absence from work on mental 
health grounds appears to be associated with long-term income poverty when compared to 
absenteeism related to acute or non-chronic general health conditions.  Furthermore, income 
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poverty continues to have a greater effect upon those who retire on mental health grounds 
compared to those retiring for other health reasons (Schofield et al., 2013a).  Those who retire 
early for reasons other than ill-health, as well as those in full-time and part–time employment, 
are all significantly less likely to experience income poverty than those who retire early due to 
all-cause ill-health (Schofield et al., 2013b).  Recognising the substantial health and economic 
impact of long-term sickness absence, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
published guidelines for managing work absence and incapacity (NICE, 2009).  The available 
data, therefore, suggests that among civilian populations, ill-health adversely impacts 
occupational functioning and creates a propensity to poverty; poor mental health may be 
particularly problematic in this regard. 
Although much of the available research relates to the civilian context, sickness absence affects 
UK AF personnel in a similar way to their civilian counterparts.  In order to maintain an 
optimally prepared fighting force, the UK AF manages those affected by mental health disorders 
within a unique occupational health framework described earlier in this chapter.  All military 
personnel are assigned a medical grading commensurate with any limitations arising from the 
state of their health (Braithwaite et al., 2009).  For mental health conditions, the grading reflects 
factors such as attentional impairment when carrying out safety critical tasks, the resupply of 
psychoactive medication during deployment and so forth.  Through the use of medical 
categorisation, the UK AF aim to retain personnel in appropriate work wherever possible, albeit 
in a sometimes modified way.  Medical restrictions can be imposed temporarily or can be made 
permanent in the case of chronic disorders which limit the ability to deploy, although this does 
not debar the person from carrying out some useful military role.  Occasionally a health 
condition is such that the affected person cannot perform any appropriate military role and, after 
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a careful review by a panel including occupational health professionals, they may be medically 
discharged from the UK AF.  In addition to work-role management, recommending short periods 
of sickness absence can be an option in the same way as in a civilian work context.  Such 
occupational health arrangements should theoretically provide the correct environment in which 
to deliver tertiary prevention through the initiation and monitoring of therapeutic interventions. 
Tertiary Prevention in a Military Context 
 
As noted above, there is a dearth of information about the effects of mental ill-health on military 
occupational functioning.  Although UK AF based research has been conducted, it is largely 
focused upon the association between PTSD and self-reported occupational impairment (Rona et 
al., 2009).  Direct objective measures of longitudinal occupational adjustment have been 
assessed in relation to UK Service personnel hospitalised with mental health problems (Jones et 
al., 2009), deployed UK mental health casualties (Jones et al 2010) and among reserve forces 
mental health casualties (Jones et al., 2011).  The only UK study examining mental health 
treatment for regular forces in a non-deployed setting measured short-term outcomes and did not 
provide longitudinal data (Gould et al., 2008). 
 
As a component of tertiary prevention, there is some evidence in various outcome studies that 
maintaining people affected by mental health symptoms in their place of work can be beneficial 
to psychological health, particularly among men (Cable et al., 2008).  The ability to retain people 
with mental health problems at work is often related to the supportive behaviour of supervisors 
(Neilsen et al., 2006) and also the occupational health and welfare support that the organisation 
chooses to put in place (Couse, 2008).  Some researchers caution that coming to work when sick 
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can negatively impact long-term mental health (Bergström
 
 et al., 2009).  This is sometimes 
referred to as ‘presenteeism’.  It seems that there is a careful balance to be struck between 
maintenance at work, which may benefit both the organisation and the individual and potential 
adverse consequences, which may compound negative productivity effects.  In a military context 
this is particularly important as military roles can involve exposure to combat and other stressful 
or even unpleasant tasks that can have profound psychological consequences.  For example, 
Israeli soldiers treated early for combat stress disorder (CSD) during the 1982 Lebanon war 
experienced poorer long-term mental health than a group who emerged from combat operations 
without mental health problems.  Furthermore, poorer mental health persisted in the CSD group 
for some time post-conflict (Benbenishty, 1991).  Tertiary prevention is mainly used when 
mental disorder has developed to alleviate symptoms and improve quality of life.  Even at this 
stage of prevention, transforming risk factors for further deterioration can be a target for 
intervention.  Whilst it is beneficial for line managers to actively support rehabilitation, tertiary 
prevention is mainly the responsibility of healthcare professionals (Cooper and Cartwright, 
1997).  Recent research suggests that adopting a tertiary preventative approach of this kind 
within a workplace context may help to prevent the further development of depressive symptoms 
(Ahola et al., 2012), though it appears less effective for general mental health complaints where 
it seems to be successful only when it is driven by a desire to return to work rather than with the 
objective of decreasing symptoms (van Oostrom, 2010). 
 
Deployment Mental Healthcare 
 
For military commanders, mental health is a necessary consideration if they are to promote 
occupational wellbeing during deployment where appropriately trained replacement personnel 
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may be at a premium.  Contemporary studies have explored the effectiveness of occupationally-
focused mental healthcare among UK Service personnel located in their home base before or 
after undertaking combat deployment (Gould et al., 2008; Iversen et al., 2009; Turner et al., 
2005; Jones et al., 2011) and some studies evaluate mental healthcare when military personnel 
are deployed on combat operations (Garber et al., 2012; Schmitz et al., 2012; Scott, 2005; 
McAllister et al., 2004). Although there is some suggestion that such care has a positive short-
term effect, the available research tends to focus exclusively on short-term outcomes, for 
instance, if a person returns to or remains at work during or after care.  The majority of 
deployment mental health research is conducted following deployment using retrospective self-
report data (Fear et al., 2010; Seal et al., 2009) or takes place after discharge from service (Seal 
et al., 2010; Zeiss and Karlin, 2008) and so lacks detail about what actually happened in the 
operational theatre. 
 
Although a broad range of treatment options are available, some aspects of military service 
appear to impact upon the choice of treatment modality.  Among clinicians delivering care to 
military personnel there is some evidence of a reluctance to prescribe medication as receipt of 
medication can affect access to weapons and engagement in safety critical tasks.  A review of 
tertiary prevention among Canadian military personnel suggested that 32.1% of those with a 
diagnosis of major depressive illness received antidepressant medication which the authors 
believe is probably an under-use of an available effective tertiary measure (Sanyal et al., 2011).  
During deployment in particular, minimising functional impairment is crucial to maintaining 
operational effectiveness and facilitating full engagement with the military occupational role.  In 
the deployed setting, prescribing psychoactive medication is problematic as it may impact on the 
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person’s ability to carry out their military role or even to remain in the operational area.  Other 
interpersonal therapy approaches are therefore required and the use of forward psychiatry 
principles may be a useful way of approaching mental health management.  There appear to be 
some disadvantages when adopting such an approach.  In a follow-up study of Israeli troops who 
suffered psychiatric disorder during a period of intense hostilities, some 18 months after the 
war’s end, the majority of mental health casualties were currently functioning well below pre-
war levels in their military role (Levav et al., 1979).  Other studies of mental health disorders 
occurring during military deployment confirm the finding that they contribute substantially to 
impaired general function (Eisen et al., 2012) and impaired functionality resulting from mental 
disorder has been linked to enduring adverse occupational effects in civilian studies (Henderson 
et al., 2011). 
 
Studying the effects of deployment mental healthcare is crucial as the timing and type of care can 
have long-lasting effects.  Analysing data from battlefield mental health treatment records 
gathered during the 1982 Lebanon war and making comparisons with historical data, Israeli 
research suggests that rates of mental health disorder were similar to those observed in other 
wars.  Emphasising the importance of early forward treatment, combat stress reaction (CSR) 
comprised 15 to 20% of the total casualties during the active phase of the war and treatment on 
the battlefield was more effective in returning soldiers to their units than treatment following 
airlift to a rear area (Noy et al., 1984).  In extended follow-up, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
personnel who developed CSR during deployment were vulnerable to poorer long-term mental 
health compared to those who did not experience psychological breakdown (Solomon et al., 
2005); however, IDF personnel who received mental healthcare for a CSR during deployment 
fared better in extended follow-up than individuals with CSR who did not obtain treatment.  
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Longitudinal studies of UK deployment mental healthcare are scarce, particularly those that 
assess the occupational consequences of such care. 
 
In the UK AF, to deliver tertiary prevention during operations, mental health professionals 
deploy as Field Mental Health Teams (FMHTs).  FMHTs practice occupationally focused 
‘forward psychiatry’ (Jones and Wessely. 2003) using the guiding principles of PIES (Jones et 
al., 2007)
 
where Proximity denotes treatment that should occur close to the battle area, 
Immediacy refers to early active treatment, Expectancy to engendering anticipation of recovery 
and return to duty (RTD) and Simplicity refers to the use of brief interventions aimed at restoring 
physical and psychological wellbeing.  In effect, PIES functions as a tertiary prevention tool 
during deployment.  Among the majority of UK AF personnel, mental disorders are non-
psychotic in nature and a range of evidence-based therapies and treatments are available that 
should help personnel afflicted by symptoms of common mental disorder to return to operational 
fitness.  Recent military research has tended to focus upon the management of PTSD yet both 
UK AF and international military research suggests that therapy for non-PTSD disorders should 
be a major focus of the treatment effort both in the deployed and non-deployed settings.  In a 
study of treatment seeking German soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and the Balkans, the most 
commonly diagnosed disorders were acute stress disorder and affective disorders rather than 
PTSD (Kowalski et al., 2012).  For deployed UK AF personnel, there is some positive evidence 
for tertiary prevention when therapy maintains symptomatic personnel in the workplace whilst 
offering support (Jones et al., 2010).  Research outcomes among other national military forces 
question whether a simple measure of maintenance within the current military role is an adequate 
index of the effectiveness of military mental health care (Levav et al., 1997).  Researchers have 
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suggested that there may be unforeseen negative consequences of deploying ‘forward psychiatry’ 
to promote presenteeism (Solomon and Benbenishty, 1986; Jones and Wessely, 2003; Solomon 
and Mikulincer, 2003) although some research suggests that outcomes are largely positive 
(Shlosburg and Strous, 2005). 
 
The only previous UK longitudinal study of occupational outcomes following treatment by the 
FMHT was carried out with personnel who were based in Iraq post-2003 using early discharge 
from the Armed Forces as a proxy mental health outcome.  The authors (Jones et al., 2010) 
concluded that organised mental health provision was effective in facilitating RTD although 
around a quarter of military personnel experienced a subsequent premature discharge from 
military service.  This form of discharge was characterised by exit from voluntary military 
service before the minimum elective service term had been completed.  Occupational fitness 
following mental health treatment may take many forms and is not necessarily restricted to 
premature separation from service in volunteer militaries.  Military indiscipline in particular, has 
been shown to be associated with mental ill-health (Brewin et al., 2012; Hawton et al., 2009), 
along with a number of other negative occurrences including lack of career progression and 
demotion in rank. 
 
Non-Deployed Tertiary Prevention 
 
In the non-deployed setting, UK AF personnel with suspected mental health conditions who 
consult primary care doctors can be referred for specialist assessment at a military Department of 
Community Mental Health (DCMH).  The DCMH provides both outpatient and peripatetic 
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clinics for military personnel serving in units within a defined catchment area.  Both initial 
assessments and ongoing care are delivered which includes the provision of evidence-based 
psychological therapies and/or the prescription of psychotropic medication.  Annually, only a 
small percentage of referrals (around 5%) require admission to hospital (Defence Statistics, 
2014), which currently can be arranged through a specific contractual arrangement with a 
network of UK National Health Service hospitals.  A central function of the DCMH is to 
contribute to the management of occupational fitness among military personnel suffering from 
mental disorders and other behavioural disturbances.  In a minority of cases, this may lead to 
managed discharge from the Armed Services on mental health grounds. 
Conclusion 
 
The results of the systematic review suggest that the three levels of prevention are difficult to 
identify and define as discrete processes and procedures within the scientific literature.  Rather, 
activity within the three levels of prevention has to be inferred from the characteristics of the 
particular intervention and its aims and objectives.  This proved to be a challenge when carrying 
out the literature review.  Furthermore, the quality of the literature is variable, with a minority of 
studies representing high level evidence such as randomised controlled trials, meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews while the majority of evidence comprises uncontrolled, non-randomised 
studies and observational data. 
 
Rationale for the Programme of Research 
 
Currently, the published scientific literature lacks a unifying account of how the primary, 
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secondary and tertiary prevention model relates to the stages of the military deployment cycle.  
There are gaps in the knowledge base concerning the effectiveness of the various components of 
medical, operational and welfare support as they are currently delivered to UK AF personnel as 
they transit from peacetime to the operational setting and back again.  There are no mental health 
outcome studies examining the mental health effects of both R&R and TLD and little is known 
about the effectiveness of clinical services delivered to UK military personnel with suspected 
mental disorder either in the deployed setting and particularly when they are preparing for 
deployment in their home base.  To avail themselves of psychological therapy, military 
personnel must first recognise their symptoms and then engage with clinical services.  The 
available literature suggests that help-seeking in a military context is infrequent and may be 
related to factors such as mental health stigmatisation, perceived barriers to care or failure to 
recognise that psychological symptoms constitute a problem requiring intervention. 
 
The main aim of the proposed research is therefore to examine the effectiveness of the various 
mental health support strategies which are currently in place for UK military personnel as they 
navigate the various stages of the deployment cycle.  In order to test the mental health impact of 
the various levels of prevention; primary, secondary and tertiary, this thesis will firstly examine 
the primary preventative mental health effects of R&R, command, general medical and welfare 
support in the operational area and TLD taken immediately post-deployment.  To test the 
specific effects of secondary prevention, the impact of mental health stigmatisation and 
perceived barriers to care upon help-seeking will be explored so that stigma-reduction strategies 
can be proposed.  Finally tertiary prevention will be explored by evaluating the effectiveness of 
clinical services as mediators of occupational fitness.  A series of detailed recommendations will 
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be produced about improving prevention activity.  Additionally, avenues for future research will 
be proposed.  Figure 1. Graphically depicts the stages of prevention which constitute the various 
areas of research and how these relate to the deployment cycle. 
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Figure 1. Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Prevention During the Military Deployment Cycle 
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Using a mixture of survey-based self-report and clinical interview-based data gathered from UK 
AF personnel as they prepared for, undertook and returned from operational deployment, a 
linked series of investigations were carried out which aimed to give a comprehensive account of 
the primary, secondary and tertiary preventative mental health measures currently utilised by UK 
AF military commanders.  The choice of preventative strategies to be investigated was 
predicated on the literature review which indicated that little or no empirical evaluation of the 
psychological effects of the various interventions had been completed among UK AF personnel 
to date.  Although each had different objectives, all of the interventions described in this thesis 
were concerned with the detection, prevention or treatment of military mental health problems 





To evaluate the effectiveness of primary prevention strategies, two distinct components of 
deployment related mental health support were investigated; firstly, the provision of a period of 
rest and recuperation taken during deployment and secondly, providing a period of structured 
rest as military personnel left the operational area.  The interventions were investigated with two 
main objectives.  Firstly, to evaluate whether taking a ten day period of rest & recuperation 
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(R&R) at home at some point during a six month operational deployment had any positive 
impact upon mental health and secondly, to investigate the psychological effects of attending a 
brief period of post-deployment structured rest known as third location decompression (TLD).  
This investigation also sought to establish whether attendance at TLD promoted better social re-
integration of Service personnel when they returned home. 
 
Although somewhat less well circumscribed and defined than R&R or TLD, general and family 
support provided by commanders, welfare support services and medical treatment services may 
well have had a part to play in directly influencing mental health levels and help-seeking for 
deployment-related and general psychological symptoms.  Although not a mental health 
intervention per se, general support of this kind may have helped to promote better psychological 
health by fostering circumstances in which mental health can either flourish or where remedial 
interventions can be accessed.  The third objective in relation to primary prevention was 
therefore to assess the effect upon help-seeking and mental health of three general support 
components, command, medical and welfare, as military personnel transitioned from preparation 






To investigate secondary prevention, surveys were conducted with two main objectives; firstly to 
estimate the extent of mental health symptoms among military personnel working in their home 
base whilst preparing for deployment, among personnel deployed and working overseas in the 
operational area and personnel who had completed their period of deployment and were 
returning to military steady state.  The aim was to better understand the extent to which mental 
health symptom detection measures may be required and what level of risk reduction might be 
necessary.  Having established the potential scope of the detection and risk-reduction 
requirement, the second objective came in two parts; firstly, to evaluate the potentially inhibiting 
effect of stigmatising beliefs about mental health and perceived barriers to care upon help-
seeking; secondly to attempt to describe in detail the relationship between stigmatisation, 
symptoms of probable mental disorder and help-seeking.  The reason for choosing stigma as a 
focus for research was that the detection of mental health symptoms must take place alongside 
remedial action which will hopefully restore those identified as requiring assistance to a state of 
mental health.  Sometimes this may require non-medical risk-reduction activity, but it may also 
encompass strategies to engage those affected by symptoms with therapy or treatment delivered 
by military medical services in order to return them to a mentally healthy state.  As described in 
the introduction to this thesis, one of the main theoretical obstacles to help-seeking is the 
presence of mental health stigmatisation.  Although understanding the influence of stigmatisation 
is important to secondary prevention, as it may well interfere with detection and risk reduction, it 
clearly crosses secondary and tertiary prevention boundaries since, if military personnel seek 
early support and or therapy for emerging symptoms, they may be less likely to develop formal 





To investigate tertiary prevention, two main objectives were established; firstly, to evaluate 
whether the provision of formal mental healthcare delivered in the non-deployed setting had any 
substantial effect in promoting both short and long term occupational fitness and secondly to 
assess the occupational impact of providing deployed clinical services to UK military personnel 
working in the operational area. 
 
Research Questions, Main Hypotheses and Methods 
 
By way of a series of investigations which took place in a variety of military settings, this 
programme of research sought to assess a number of key mental health prevention measures.  In 
relation to each level of prevention, primary, secondary and tertiary, a number of research 
questions were identified, hypotheses were generated and research methods were designed to 
evaluate them.  This chapter is intended to give a broad overview of the research questions, 
hypotheses and methods employed in each component of the research programme.  A detailed 
description of the use or adaptation of any survey items, outcome measures and any methods 
particular to the area of study is given in each of the chapters dealing with the component 
investigations. 
 
Rational for the use of Common Measures 
 
In order to ensure that similar mental health outcomes and general determinants of psychological 
health were being assessed within each component of the thesis and to allow for comparisons 
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across datasets, common scales, schedules or questionnaires were used wherever possible.  Each 
of the common measures related to dimensions of mental health, or aspects of military 
functioning such as leadership, morale or cohesion.  How and when they were utilised within 
each discrete study area is shown in Table 1.  The cut-off points and adaptations used to 
delineate mental health caseness or substantial effects for each measure varied by study and are 
described in detail in later chapters.  Additional measures were selected for their capacity to 




Table 1. Thesis Outcome Measures 
MEASURE 
STUDY AREA & CHAPTER 






































































































































































































































































Common Mental Disorder Symptoms GHQ-12 GHQ-12 GHQ-12 GHQ-12 GHQ-12 
Multiple Physical Symptoms  52 Items    
Alcohol Use *Audit-10 Audit-10 Audit-C Audit-10  
Global Health (Short Form 36) One Question One Question   One Question 
†Mental Health Stigmatisation and Barriers to Care 
  Stigma 11 Items Stigma 8 Items 
Stigma 13 
Items 
Discrimination (Reported/Intended Behaviour Scale)   4 Items   
Leadership    4 Items 4 Items 
Morale     4 Items 
Cohesion     4 Items 
Functional Impairment (Short Form 36) One Question    One Question 
R&R Experiences and Satisfaction Bespoke Scale     
Combat Experiences Scale ***17 Items  **13 Items  **17 Items **17 Items 
Fear of Death or Injury One Question     
Readjustment upon return home  4 Items    
Modifications: 
 
*Two separate measures modified to assess the usual pre-deployment level of alcohol use and the level of alcohol use during R&R only. 
**Seven items were retained from the original scale and the following items were amended to take account of language differences, specific current aspects of combat and difference in military techniques, 
tactics and procedures: 
Items amended or deleted: being attacked or ambushed; responsibility for enemy combatant deaths; responsibility for non-combatant deaths; seeing human remains; seeing dead Americans; mine-
clearing operations; seeing ill or injured civilians; experiencing a ‘close call’ and hand-to-hand combat. 
Items inserted or amended to: giving aid to the wounded; experiencing a landmine strike; experiencing civilian hostility; Improvised Explosive Device strike; encountering sniper fire and not being 
able to respond to threats because of prevailing rules of engagement. 
***Likert scale removed and replaced with a present/absent response scale.  The modified 13 item scale was further amended to take account of the current combat mission in Afghanistan at the time of the 
study.  Amended items included: a missile landed nearby but failed to explode; equipment shot off or saved by protective equipment; close quarter battle with a fixed bayonet; personally wounded or injured 
and saw sick or ill women or children but unable to help. 




General Measures of Mental Health and Military Functioning: 
 
1.  The intensity and extent of combat and operational exposure was assessed with variations 
of the 18 item combat and operational events scale developed for use among US Forces 
(Hoge et al., 2004).  Modifications to the original scale were undertaken to account for 
differences in the way that US and UK forces execute combat operations, language 
differences and items that became more or less relevant over the period of protracted combat 
deployments.  The response scale consisted of five options which reflected increasing 
frequency of exposure.  Responses were scored from 0 (no exposure) to five (exposure on 10 
or more occasions).  The amendments and modifications are shown in the Table 1 footnotes.  
The exposure scale is shown in full in the deployment mental health support survey in 
appendix 2. 
 
2.  Symptoms of common mental disorder (CMD) were measured using the 12 item General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ12) (Goldberg et al., 1997).  A psychometrically derived cut-off 
point was used to detect possible ‘caseness’ on this scale, where caseness indicated the 
potential presence of symptoms of mental health disorder.  Each of the GHQ-12 scale items 
were rated on a four point scale, which generated item scores of 0, 0, 1 and 1 respectively.  
Scores were summated to give a potential range of scores from 0 to 12.  A score of 4 or more 
indicated probable caseness levels of CMD. 
 
3.  Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms were assessed using the Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder Checklist Civilian Version (PCL-C) (Weathers et al., 1994).  The PCL-C has 
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17 items which were each rated using a five point scale.  Each item was scored from one to 
five representing increasing symptom intensity to give a minimum score of 17 and a 
maximum of 85.  Cut off scores ≥50 indicated probable caseness on this measure.  The 
civilian rather than the military version of this scale was included in the various studies as it 
is the most commonly employed measure of PTSD in military research and would allow for 
comparisons to be made with both UK and international studies.  In the non-deployed help-
seeking study, the four item Primary Care PTSD scale (PC-PTSD) (Prins et al., 2004) was 
used to decrease the length of the survey and the associated burden upon respondents.  
Possible PTSD caseness on this measure was indicated by the presence of three or more 
symptoms. 
 
4.  Self-rated general health was assessed with one question from the Medical Outcomes 
Study (MOS) 36-Item Short Form Health Survey (SF36) (Mc Horney et al., 1993, Ware and 
Sherbourne, 1992).  To assess subjective perceptions of health, a variable was generated for 
all studies that used the measure where individuals rating their health as fair or poor were 
compared with those rating their health as good, very good or excellent. 
 
5.  To assess functional impairment, one item from the MOS SF36 gauged the impact of 
mental health symptoms upon day-to-day functioning (Ware and Sherbourne, 1992).  This 
measure has been used in military studies to examine the impact of mental health symptoms 
upon personnel who perform safety critical tasks such as improvised explosive device 
detection, flying aircraft or providing medical support (Rona et al., 2009).  For all studies, a 
binary variable was generated for the question ‘If you experienced any [mental health 
problems] how difficult have these problems made it for you to do your work, take care of 
things or get along with other people?’  Those reporting little or no impairment were 
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compared with those reporting that their difficulties were causing greater levels of 
impairment. 
 
6.  Where alcohol use and its effects were measured, these were assessed with the 10 item 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT)
 
(Babor et al., 2001).  The AUDIT is a 
validated questionnaire which indicates potentially hazardous, harmful and dependent levels 
of alcohol use.  Responses were given to a 5-point scale which generated scores ranging from 
0 to 4 for each of the 10 scale items thus yielding a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 
40.  Scores ≥8 were used to indicate potentially hazardous alcohol use and scores of 16 or 
more indicated alcohol use that is potentially harmful to health.  In one study, a three item 
variation, the AUDIT-C (Bush et al., 1998) was used decrease the burden of completing the 
survey for participants by reducing the length and complexity of the survey.  The AUDIT-C 
is brief validated screening instrument used to identify potential alcohol use disorders using 
the first three questions of the 10 item AUDIT (Bush et al., 1998). 
 
7.  Multiple Physical Symptoms (MPS) were measured using a 53 item symptom checklist first 
used in a cohort study of Gulf War veterans (Ismail et al., 1999) (Unwin et al., 1999) which 
was refined and used in phase one of the KCMHR cohort study of military personnel (Hotopf 
et al 2006).  Cases of Multiple Physical Symptoms (MPS) were defined as the endorsement 
of 18 or more out of 53 symptoms representing the top decile of responses in phase 1 of the 




8.  Stigmatising beliefs about mental health, help-seeking and barriers to care were assessed 
using adapted versions of a 13 item measure developed for use in US military research (Hoge 
et al., 2004).  The measure has subsequently been used in various forms when assessing help-
seeking and potential barriers to care among UK military personnel (Osorio et al., 2012).  
Items comprising the 13 item version of the stigma scale were: 
 
• Members of my unit might have less confidence in me 
• My unit leaders might treat me differently 
• I would be seen as weak by those who are important to me 
• Seeking help would be too embarrassing 
• If I sought help it would harm my career 
• People with mental illness should not be given any responsibility 
• I would think less of a team member if they receive MH care 
• There would be difficulty getting time off of duty 
• My visit would not remain confidential 
• I don’t know where to get help 
• I don’t trust mental health professionals 
• My leaders discourage the use of MH services 
• I have had previous bad experience of MH professionals 
 
The response format and scoring method for the stigma scale varied by study and the strategy 
particular to each area of study is dealt with separately in each study chapter. 
 
9.  Reported and Intended Behaviour Scale (RIBS) 
 
An abbreviated version of the Reported and Intended Behaviour Scale (RIBS) was used 
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(Evans-Lacko et al., 2011).  Each scale item was endorsed using a five point Likert scale, 
indicating strength of agreement, scores of one indicated no agreement, representing high 
levels of potential discrimination, scores of three were neutral and scores of five indicated 
complete agreement, representing low potential discrimination.  The four scale items were: 
 
1. ‘I would live with someone with a mental health problem’. 
2. ‘I would work with someone with a mental health problem’. 
3. ‘I would live nearby someone with a mental health problem’. 
4. ‘I would continue a relationship with someone with a mental health problem’. 
 
The strategy for dealing with this scale is described in detail in the chapter describing the 
non-deployed help-seeking study. 
 
10.  Leadership was assessed using a four item measure developed for use among US military 
personnel (Castro et al., 1998, Castro and McGurk, 2004, Wright et al., 2009).  This scale 
assesses perceptions of four dimensions of leader behaviour using a single question for each 
item.  Responses were given to a five item Likert scale.  The response options were never, 
seldom, sometimes, often and always and were allocated ascending scores; items one and two 
were reverse scored.  For some studies where the measure was used, a binary variable was 
generated where the endorsement of three or more of the leader behaviours represented high 
levels of leadership and two or fewer indicated lower levels.  The items comprising the 
leadership scale were: 
 
(Stem question) ‘During this deployment, my leaders…’ 
• Embarrass unit members in front of others 
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• Accept extra unit duties in order to impress their seniors 
(Stem question)  ‘During this deployment, my leaders…’ 
• Treat all members of the unit fairly 
• Show concern about the safety of unit members 
 
11.  Cohesion was assessed using a four item measure developed for use among military 
personnel (Wright et al., 2009).  Responses were rated using a five item Likert scale ranging 
from strongly disagree through disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree and strongly agree.  
Responses were rated using a five item Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree through 
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree and strongly agree using an ascending scoring 
format.  The cohesion variable transformations used the same method as that used with the 
leadership variable.  The chosen method is described in chapters dealing with individual 
studies.  The items that comprised the cohesion scale were: 
• I feel a sense of comradeship with others in my unit 
• I am able to go to most people in my unit with a personal problem 
• My seniors are interested in what I do or think 
• I feel well informed about unit matters 
 
12.  Morale was assessed using a four item measure.  The morale scale was scored and 
transformed in the same manner as the cohesion scale.  The items that comprised the morale 
scale were: 
• Morale within the unit has generally been high 
• The unit has been motivated and enthusiastic 
• The unit has been operating efficiently 




The leadership, morale and cohesion scales are shown in the deployment health survey 
(Appendix 2). 
Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Study Measure 
 
R&R relates to a period of leave taken by many but not all military personnel during a 
protracted period of operational deployment.  It is thought to be helpful as a mental health 
support measure but has never been evaluated in relation to this theoretical function.  As no 
measures of R&R experiences exist, a measure was generated for the study and the process of 
constructing the measure is described in the chapter dealing with the rest and recuperation 
study.  The scale is shown in full in appendix 2. 
 
For the deployed and non-deployed healthcare studies, no psychometric scales were used.  
Instead, real-world measures of occupational outcome were used.  These are described in the 
chapter dealing with the studies. 
 
General Analysis Strategy 
 
For each of the research areas, categorical variables, including socio-demographic, 
operational and military characteristics, mental health factors and variables were initially 
explored using Pearson’s chi squared (χ
2
) test to establish significant associations.  The 
minimum level of statistical significance was maintained at p≤0.05 throughout. 
 
Investigation of significant associations was carried out using univariable and multinomial 
logistic regression to generate odds ratios (ORs) with 95% confidence intervals (CI).  ORs 
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and CIs were adjusted for a range of potential confounding variables that were selected a 
priori for their known or hypothesised association with the independent variables under 
investigation.  Additional analyses were based upon the characteristics of the variables being 
explored and are summarised in the sections dealing with each of the thesis components 
below and in detail in each of the study chapters. 
 
In some studies, variables were rank ordered using the results of the Wald test statistic and 
associated significance level.  The Wald test is a method used for testing the significance of 
explanatory variables within a statistical model.  In each instance where it was used, the test 
statistic and associated p value is shown. 
 
In the instances where correlations were assessed, as data were not normally distributed and 
could not be transformed to a normal distribution, Spearman’s rho was used to assess 
variables of interest. 
 
Thesis Study Elements 
 
Each of the proposed study components were carefully assessed for their feasibility prior to 
embarking on the programme of research and were designed to test each component of 
prevention, namely, primary prevention (prevent), secondary prevention (detect) and tertiary 
prevention (treat).  The main aim of the thesis was to evaluate a prevention component 
during each of the three phases of deployment, namely pre, during and post-deployment.  
Some study components spanned the phases of the deployment cycle and the theoretical 
boundaries of prevention activity.  A graphical representation of the proposed programme of 
study is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Thesis Components Overview 
 
 Prevent Detect Treat 
Pre-Deployment    
Deployment    
Post Deployment    
 
Studies Comprising the Thesis 
 
Chapter 4 - Primary Prevention During Deployment - Rest and Recuperation (R&R) 
 
The first research question related to the potential primary preventative mental health effects 
of taking a period of R&R during operational deployment.  The hypothesis tested was that 
symptoms of common mental disorder (CMD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
would be similar among military personnel about to embark upon a period of R&R to those 
reported by personnel as they finished their R&R.  The secondary objective of this study was 
to describe the factors which were statistically significantly associated with dependent 
variables which included mental health symptoms and alcohol misuse.  Independent variables 
included operational exposures, socio-demographic factors, deployment and military 
characteristics and R&R experiences identified through principle component analysis which 























Family, Welfare & 
Medical Support Study 
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The mental health measures used in this study were a modified AUDIT-10, the GHQ-12, 
PCL-C and two single questions relating to perceived global health and impairment arising 
from mental health disorder symptoms.  The modifications to the AUDIT are described in the 
chapter dealing with the R&R study.  In addition to gathering socio-demographic and military 
characteristic information, the survey contained a modified combat exposure scale assessing 
17 operational experiences and an additional single question regarding perceptions of 
impending death or serious injury. 
 
Principle component analysis (PCA) was conducted to further reduce the R&R experiences 
scale to key constituents so that associations between the PCA derivatives, representing 
discrete aspects of R&R, and the mental health outcome measures could be assessed.  The 
associations between independent categorical variables, including socio-demographic, 
operational and military characteristics, mental health, and ratings of R&R experiences were 
assessed using the general analysis strategy described at the beginning of this section.  The 
measures used in this study are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Chapter 5 - Primary Prevention Immediately Post-Deployment - Third Location 
Decompression (TLD) 
The second research question related to the primary preventative mental health effects of 
immediate post-operational mental health support; the question was, does TLD have a 
beneficial effect upon mental health and does it help to improve psycho-social re-adjustment 
following return from deployment?  Two research hypotheses were tested; first, personnel 
attending TLD following operational deployment would report similar levels of symptoms of 
CMD, PTSD, global health, multiple physical symptoms and would experience similar levels 
of alcohol misuse to personnel who did not attend TLD.  The second hypothesis was that 
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personnel attending TLD would experience similar levels of psycho-social re-integration 
upon return to their home base to those who do not attend TLD. 
 
Hypotheses were tested by comparing mental health and post-deployment re-adjustment 
outcomes among a group of military personnel who received the TLD intervention with those 
in a no intervention group.  To achieve this, data gathered as part of the ongoing military 
cohort study conducted by the King’s Centre for Military Health Research (Hotopf et al., 
2006, Fear et al., 2010) were examined.  A sub-section of the cohort survey asked whether 
personnel had attended TLD or not when it was available.  With sample weights applied, the 
profile of the initial sample was broadly representative of UK AF personnel who were in 
service at the time of the deployment to Iraq in 2003 and a later sample was broadly 
representative of those personnel who were in service as continued deployment to Iraq or 
Afghanistan took place.  It was therefore possible to make tentative extrapolations from 
research findings based on these samples and the whole UK military force.  The TLD study 
compared the responses of those who provided data at both the initial and follow-up survey 
points.  Preliminary exploration of the datasets suggested that at least 2500 subjects were 
suitable for inclusion in the TLD study. 
 
In addition to the standard mental health measures, social re-adjustment was assessed using 
four directly relevant questions relating to potentially problematic homecoming extracted 
from 11 questions contained in the KCMHR cohort survey which enquired about repatriation 
experiences.  The ‘re-adjustment scale’ is described in detail in the methods section of the 
TLD study chapter.  To assess the psychological effect of the intensity and extent of 
operational experiences, the study sample was stratified by combat exposure level which was 
generated from the 13 item version of the combat experiences scale. 
96 
 
The TLD study used observational data collected primarily for a large epidemiology study 
rather than for intervention studies.  This restricted the ability to infer whether TLD had 
differential effects among those attending or not attending TLD.  The gold standard in any 
intervention study is the use of randomisation and a control condition, however, such 
procedures were not feasible as TLD was mandated for the vast majority of personnel 
returning from Afghanistan at the time that the study was proposed.  A procedure has been 
developed to allow for observational data to be analysed in such a way that some 
characteristics of a randomised controlled trial are mimicked and inferences about the 
contribution of an intervention to an outcome can be made.  Propensity score matching is 
such a procedure which can only be implemented when a dataset is fully or almost fully 
populated.  As the TLD dataset was well populated with few missing fields, propensity score 
matching was used to pseudorandomise data in order to minimise potential sources of bias.  A 
detailed description of the use of propensity score matching and the subsequent analysis 
strategy is given in the TLD study chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 - Primary Prevention During Deployment - The Mental Health Effects of 
Pre-Deployment Mental Health Briefing, Command, Family, Medical and Welfare 
Support 
 
The third research question related to elements of primary and secondary prevention activity 
carried out during deployment.  In this context, primary prevention took the form of pre-
deployment preparation and subsequent command, medical, family and welfare support; 
medical and command support encompassed elements of secondary prevention.  The research 
question related to the effectiveness of three distinct support components; firstly, what were 
the mental health effects of receiving psycho-education in the form of a stress management 
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briefing prior to deployment?  Secondly, are levels of psychological health measured during 
deployment related to general medical support, perceived provision of support for families at 
home and welfare activity?  Thirdly, is there a psychological benefit to be gained from 
experiencing effective command exemplified by good leadership while deployed on 
operations?  Three main hypotheses were tested; firstly, levels of CMD and PTSD would be 
similar amongst personnel who received a pre-deployment mental health psycho-educational 
brief and those that did not.  Secondly, mental health effects would be similar among those 
who perceived that their families received satisfactory levels of support provision while they 
were deployed versus those personnel who perceived that their families received inadequate 
or no support.  Thirdly, psychological outcomes would be similar among those who rated 
their leader’s behaviour in a positive manner and those who perceived that their leaders were 
less effective during deployment. 
 
A combined dataset derived from two surveys conducted whilst personnel were deployed in 
Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011 was analysed.  Preliminary examination of the two datasets 
suggested that there were sufficient similarities among the variables to allow for a direct 
comparison between the two periods of deployment and to provide for a robust evaluation of 
the various primary prevention strategies using the combined dataset while adjusting for the 
year that data were collected.  Mental health outcomes were compared using various support 
components as independent variables and a range of socio-demographic, military and 
deployment factors as potential confounding variables.  Both surveys utilised the core mental 
health measures including the GHQ-12 and the PCL-C which represented the dependent 
variables.  Functional impairment, subjective global health and stigma were also assessed.  
Operational exposure was measured using a modified 17 item version of the combat 
experiences scale.  Subjective impression of leadership, morale and cohesion was assessed 
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using the standard four item measures.  Pre-deployment preparation in the form of receipt of 
a stress management brief, perceptions of family support at home and actual use of deployed 
medical and welfare support were all assessed with single questions.  The various methods of 
transforming, summating, or categorising responses to the various scales are described in the 
chapter detailing the deployment mental health support study. The scales utilised in the study 
are summarised in Table 1. 
 
The operational datasets were powered using known prevalence rates for common mental 
disorder among military personnel measured using the GHQ-12.  The surveys aimed to detect 
a common mental disorder symptom prevalence of 18-22% with a confidence level of 95% 
among 15% of the military force deployed in Afghanistan at the time that the two surveys 
were to take place.  To achieve this, a minimum sample size of 733 members of the deployed 
force was required; approximately 1400 personnel were sampled during the first survey and 
just under 1400 personnel during the second. 
 
A standard approach to analysis was taken where chi squared tests were initially conducted to 
explore the datasets.  Unadjusted and adjusted univariable and multi variable logistic 
regression was then used to further explore significant associations.  Dependent variables 
included being a mental health case on either the PTSD or CMD measure using the standard 
cut-off scores, subjectively experiencing poorer or better subjective global health, greater vs. 
lesser functional impairment and lesser vs. greater levels of stigma and perceived barriers to 
care related to mental health and help-seeking.  In addition to the year of deployment, 
predictor variables were adjusted for a range of potential confounding variables which are 
described in detail in the chapter dealing with this study.  Trends in the data were examined 
using chi-Squared (χ
2
) test for trend. 
99 
 
Chapter 7 - Secondary Prevention in the Non-Deployed Setting – Mental Health 
Stigmatisation, Symptoms and Help-Seeking  
 
The fourth area of research related to secondary prevention and sought to identify the main 
factors associated with seeking support or help for mental health difficulties in a non-
deployed setting; the non-deployed setting in this case relates to the period of re-constitution 
and training undertaken in the home garrison prior to further periods of operational activity.  
The specific research question was whether actual help-seeking and interest in receiving help 
was related to prevailing beliefs about mental health and seeking support.  The hypothesis 
tested was that levels of help-seeking in a non-deployed setting would be similar among 
military personnel reporting higher levels of perceived stigmatisation regarding mental 
health, help-seeking and related barriers to care (stigma/BTC) to those reporting lower levels 
of stigma/BTC.  The secondary aim of the research was to define the role of current mental 
health symptoms in modulating the decision to seek help.  The intention was to generate 
recommendations for improving the engagement of military personnel with psychological 
symptoms with potential sources of help. 
 
An intervention study provided secondary data for this element of the thesis, however, 
evaluating help-seeking, stigmatisation and mental health was always a planned secondary 
objective of the primary trial.  Data were provided by a randomly chosen sample of Army 
personnel participating in a comparative study assessing the impact of a stigma reduction 
strategy using a comedy show as the means of delivery.  The help-seeking and related 
questions were embedded in the baseline element of the comparative study to facilitate an 
evaluation of changes in help-seeking pre- and post-intervention.  During the initial study 
design, the questions were crafted in such a way that secondary data could be generated to 
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assess levels of current help-seeking and their relationship to a range of beliefs about mental 
health.  The main outcome measure used in the evaluation of the stigma reduction 
intervention was the stigmatisation and barriers to care scale described in the thesis 
introduction.  A stigma/BTC frequency of around 60% has been demonstrated among 
military personnel in previous studies (Osorio et al., 2012) and the intervention study was 
powered to detect a post-intervention change of plus or minus 5% in the rate of reporting one 
or more stigma scale item(s) with 95% confidence among 212 subjects in the intervention 
arm.  There was an intervention and a control group in the comparative study and the final 
sample size was comprised of 484 personnel who provided comprehensive baseline data prior 
to the intervention.  Only the baseline data were used in this thesis component, so the 
intervention did not introduce a potential source of bias into the current study.  A cross-
sectional design was chosen as the stigma reduction intervention had a significant anti-stigma 
effect both post-intervention and at follow-up in the primary trial.  Furthermore, the study 
samples undertook operational deployment before the planned follow-up assessment and 
response rates were quite low.  A second stigma/BTC and help-seeking study, which is 
described below, used post-deployment data to provide longitudinal outcomes for this thesis. 
 
As the outcome measures for the intervention study were extensive, brief survey measures 
were chosen wherever possible to reduce the bulk of the survey in order to make completion 
less onerous for participants.  After enquiring about socio-demographic, military and 
operational characteristics, current levels of alcohol use were assessed with the three item 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT-C)’.  For this study, symptoms of PTSD 
were assessed using the four item PC-PTSD and symptoms of CMD were assessed with the 
standard measure, the GHQ-12.  To gain an in-depth understanding of military personnel’s 
view of their personal role in managing psychological symptoms and whether they viewed 
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themselves as having responsibility for their mental health, further questions that have been 
shown to be important in previous research were added to the modified 11 item version of the 
standard stigma/BTC scale and are described in full in the non-deployed help-seeking 
chapter.  Other questions related to interest in receiving support and actual help-seeking 
activity.  Potential discriminatory beliefs relating to mental illness were assessed using the 
reported and intended discrimination scale (RIBS) (Evans-Lacko et al., 2011).  Help-seeking 
behaviours, help-seeking intentions and interest in receiving support were assessed using 
multiple questions.  Comparisons were made between those seeking help from medical and 
non-medical sources.  The effects of mental health stigmatisation, perceived barriers to care 
and potential mental health-related discrimination upon rates of help-seeking were evaluated. 
 
The standard analytic strategy was used to evaluate study data, however, in addition to 
assessing the effects of a range of independent variables using chi squared tests, unadjusted 
and adjusted regression analyses, a receiver operating characteristic curve was generated 
using current study participant’s AUDIT-C responses and the responses of a large 
representative sample of military personnel who had completed the ten item AUDIT to 
establish the optimal cut-off score for the abbreviated alcohol measure used in the current 
study. 
 
Chapter 8 - Secondary Prevention in the Early Period Following Return from 
Deployment - Mental Health Stigmatisation, Symptoms and Help-Seeking. 
 
The fifth research question related to secondary prevention which was assessed in a sample of 
personnel who had recently returned from operational deployment, a later phase of the 
deployment cycle.  The research question posed in this element of the thesis was similar to 
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that asked in the non-deployed setting, however, help-seeking activity, intention to access 
support and the psychological effects of stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care were 
evaluated on the first day after leaving the operational deployment area and participants 
completed further follow-up measures some six months later.  Given the longitudinal nature 
of the dataset, the hypothesis tested was that symptoms of probable mental disorder would be 
similar among those reporting higher and lower levels of stigma/BTC at both assessment 
points.  The second research question was whether levels of stigma/BTC would have any 
substantial effect upon help-seeking behaviour. 
 
For this study element, data were examined which had been provided by approximately 1600 
personnel who took part in a randomised controlled trial of a post-deployment mental health 
intervention after having deployed to Afghanistan in 2008 to 2009.  In addition to a sub-
section measuring the main effects of the intervention study, discrete sub-sections of the 
survey dealt with help-seeking behaviour and intent and mental health stigmatisation and 
barriers to care.  Changes in levels of stigmatisation over the follow-up period were 
compared in those developing new mental health symptoms, in those entering remission, and 
among personnel who maintained minimal symptoms or none at all.  The effect of varying 
levels of psychological symptoms and stigma/BTC upon help-seeking behaviour and intent 
were assessed. 
 
Mental health outcome measures for this thesis element were representative of the standard 
array described above.  A modified 8 item mental health stigmatisation and barriers to care 
scale and the standard mental health measures were used, namely the GHQ-12 and PCL-C; 
all of these measures were administered at baseline and follow-up.  The stigma/BTC scale 
modifications are detailed in the chapter describing this study element.  Personnel were asked 
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to respond to a single question which asked if they had experienced a stressful, emotional, 
relationship or family problem at any time either during deployment or following the return 
home.  They were further asked if they had sought help for any such problems and about the 
source of any support provided.  Perceived alcohol problems were assessed at follow-up only, 
at which time the AUDIT-10 was administered.  Personnel were not asked about alcohol use 
at the initial post-deployment evaluation as alcohol use is forbidden during deployment. 
 
The analysis strategy used exploratory chi squared tests and adjusted univariable and 
multinomial logistic regression analyses to assess whether changes in mental health status 
were associated with corresponding changes in stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care 
over the follow-up period and whether either impacted upon help-seeking behaviour, interest 
or intent. 
 
Chapter 9 - Tertiary Prevention - Occupational Fitness and Clinical Care in the 
Deployed Setting 
 
Data for the deployed clinical study were gathered during mental health assessments over a 
period of four years.  The assessments were conducted among UK AF personnel referred to 
the deployed Field Mental Health Team (FMHT) for psychological evaluation while serving 
in Afghanistan.  Following in-depth mental health interviews, clinicians recorded their initial 
findings in an electronic database along with subsequent clinical input and whether the 
referred person returned to their deployed unit or if they were evacuated home.  Mental 
disorder categories were derived from in-depth clinical assessments rather than through the 
administration of psychometric scales and measures. 
 
To assess the effects of tertiary prevention among deployed personnel, both short and longer-
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term occupational fitness rates following assessment and or clinical care were evaluated.  
Study subjects were military personnel who either became mentally unwell during their 
period of deployment or were referred when their behaviour gave cause for concern to those 
around them.  Based upon the outcomes described in a previous study of deployment mental 
healthcare (Jones et al., 2010) two research questions were generated.  The first related to 
short-term occupational fitness and sought to assess whether management by the FMHT, 
using the principles of forward psychiatry
1
, could return around three quarters of personnel to 
their operational unit where they would remain to complete their operational tour.  The 
second research question related to longer-term occupational fitness, where it was 
hypothesised that, based upon previous study findings, around three quarters of military 
personnel treated by deployed military mental health teams would continue to experience full 
occupational fitness at any time during the four years following their return from deployment.  
Secondary objectives were firstly, to evaluate the occupational effects of being referred by 
way of a range of sources.  Self-initiated or chaplain referrals were deemed to represent an 
easier and less occupationally risky pathway into mental healthcare than the route associated 
with consulting a welfare provider, military doctor or commander
2
.  Secondly, the study 
sought to describe the predictors of reduced longer-term occupational fitness following 
completion of mental health assessment or therapy. 
 
Following mental health assessment, demographic and military data, referral source, 
subsequent treatment and short-term occupational outcome were recorded in the deployment 
electronic database.  Specific areas were assessed, such as aspects of the operational 
environment, adjustment to being deployed and self-reported combat exposure.  In order to 
assess whether the clinical sample had any unique properties, the characteristics of personnel 
                                                           
Forward Psychiatry relates to the practice of providing mental health treatment as close to the place of work as possible and utilises the 
principles of proximity (treatment close to the military unit), immediacy (treatment initiation as soon as practically possible, expectancy 
(creating the expectation of an early return to the workplace) and simplicity, which relates to the delivery of uncomplicated interventions. 
2 Military doctors and unit commanders can impose functional restrictions upon personnel who they deem to be a substantial workplace risk. 
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referred to the FMHT were compared with whole force personnel characteristics.  To 
determine longer-term occupational outcome over a four year period, data linkage was 
carried out under an ethically approved data sharing agreement between the clinical dataset 
and markers of occupational functioning recorded in a personnel database maintained by 
Defence Statistics, an organisation that compiles personnel and other military data that can be 
made available for research purposes.  The occupational markers are described in detail in the 
chapter dealing with this study.  To broaden the assessment of occupational functioning, 
indirect indicators of poorer military occupational functioning were examined, including 
serious disciplinary infringements and discharge from the Armed Forces; positive outcomes 
were assessed including deployment on combat operations and promotion following the 
mental health intervention.  
 
Among approximately 550 referrals around 90% of the clinical records contained a 
documented short-term occupational fitness marker and following data linkage, longer-term 
occupational outcome markers were available for around 80% of referrals. 
 
The standard analytic strategy for categorical data was employed using exploratory chi 
squared tests with unadjusted and adjusted logistic regression to explore significant 
associations among the data and trends in the data over time were examined using chi 
squared (χ2) tests for trends. 
 
Chapter 10 Tertiary Prevention - Occupational Fitness following Clinical Care in the 
Non-Deployed Setting 
 
The final research question related to tertiary prevention which took the form of 
106 
 
psychological assessment and treatment delivered to military personnel in the non-deployed 
setting.  The study sought to establish the occupational impact of providing mental health 
assessment and/or clinical care to military personnel who develop potential mental disorder 
symptoms or behavioural disturbances while working in their home base.  As described 
earlier, occupational functioning was chosen as an outcome as this is a routinely recorded, 
real-world marker of an individual’s general functioning.  Occupational data are regularly 
gathered over a protracted period of time, whereas mental health measures were not available 
for all participants and when collected, they were entered into different systems using varying 
methods and formats.  Occupational measures therefore represented a consistent, standardised 
outcome. 
 
Based upon published rates of return to duty among military mental health patients, the 
hypotheses to be tested in the non-deployed setting were that clinical intervention delivered 
by military mental health services would return at least 75% of personnel referred with 
mental health problems to work with no medical restrictions (Gould et al., 2007).  Secondly, 
mental health treatment delivered by military clinicians in a non-deployed setting would 
promote long-term occupational fitness for role in around 80% of personnel (RAF Health 
Report, 2013).  The secondary objective was to describe the predictors of both short and 
longer-term occupational fitness following discharge from military mental healthcare. 
 
Occupational fitness was represented by the individual’s medical employment standard, 
which is assessed by a doctor and governs a military person’s employability in the context of 
any prevailing health conditions.  As described in the thesis introduction , it is a marker of the 
ability to deploy given the current state of an individual’s mental and physical health.  In 
addition to medically imposed restrictions, discharge from service for medical reasons was 
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incorporated into this category.  In the non-deployed setting, occupational fitness was 
assessed and recorded upon discharge from clinical care conducted in military departments of 
community mental health (DCMH) and was then recorded in personnel databases at various 
points in the following months and years.  Clinical, socio-demographic and military data 
were routinely gathered by therapists working in the DCMH.  Socio-demographic, military, 
clinical data and therapy characteristics represented independent variables while medical 
category on discharge following completion of the episode of care represented the dependent 
variable.  To establish longer term occupational fitness in the form of the current medical 
grading or medical discharge, using the same method as the deployment healthcare study, the 
clinical database was linked to a personnel database under a data sharing agreement. 
 
The non-deployed dataset contained approximately 3050 complete clinical records, a 
proportion of which related to re-referral episodes.  A record of longer-term occupational 
outcome was available for 1205 individuals. 
 
Data were recorded by community based mental health therapists carrying out mental health 
assessments in a purpose designed electronic database.  For clinical and therapeutic factors, 
treatment was categorised as either assessment only or a combination of other forms of 
support and psychological therapy.  Therapy was coded as brief, intermediate or prolonged 
according to the number of sessions delivered and therapy was further categorised as being 
delivered by a single therapist or with input from a multi-disciplinary team.  Clinical data 
included current and historical acts of deliberate self-harm (DSH), current levels of alcohol 
use, co-morbidity of mental disorder and hazardous or harmful alcohol use, past referral for 
psychiatric assessment and clinical diagnosis which was generated using International 
Classification of Mental Disorders Version 10 criteria (ICD 10) (World Health 
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Organisation.1992).  These data were used to assess the association of personal, military, 
clinical and therapy factors with both short and longer-term occupational fitness.  As the 
outcome data were longitudinal, it was possible to make causal inferences. 
 
The analytical strategy used the standard approach of exploratory chi squared analyses and 
unadjusted and adjusted logistic regression described earlier in this chapter.  In addition, 
interaction terms were created for specific variables of interest and were used as predictor 
variables in the regression analyses.  Trends over time were assessed with chi squared tests 
for trends.  As longer-term data were missing for a substantial number of personnel, the 
characteristics of personnel with missing data were explored and the factors that were found 
to be significantly associated with data non-availability were examined using multinomial 
logistic regression.  Response weights were then calculated and applied to the dataset prior to 
conducting the analyses of longer-term occupational fitness, the procedure for calculating the 
weights is described in the non-deployed clinical study chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 - PRIMARY PREVENTION - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF 
OPERATIONAL REST AND RECUPERATION (R&R) 
Overview 
 
This chapter describes a study which sought to evaluate the mental health effects of R&R, 
which is a short period of leave taken by UK military personnel at a home location during a 
six month duration overseas operational deployment.  The aims of the study were to examine 
whether the provision of R&R functioned as a primary preventative measure taken to provide 
respite from adversity and to improve mental health for deployed personnel when they 
returned to the operational area.  The second aim was to identify which, if any, elements of 
R&R were significantly associated with deployment mental health.  Two samples of military 
personnel were surveyed.  All participants completed measures of mental health and alcohol 
use and a post-R&R sample reported upon their experience of R&R upon completion of their 
time at home; 304 personnel were surveyed as they embarked upon R&R and 232 as they 
returned to the operational area.  42 subjects were surveyed at both points.  Overall, 11.5% of 
all respondents reported substantial symptoms of CMD, endorsing ≥4 symptoms on the 
GHQ-12; the rates were 11.2% in the pre-R&R survey group and 12.1% in the post-R&R 
group.  3.2% reported symptoms of probable PTSD, scoring ≥50 on the PCL-C; the rates 
were 2.7% in the pre-R&R survey group and 3.7% in the post-R&R group.  46.9% of 
personnel (n=135) scored at or above the cut-off point for hazardous use of alcohol on the 
modified AUDIT-10 prior to deployment and 50.0% (n=110) reported similar levels of use 
during R&R.  The levels of probable CMD, PTSD and hazardous alcohol use were not 
significantly different between the pre and post R&R groups.  In those assessed pre- and post-
R&R, mean mental health symptom and AUDIT scores were not significantly different.  
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Approximately 90.0% of those returning to the operational area expressed strong satisfaction 
with the overall experience of R&R.  Principle components analysis of the R&R experiences 
scale generated five factors; engaging with or deriving satisfaction from each of the five 
factors was associated with better mental health when returning to the operational area and 
lower levels of alcohol use during R&R.  There was a positive general mental health and 
alcohol effect among those personnel who were better able to engage with certain aspects of 




As detailed in the introductory chapter, given the paucity of information about work 
recuperation generally and the mental health effects of taking R&R among UK military 
personnel specifically, the main aims of the current study were to examine whether taking 
R&R led to improved mental health for military personnel when they returned to the 
operational area and to identify the elements of R&R that were associated with deployment 
mental health.  Whilst the findings were derived from a sample of military personnel, it is 
suggested that the study outcomes may have implications for other organisations that deploy 






After conducting a literature review and using the Recovery Experience Questionnaire 
(Sonnentag and Fritz, 2007) as a template, initial focus groups were conducted by a colleague 
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to establish survey content amongst two groups of 12 infantry soldiers who had recently 
taken R&R.  After constructing the scale and testing it for comprehension among a small 
sample of soldiers, content validity was established using Chronbach’s alpha which was .84 
for the full scale.  The final measure consisted of 30 items which were rated using a 4 point 
Likert scale broadly indicating strength of agreement, satisfaction and quality (Parsloe et al., 
2014).  The full R&R Experiences Scale is shown at Appendix 1 and the method of 
administration is described at the end of this section. 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the R&R Experiences Scale 
 
To prepare the R&R experiences scale for analysis, the final five scale items (numbers 25-30) 
were removed before data entry as they related to satisfaction with the overall experience of 
R&R rather than being about discrete facets of R&R.  The remaining 25 items were entered 
into the analysis.  The oblique promax rotation method was selected as the number of 
subjects who had completed the measure was sufficiently large and a manual inspection of 
the correlation matrix suggested that the majority of the R&R experiences scale items were 
correlated; this method gives the optimal solution when data have these characteristics.  As 
the sample size exceeded 200 (n=227), in accordance with Kaiser’s criterion for factor 
extraction (Kaiser, 1960), all factors with eigenvalues >1 and individual R&R scale items 
with 10 or more factor loadings >0.40 were retained in the model.  Although this is not 
necessarily a problem when conducting PCA (Field. 2013), multicollinearity was assessed 
and found not to be present, (determinant of the R matrix >0.00001).  The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.79 indicating that the sample size was 
sufficiently large to allow for a robust PCA.  Bartlett’s test of Sphericity indicated substantial 
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relationships between the variables used to perform the PCA (p<0.001).  All off-diagonal 
values in the anti-image matrix had p values >0.5 so none were deleted. 
 
Following examination of the scree plot (Cattell, 1966), (Figure. 3), the point of inflection 
appeared to fall around the sixth extracted factor; the first five components were therefore 
selected for retention (Table 2).  The retained components explained 61.2% of the overall 
model variance.  All components contained a minimum of two items and all had factor 
loading coefficients ≥.50. 
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Figure 3. Scree Plot – R&R Component Eigenvalues 
 
Table 2.  Five Component PCA Solution for the R&R Scale, Component Eigenvalues 
and Percentage of Model Variance 
 
R&R Survey Component Label Items (n) Eigenvalue Variance (%) 
Mental Disengagement from Events in Afghanistan 5 7.21 28.8 
Rest and Social Support 5 2.99 12.0 
Travel from Afghanistan 2 2.16 8.7 
Physical Recovery 3 1.56 6.3 
Relaxation 4 1.36 5.4 
 
Overall % of Model Variance 19  61.2 
Retention Cut Off Point 
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Table 3 shows the composition of the five item solution with pattern matrix coefficients. 
Table 3.  R&R Component Composition and Pattern Matrix Coefficients 
 
Components and Component Items 
Component Number and 
Coefficient 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Mental Disengagement from events in Afghanistan 
I did not think about work at all .98     
I could switch off and did not think about what was happening in Afghanistan .89     
I did not worry about work or my unit back in Afghanistan .82     
I forgot about work .80     
I did not try to get news about Afghanistan .70     
2.  Rest & Social Support 
I got as much support as I wanted from friends and family  .87    
On R&R I felt close to the people that matter to me  .85    
I could do leisure activities that I enjoy  .56    
I could do relaxing things  .54    
I was able to get a good night’s sleep  .50    
3.  Travel 
How would you rate your experience of the journey back to the UK?   .97   
Overall, how satisfied are you with your experience of travelling back to the UK?   .94   
4.  Physical Recovery 
It was difficult to kick back and do nothing at home     .82  
I did not feel close to my family/friends on R&R    .77  
The journey back to the UK had a negative impact on my experience of R&R    .68  
5.  Relaxation 
I got a break from the physical demands of being on tour     .82 
I could relax and switch off from feeling in danger     .79 
I saw family and friends     .50 




The survey asked about socio-demographic, operational and military factors.  The 
questionnaire contained a removable section where personal information could be entered 
however, personnel were advised that they could complete the questionnaire anonymously if 
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they chose not to record identifiable details, in this case, to allow for later data linkage, a 
unique number was allocated and recorded which was known only to the researcher and the 
subject. 
 
As described in the general methods section, exposure to 17 combat and operational events 
(Hoge et al., 2004) was assessed.  For this study, the scale was reduced to a dichotomous 
response format for each scale item; each item was rated as exposure experienced or not 
experienced.  Normally, this scale has a graded frequency response format, however, for this 
study, presence or absence was judged to be a sufficient indicator of exposure and 
simplification of the study measures was sought wherever possible to reduce the burden of 
completing this complex survey.  Scores for the 17 combat exposure scale items were 
summated and tertiles were computed.  A dichotomous variable was produced where scores 
falling above the upper tertile were compared with those falling below the middle tertile.  In 
addition, personnel were asked to endorse a single item regarding perceptions of impending 
death or serious injury which was rated from never through once or twice, sometimes and 
many times. 
 
Harmony Guidelines were assessed.  Although there are small differences in how Harmony 
duration is calculated between the three branches of the Armed Services, the guidelines 
generally state that individuals should not exceed around 13 months of cumulative separated 
service in any continuous period of 30 months.  It was felt to be important to assess 
adherence to the guidelines as research suggests that breaches of Harmony Guidelines are 




As described in the general methods chapter, mental health outcomes measured in this study 
were common mental disorder, PTSD symptoms and associated functional impairment.  In 
order to assess the overall mental health effect of R&R, a composite variable was generated 
combining the PCL-C with a cut off score ≥50 and/or a GHQ-12 score ≥4. 
 
Alcohol use was measured using the 10 item AUDIT questionnaire.  Consumption of alcohol 
is prohibited during deployment; the AUDIT was therefore modified so that at Time 1, 
personnel rated their average level of alcohol use in the year prior to deployment to gauge 
their usual pattern of drinking.  At Time 2 personnel rated alcohol use during R&R.  
Subjective health was rated from poor through excellent using a five point Likert scale.  
Responses were dichotomised by combining ‘poor’ or ‘fair’ subjective health and comparing 
these against combined ‘good’, very good’ or ‘excellent’ responses. 
 
The R&R experiences scale was administered at Time 2 only.  Response options were 
reduced to a binary format by combining strongly agree and agree responses and disagree and 
strongly disagree responses; where quality was rated, good and excellent responses were 
grouped together and compared with poor ratings; for satisfaction-based responses, very and 
mostly satisfied responses were grouped and compared with mostly dissatisfied responses.  
To gauge the overall level of satisfaction with R&R, positive endorsements of each of the 
five general satisfaction items were summated and a dichotomous variable was generated 
which compared four to five positive responses, representing high levels of satisfaction with 
zero to three positive responses, representing moderate to low levels of satisfaction.  The 
R&R scale was sub-categorised into components identified in the PCA and percentiles were 
generated for each of the five components to examine the association of various levels of 
endorsement of the component categories with mental health and alcohol outcomes. 
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Survey Timings and Schedule 
 
The survey without the embedded R&R experiences scale was administered to a sample of 
personnel as they arrived in the UK to take R&R whilst undertaking deployment to 
Afghanistan in 2011 (Time 1).  A second group completed the baseline survey plus the R&R 
experiences scale on completion of R&R (Time 2) and a smaller group were surveyed as they 
arrived to take R&R and then again as they returned to the operational area some 10-14 days 
later having completed R&R.  It was intended that a matched sample would be assessed, 
however, unavoidable logistical challenges resulted in only a small number of personnel 
completing both surveys.  Air transport to and from Afghanistan was frequently delayed or 
cancelled due to operational incidents, mechanical problems, weather conditions and so forth, 
which, given the demands of military operations was perhaps inevitable.  The extent of this 
disturbance had not been fully anticipated, particularly for the group departing for 
Afghanistan and as a consequence, gaining access to personnel as they transitioned to and 
from deployment was greatly disrupted.  Flights arrived and departed at all hours of the day, 
aircraft were re-routed to carry casualties, aircraft mechanical problems occurred and adverse 
weather conditions were surprisingly frequent.  It was not possible to position the researcher 
in the air terminal on a permanent basis.  An opportunistic sampling schedule was adopted in 
order to attempt to survey as many personnel as possible as they transited the arrival and 
departure area.  Different personnel completed the survey at Time 1 and Time 2 with a small 
number of personnel completing both Time 1 and 2 surveys 
Analyses 
 
For this study, the Statistics Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 20 for Windows 
was used for the analyses.  The general analysis strategy was adopted and for those who 
completed pre and post R&R surveys, continuous scores were compared using Wilcoxon 
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signed rank test and in the unmatched sample, scores were compared using the Mann-
Whitney U test.  Statistical significance was defined as p≤0.05 throughout. 
 
The study was approved by the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (MODREC, 






536 personnel completed surveys; 304 at Time 1 and 232 at Time 2; the sample total included 
42 subjects who completed surveys at both assessment points.  The Time 1 response rate was 
79.4%; 383 surveys were distributed and 79 personnel either refused to participate or returned 
incomplete or spoiled questionnaires.  The number of non-responders was not recorded at 
Time 2 as flights could not be supervised continuously by the researcher. 
 
Socio-Demographic and Military Characteristics 
 
The socio-demographic and military characteristics of the R&R sample respondents were 
compared with population data derived from the whole of the UK AF where this was 
available (Table 4).  Certain groups were over-represented in the R&R sample including 
Army personnel, junior ranks and individual augmentees.  The latter are known as ‘IA’s’ who 
deploy without the majority of their usual unit.  IAs comprised 40.2% (n=206) of the R&R 
sample compared with a rate of 35.0% which was found among a representative sample 
participating in a recent survey of deployment mental health.  Other groups were under-
represented including Royal Air Force personnel, senior ranks, women and reserve forces 
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personnel.  Approximately two thirds of the study subjects were in a longer-term relationship 
and approximately one third had one or more dependant children.  R&R personnel were 
marginally younger than the UK AF population.  Official statistics report the median age of 
the UK AF as 29 years; the median age of the study sample was 27 years (Defence Statistics, 
2013).  The Time 1 and 2 samples were compared and only differed significantly in Service 





Table 4.  R&R Participants - Socio-demographic Factors 
 






2 ,d.f., p= *Armed 
Forces % 
Service Background (n=524) 
Royal Navy 24, (4.6) 18 (5.9) 6(2.7) 
χ
2 =19.02, d.f. 3, 
p<0.01 
20 
Royal Marines 68 (13.0) 54 (17.8) 14 (6.4) 
Army 393 (75.0) 212 (69.7) 181 (82.3) 52.5 
Royal Air Force 39 (7.4) 20 (6.6) 19 (8.6) 22.5 
Rank Range (n=524) 
Junior Rank/Junior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)  361 (68.9) 212 (69.7) 149 (67.7) 
χ
2  =0.31, d.f. 2, 
p=0.86 
60.7 
Senior NCO/Warrant Officer 83 (15.8) 46 (15.1) 37 (16.8) 22.7 
Commissioned Officer 80 (15.3) 46 (15.1) 34 (15.5) 16.7 
Gender (n=514) 
Male 484 (94.2) 279 (93.3) 205 (95.3) χ2  =0.95, d.f 1., 
p=0.33 
90.4 
Female 30 (5.8) 20 (6.7) 10 (4.7) 9.6 
Relationship Status (n=535) 
Not in a Relationship (single/divorced/separated) 168 (31.4) 95 (31.3) 73 (31.6) χ2  =0.01, d.f 1., 
p=0.93 
 
In a Long Term Relationship 367 (68.6) 209 (68.8) 158 (68.4)  
children (n=514) 
No Dependant children 324 (63.0) 184 (62.6) 140 (63.6) χ2  =0.60, d.f 1., 
p=0.81 
 
One or more Dependant children (<18yrs old) 190 (37.0) 110 (37.4) 80 (36.4)  
Age Range (n=520) 
18-24 Years 185 (35.6) 110 (36.5) 75 (34.2) 
χ
2  =3.99, d.f. 3, 
p=0.26 
 
25-34 Years 243 (46.7) 145 (48.2) 98 (44.7)  
35-44 Years 74 (14.2) 39 (13) 35 (16.0)  
45 Plus Years 18 (3.5) 7 (2.3) 11 (5.0)  
Service Length(n=523) 
1-4 Years 202 (38.6) 116 (38.3) 86 (39.1) χ2  =0.35, d.f 1., 
p=0.85 
 
5 Years or More 321 (61.4) 187 (61.7) 134 (61.9)  
Engagement Type (n=509) 
Regular 473 (92.9) 277 (92.6) 196 (93.3) χ2  =0.90, d.f 1., 
p=0.77 
83.6 
Reserve 36 (7.1) 22 (7.4) 14 (6.7) 16.4 
Individual Augmentee or Formed Unit Member (n=512) 
Formed Unit Member 306 (59.8) 181 (60.5) 125 (58.7) χ2  =0.18, d.f 1., 
p=0.67 
 
Individual Augmentee 206 (40.2) 118 (39.5) 88 (41.3)  
 
* www.dasa.mod.uk 






Over three quarters (87.7%, n=462) of personnel had deployed previously (range 0 to 9 
deployments, mode =1 deployment) and two thirds (65.8% n=345) had accumulated 
sufficient time currently deployed to theoretically accumulate greater levels of operational 
exposure, having completed more than 16 weeks in the operational area at the time of R&R; 
the usual tour length is 26 weeks.  Time spent on the current deployment was not 
significantly different between the two samples.  Time 2 respondents had however, over a 
period of around three years, spent a significantly longer cumulative period deployed than 
Time 1 subjects (51.6% vs. 21.1%, p<0.001), though most personnel (91.4% n=467) had 
accumulated deployments totalling less than 13 months in the last thirty months.  Therefore, 
Harmony Guidelines had been breached for less than one tenth of personnel and there were 
no significant differences in the proportions experiencing such breaches between the two 
samples.  During the current deployment, the majority of personnel had spent their time 
working in relatively well protected locations, with the remainder (41.9%, n=219) deployed 
to more austere and dangerous exposed locations; there were no significant differences in the 
potential dangerousness of deployed locations between the two samples.  Over two thirds of 
respondents (70.3%, n=367) reported experiencing perceptions of impending death or serious 
injury at least once during the current deployment; Time 2 respondents were significantly 
more likely to report this outcome than Time 1 subjects (83.7% vs. 60.0%, p<0.001).  The 




Table 5.  R&R Participants - Operational Factors 
 




χ2 ,d.f., p= 
Previous Deployments (n=527) n=299 n=228 χ2  =0.25, d.f. 1, 
p=0.62 0 65 (12.3) 35 (11.7) 30 (13.2) 
1 Plus 462 (87.7) 264 (88.3) 198 (86.8) 
Current Deployment Duration (n=524) n=299 n=225 χ2  =53.05, d.f. 1, 
p<0.001 0-16 Weeks 345 (65.8) 236 (78.9) 109 (48.4) 
16 Weeks or More 179 (34.2) 63 (21.1) 116 (51.6) 
Harmony Guidelines (n=511) n=291 n=220 χ2  =0.38, d.f. 1, 
p=0.54 Deployed Within Harmony (<1 year Deployed in Three) 467 (91.4) 264 (90.7) 203 (92.3) 
Harmony Breach (>1 Year Deployed in Three) 44 (8.6) 27 (9.3) 17 (7.7) 
Operational Area Location (n=523) n=300 n=223 χ2  =0.12, d.f. 1, 
p=0.91 Mostly Check Points and Patrol Bases  219 (41.9) 125 (41.7) 94 (42.2) 
Mostly Forward or Main Operating Bases  304 (58.1) 175 (58.3) 129 (57.8) 
Potentially Traumatic Exposure (Fear of Death or Injury) (n=522) n=295 n=106 χ2  =34.52, d.f. 1, 
p<0.001 Never 155 (29.7) 118 (40.0) 37 (16.3) 
One or more Times 367 (70.3) 177 (60.0) 190 (83.7) 
Combat Exposure Tertiles (n=425) n=302 n=123 χ2  =7.05, d.f. 1, 
p<0.01 Lower and Middle 292 (68.7) 219 (72.5) 73 (59.3) 
Upper 133 (31.3) 83 (27.5) 50 (40.7) 
 
** Some sub-category %s do not add up to 100% due to rounding and missing data 
 
The most frequent operational or combat exposure factor reported on the combat experiences 
scale was being subjected to incoming artillery, rocket or mortar fire with 53.6% of personnel 
(n=225) reporting events of this kind, 49.3% (n=207) experienced enemy small arms (rifle) 
fire and 34.0% (n=142) encountered hostile or aggressive reactions when interacting with 









95.7% (n=179 of 187) of respondents reported general satisfaction with R&R, 95.5% would 
value R&R on a subsequent deployment, 92.5% rated it as a positive experience, 92.1% were 
able to do what they wanted to during R&R and 91.8% had their individual needs met (Table 
7). 
  
Have you experienced any of the following during THIS DEPLOYMENT? (n) 
One or More 
Times n (%) 
Received incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire (n=420) 225 (53.6) 
Received small arms fire (n=420) 207 (49.3) 
Encountered hostile or aggressive reactions from civilians (n=418) 142 (34.0) 
Seen dead or seriously injured friendly forces personnel (n=415) 133 (32.0) 
Cleared/searched homes or buildings, caves or bunkers (n=415) 110 (26.5) 
Had an improvised explosive device (IED) or booby trap explode near you (n=420) 102 (24.3) 
Shot at the enemy with your personal weapon (n=415) 91 (21.9) 
Provided aid to the wounded (n=419) 90 (21.5) 
Encountered enemy sniper fire (n=418) 82 (19.6) 
Seen injured or sick women or children who you were unable to help (n=414) 75 (18.1) 
Been threatened and were unable to respond because of the rules of engagement (n=415) 72 (17.3) 
Had a mate injured or killed who was near you (n=416) 60 (14.4) 
Handled or discovered human remains (n=415) 48 (11.6) 
Had a close call where a shell, rocket or missile that failed to explode landed near you (n=417) 28 (6.7) 
Had equipment shot off your body or you were shot or hit but protective gear saved you (n=415) 5 (1.2) 
Been wounded or injured (n=416) 6 (1.4) 
Engaged in close quarter battle with fixed bayonet (n=416) 6 (1.4) 
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Table 7.  General Satisfaction Items from the R&R Experiences Scale 
 
R&R Experiences Survey Satisfaction Items Yes n (%) No n (%) 
If you were deployed again, would you like R&R on that deployment? 182 (95.5) 9 (4.5) 
Overall, I was satisfied with the experience of R&R 179 (95.7) 8 (4.3) 
I did what I wanted to do on R&R 175 (92.1) 15 97.9) 
The experience of R&R was positive 172 (92.5) 14 (7.5) 
R&R met my needs 169 (91.8) 15 (8.2) 
 
The study respondents rated 25 further factors relating to the individual elements of R&R. 
(Table 8). 
Table 8.  R&R Experiences Scale - Individual Item Responses 
 
R&R Experiences Survey Items Yes No 
I saw family/friends 221 (99.5) 1 (0.5) 
I got a break from the physical demands of being on tour 214 (98.4) 3 (1.4) 
I could do relaxing things 209 (98.6) 3 (1.4) 
I could do leisure activities that I enjoy 206 (97.6) 5 (2.4) 
I felt close to my family/friends on R&R 195 (95.6) 9 (4.4) 
I got as much support as I wanted from my family/friends 199 (93.4) 15 (6.6) 
I could chill out 190 (92.7) 15 (7.3) 
I could relax and switch off from feeling in danger 191 (91.8) 17 (8.2) 
I was able to get a good night’s sleep 181 (86.2) 29 (13.8) 
I have recovered physically 162 (85.3) 28 (14.7) 
I felt recharged and had more energy by the end of R&R 147 (73.5) 53 (26.5) 
Overall, I was satisfied with the experience of travelling back to the UK 120 (69.4) 53 (30.6) 
I talked about what I have been doing on tour with my family/friends as much as I wanted 126 (64.0) 71 (36.0) 
My experience of the journey back to the UK was positive 102 (63.8) 58 (36.3) 
The journey back to the UK did not adversely affect my experience of R&R 112 (59.3) 77 (40.7) 
I did not find the journey back to the UK frustrating 120 (57.3) 89 (42.6) 
I felt rested by the end of R&R 114 (55.3) 92 (44.7) 
I did not lose too many of my R&R days as a result of being delayed on the journey back 108 (55.1) 88 (44.9) 
On R&R I felt close to the people that matter to me 112 (54.4) 94 (45.6) 
It was not difficult to kick back and do nothing at home 110 (53.9) 94 (46.1) 
I did not worry about work or my unit back in Afghanistan 107 (52.2) 98 (47.8) 
I forgot about work 105 (50.7) 102 (49.3) 
I could switch off and did not think about what was happening in Afghanistan 98 (48.3) 105 (51.7) 
I did not try to get news about what was happening back in Afghanistan 87 (42.2) 119 (57.8) 
I did not think about work at all 72 (34.4) 137 (65.6) 
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When the elements were rank ordered according to the rate of endorsement of each item, the 
five most frequently endorsed items related to being with friends and family and having the 
opportunity to take a break and relax.  These were endorsed by over 95.0% of personnel.  The 
five least frequently endorsed items related to being able to cognitively disengage from 
Afghanistan.  Substantial numbers of personnel reported that they worried about, thought 
about or tried to get news of their colleagues back in Afghanistan during R&R and continued 
to think about their work while they were at home. 
 
Comparisons were made between those expressing overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
R&R using a range of socio-demographic, military and operational characteristics as 
independent variables.  For most of the characteristics that were evaluated, the levels of 
satisfaction were not significantly different between sub-categories.  However, significant 
differences were found for length of time spent in the operational area prior to R&R, where 
89.4% of those deployed for 16 weeks or less (n=93) were significantly more likely to be 
satisfied with R&R compared to 75.5% of those who had spent a longer period in the 
operational area (n=74) (p<0.01).  Of those personnel who were in a long term relationship, 
85.9% (n=122) reported satisfaction compared to 72.3% of those who were not in a long-term 
relationship (n=47) (p=0.02).  86.8% of personnel who reported more frequent perceptions of 
impending death or serious injury (n=151) were satisfied with their overall experience of 
R&R compared to 58.6% of those with fewer such perceptions (n=17) (p<0.001).  
Satisfaction rates were lower at 64.3% among those reporting functional impairment during 
R&R (n=18) than the rate of 84.8% among those experiencing no such impairment (n=134) 




Table 9.  Overall Satisfaction with R&R – Significant Differences among Socio-
Demographic, Operational and Functional Impairment Categories 
 
Overall Satisfaction with R&R 






2 ,d.f., p= 
Time Deployed(n=202) 
0-15 weeks  104 (51.5) 11 (10.6) 93 (89.4) χ2 =6.82 d.f. 1, 
p<0.01 16 weeks or More 98 (48.5) 24 (24.5) 74 (75.5) 
Relationship Status (n=207) 
Not in a Relationship (Divorced/Single/Separated) 65 (31.4) 18 (27.7) 47 (72.3) χ2 =6.10 d.f. 1, 
p=0.02 In a Relationship/Married 142 (68.6) 20 (14.1) 122 (85.9) 
Perceptions of Death and Impending Physical Injury (n=203) 
Never Experienced 29 (14.3) 12 (41.4) 17 (58.6) χ2 =14.58 d.f. 1, 
p<0.001 Experienced One or More Times 174 (85.7) 23 (13.2) 151 (86.8) 
Functional Impairment (n=186) 
No Impairment 158 (85.0) 24 (15.2) 134 (84.8) χ2 = 6.71 d.f. 1, 
p=0.01 Some Level of Impairment 28 (15.1) 10 (35.7) 18 (64.3) 
 
* 0-3 Satisfaction Items Endorsed 
** 4-5 Satisfaction Items Endorsed 
 
Combat exposure, time in the operational area and functional impairment appeared to cluster; 
38.3% (n=57) of those personnel who had spent 16 or more weeks in the operational area 
reported greater levels of combat exposure compared to 27.2% (n=73) of those who had 
deployed for 15 weeks or less (χ
2 
=5.42, d.f. 1, p=0.02).  Those spending longer currently 
deployed were also significantly more likely to report functional impairment arising from 
mental health symptoms (16 or more weeks deployed, 19.3% (n=31) vs. 15 weeks or less 
11.6% (n=37 χ
2 
=5.09, d.f. 1, p=0.02). 
 
Mental Health Outcomes 
 
Probable CMD caseness levels were found among 11.6% (n=60) of respondents overall and 
probable PTSD caseness was detected among 3.2% (n=16) of all respondents.  46.9% 
(n=135) of Time 1 respondents were found to endorse levels of alcohol consumption 
representative of hazardous use in the year prior to deployment and 50.0% reported this level 
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of use during R&R (n=110); the difference between the usual level of alcohol use and the 
level of alcohol use during R&R was not statistically significant.  14.0% (n=68) of all 
respondents reported moderate to severe functional impairment related to the presence mental 
health symptoms. 92.3% (n=480) of personnel reported high levels of subjectively good 
health.  Overall, there were no statistically significant differences in the rates of mental 
disorder, functional impairment or ratings of global health between the Time 1 and 2 samples.  
Table 10 shows the analyses of mental health outcomes. 
 
Table 10.  R&R Study - Mental Health Outcomes 
 





χ2 ,d.f., p= 
PTSD (n=508) n=291 n=217 
χ
2 =0.36, d.f. 1, 
p=0.55 
Probable caseness (PCL-C Score ≥50) 16 (3.2) 8 (2.7) 8 (3.7) 
*Alcohol (n=508) n=288 n=220 
χ
2 =0.49, d.f. 1. 
p=0.49 
Hazardous use (AUDIT 8 cut off)  135 (46.9) 110 (50.0) 
Common Mental Disorder (n=520) n=297 n=223 
χ
2 =0.12, d.f. 1, 
p=0.72 
Probable caseness (GHQ 12 ≥4 symptoms) 60 (11.6) 33 (11.1) 27 (12.1) 
Functional impairment (n=487) n=281 n=206 
χ
2 =1.26, d.f. 1, 
p=0.26 
None or little impairment 419 (86.0) 246 (87.5) 173 (84.0) 
Greater impairment 68 (14.0) 35 (12.5) 33 (16.0) 
Global Health Rating (n=520) n=300 n=220 
χ
2 =0.48 d.f. 1, 
p=0.49 
Poor or fair health 40 (7.7) 21 (7.0) 19 (8.6) 
Good, very good or excellent health 480 (92.3) 279 (93.0) 201 (91.4) 
 
*Overall levels of hazardous alcohol use are not shown as different sample periods were used for Time1 and Time 2 respondents  
 
CMD and PTSD cases were amalgamated to represent any case of mental health disorder to 
examine whether there were any overall mental health differences between the two samples; 
there were none; (Time 1 CMD and PTSD =12.0%, (n=36), Time 2 CMD and PTSD =13.5% 
(n=30), OR 1.14, 95% CI 0.68-1.91).  Binary logistic regression analyses were repeated 
adjusting for a range of potential confounders, including: engagement type, IA status, 
Service, rank, sex, age, dependant children, previous tours, cumulative deployment time, 
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combat arm, perceptions of impending death or serious injury, global health, PTSD, 
hazardous alcohol use and CMD; no potential confounders had a statistically significant 
adjusting effect.  Binary logistic regression analyses were repeated using hazardous drinking 
as the dependant variable and time of sampling as the independent variable; no significant 
differences were demonstrated between the two samples (OR 1.13, 95% CI 0.80-1.61).  After 
adjusting for the confounding variables described above (excluding hazardous alcohol use) 
there were no significant adjusting effects except for the finding that hazardous alcohol use 
was significantly more common among those exposed to higher levels of combat (OR 1.89, 
95% CI 1.20-2.97). 
 
R&R Experiences Scale Components 
 
The first R&R component generated from the PCA, explaining 28.8% of the total model 
variance, was labelled ‘mental disengagement from events in Afghanistan’.  The second 
component, explaining 12.0% of the model variance, was labelled ‘rest and social support’.  
The remaining components were labelled ‘travel’, ‘physical recovery’ and ‘relaxation’, 
explaining 8.7, 6.3 and 5.4% of the total model variance respectively.  With the exception of 
the relaxation component, for subjects with scores falling within the upper percentile of 
scores representing higher levels of mental disengagement from Afghanistan, more positive 
ratings of travel, physical recovery and greater endorsement of the ability to rest and engage 
with social support, there was a significantly reduced odds of reporting hazardous alcohol use 
during R&R.  Following adjustment for a range of confounding variables the association of 
hazardous alcohol use and the physical recovery and rest and social support components was 
no longer significant.  With exception of the travel component, scores falling within the upper 
percentile of disengagement, physical recovery, relaxation, rest and social support, there was 
a significantly reduced odds of reporting either CMD or PTSD symptoms.  Following 
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adjustment for confounders, the association between mental health symptoms and the 
physical recovery component became non-significant.  The detail of the five selected 
components and their association with mental health and alcohol outcomes is shown in Table 
11. 
 
The differences in mean PCL-C, GHQ-12 and AUDIT scores pre and post R&R in the 
matched sample were not statistically significantly different.  In the non-matched samples, 
the mean score for the PCL-C was significantly higher at Time 2 (22 at Time 1 and 23 at 
Time 2 (possible range 17 to 85), U = 19477.0, p<0.05).  For the mean GHQ-12 and AUDIT 
scores, there were no significant differences. 
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* Composite variable consisting of PCL-C score ≥44 and /or GHQ12 score ≥4 
1 Adjusted for Regular or Reserve Status, Individual Augmentee Status, Service background, Rank, Sex, Age, Dependant Children, Previous Operational Deployment, Concerns About Death or Injury,  
Relationship Status, Combat Arm and Time Deployed on the Current Tour 









n 1OR (95%CI) AOR (95%CI) 
Disengagement from Events in Afghanistan Component 
I did not think about work at all 
I could switch off and did not think about what was happening in Afghanistan 
I did not worry about work or my unit back in Afghanistan 
I forgot about work 
I did not try to get news about what was happening back in Afghanistan 
1 43 (62.3) 69 1 1  15 (21.4) 70 1 1 
2 17 (43.6) 39 0.47 (0.21-1.04) 0.40 (0.15-1.04) 10 (25.6) 39 1.26 (0.51-3.17) 1.53 (0.52-4.47) 
3 24 (57.1) 42 0.81 (0.37-1.76) 0.78 (0.30-2.06) 3 (7.1) 42 0.28 (0.08-1.04) 0.25 (0.05-1.30) 
4 22 (34.4) 64 0.32 (0.16-0.64) 0.37 (0.14-0.93) 1 (1.5) 66 0.06 (0.01-0.44) 0.60 (0.01-0.54) 
Travel Component 
How would you rate your experience of the journey back to the UK? 
Overall, how satisfied are you with your experience of travelling back to the 
UK? 
1 28 (62.2) 45 1 1 10 (21.7) 46 1 1 
2 15 (50.0) 30 0.61 (0.37-1.76) 0.37 (0.11-1.29) 5 (16.1) 31 0.69 (0.21-2.27) 1.17 (0.27-5.11) 
3 33 (36.3) 91 0.35 (0.17-0.72) 0.30 (0.11-0.80) 9 (79.8) 92 0.39 (0.15-1.04) 0.45 (0.13-1.56) 
Physical Recovery Component 
The journey back to the UK had a negative impact on my experience of R&R 
I did not feel close to my family/friends on R&R 
It was difficult to kick back and do nothing at home 
1 26 (76.5) 34 1 1 10 (28.6) 35 1 1 
2 44 (43.6) 101 0.24 (0.10-0.58) 0.40 (0.14-1.10) 12 (11.9) 101 0.34 (0.13-0.87) 0.37 (0.12-1.14) 
4 35 (44.9) 78 0.25 (0.10-0.62) 0.61 (0.20-1.81) 7 (8.8) 80 0.24 (0.08-0.70) 0.33 (0.09-1.20) 
Relaxation Component 
I could relax and switch off from feeling in danger 
I got a break from the physical demands of being on tour 
I saw family/friends 
I got as much support as I wanted from my family/friends 
1 36 (60.0) 60 1 1 16 (26.2) 61 1 1 
3 71 (45.5) 156 0.56 (0.30-1.02) 0.77 (0.37-1.61) 13 (8.2) 158 0.25 (0.11-0.56) 0.23 (0.09-0.60) 
Rest and Social Support 
I could do leisure activities that I enjoy 
I got as much support as I wanted from my family/friends 
I could chill out 
On R&R I felt close to the people that matter to me 
I was able to get a good night’s sleep 
1 47 (60.3) 78 1 1 21 (26.6) 79 1 1 





The main findings of this study were that taking R&R was a highly satisfying experience for 
over 90% of the respondents and the vast majority would like to take a period of R&R during 
future deployments.  The most highly endorsed aspects of R&R related to being with friends and 
family and having the opportunity to use the pause in operational deployment to relax.  Over half 
of the military personnel taking part in this study appeared to have difficulty cognitively 
disconnecting from events in Afghanistan during their spell of R&R.  This was evidenced by 
personnel reporting that they worried about friends and colleagues in Afghanistan and tried to get 
news about their deployed unit during R&R.  This is important as disengagement from events in 
Afghanistan was linked to better mental health and lower levels of hazardous alcohol use.  As 
described in the introductory chapter, the hypothesis tested was that symptoms of common 
mental disorder (CMD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) would be similar among 
military personnel about to embark upon a period of R&R to those reported by personnel as they 
finished their time at home and left to journey back to the operational area.  In this case, the null 
hypothesis was supported in that there was no evidence that taking R&R had any substantial 
effects upon overall mental health when personnel departed back to the operational area and 
when potential confounders were accounted for, physical recovery did not appear to be 
associated with engagement with the R&R process.  Levels of symptoms of both mental disorder 
and alcohol use were similar among both the unmatched pre and post R&R samples and although 
PTSD scores were statistically significantly different at both measurement points within the 
matched sample, mean scores differed by very small margins and were not therefore clinically 
meaningful.  The secondary objective of this study was to describe any factors which were 
significantly associated with increased mental health symptoms and alcohol misuse.  Although 
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no factors proved to be significant predictors, the ability to utilise R&R for the purpose for which 
it was intended, that is, to rest at home, seemed to be an important associate of mental health; 
this was evidenced by better levels of mental health among those who engaged with various 
aspects of the R&R process. 
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CHAPTER 5 – PRIMARY PREVENTION - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF 
THIRD LOCATION DECOMPRESSION (TLD) 
Overview 
 
Third Location Decompression (TLD) is a structured activity undertaken by UK Armed Forces 
personnel at the end of an operational deployment.  TLD aims to smooth the transition between 
operations and returning home and to promote better re-adjustment and mental health in the 
period immediately following deployment.  This thesis component assessed whether undertaking 
TLD had any impact upon mental health and post-deployment re-adjustment.  Data collected 
during a large military cohort study was examined to identify personnel who either engaged in 
TLD following deployment before they returned home or went directly back to their home base 
with no additional transition activity.  As these data were observational, propensity scores (PS) 
were generated to pseudo-randomise the data and the PS were used to calculate inverse 
probability of treatment weights which were applied to the dataset before conducting adjusted 
regression analyses.  A range of mental health outcomes and post-deployment re-adjustment 
problems were compared among those who did and did not transition through TLD at the end of 
their operational tour.  The results of the study suggested that TLD had a positive impact upon 
two out of five assessed mental health outcomes; these were PTSD and multiple physical 
symptoms.  In addition, TLD attendance appeared to be associated with reduced levels of 
harmful alcohol use.  A small number of indicators of post-deployment readjustment were 
examined which were characterised by experiencing homecoming problems, difficulty 
readjusting to being at home and difficulty resuming normal social activities.  There was no 
evidence to suggest that TLD promoted better transition from operations to the peacetime 
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environment.  However, when the samples were stratified by the level of combat exposure 
experienced during deployment, although post deployment re-adjustment was similar for all 
exposure levels, personnel experiencing low and moderate levels of combat exposure 




Within the United Kingdom Armed Forces, Third Location Decompression (TLD) is a post 
deployment activity which provides for a pause at the end of an operational deployment.  TLD 
does not have an underlying theoretical basis and is largely about structured, supervised rest.  
Despite this, among military commanders it is widely promoted as a positive mental health 
strategy and its distinctive features are broadly representative of a primary preventative mental 
health intervention.  Given that TLD has been widely used within the UK AF following combat 
operations for a number of years without any evaluation of its effect upon mental health, this 
study aimed to assess whether it had any significant psychological effects and whether it assisted 
in promoting better post-deployment readjustment.  The study null hypothesis was that there 
would be no difference in mental health symptom levels and post-deployment readjustment 






Study Design and Participants 
 
This study used data collected during a UK-based longitudinal cohort study of military personnel 
conducted by the King’s Centre for Military Health (KCMHR) using a self-report survey 
instrument (Hotopf et al., 2003).  Phase 1 of the cohort study assessed the health of a randomly 
selected group of UK AF personnel (approximately 10%) who were deployed to the warfighting 
phase of operations in Iraq in 2003 (codenamed Operation TELIC) and a randomly selected 
group of personnel who were serving in the UK AF at the time of the war but who did not deploy 
to the Persian Gulf.  To transform the cohort to yield longitudinal data, a second phase of data 
collection took place approximately four years after the initial survey.  To ensure that the survey 
sample remained contemporary and took account of rapidly expanding operations in 
Afghanistan, two supplementary samples of personnel were recruited into the cohort (Fear et al., 
2010).  The final sample consisted of the original 9,395 individuals who had participated at 
phase 1 and provided data at phase 2; 1,789 randomly selected personnel who had deployed to 
military operations in Afghanistan (codenamed Operation HERRICK) between April 2006 and 
April 2007; to maintain the characteristics of the original cohort, a replenishment sample of 
6,628 randomly selected individuals who had joined the UK AF since 2003, making a total of 
17,812 subjects.  Data collection for phase 2 began in November 2007 and ended in September 
2009.  A total of 9,990 participants responded to the survey at phase 2 giving a final response 
rate of 56%.  Responding to the request to complete the survey was associated with older age, 
being female, ofﬁcer status and being a member of the Regular as opposed to Reserve Forces.  
Crucially, non-response at phase 2 was not associated with mental health status at phase 1, 
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including probable Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), common mental disorder (CMD) or 
alcohol misuse.  Weights were created to account for sampling fractions and to account for 
response rate differences at phase 2.  The study received ethics approval from the MoD’s 





For the purpose of the TLD study, subjects were recruited from the cohort into the TLD 
attendance sample if they answered the following study question; ‘after leaving deployment 
following the most recent [Afghanistan or Iraq] deployment, did you have a short period of time 
away from the operational area for you to relax before returning to your home base?’  Personnel 
were excluded if they did not answer the question.  Some subjects may have been reporting 
alternative forms of transition support such as operational stand down, where rest is taken close 
to the operational area, not in a third location.  To ensure that this did not occur, survey 
respondents were excluded from the TLD study if the date of the rest period coincided with a 
period when it was known that TLD had not taken place.  Respondents were further excluded if 
the date of attendance at TLD was not recorded or the stated length of the rest period exceeded 
three days.  TLD seldom exceeds two days in duration and never exceeds a period of three days 
including travel to and from the TLD location.  Some participants who provided data for the 
KCMHR cohort study also took part in a separate study which assessed the subjective utility of 
TLD.  Mental health and readjustment information provided by personnel who failed to answer 
the cohort survey question concerning post deployment rest were included in the TLD sample if 
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they had a valid record of attendance in the TLD utility study.  Although TLD is now mandatory 
for all deploying personnel, this has not always been so.  During the early phase of 
implementation, TLD was undertaken at the discretion of the operational commander and TLD 
policy was less rigorously applied.  To construct the control sample, subjects were recruited if 
they stated that they had not undertaken TLD when it was available but had undertaken an 
operational deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan.  Personnel were excluded from the control 
sample if their deployment took place when TLD was not available. 
 
Most of the Royal Navy (with the exception of Royal Marines) and Royal Air Force personnel 
who attended TLD prior to Phase 2 of the cohort study were Individual Augmentees (‘IAs’ or 
personnel who deploy as individuals without the majority of their parent unit).  Most of these 
personnel volunteered to take part in TLD or had to attend because they were attached to a 
formed unit to provide a specialist function during the deployment.  As described earlier, their 
attendance as IAs was only mandated from early 2011.  These personnel therefore constituted a 
substantial number of the survey controls (n=1130) but a smaller number of TLD attendees 
(n=317).  RAF and RN units deploy and engage with TLD in a Service-specific way compared to 
ground units and, overall, they face fewer operational threats than Army and Royal Marine 
personnel.  In order to harmonise the comparison groups, RN and RAF personnel were excluded 
a priori.  Royal Marines, who deployed mostly in a ground role during the study period, were 
included in both the TLD attendee and control groups.  The process for generating the TLD 
sample and the number of subjects excluded is shown in Figure 4. 
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Mental Health Measures 
 
Self-rated general health, CMD, probable PTSD were assessed using the standard cut-off scores 
and measures described in the general methodology section of this thesis.  Alcohol use was 
measured using the 10 item AUDIT where scores ≥16 indicated alcohol use that is potentially 
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Post-deployment re-adjustment was assessed using four questions extracted from an eleven item 
post-deployment experiences scale.  Following pilot study interviews, the scale was generated 
for the deployment element of the KCMHR cohort survey with additional advice from a 
sociologist about the utility of each item.  Four of the scale items asked about post deployment 
re-adjustment rather than the general experience of returning home and these were used in the 
current study.  The four questions were; ‘I had no major problems on return from deployment’ 
(this item was reverse scored); ‘I found it difficult to adjust to being back home’; ‘I found it 
difficult to resume my normal social activities’ and ‘I had other major problems on return from 
deployment’.  Each question was answered using a dichotomous response indicating agreement 
or disagreement.  A positive response to any of the questions was taken to mean that a re-
adjustment problem had occurred.  The scale was summated and a binary variable was generated 
reflecting whether re-adjustment was present, as indicated by one or more endorsements, or 
absent, represented by no endorsements. 
 
Leadership and Combat Exposure 
 
Leadership and combat exposure were assessed using the scales described in the general methods 
chapter.  For leadership, a binary variable was generated where the endorsement of three or more 
of the leader behaviours represented high levels of leadership and two or fewer indicated lower 
levels.  Leadership was used as a covariate in the generation of propensity scores.  For the 
combat and operational exposure scale, tertiles were generated from summated scores for the 
whole scale.  The study groups were then stratified by level of combat exposure with high levels 
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of exposure represented by scores falling above the upper tertile, moderate exposure by scores 
situated between the middle and lower tertile and the lowest exposure levels by scores falling 




Random assignment to receive or not to receive an intervention is normally used in robust 
outcome studies in an attempt to ensure that receipt or non-receipt of the intervention is the only 
differentiating factor between two study groups.  In this way, a control group can be used to 
evaluate the effects of non-intervention.  The general principle of propensity score matching is 
that when randomisation is absent, as is the case with observational data, propensity score 
matching can be used to identify subjects who received an intervention who have similar, but not 
necessarily identical characteristics to those who did not receive the intervention.  The propensity 
score therefore represents the probability that a subject in the combined sample of intervention 
and non-intervention subjects receives the intervention, based upon a set of observed variables.  
The differential effects of intervention between two matched subjects can then be estimated and 
when this effect is averaged across the whole study sample, the overall effect of the intervention 
can be estimated.  As the subjects in this study were not randomised to receive TLD and the 
delineating independent variable was receipt of the TLD intervention, propensity scores were 
thought to be appropriate and were used to minimise bias.  In this study, the propensity score 
(PS) summarised the probability of receiving TLD as a decimal which was calculated using an 
algorithm.  Socio-demographic, military and operational characteristics with a theoretical link to 
attendance or non-attendance at TLD were entered into the calculation.  Theoretically, many 
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participants with the same propensity score are likely to appear in both the TLD attendance and 
non-attendance samples, therefore the samples should be approximately balanced on the 
variables predicting the propensity score.  However, the successful calculation of propensity 
scores relies upon having a full dataset with very little missing data and that data be gathered 
from the same source using a similar instrument (Heinrich et al., 2010).  If any of the observed 
covariate fields within the dataset contain even relatively small quantities of missing data, the 
calculation will fail.  The KCMHR dataset was sufficiently complete for the purpose of 
generating propensity scores. 
 
Covariates selected for inclusion in the calculation of the PS were those that hypothetically could 
have been sources of potential bias and included: 
 
Combat role, which has three sub-categories.  These are: combat arm personnel, who engage the 
enemy; combat support arm personnel, who provide direct support for combat personnel and 
combat service support arm personnel, who provide logistic, medical and general support.  This 
variable was used in the calculation of the PS as those with potentially greater exposure to the 
rigours of combat might be directed to attend TLD by their commanders to alleviate the effects 
of combat fatigue. 
 
The remaining variables used were: 
 
1. Younger (≤24 years) versus older age (≥25 years); younger personnel were likely to be of 




2. Engagement type; reserve forces personnel were less likely than regular forces personnel 
to be found in formed units and were less likely to be required to attend TLD at the time 
that data were collected for this study. 
 
3. IA or formed unit deployment; at the time of data collection personnel in the IA category 
were less likely to attend TLD. 
 
4. Being in a long-term relationship or not; personnel who are in a long term relationship 
are theoretically more likely to attempt to bypass TLD to return to their loved ones as 
early as possible. 
 
5. Leadership levels; theoretically, good leaders are more likely to seek to ensure that 
personnel under their command attend TLD as they are concerned for their subordinates 
welfare. 
 
6. Time since deployment; operational deployments are broken up into six month segments 
or phases which are sequentially numbered.  The end dates of the various operational 
phases were known to the researcher and the operational phase within which each subject 
deployed was also known.  Military units return from deployment at various times over a 
six week period at the end of each deployment phase and it was difficult to be precise 
about the exact date of attendance at TLD or the date of return home.  To account for a 
potential delay in returning home, which can happen for some, particularly for personnel 
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with a logistics role, attendance at TLD or the return home was estimated to have 
occurred within a three month period following the end of each of the operational phases. 
 
As sample sizes increase, the PS captures incrementally greater amounts of the variation in the 
covariates related to receiving the intervention (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and has a higher 
likelihood of balancing the distribution of the covariates across intervention and non-intervention 
samples (Rosenbaum, 2002).  Using the ‘area of common support’ option in the statistical 
programme, it was possible to check that there were sufficient numbers of individuals who 
shared similar propensity scores amongst the TLD attendance and non-attendance samples 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2002).  The results of this element of the analysis suggested that the 
distribution of the observed baseline covariates was sufficiently similar between attendees and 
non-attendees for the calculation of the PS to proceed (Austin, 2011).  Using further equations in 
the statistical package, following the application of the PS, the balance of the model was checked 
to ensure that the distribution of the covariates was the similar among the attendance and non-
attendance samples.  The diagnostic tests generated six strata of subjects with similar propensity 
scores; with the exception of military rank, each of the selected covariates was balanced across 
subjects in each of the strata thus indicating a robust model.  When imbalances occur, the model 
is rejected and the covariate causing the imbalance is reported.  Imbalances usually occur when 
covariate fields are insufficiently populated or are substantially skewed; the variable must be 
deleted before re-evaluating the PS balance in the dataset sub-samples.  The general function of 
the PS is to summarise the chosen covariates which are represented as a single decimal for each 
subject.  In the current study, the rank variable was not included in the final PS calculation as it 
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was unequally distributed across the two samples and could not be balanced.  This variable was 
therefore adjusted for in the final regression analyses. 
 
PS scores can be used in a variety of ways when comparing samples.  In the current study, 
inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) were calculated and applied to the dataset prior 
to conducting regression analyses.  The IPTW was generated by dividing 1 by the propensity 
score for attendees and 1 divided by 1 minus the propensity score for non-attendees.  In theory, 
when the PS derived IPTWs are applied, a pseudo-randomisation effect is achieved which allows 
any researcher using longitudinal data to make causal inferences about receiving or not receiving 
and intervention with greater confidence.  A composite weight was generated by multiplying the 
sample and response weight described earlier by the IPTW. 
 
Analyses were undertaken using the statistical software package Stata version 10.1.  As the data 
were weighted, the analyses presented in this study used the survey (svy) command in Stata.  All 
categorical variables were examined using Pearson’s chi Squared Test using Scott and Rao’s 
second order correction to account for weighted data (Rao and Scott, 1984).  Outcomes were 
examined using weighted multivariable logistic regression to generate odds ratios with 95% 
confidence intervals which were adjusted for rank and the statistical significance of the effect of 
combat exposure was calculated through Wald's test.  Weighted percentages and odds ratios 






To assess whether TLD promoted better readjustment and mental health in attendees, differences 
in post-deployment re-adjustment and longer term mental health were compared with a non-
attendance sample.  3071 personnel fulfilled the inclusion criteria for the study; 45.8% (n=1407) 
were TLD attendees and 54.2% (n=1664) formed the non-intervention (control) group.  The TLD 
group were younger and of lower rank than the control group; 46% (n=790) of the controls were 
aged 18-30 compared to 55.4% (n=828) of the TLD attendees (p<0.001); there were significantly 
more combat support arm personnel in the control group; 13.4% (n=208) of the controls were 
from the combat support arm compared to 8.3% (n=114) of the TLD attendees (p <0.01).  In all 
other respects, the socio-demographic characteristics of the two samples were not significantly 




Table 12.  Demographic Characteristics TLD Participants and Controls 
 
Socio-Demographic Factors (n) **Controls n (%) TLD n (%) *p= 
Age at Phase 2 (in years) (2971)   p<0.001 
18-20 (120) 31 (2.1) 89 (3.3)   
21-25 (733) 319 (20.9) 414 (23.9)  
26-30 (715) 390 (23.0) 325 (28.2)  
31-35 (545) 339 (21.3) 206 (19.5)  
36-40 (510) 329 (20.6) 181 (18.4)  
41-45 (191) 138 (7.6) 53 (4.8)  
≥46 Years (157) 118 (4.6) 39 (1.9)  
Engagement Type (3071)   p=0.6 
Regular (2733) 1517 (94.3) 1216 (94.7)  
Reserve (338) 147 (5.7) 191 (5.3)  
Role (2971)   p<0.01 
Combat (936) 385 (32.3) 551 (33.8)  
Combat Support Arm (322) 208 (13.4) 114 (8.3)  
Combat Service Support (1713) 1071 (54.4) 642 (57.9)  
Service (3071)   p=0.60 
Army (2898) 1578 (95.7) 1320 (95.3)  
RM (173) 86 (4.3) 87 (4.8)  
Sex (3071)   p=0.17 
Male (2846) 1515 (94.5) 1331 (92.8)  
Female (225) 149 (5.5) 76 (7.2)  
Relationship Status (2958)   p=0.3 
In a Long-Term Relationship (2157) 1248 (74.3) 909 (76.3)  
Not In a Long-Term Relationship (801) 413 (25.7) 388 (23.8)  
Rank (2971)   p<0.0001 
Senior Officer (75) 67 (2.8) 8 (0.6)  
Officer (504) 337 (14.8) 167 (11.3)  
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer - SNCO (736) 486 (33.3) 250 (28.4)  
Junior Non-Commissioned Officer - JNCO (1020) 540 (33.4) 480 (39.1)  
Junior Rank (636) 234 (15.6) 402 (20.5)  
IA vs. FU Personnel (2908)   p=0.51 
FU Personnel (2555) 1363 (87.7) 1192 (89.1)  
IA Personnel (353) 291 (12.3) 62 (10.9)  
 
*P values are for Pearson chi Squared Test corrected for weighting using Rao and Scott second order corrections 
**n’s are shown without the composite weight applied, %s are shown with the composite weight applied 
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There were no significant differences in the levels of post-deployment re-adjustment problems 
reported by TLD attendees and controls.  There were, however, significant differences in 
probable PTSD; approximately 3.0% of TLD attendees reported PTSD compared with 4.5% of 
controls (AOR 0.57 95% CI 0.36-0.91); TLD attendees were significantly less likely than 
controls to report MPS caseness (6.6% vs. 9.4%, AOR 0.65 95% CI 0.45-0.95).  In addition, 
attendees were less likely than controls to report harmful levels of alcohol use (16.8% vs. 19.5% 
of controls, AOR 0.74 95% CI 0.54-1.00).  All other differences were not significant.  The 
results of these analyses are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. TLD Mental Health Outcomes - Attendees vs. Controls 
 
 Study Group 
**Outcome (n) Control n (%) TLD n (%) 
PCL-C Score ≥50 
Case (123) 68 (4.5) 55 (3.0) 
No Case (2813) 1583 (95.5) 1230 (97.0) 
AOR (95% CI) 1 0.57 (0.36-0.91) 
GHQ-12 4 Symptom Cut Off (CMD) 
Case (573) 355 (21.4) 218 (17.9) 
No Case (2350) 1293 (78.6) 1057 (82.1) 
AOR (95% CI) 1 0.80 (0.56-1.13) 
Multiple Physical Symptoms ≥18 (MPS) 
Case (229) 140 (9.4) 89 (6.6) 
No Case n (2488) 1381 (90.6) 1107 (93.4) 
AOR (95% CI) 1 0.65 (0.45-0.95) 
AUDIT Score ≥16 
Case (529) 285 (19.5) 244 (16.8) 
No Case (2382) 1355 (80.5) 1027 (83.2) 
AOR (95% CI) 1 0.74 (0.54-1.00) 
Health Rating 
Excellent, Very Good or Good (1408) 764 (45.2) 644 (48.7) 
Fair or Poor (1548) 894 (54.8) 654 (51.3) 
AOR (95% CI) 1 1.14 (0.88-1.47) 
Re-adjustment Problems 
None (1501) 900 (51.2) 601 (51.5) 
One or More (1393) 755 (48.8) 638 (48.5) 
AOR (95% CI) 1 0.93 (0.72-1.20) 
 
* All ORs adjusted for Rank 
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To assess whether differences in mental health status might be a potential source of bias, a 
comparison was made between the mental health status of the TLD and non-TLD groups at 
baseline, represented by data collected at phase 1 of the cohort study for those subjects where 
data were available (TLD n= 886, Control n= 608).  The results suggested that there were no 
significant differences between the two groups.  Controls reported similar levels of PTSD, 
(3.1% vs. 3.1%, p= 0.93), symptoms of CMD (20.8% vs. 19.3%, p= 0.60) and MPS caseness 
(9.1% vs. 9.6%, p= 0.82) to TLD attendees.  Levels of harmful alcohol use were also similar 
in both samples (18.4% vs. 20.0%, p= 0.56) 
 
In analyses stratified by level of combat exposure, the greatest effect for TLD appeared to be 
within the medium combat exposure level group where attendees were significantly less 
likely than controls to report probable PTSD symptoms (1.8% vs. 4.7% AOR 0.35 95% CI 
0.14-0.88) and MPS (5.3% vs. 10.5% AOR 0.47 95% CI 0.23-0.93).  Within the lowest 
combat exposure level groups, attendees were less likely to report symptoms of CMD (10.8 
vs. 17.7% AOR 0.57 95% CI 0.33-0.96).  No significant effects for TLD were detected for 
readjustment or mental health among the highest combat exposure level group (Table 14).  




Table 14.  Mental Health Outcomes - TLD Attendees and Controls Stratified by Level of Combat Exposure 
 
Study Groups Stratified by Combat Exposure Level 












Wald Test F p= 
PCL-C Score ≥50         
F=7.38 p<0.001 Case n (%) 38 (5.7) 35 (9.0)  11 (1.8) 21 (4.7)  5 (0.9) 10 (1.4) 
No Case n (%) 495 (94.3) 343 (91.0)  336 (98.2) 510 (95.3)  342 (99.1) 722 (98.6) 
AOR (95% CI) 0.59 (0.32-2.00) 1  0.35 (0.14-0.88) 1  0.56 (0.14-2.24) 1  
GHQ-12 4 Symptom Cut Off (CMD)         
F= 3.64 p <0.01 Case n (%) 107 (24.3) 100 (26.4)  54 (17.9) 115 (22.2)  49 (10.8) 137 (17.7) 
No Case n (%) 420  (75.7) 278 (73.6)  291 (82.1) 416 (77.8)  296 (89.2) 592 (82.3) 
AOR (95% CI) 0.89 (0.52-1.54) 1  0.76 (0.42-1.39) 1  0.57 (0.33-0.96) 1  
Multiple Physical Symptoms ≥18         
F=6.14 p <0.001 Case n (%) 58 (11.3) 48 (14.1)  19 (5.3) 48 (10.5)  10 (2.4) 44 (5.6) 
No Case n (%) 444.(88.7) 306 (85.9)  303 (95.7) 437 (89.5)  308 (97.6) 629 (94.4) 
AOR (95% CI) 0.94 (0.55-1.59) 1  0.47 (0.23-0.93) 1  0.52 (0.21-1.26) 1  
AUDIT Score ≥16         
F=4.05 p <0.001 Case n (%) 131 (21.9) 96 (26.4)  59 (16.9) 99 (21.1)  41 (10.8) 89 (14.2) 
No Case n (%) 394 (78.1) 281 (73.4)  284 (83.1) 429 (78.9)  303 (89.2) 635 (85.8) 
AOR (95% CI) 0.61 (0.35-1.14) 1  0.72 (0.41-1.29) 1  0.74 (0.48-1.13) 1  
Health Rating         
F=0.63 p =0.68 Excellent, Very Good or Good n (%) 281 (50.6) 172 (45.0)  172 (45.2) 246 (43.7)  164 (50.4) 338 (45.2) 
Fair or Poor n (%) 258 (49.4) 206 (55.0)  177 (54.8) 288 (56.3)  187 (49.6) 397 (54.8) 
AOR (95% CI) 1.24 (0.84-1.84) 1  1.06 (0.69-1.63) 1  1.20 (0.75-1.91) 1  
Re-adjustment Problems         
F=17.49 p <0.001 None n (%) 203 (37.0) 137 (34.8)  177 (51.5) 270 (44.9)  216 (68.5) 487 (65.7) 
One or More n (%) 337 (63.0) 241 (65.2)  166 (48.5) 262 (55.2)  130 (31.5) 246 (34.3) 
AOR (95% CI) 0.88 (0.59-1.32) 1  0.75 (0.48-1.16) 1  0.82 (0.50-1.36) 1  
 
*All AORs adjusted for Rank 




This study evaluated the impact of TLD attendance upon post deployment re-adjustment, mental 
health and alcohol use among deployed UK AF personnel.  It would have been preferable to 
conduct a prospective Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) to assess these outcomes, however, at 
the time of this study TLD was mandatory for all personnel and it was not possible to generate a 
control group.  When data collection for the cohort study took place, TLD was not compulsory 
for all deploying personnel, a group of personnel, representing a potential control group, 
deployed without participating in TLD even though it was available.  Given the nature of the 
cohort dataset, a method of analysis was chosen that helped to minimise bias when using 
observational data.  Two hypotheses were tested, firstly, personnel attending TLD would 
experience similar levels of psycho-social re-integration upon return to their home base to those 
who do not attend TLD.  The main study findings suggested that TLD attendees reported similar 
levels of re-adjustment difficulties to non-attendees irrespective of the level of combat exposure.  
The null hypothesis was supported.  The second hypothesis was that personnel attending TLD 
following operational deployment would report similar levels of symptoms of CMD, PTSD, 
global health, multiple physical symptoms and would experience similar levels of alcohol misuse 
to personnel who did not attend TLD.  In this case, the null hypothesis was not supported.  TLD 
appeared to have a greater positive impact upon symptoms of PTSD, multiple physical 
symptoms and harmful alcohol use, when stratified by level of combat exposure, personnel who 
experienced lower levels of combat exposure appeared to benefit more than those experiencing 
the highest levels.  TLD attendance appears to have mental health benefits, these are not evenly 
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distributed across all personnel; combat and operational experience appears to modulate the 
potential impact of TLD. 
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CHAPTER 6 – PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PREVENTION - PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SUPPORT AMONG UK ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO 




Given the UK Armed Forces’ increasing involvement in counter-insurgency operations and 
asymmetric warfare, little is known about the best ways to support mental health and wellbeing 
during deployment in this context.  The evaluation of deployment mental health in UK Armed 
Forces personnel often relies upon retrospective accounts which may be subject to memory 
distortion.  The aim of this study was therefore to examine the burden of mental ill health and the 
effect of primary and secondary preventative measures including operational, family, welfare 
and medical support using data obtained within the operational area on two occasions some 
eighteen months apart.  2794 personnel completed a paper survey in their deployment location or 
place of work whilst deployed to Afghanistan; 1431 provided data in 2010 and 1363 in 2011.  
Responses obtained from the two groups were compared and contrasted.  The prevalence of self-
reported mental health symptoms was low given the arduous operational environment and was 
not significantly different between the two survey points; the rates of probable PTSD were 2.8% 
in 2010 and 1.8% in 2011; for common mental health disorders, the rates were 17.0% and 16.0% 
respectively.  Rates of stigmatising beliefs concerning mental health help-seeking and perceived 
barriers to accessing care were similar at both survey points with 49.4% of military personnel 
reporting three or more out of 13 potential stigmatising beliefs in 2010 and 47.1% in 2011.  Sub-
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threshold posttraumatic stress symptoms, but not common mental disorder symptoms, were 
significantly more prevalent in both samples when personnel were deployed in more austere, 
exposed and dangerous forward locations.  Rates of reporting the highest levels of combat 
exposure had reduced significantly over time.  46.5% reported the highest levels of such 
exposure in 2010 compared with 36.8% in 2011.  Following adjustment for the year of 
deployment, factors relating to primary prevention including remembering receiving a pre-
deployment psycho-educational briefing, perceptions of good leadership and perceptions that 
support had been provided for the family at home were all significantly associated with better 
deployment mental health.  Seeking support from non-medical sources and reporting sick for 




Since the start of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the psychological health of 
deployed United Kingdom (UK) military personnel has become a high profile political concern 
and is much reported in the media, sometimes in a distorted way.  In addition, various aspects of 
UK military health have been explored in scientific publications including the effects of 
‘overstretch’ where personnel are deployed for excessive cumulative lengths of time (Rona et al., 
2007), high rates of alcohol misuse (Fear et al., 2007) and the gender of the deployed person 
(Woodhead et al., 2012).  However, most of the scientific work on deployment mental health 
support has been conducted with personnel who are stationed in their home bases following 
deployment.  This often results in a variable gap between returning home and completion of the 
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survey.  Asking personnel about what happened to them on deployment may therefore be 
affected by various aspects of memory distortion (Engelhard and McNally, 2014). 
 
In order to find out more about deployment mental health and its support in high threat areas, the 
US forces began surveying military personnel in their deployed location in 2003 (Department of 
the Army, 2012); in 2009, using a similar but not identical methodology, the UK surveyed 
deployed military personnel in Iraq (Mulligan et al., 2010).  The result of this study (termed the 
Operational Mental Health Needs Evaluation Iraq or OMHNE I) suggested that the mental health 
of UK AF personnel on deployment was similar to that reported during surveys of home based 
personnel (Hotopf et al., 2006, Fear et al., 2010).  The OMNHE I found that 20.5% of deployed 
personnel reported symptoms of probable CMD and 3.4% reported probable PTSD symptoms. 
 
OMHNE I took place during the last phase of the UK’s military operations in Iraq during which 
the operational threat level was much decreased compared to previous years; this contrasted 
sharply with the combat intensity experienced by UK AF personnel deployed in Afghanistan at 
that time.  Therefore, in order to better understand the mental health impact of prolonged 
operations in a high threat area, a survey was carried out in the winter of 2010 amongst 1431 
personnel deployed in Afghanistan (the survey was termed OMHNE A1).  The results of the 
survey suggested that approximately 3.0% of personnel were experiencing symptoms of probable 
PTSD and around 17.0% reported symptoms of probable CMD.  The study outcomes suggested 
that, in addition to low levels of stress back at home (Mulligan et al., 2012), good mental health 
on deployment was related to supportive factors such as team cohesion and leadership (Jones et 
al., 2012).  To understand how changes in operational support and the deployed environment 
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may have impacted upon mental health, a survey of deployed personnel was carried out in 
Afghanistan during July and August 2011 (termed OMHNE A2).  Unlike the OMHNE A1, the 
A2 survey was undertaken in the summer to take account of different climactic conditions and 
seasonal variations in combat intensity.  During OMHNE A1, the study team was unable to carry 
out as much forward sampling as had been planned prior to deployment.  This occurred because 
a major coalition offensive operation was underway and transport assets, particular access to 
helicopters was somewhat limited; no such restrictions were present during A2.  Given that being 
in a forward area potentially limits access to potential sources of prevention including medical 
and welfare support, the study team sought to assess whether location and combat environment 
had impacted upon mental health by concentrating the survey effort in more austere, forward 
locations away from the main base areas. 
 
This study compared the mental health of UK personnel who took part in the OMHNE A1 and 
A2 surveys whilst deployed to Afghanistan to evaluate the effect of changes over time in both 
the operational environment and levels of mental health support.  The main focus of the study 
was to assess the impact upon mental health of primary prevention in the form of pre-
deployment psycho-education, family and welfare support and secondary prevention in the form 




In preparation for the OMHNE studies, on both occasions the team leader carried out extensive 
liaison through the UK co-ordinating headquarters with senior commanders responsible for 
personnel and medical issues in the operational area.  Upon arrival in the operational area, 
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further contact was made with key personnel and senior commanders.  This was primarily to 
ensure that arrangements were in place to support the survey team and to ensure that 
commanders were aware of the team’s visit, aims and requirements.  The questionnaires and 
survey equipment were sent by air freight so that delivery coincided with the team’s arrival and 
completion of a five day operational familiarisation and training package.  Prior to commencing 
the surveys, the OMHNE teams were provided with a copy of the current personnel report to 
establish the disposition of the deployed force.  The target sample size on both occasions was 
around 1200 personnel.  This figure represented approximately 15% of around 9000 deployed 
personnel on each occasion.  Approximately 1000 personnel were absent from the operational 
area undertaking rest and recuperation giving a true sample size of around 8000.  The surveys 
were powered on the GHQ-12, to detect an 18 to 22% prevalence of common mental disorder 
with a confidence level of 95%. 
 
Secure data storage was achieved by using a padlocked and chained metal box used for air-
freighting the survey hardware and scanning equipment to the operational area.  A second 
lockable trunk was used for the secure storage of completed questionnaires which were retained 
for backup purposes until all data entry was complete. 
 
Distribution of the questionnaires was mainly conducted by the OMHNE survey teams.  In most 
locations the local commander agreed to assemble all available personnel in a central location in 
order to receive a formal verbal briefing from a member of the survey team prior to the surveys 
being distributed.  All participants were offered the opportunity to refuse participation or to 
withdraw at any time.  This was based upon a written script.  The survey procedure was endorsed 
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by the MoD research ethics committee (Ref: 0839/194 dated September 2008) with amendments 
for the current survey endorsed in September 2009.  For some units conducting deployments 
outside the main operating base, making access to participants difficult, commanders were asked 
to deliver a scripted brief prior to administering the survey which was also made available in 
printed form for participants to read if they wished to.  The completed surveys were then collated 
and stored securely for collection by the OMHNE team.  The survey team recorded the survey 
location and made notes on items of interest in a blank area of the questionnaire as required.  To 
maximise movement around the operational area and to offset any potential difficulties arising 
from flight logistical problems, the team undertook the survey as individuals or sometimes in 
pairs. 
 
Completed surveys were scanned into a Remark
TM
 software database, having been produced 
using the Remark
TM
 software template editor with an electronic scanner.  This allowed the 
software to ‘read’ the completed boxes on the questionnaire and convert them to numerical 
information which was transferred to a Statistical Package for Social Sciences Version 15 
database (SPSS v15) for the purpose of analysis.  Prior to export, data were ‘cleaned’ manually 
using the software’s inbuilt utility to improve the accuracy of the scanned data when the 
respondent’s answers had been incorrectly read.  The cleaning process was performed by 
examining digital images of the completed questionnaire stored within the software data storage 
area and updating the associated dataset.  The team leader then carried out a 100% fidelity check 
of the entered data.  Once the scanned data had been cleaned and backed-up, hard copies of the 
questionnaires were destroyed by shredding and then burning. 
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During both surveys, the survey teams consisted of both military mental health professionals and 
general military personnel.  The mental health team members were responsible for advising 
about mental health-related matters and the purely military members were responsible for 
general logistics and gave military advice to the team.  Although the sampling was broadly 
representative of the deployed force, a decision was taken prior to each visit to over-sample 
groups who were deemed to be at potentially higher psychological risk, such as the Counter-IED 
Task Force (CIED-TF), colloquially, but not militarily, known as bomb disposal personnel, 
medical personnel, Special Investigations Branch (SIB) personnel who travel widely within the 
operational area to investigate every UK AF death, Military Police, Joint Helicopter Force and 
Defence Fire Service personnel who receive helicopter-borne casualties and transport them to the 
treatment facility.  In ideal circumstances, a random sampling strategy would allow for the study 
findings to be reliably extrapolated to the whole deployed population as random selection helps 
to minimise the likelihood that the results obtained are due to confounding factors overly present 
or absent in the sample but not in the force as a whole.  Due to operational constraints and the 
requirement to continually adapt the visit plan, a cluster-based, purposive sampling strategy was 
used during each visit to capture various groups as truly random sampling was not possible.  The 
visit plans were drawn up prior to the team landing in the operational area and sought to ensure 
that personnel working in the locations to be visited and sampled were representative of the 
deployment profile of the overall force.  Fewer forward locations were visited than planned 
during OMHNE A1, such as Check Points (CPs) and Patrol Bases (PBs) positioned in more 
austere and exposed areas.  In order to maximise the forward survey focus during OMHNE A2, 
the survey team sought to ensure that as many forward locations as possible were visited and that 
personnel surveyed in relatively safe main operating bases (MOBs) were drawn from units that 
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undertook frequent, mostly combat or combat logistic patrols in potentially dangerous areas 
outside the base location. 
 
During both surveys, fully informed signed consent to participate was obtained from respondents 
who gave their personal details.  Others were given the opportunity to complete the survey 
anonymously if they wanted no further contact from the survey team.  In this case, completion of 
the survey constituted implied consent.  The survey team recorded the number of refusals but no 
identifiable information.  The core of the survey instrument was retained between visits to ensure 
that a robust comparison of the two visits could be undertaken.  The instrument used in the 2011 
survey is contained in Appendix 2. 
 
In both surveys, the standard mental health measures, the GHQ-12, PCL-C, subjective global 
health and functional impairment with the standard cut-off scores and case definitions were used.  
On this occasion PCL-C scores ≥30 were used to ensure that the survey captured not only 
probable PTSD cases, but also personnel who reported sub-threshold PTSD symptoms as these 
have been shown to be associated with functional impairment in previous research (Rona et al., 
2009); hereafter, respondents who reported PCL-C scores ≥30 are classified as exhibiting sub-
threshold PTSD symptoms and those reporting PCL-C scores of ≥50 as probable PTSD cases.  
To determine the association of a range of variables with mental health overall, CMD and PTSD 
cases were conflated to produce a single variable labelled ‘any mental health disorder’. 
 
In this study, a combat exposure variable was generated by summating any positive responses 
(scores greater than 0) to the 17 items of the operational experiences scale described earlier in 
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this thesis.  Each of the operational experiences questions had a score of 0, 1, 3, 7 and 10 
assigned to the five potential response options to reflect increasing frequency of exposure.  The 
final scale had a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 170.  Tertiles were generated 
from the summed scores for this scale and the middle and lower tertiles were combined so that a 
comparison could be made between the highest levels of combat exposure and all others. 
 
Morale, leadership and cohesion were each assessed using the four item measures described in 
the general methods chapter.  Each scale was dealt with in a similar manner where individual 
scale items were first reduced to binary variables (indicating presence or absence, endorsement 
or non-endorsement) and then converted to count variables.  This was achieved by combining 
strongly agree and agree responses and strongly disagree and disagree responses. For each scale, 
the cut-off points were 3 out of 4 endorsements to represent high levels of each factor. 
 
The 13 item version of the mental health stigmatisation scale was included using a cut-off point 
of three endorsed items to indicate higher levels of stigmatising beliefs and perceived barriers to 
help-seeking.  The stigma/BTC scale items were grouped into three categories representing 
internal stigma (stigmatisation relating to the self), external (stigmatisation relating to others) and 
perceived barriers to care (impediments to help-seeking). 
 
Finally, the survey contained several groups of questions regarding aspects of deployment 
support.  This included pre-deployment preparation in the form of psycho-education, where 
personnel were asked ‘Did you receive a stress brief prior to this deployment?’  Perceptions of 
family and welfare support at home was assessed by asking ‘Has the military provided any 
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reassurance or support to your family (parents, siblings, partner or spouse) whilst you have been 
on this deployment? (e.g. phone calls or visits, arranging 'get-togethers' with other service 
families, newsletters etc.).  Finally, respondents were asked about the use of deployed medical 




The standard analytic approach was adopted whereby data were first explored using Pearson’s 
chi squared tests and then further examined using unadjusted and adjusted univariable and 
multivariable logistic regression.  In addition to the year of deployment, predictor variables were 
adjusted for socio-demographic characteristics that have been shown to be important in previous 
UK AF studies.  These included age, Service background, engagement type and sex (Fear et al., 
2010).  Confounders also included those where the nature of the deployment and characteristics 
of the operational area might theoretically be linked to mental health such as combat exposure, 
deploying without other unit members, being in a relationship (reflecting potential social 
support), deployment location and shorter vs. longer periods spent in the operational area, 
reflecting potential exposure to cumulative operational stress.  Confounding variables related to 
non-deployment factors included the presence of home front concerns (Mulligan et al., 2012), 
having dependant children, time spent away from home and time spent on previous deployments 
(Rona et al., 2007).  For this study, trends in the data were examined using chi-Squared (χ
2
) test 




2794 personnel took part in the surveys; refusal to participate and returning spoiled or 
incomplete questionnaires was minimal, resulting in a response rate of 99.6% during OMHNE 
A1 (n=1431) and 95.8% during OMHNE A2 (n=1363).  During the A2 survey, 68.7% of the 
participants were located in forward areas (CPs, PBs and forward operating bases (FOBs) rather 
than MOBs) contrasting with 35.7% in forward areas during A1 (χ2=350.54, d.f.1, p<0.001). 
 
Socio-demographic, Military and Operational Factors 
 
The socio-demographic characteristics of the two samples differed significantly in a number of 
ways.  The A1 sample contained greater numbers of Army and Royal Marines and marginally 
fewer RAF and Royal Navy personnel than the A2 sample.  Significantly greater numbers of 
reserve forces took part in A1 (A1 6.9% n=98 vs. A2 4.6% n=60, p<0.01).  Although the age 
categories differed significantly, the difference in the proportions of personnel under 24 years of 
age, a group known to be at greater risk of mental health disorder, was not significant (A1 42.3% 
vs. A2 40.2%, p=0.26).  A2 contained a significantly greater number of personnel with 
dependant children (A1 64.2% vs. A2 69.0% p<0.01), significantly fewer individual augmentees 
(A1 8.7% vs. A2 6.7%, p<0.05) and significantly fewer operationally experienced personnel (A1 
40.0% vs. A2 50.5%, p<0.001).  A2 had significantly more experienced personnel with longer 
lengths of service (A1 58.0% vs. A2 62.9% p=0.01).  Although the proportions of the three 
combat role categories were significantly different in the two samples, the proportions of combat 
personnel (those undertaking direct combat missions, engaging the enemy and most at risk of 
poorer mental health) were similar (A1 53.7% n=769. A2 51.8% n=706 χ
2
=1.05, d.f.1, p=0.30).  
The levels of general combat exposure differed significantly between the two samples.  During 
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A1, 46.5% (n=661) of personnel reported experiences falling within the upper tertile of combat 
exposure compared to 36.8% (n=501) of A2 personnel (χ
2
=27.09, d.f.1, p<0.001).  All of the 
socio-demographic, military and operational variables that differed significantly between the A1 
and A2 samples were treated as observed confounding variables when conducting subsequent 
regression analyses.  When compared with whole Service data (where it was available) in both 
OMHNE samples, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy personnel were under-represented as were 
officers, senior non-commissioned officers, reserve forces and both samples were younger than 
would be expected in a whole force representative sample (Table 15). 
 
Mental Health Outcomes 
 
Overall, the mental health outcomes generated from the two surveys were not significantly 
different, although the prevalence of probable PTSD (caseness) was borderline non-significant 
with a rate of 2.8% during A1 and 1.8% during A2 (Adjusted Odds Ratio (AOR) 2.12, 95% 
Confidence Interval (CI) 0.99-4.53).  For common mental health disorders the rate was 17.0% 
during A1 and 16.0% during A2 (AOR 0.90, 95% CI 0.68-1.19).  94.1% of A1 personnel rated 
their global health as good, very good or excellent compared with 93.3% of A2 personnel and the 
difference was not statistically significant.  The rate of reporting a PCL-C score ≥30 was 16.5% 
during A1 and 14.4% during A2, which was not statistically significant, and functional 
impairment related to PTSD symptoms was not significantly different between the two surveys 
(22.2% during A1 vs. 20.2% during A2).  During both deployments, PCL-C ≥30 scores (sub-
threshold PTSD) were more prevalent in more austere, exposed and dangerous locations; for the 
combined samples the rates of symptoms in rear through to forward locations respectively were 
MOB 13.1%, FOB 17.1%, PB 18.2%, CP 17.8% and for those accompanying Afghanistan Army 
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patrols, the rate was 20.6%.  There was a statistically significant trend for experiencing more 
sub-threshold symptoms with progressively forward deployment (χ
2
 test for linear trend =7.83, 
p<0.05).  CMD symptoms occurred at a similar rate irrespective of location in the operational 
area.  Of the PCL-C ≥30 cases in both samples (n=415), 67.2% (n=279) reported being 
somewhat, very much or extremely functionally impaired compared to 11.9% (n=246) of non-
cases (n=2063) (χ2= 632.86, d.f.1 p<0.001).  The mental health outcomes are shown in Table 16. 
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Table 15.  Demographic and Operational Characteristics OMHNE Sample 
Characteristic (n) Category (n) A1 n (%) A2 n (%) **DS ***χ2, d.f., p 
Service (2794) 
Royal Navy (117) 18 (1.3) 99 (7.3) **20.3 
χ
2=71.87, d.f.2, p<0.001 Army and Royal Marines (2446) 1313 (91.8) 1133 (83.1) 55.5 
RAF (231) 100 (7.0) 131 (9.6) 24.2 
Rank (2790) 
Junior Rank (2085) 1051 (73.4) 1034 (76.1) 60.2 
χ
2=2.59, d.f.2, p=NS Senior Rank (392) 212 (14.8) 180 (13.2) 22.7 
Officer (313) 168 (11.7) 145 (10.7) 17.1 
Sex (2769) 
Male (2558) 1308 (91.7) 1250 (93.1) 90.4 
χ
2=2.16, d.f.1, p=NS 
Female (211) 119 (8.3) 92 (6.9) 9.6 
Engagement Type 
(2723) 
Regular Forces (2565) 1315 (93.1) 1250 (95.4) 90.9 
χ
2=6.90, d.f.1, p<0.01 
Reserve Forces (158) 98 (6.9) 60 (4.6) ****9.1 
Age Group (2790) 
18-24 Years (1152) 605 (42.3) 547 (40.2) 28.2 
χ
2=8.23, d.f.2, p<0.01 25-34 Years (1162) 561 (39.2) 601 (44.2) 39.6 
35-44 Years (414) 264 (18.5) 212 (15.6) 32.2 
Relationship Status 
(2787) 














2=0.18, d.f.1, p=NS 
Single (953) 483 (33.8) 470 (34.6) 
Service Length 
(2630) 
<1 Year (91) 70 (5.2) 21 (1.7) 
χ
2=27.02, d.f.4, p<0.001 
2-4 Years (951) 500 (36.8) 451 (35.5) 
5-12 Years (1030) 505 (37.2) 525 (41.3) 
13-22 Years (461) 231 (17.0) 230 (18.1) 
≥22 Years (97) 52 (3.8) 45 (3.4) 
Dependant children 
(2755) 
Yes (1832) 919 (64.2) 913 (69.0) 
χ
2=6.93, d.f.1, p<0.01 
No (923) 512 (35.8) 411 (31.0) 
Deployment (2794) 
0-1 Previous Deployment (1533) 858 (60.0) 675 (49.5) 
χ
2=30.70, d.f.1, p<0.001 
≥2 Previous Deployment (1261) 573 (40.0) 688 (50.5) 
IA or FU Personnel 
(2794) 
Formed Unit Personnel (2578) 1306 (91.3) 1272 (93.3) 
χ
2=4.15, d.f.1, p<0.05 
Individual Augmentee (216) 125 (8.7) 91 (6.7) 
Length of Time 
Deployed (2773) 
0-4 Weeks (185) 119 (8.4) 66 (4.9) 
χ
2=171.06, d.f.4, p<0.001 
5-8 Weeks (280) 200 (14.1) 80 (5.9) 
9-16 Weeks (857) 355 (25.0) 502 (37.2) 
17-26 Weeks (1310) 625 (44.0) 685 (50.7) 




Check Point (300) 0 (0.0) 300 (22.1) 
χ
2=819.62, d.f.3, p<0.001 
Patrol Base (525) 82 (5.7) 443 (32.6) 
Forward Operating Base (618) 428 (30.0) 190 (14.0) 
*Main Operating Base (1343) 918 (64.3) 425 (31.3) 
Combat Arm or 
Role (2794) 
Combat (1475) 769 (53.7) 740 (51.8) 
χ
2=15.85, d.f.2, p<0.001 Combat Support (506) 220 (15.4) 286 (21.0) 
Combat Service Support (813) 442 (30.9) 371 (27.2) 
Combat Exposure 
(2783) 
Upper Tertile (1162) 661 (46.5) 501 (36.8) 
χ
2=27.09, d.f.1, p<0.001 
Middle and Lower Tertile (1621) 760 (53.5) 861 (63.2) 
*Personnel accompanying the Afghanistan Army were collapsed into the MOB category as they are often located in base areas between missions. 
**DS stands for Defence Statistics 
***For the difference between A1 and A2 
****Deployed reserve forces. 
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Table 16.  OMHNE Sample - Mental Health Outcomes 
 
Mental Health Outcome A1 n (%) A2 n (%) 
Global Health 
Excellent, Very Good or Good (2610) 1341 (94.1) 1269 (93.3) 
Poor/Fair (175) 84 (5.9) 91 (6.7) 
*AOR 1 1.11 (0.72-1.70) 
Common Mental Disorder 
CMD Not a Case (2320) 1179 (83.0) 1141 (84.0) 
CMD Case (460) 242 (17.0) 218 (16.0) 
*AOR 1 0.90 (0.68-1.19) 
PTSD 
PTSD Not a Case (2713) 1378 (97.2) 1335 (98.2) 
PTSD Case (63) 39 (2.8) 24 (1.8) 
*AOR 1 2.12 (0.99-4.53) 
Sub-threshold PTSD Symptoms 
Sub-threshold PTSD Symptoms (PCL Cut Off ≤29) (2346) 1183 (83.5) 1163 (85.6) 
Sub-threshold PTSD Symptoms (PCL Cut Off ≥30) (430) 234 (16.5) 196 (14.4) 
*AOR 1 1.27 (0.94-1.70) 
Functional Impairment 
No Functional Impairment (1955) 957 (77.8) 998 (79.8) 
Somewhat very or extremely Functionally Impaired (525) 273 (22.2) 252 (20.2) 
*AOR 1 1.03 (0.79-1.35) 
Stigmatising Beliefs and Barriers to Care (2620) 
Stigmatising Beliefs and Barriers to Care ≤2 Item (1354) 681 (50.6) 673 (52.9) 
Stigmatising Beliefs and Barriers to Care ≥3 Items (1266) 666 (49.4) 600 (47.1) 
*AOR 1 1.09 (0.88-1.34) 
*AOR Adjusted for data capture during 2010 vs. 2011, Rank, Service Background, Engagement Type, Individual Augmentee vs. Formed Unit, 
Sex, Relationship Status, Dependant children, CP and PB vs. FOB and MOB, Combat Exposure, previous tours, shorter vs. longer period in 
operational area, Family Support, Good vs. Poorer Leadership. 
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Perceived Stigmatisation and Perceived Barriers to Care Scale Components 
 
Similar numbers of survey respondents reported three or more stigmatising beliefs about having 
a mental health problem (stigma) and/or barriers to care (BTC) at both survey points, (A1 49.4% 
vs. A2 47.1%, AOR 1.09, 95% CI 0.88-1.34).  Any mental health disorder caseness was 
significantly associated with reporting ≥3 stigma/BTC items at both assessment points (A1 cases: 
69.5% (n=169) vs. 45.0% non-cases (n=495), χ2=47.8, d.f.=1, p<0.001), (A2: 65.9 (n=139) vs. 
43.4% non-cases (n=460) , χ2=35.8, d.f=1, p<0.001).  (Table 16) 
 
Responses given by A1 and A2 participants to each of the 13 items that constituted the perceived 
stigmatisation and barriers to care scale were compared and stigma/BTC were found to be 
consistently reported at similar levels with the exception of firstly, beliefs about potential 
breaches of confidentiality if mental health support were to be sought and secondly, not knowing 
where to get help.  Both items were reported at significantly lower levels during the later 
deployment.  Additionally, the rank order of stigma/BTC items within the three categories, 
internal stigma, external stigma and perceived barriers to care, were similar at both survey 
points. (Table 17) 
  
 168
Table 17.  OMHNE Sample - Stigmatising Beliefs and Barriers to Care 
 







 d.f. p 
Internal Stigmatisation 
Members of my unit might have less confidence in me 611 (45.4) 549 (43.4) χ2=0.12 d.f.1 p=0.29 
My unit leaders might treat me differently 590 (44.3) 550 (43.3) χ2=0.13 d.f.1 p=0.72 
I would be seen as weak by those who are important to me 483 (36.0) 434 (34.3 χ2=0.81 d.f.1 p=0.37 
Seeking help would be too embarrassing 344 (25.6) 292 (22.9) χ2=2.65 d.f.1 p=0.10 
If I sought help it would harm my career 398 (29.6) 376 (29.6) χ2=0.00 d.f.1 p=1.00 
External Stigmatisation 
People with mental illness should not be given any responsibility 500 (37.1) 439 (34.4) χ2=2.15 d.f.1 p=0.14 
I would think less of a team member if they receive MH care 154 (11.5) 145 (11.5) χ2=0.00 d.f.1 p=1.00 
Perceived Barriers to Care 
There would be difficulty getting time off of duty 399 (29.9) 352 (27.7) χ2=1.49 d.f.1 p=0.22 
My visit would not remain confidential 285 (21.2) 225 (17.8) χ2=4.76 d.f.1 p<0.05 
I don’t know where to get help 170 (12.6) 117 (9.2) χ2=7.97 d.f.1 p<0.01 
I don’t trust mental health professionals 144 (10.7) 135 (10.6) χ2=0.01 d.f.1 p=0.94 
My leaders discourage the use of MH services 56 (4.2) 54 (4.3) χ2=0.02 d.f.1 p=0.90 
I have had previous bad experience of MH professionals 57 (4.3) 54 (4.3) χ2=0.00 d.f.1 p=1.00 
*Stem question - Here is a list of concerns that you might have when considering seeking help for a stressful, emotional, mental health or family 
problem.  Please rate each of the possible concerns that might affect YOUR decision to receive help. 
 
Leadership, Morale and Cohesion 
 
Subjective impressions of leadership were generally high and remained fairly constant across the 
two surveys.  67.1% of personnel endorsed ≥3 out of 4 positive leadership statements during A1 
compared to 66.7% during A2 (p=0.80).  Despite continued high levels of endorsement, the 
proportion of personnel reporting that their leaders showed concern for their safety had fallen 
significantly from 91.3% during A1 to 89.0% during A2.  For perceptions of unit cohesion, 
70.5% endorsed ≥3 out of 4 positive cohesion statements during A1 compared to 67.7% during 
A2 (p=0.12).  All morale items were endorsed at lower levels during A2, however, the 
proportion of respondents endorsing the highest levels of morale, represented by the 
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endorsement of ≥3 out of 4 positive morale statements increased from 70.0% during A1 to 
76.5% during A2 (p<0.001).  The detail of the responses given to the leadership, cohesion and 
morale scale items is shown in Table 18. 
 










Leadership ‘my leaders never or seldom…’ 
Embarrass unit members in front of others 953 (67.3) 957 (70.5) χ2=3.35, d.f.1, p=0.07 
Accept extra unit duties in order to impress their seniors 746 (52.9) 732 (54.4) χ2=0.63, d.f.1, p=0.43 
Leadership ‘my leaders often or always…’ 
Treat all members of the unit fairly 1161 (82.2) 1084 (80.1) χ2=1.89, d.f.1, p=0.17 
Show concern about the safety of unit members 1294 (91.3) 1204 (89.0) χ2=4.25, d.f.1, p<0.05 
Three or more Leadership items endorsed 952 (67.1) 905 (66.7) χ2=0.06, d.f.1, p=0.80 
Cohesion 
Feel a sense of comradeship with others in my unit 1307 (92.4) 1235 (91.2) χ2=1.23, d.f.1, p=0.27 
Able to go to most people in unit with personal problem 1000 (70.6) 999 (73.7) χ2=3.31, d.f.1, p=0.07 
My seniors are interested in what I do or think 1046 (73.1) 957 (70.8) χ2=3.52, d.f.1, p=0.06 
I feel well informed about unit matters 884 (62.4) 837(62.0) χ2=0.55, d.f.1, p=0.82 
Three or more Cohesion items endorsed 1000 (70.5) 921 (67.7) χ2=2.46, d.f.1, p=0.12 
Morale 
Morale within the unit has generally been high 996 (88.8) 1054 (77.6) χ2=54.17, d.f.1, p<0.001 
The unit has been motivated and enthusiastic 997 (91.4) 1103 (81.3) χ2=50.10, d.f.1, p<0.001 
The unit has been operating efficiently 1136 (93.3) 1159 (85.7) χ2=39.58, d.f.1, p<0.001 
I have felt good about being part of this unit 966 (88.3) 1057 (78.1) χ2=43.74, d.f.1, p<0.001 
Three or more Morale items endorsed 940 (70.0) 1040 (76.5) χ2=14.83, d.f.1, p<0.001 
 
Operational, Welfare and Medical Support 
 
When the components of operational support were examined, the proportion of personnel who 
remembered receiving pre-deployment stress briefings rose significantly from 75.3% during A1 
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to 81.1% during A2 (p<0.001), although the rate of taking R&R and finding it helpful remained 
constant at around 95% (p=0.57).  Subjective impressions of family support remained stable with 
two thirds of personnel reporting that families at home had received at least some level of family 
support at both time points (p=0.56); over half of all personnel felt that this support was 
sufficient at both survey points.  Significantly more personnel (37.0%) had reported sick on at 
least one occasion during A2 than during A1 (29.3%) (p<0.001).  The proportion of personnel 
admitted to the field hospital had also risen significantly from 4.6% during A1 to 7.9% during 
A2 (p<0.001) (Table 19). 
  
 171
Table 19.  OMHNE Sample - Operational and Family, Welfare and Medical Support 
 
Medical and Welfare Support n (%) A1 n (%) A2 n (%) χ
2
, d.f., p 
Pre-Operational Stress Brief (2755) 
Received a Pre-Operational Stress Brief 2152 (78.1) 1052 (75.3) 1100 (81.1) 
χ
2
=13.60, d.f.1, p<0.001 
No Pre-Operational Stress Brief Received 603 (21.9) 346 (24.7) 257 (18.9) 
Rest and Recuperation (R&R) (1779)  
R&R Taken and Not Found Useful 88 (4.9) 42 (4.7) 46 (5.2) 
χ
2
=0.33, d.f.1, p=0.57 
R&R Taken and Found Useful 1691 (95.1) 860 (95.3) 831 (94.8) 
Family Support (2269) 
Family Support Not Given 745 (32.8) 338 (34.0) 407 (31.9) 
χ
2
=1.16, d.f.2, p=0.56 Family Support Given Not Sufficient 359 (15.8) 154 (15.5) 205 (16.1) 
Family Support Given and Sufficient 1165 (51.3) 501 (50.5) 664 (52.0) 
Welfare and Non-Medical Mental Health Support (2735) 
No Help Sought 2376 (86.9) 1215 (85.4) 1161 (88.5) 
χ
2
=5.78, d.f.2, p<0.05 
Sought Help 359 (13.1) 208 (14.6) 151 (11.5) 
Reporting Sick for Medical Reasons (2783) 
Reported Sick 920 (33.1) 417 (29.3) 503 (37.0) 
χ
2
=18.54, d.f.1, p<0.001 
Did Not Report Sick 1863 (66.9) 1006 (70.7) 857 (63.0) 
Field Hospital Admission (2777) 
Field Hospital Admission 173 (6.2) 66 (4.6) 107 (7.9) 
χ
2
=12.73, d.f.1, p<0.001 





The samples were combined to examine the source of support that was sought out when 
personnel made the decision to seek help for a stressful, emotional, family or relationship 
problem.  The most frequently accessed help source was a friend while the unit medical officer 
was least frequently sought out (Table 20). 
 
Table 20.  OMHNE Sample - Help-seeking Categories 
 
Source of Help n (%) 
Friend 244 (8.7) 
Chain of Command 123 (4.4) 
TRiM Practitioner 96 (3.4) 
Chaplain 60 (2.1) 
Paramedical 20 (0.7) 
Medical Officer 12 (0.4) 
*TRiM is Trauma Risk Management, a dedicated system of peer support that is activated following exposure to a potentially 
traumatising event. 
 
Support for Families 
 
During OMHNE A2, survey respondents were given the opportunity to provide free text 
comments about the perceived provision of support for families.  Comments were received from 
14.8% (n=201) of personnel (Table 21).  The majority of comments referred to a lack of 
information transmitted from the parent military unit to family members, particularly to those 
that live ‘off-base’ in their own accommodation rather than married quarters provided by the 
military.  There was a perception that welfare support was focused on married personnel with 
children and that the military viewed and treated non-married partnerships differently.  The 
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remaining comments were fewer in number and related to welfare provision in the operational 
area including telephone and internet access, difficulties supporting IA personnel, problems 
supporting the families of mobilised reserves, problems with support when the spouse was also 
serving in the military, difficulties with travel to unit events for families and general 
dissatisfaction with support arrangements. 
 
Table 21.  OMHNE Sample - Qualitative Analysis of Free Text Comments about Support 
Provision for Families 
 
Theme of Comment 
Frequency 
% (n)* 
Insufficient information/contact from Parent Unit to family 35% (71) 
General dissatisfaction 12% (24) 
Insufficient contact/support as family live off-base 19% (38) 
Welfare focuses on married personnel with children and treats non-married partnerships differently 14% (28) 
Miscellaneous comments 4% (8) 
In-operational area welfare provision is insufficient (phone and internet) 4% (9) 
Poor provision to individual augmentee personnel 4% (9) 
Poor provision to reserve families 3% (7) 
Insufficient as spouse also military 2% (4) 
Dissatisfaction with travel arrangements for family to events 1% (3) 
Total (n) 201 
 
Column % total may not equal 100% due to rounding 
 
In response to the question asking whether family support was sufficient or not, half of the 
survey respondents felt that support for families was sufficient.  Personnel who thought that their 
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families had either not received any support or had not been sufficiently supported during their 
deployment were significantly more likely to be GHQ cases (χ
2
=10.45, d.f.=1, p=0.001) but not 
PCL cases. 
 
Operational Support and Mental Health Caseness – Adjusted Regression Analyses 
 
After adjusting for year of deployment and a range of additional observed confounding variables, 
the results of the regression analyses suggested that those who did not recall receiving a pre-
deployment stress brief (21.9%, n=603), and those who took R&R but did not find it helpful 
(4.9%, n=88 of those who took R&R) reported poorer mental health.  The R&R findings became 
borderline non-significant when adjusted for all confounding variables included in the model.  
Better mental health was associated with reporting the highest levels of perceived leadership.  
Perceived adequate support to families at home was associated with better mental health; those 
who sought out support for a stressful, family or emotional problem from non-medical sources 
during deployment were more likely to report mental health problems, as were personnel who 
reported sick for medical reasons and those who were admitted to the field hospital.  Despite the 
substantial differences in the levels of combat exposure and the variations in deployment 
location between OMHNE A1 and A2, the year of deployment had no modifying effect upon any 
of the support variables examined.  The adjusted logistic regression analyses are shown in Table 
22. 
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Table 22.  The Relationship of Operational Support to PTSD or CMD Caseness 
 
Factors (n) 
PTSD or CMD Caseness 
OR 95% CI 1AOR 95% CI 2AOR 95% CI 3AOR 95% CI 4AOR 95% CI 5AOR 95% CI 
No Case Case 
Pre-Operational Stress Brief (2747) 
Received Pre Deployment Stress Brief Received (2145) 1800 (83.9) 345 (16.1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
No a Pre Deployment Stress Brief (602) 478 (79.4) 124 (20.6) 1.35 (1.08-1.70) 1.34 (1.07-1.69) 1.41 (1.11-1.78) 1.36 (1.05-1.75) 1.29 (1.02-1.63) 1.40 (1.06-1.84) 
Rest and Recuperation (R&R) (1773) 
R&R Taken and Found Useful (1686) 1417 (84.0) 269 (16.0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R&R Taken and Not Found Useful (87) 64 (73.6) 23 (26.4) 1.89 (1.16-3.10) 1.97 (1.21-3.20) 1.80 (1.07-3.03) 1.77 (1.00-3.15) 1.74 (1.05-2.88) 1.72 (0.94-3.17) 
Leadership (2767) 
1-2 Leadership Items Endorsed (Lower) (918) 673 (73.3) 245 (26.7) 1 1 1 1 
NA 
1 
3-4 Leadership Items Endorsed (Higher) (1849) 1622 (87.7) 227 (12.3) 0.38 (0.31-0.47) 0.38 (0.31-0.47) 0.38 (0.30-0.47) 0.36 (0.28-0.45) 0.35 (0.28-0.45) 
Family Support (2262) 
Family Support Not Given or Insufficient (1099) 887 (80.7) 212 (19.3) 1 1 1 
NA 
1 1 
Family Support Given and Sufficient (1163) 1004 (86.3) 159 (13.7) 0.66 (0.53-0.83) 0.66 (0.53-0.83) 0.68 (0.54-0.86) 0.72 (0.57-0.90) 0.73 (0.58-0.93) 
Welfare and Non-Medical Mental Health Support (2725) 
No Help Sought (2368) 1997 (84.3) 371 (15.7) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sought Help (357) 262 (73.4) 95 (26.6) 1.95 (1.51-2.53) 1.94 (1.50-2.52) 1.77 (1.35-2.32) 1.98 (1.48-2.65) 1.89 (1.45-2.46) 1.73 (1.27-2.37) 
Field Hospital Admission (2769) 
Not Admitted to Hospital (2596) 2170 (83.6) 426 (16.4) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Field Hospital Admission (173) 126 (72.8) 47 (27.2) 1.90 (1.34-2.70) 1.93 (1.36-2.74) 1.76 (1.20-2.56) 1.86 (1.25-2.77) 1.84 (1.28-2.63) 1.64 (1.05-2.56) 
Reporting Sick for Medical Reasons (2775) 
Did Not Report Sick (1858) 1585 (85.3) 273 (14.7) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Reported Sick (917) 717 (78.2) 200 (21.8) 1.62 (1.32-1.98) 1.64 (1.34-2.01) 1.65 (1.34-2.05) 1.59 (1.27-2.00) 1.53 (1.24-1.88) 1.55 (1.21-1.98) 
1AOR Adjusted for 2010 vs. 2011 
2AOR – Adjusted for Rank, Service Background, Engagement Type, Individual Augmentee vs. Formed Unit, Sex, Relationship Status, Dependant children, CP and PB vs. FOB and MOB, Combat 
Exposure, Previous Tours, Shorter vs. Longer Period in the Operational Area 
3AOR – Adjusted for Family Support 
4AOR – Adjusted for Higher vs. Lower Levels of Perceived Leadership 




The OMHNE study results suggest that general mental health and mental health 
stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care levels were stable across two survey points some 
18 months apart despite the level of reported combat exposure reducing significantly from 
survey one to survey two.  In both samples, sub-threshold PTSD symptoms and associated 
functional impairment were more prevalent in forward areas.  Three main hypotheses were 
tested; firstly, levels of CMD and PTSD would be similar amongst personnel who received a 
pre-deployment mental health psycho-educational brief and those that did not.  Secondly, 
mental health effects would be similar among those who perceived that their families 
received satisfactory levels of support provision while they were deployed versus those 
personnel who perceived that their families received inadequate or no support.  Thirdly, 
psychological outcomes would be similar among those who rated their leader’s behaviour in 
a positive manner and those who perceived that their leaders were less effective during 
deployment.  The null hypotheses were all rejected; primary prevention in the form of direct 
operational mental health support including memorable pre-deployment stress briefs, 
perceptions of good family support and perceived good leadership were all associated with 
better mental health at both survey points, however, in both samples, those seeking help from 
both non-medical and medical sources were more likely to experience poorer mental health. 
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CHAPTER 7 – PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PREVENTION IN A NON-




When Service personnel are serving in their home base, mental health care and support is 
freely available and yet only a small proportion access help when they experience symptoms 
of mental ill-health.  One major impediment to initiating help-seeking is the presence of 
stigmatising beliefs about seeking support for mental health problems and perceived barriers 
to care (stigma/BTC).  Secondary prevention activity in the non-deployed setting is focused 
upon facilitating care access by overcoming the effects of stigma/BTC through a variety of 
means.  In both deployed and non-deployed settings, Stigmatising beliefs and BTC are 
commonplace among military personnel, yet how they influence help-seeking is unclear.  
This study sought to explore the role of stigma/BTC in mental health help-seeking among 
British Army personnel while they were serving in their home base.  Mental health and 
alcohol use were assessed by way of a questionnaire in a randomly selected sample of 484 
personnel undertaking preparation for deployment and non-deployed duties.  In addition, 
personnel were evaluated for stigma/BTC levels, help-seeking behaviour, related perceptions 
of care and mental health-related beliefs. 
 
On brief screening measures, 35.0% of respondents screened positive for potentially harmful 
alcohol use, 25.2% for CMD symptoms and 12.4% screened positive for probable PTSD 
symptoms.  Mental health stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care was significantly 
associated with probable mental health caseness but not alcohol misuse.  40.0% of 
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symptomatic personnel and 70.3% of potentially harmful alcohol misusers had not sought 
help of any kind despite recognising a requirement for additional support when symptoms of 
mental disorder were present. More than 80% of probable mental health cases felt that 
seeking support was helpful or necessary to resolve mental illness and that help-seeking 
required courage or strength.  When help was sought, non-medical sources were accessed 
more frequently than military medical services.  Greater levels of stigma/BTC were 
associated with both interest in and actually receiving support.  Friends or family were the 
commonest preferred and actual help source; unit commanders were among the least 
preferred but were the second most commonly accessed help source.  The results of this study 
suggest that perceptions about the potential negative occupational and social consequences of 
help-seeking and current mental health status may influence the decision to seek support and 




The introduction to this thesis described how supporting the mental health of Service 
personnel is a key component of military command efforts to ensure that the UK fighting 
force is operationally effective.  Unlike deployment settings, when Service personnel are 
serving in their home base, mental health care and support is freely available and yet only a 
small proportion of those affected by symptoms of mental ill-health appear to access help 
(Iversen et al., 2011).  Theoretically, reduced help-seeking may be related to stigmatising 
beliefs about seeking support for mental health problems and perceived barriers to care 
(stigma/BTC).  Secondary prevention efforts put in place during the preparatory phase of the 
deployment cycle are often focused upon facilitating care access by overcoming the effects of 
stigma/BTC through a variety of means. 
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Conflicting evidence exists for a direct causal relationship between the decision to access 
care and stigma/BTC (Britt and McFadden, 2012).  Furthermore, there is sometimes 
contradictory information about how stigma/BTC might exert an effect when military 
personnel decide whether to seek help.  This study sought to examine the association of 
stigmatising beliefs, perceived barriers to care, mental health symptoms and mental health 
help-seeking in UK military personnel.  A secondary aim was to define the nature of any such 
relationship.  The reason for choosing to conduct the research among military personnel 
serving in a garrison setting was that this area is under-researched with most studies 
evaluating deployment-related stigma/BTC and the mental health effects of deployment.  
This study also contributes directly to the overall picture of the three levels of prevention 
across the deployment cycle, the main focus of this thesis.  The intention was to generate 
proposals designed to minimise the risk of non-engagement and associated occupational 
dysfunction so that effective mechanisms to engage symptomatic personnel with therapy or 
support could be found. 
 
Study Specific Methods 
 
Study participants were serving members of the British Army (BA) who provided baseline 
information prior to voluntarily participating in the evaluation of a stigma reduction 
intervention.  The survey instrument used in the study was deliberately designed to capture 
detailed information about help-seeking behaviours and intent so that a planned secondary 
analysis of the relationship between help-seeking and a range of influencing factors could be 
undertaken.  The study took place at an Army base in the UK where the soldiers took part in a 
stigma reduction study.  Participants were randomly selected a priori by clusters which 
represented various areas of employment and shared roles within the larger military unit.  
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They then received either a comedy show with an active stigma reduction component or a 
standard comedy show (Jones et al., 2014).  They were informed that their responses would 
be used for further research purposes, they were offered the opportunity to withdraw prior to 
providing baseline information and gave consent to participate.  Participants completed a 
questionnaire which enquired about demographic characteristics, current mental health 
symptoms, stigmatising beliefs about help-seeking for mental health problems and potential 
barriers to care (hereafter termed ‘stigma/BTC’).  In addition they were asked about potential 
discriminatory behaviour in relation to other people with mental health problems, how they 
viewed their personal role in managing mental health symptoms, current levels of help-
seeking, the sources of mental health support that they had accessed and the sources of help 
that they would prefer to use should a mental health problem occur in the future.  The study 





The mental health measures used in this study were selected for brevity as the survey was 
potentially lengthy, having pre- and post-intervention sections, and possibly onerous for 
potential respondents.  Mental health indices included current levels of alcohol use which was 
assessed using the AUDIT-C.  As normative data for a military population was not available 
for the AUDIT-C, data derived from the King’s Centre for Military Health Research Cohort 
was used to assess the optimal cut-off score.  The King’s cohort was described in the third 
location decompression study chapter.  Of 9838 cohort members, 1323 (13.5%) had scores 
≥16 on the 10 item Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT-10).  An AUDIT-C 
was generated for the cohort sample by extracting and summating scores given to the first 
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three items of the AUDIT-10.  A receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) was generated 
to assess the performance of various scores on the AUDIT-C in identifying cases of alcohol 
use potentially harmful to health represented by scores of ≥16 on the AUDIT-10 (Figure. 5).  
For a score of 8.5 on the AUDIT-C, case identification sensitivity was .86 and 1-specificity 
was .23.  The area under the curve (AUC) was 0.89 (Standard error =0.004).  Scores of ≥16 
on the AUDIT-10 were broadly equivalent to scores of ≥8 on the AUDIT-C.  Given the high 
prevalence of alcohol use disorders in the UK AF (Greenberg et al., 2011), a higher AUDIT-
C cut off score of ≥8 rather than the recommended score of ≥4 was used to indicate the 
presence of a level of alcohol use potentially harmful to health. 
 
Figure 5.  AUDIT-C, AUDIT-10 Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve 
 
Symptoms of common mental disorder (CMD) were assessed using the GHQ-12 with 
standard cut-off scores used to indicate caseness.  Symptoms of PTSD were assessed using 
the PC-PTSD; endorsing three or more symptoms on this measure indicated the presence of 
symptoms of probable PTSD.  An inspection of the data showed that GHQ-12, PC-PTSD and 
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AUDIT-C scores were not normally distributed and although attempts were made, they could 
not be transformed to normal distributions.  When examined as continuous measures, GHQ-
12 scores were positively and significantly correlated with PC-PTSD scores (Spearman’s 
rho= 0.44, p<0.001) but not with AUDIT-C scores (Spearman’s rho= -0.10, p=0.83).  PC-
PTSD scores were not significantly correlated with AUDIT-C scores (Spearman’s rho= 0.01, 
p=0.79).  Given the association between the two mental health outcomes, a variable was 
generated combining probable PTSD or CMD caseness (termed any mental health problem) 
to assess the association of stigma/BTC and other variables with symptoms of generalised 
mental ill-health.  As it appeared to be measuring a unique behavioural outcome not 
necessarily related to psychological symptoms, AUDIT-C caseness was not included in the 
composite variable. 
 
As stigma/BTC constituted the main dependent variable in this study, prevailing levels of 
these beliefs were assessed using an 11 item version of the stigma/BTC scale.  The adaptation 
for the current study included the deletion of four items which did not apply to UK samples, 
including cost of care, arranging transport, scheduling appointments and getting time off 
work.  In the UK military, logistics and work absence are provided for and care is free.  Two 
further items were not included as they were rarely endorsed in previous UK military surveys 
(Mulligan et al, 2012) and instead four items were included.  These were the availability of 
services, thinking less of colleagues, lack of military support for mental health problems and 
giving responsibility to those with mental health problems, all of which have been used to 
assess military samples (Kim et al., 2010; Sipos et al., 2012).  Respondents were asked to rate 
their strength of agreement with each stigma or BTC item using a four-point Likert scale 
which yielded scores ranging from 11–44.  Item 2, ‘the military supports Service members 
who have mental health problems’ was reverse scored and transformed so that the scoring 
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format corresponded to other scale items where higher scores indicated greater levels of 
stigma/BTC.  The stigma/BTC scale was then summed and tertiles were generated; lower and 
middle tertiles were combined to compare the highest levels of stigma/BTC with lower 
levels.  In addition, strongly agree and agree responses were combined for each stigma scale 
item as were strongly disagree and disagree responses.  This produced a binary variable for 
each stigma/BTC item.  A count variable was generated, giving a scale ranging from 0-11.  
Agreeing with three or more items was used to give an estimate of high levels of stigma/BTC 
(Osorio et al., 2012). 
 
As discrimination toward people with mental health conditions is sometimes viewed as a 
component of stigma/BTC, potential discriminatory behaviour directed at people with mental 
health problems was assessed using items five to eight of the Reported and Intended 
Behaviour Scale (RIBS).  The scale was summed to give a range of scores from 4 to 20 with 
lower scores reflecting greater levels of potential discrimination.  Tertiles were then 
generated and the middle and upper tertiles were combined so that greater levels of potential 
discrimination (the lower tertile) could be compared with lower levels (the middle and upper 
tertiles).  To estimate levels of agreement, both agreement categories were combined as were 
the disagreement categories, while don’t know’ responses were recoded to neutral and 
deleted.  This allowed for the production of a binary variable for each RIBS item. 
 
As identified in the introduction, recent research suggests that military personnel who 
experience mental health problems often report that they wish to manage their symptoms 
themselves.  Participants were asked to consider five statements currently being developed 
for use in military studies regarding their view of an individual’s role in managing their own 
mental health.  These were: ‘mental health support can be helpful for those who need it’; ‘it 
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takes courage or strength to get treatment for a psychological problem’; ‘I would prefer to 
manage my problems on my own’; ‘strong people can resolve psychological problems by 
themselves’ and ‘psychological problems tend to work themselves out without help’.  
Respondents were asked to rate their strength of agreement with each item using a four-point 
Likert scale which yielded scores ranging from 5–20; lower scores indicated greater 
agreement with the five statements, therefore, a more substantial personal role in managing 
mental health problems.  The scale was first summed, tertiles were generated and the lower 
and middle tertiles were combined so that those rating their personal responsibility for or role 
in managing mental health less markedly (the upper tertile), could be compared with those 
who felt that self-management and personal responsibility were more important (the middle 
and lower tertiles).  To estimate levels of agreement, both agreement categories were 
combined as were the disagreement categories, which allowed for the production of a binary 
variable for each personal responsibility scale item. 
 
Personnel were asked if they were currently accessing support for a stressful, emotional or 
family problem and if they were currently interested in receiving support.  They were asked 
to consider nine potential help sources which represented military medical assistance (mental 
health professional, regimental medical officer or doctor and other medical staff) and non-
medical help (friend or family, unit chain of command, colleague, Trauma Risk Management 
(TRiM) practitioner, chaplain and Big White Wall therapist support).  TRiM practitioners are 
military peers serving in the same unit as the help-seeker who are trained to provide support 
following exposure to traumatic events (Greenberg et al., 2010); the Big White Wall is an 
online support, information and early intervention service for people experiencing 
psychological distress which has been adapted for use by those with a history of military 
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service (www.bigwhitewall.com, 2013).  Participants were asked whether they would be 




The study was powered to detect a change of plus or minus 5% in reporting one or more 
stigma scale items among 212 personnel with 95% confidence.  Osorio et al (2012) reported 
that stigma at this level has a mean frequency of approximately 60% among deployed 
military personnel.  All analyses were conducted in the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 20.  The standard approach to analysis was undertaken using 
Pearson’s chi squared test to explore categorical data.  Adjusted univariable and multinomial 
logistic regression was used to assess data and the Wald test was used to assess the 
significance of explanatory variables.  Adjusting variables included rank categorised into 
three groups (Junior Rank, Senior Rank and Officer), age grouped into five categories, 
service length grouped into five categories, sex, being in a relationship or not and being 
deployed in the last year or not.  Numbers and percentages of those who returned a valid 
answer are reported in this study, whereas missing data are not.  The proportion of missing 
data varied by survey item and percentages and numbers may not sum to sample and sub-




594 survey questionnaires were distributed, 110 were not returned or returned blank giving an 





51.6% (n=248) of respondents were aged 18-23 years and 48.4% (n=233) were aged 24 years 
and over.  At the time of the survey, official statistics give the median age of the Army as 29 
years (www.DASA.mod.uk., 2012); for the study sample the median age was 25 years.  
51.4% (n=237) had short service lengths of 0-4 years and 48.6% (n=224) had served for five 
years or more.  The study sample consisted primarily of regular forces rather than reserves 
(98.3%) and most participants were male (95.1%); official statistics suggest that regulars 
should comprise 83.6% of a representative sample and 90.3% should be males.  79.8% 
(n=383) were junior ranks (Private soldier and Lance Corporal equivalent) whereas 53.3% 
would normally be expected.  28.5% (n=138) had completed ≥2 operational tours and 50.6% 
(n=245) had not deployed at the time of the study.  There were no statistically significant 
differences in the highest levels of stigma/BTC within the various socio-demographic 
categories (Table 23). 
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Table 23.  Non-deployed Help-seeking Study - Socio-Demographic and Operational 
Characteristics 
 






, d.f., p 
Age (n=481) 
18-19 50 (10.4) 16 of 48 (33.3) χ
2
=3.35 d.f. 4, 
p=0.50 20-24 198 (41.2) 50 of 188 (26.6) 
25-29 116 (24.1) 39of 112 (34.8) 
30-34 77 (16.0) 25 of 73 (34.2) 
35+ 40 (8.3) 14 of 39 (35.9) 
Service Length (n=461) 
< 1 Year 38 (8.2) 7 of 36 (19.4) χ
2
=5.42, d.f. 4, 
p=0.25 2-4 Years 199 (43.2) 57 of 190 (30.0) 
5-12 Years 183 (39.7) 63 of 174 (36.2) 
13-22 Years 36 (7.8) 9 of 36 (25.0) 
≥ 22 Years 5 (1.1) 1 of 5 (20.0) 
Engagement Type (n=480) 
Regular 472 (98.3) 144 of 453 (31.8) χ2=2.78, d.f. 1, 
p=0.10 Reserve 8 (1.7) 0 of 6 (0.0) 
Sex (471) 
Male 448 (95.1) 132 of 430 (30.7) χ2=0.77, d.f. 1, 
p=0.38 Female 23 (4.9) 8 of 20 (40.0) 
Relationship Status (n=481) 
Not In a Long-Term Relationship 180 (37.4) 47 of 173 (27.2) χ2=1.10, d.f. 1, 
p=0.16 In a Long-Term Relationship 301 (62.6) 96 of 287 (33.4) 
Rank (n=483) 
Junior Rank 302 (62.5) 
132 of 419 (31.6) 
χ
2=3.73, d.f. 2, 
p=0.16 Junior Non-Commissioned Officer - JNCO 138 (28.6) 
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer - SNCO/WO 36 (7.5) 12 of 36 (33.3) 
2nd Lt-Maj 6 (1.2) 
0 of 0 (0.0) 
Lt Col and Above 1 (0.2) 
Previous Deployments (n=484) 
None 245 (50.6) 73 of 234 (31.2) χ2=0.24, d.f. 2, 
p=0.99 1 101 (20.9) 31 of 97 (32.0) 
≥2 138 (28.5) 41 of 132 (31.1) 
*Upper Tertile of Stigma/BTC Scale Total Score.  The proportion of those returning a valid response is shown. 
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Mental Health Outcomes, Help-Seeking and Sources of Help 
 
25.2% (n=112) of respondents reported symptoms of CMD, 12.4% (n=55) screened positive 
for probable PTSD and 35.0% (n=155) screened positive for levels of alcohol use potentially 
harmful to health.  42.9% (n=48) of the CMD cases had not sought help; of those that had 
and who reported a help source, non-medical sources of support were more commonly 
accessed than military medical.  Of the probable PTSD cases, 32.7% (n=18) had not sought 
help; among PTSD help-seekers, non-medical sources were more commonly accessed than 
military medical.  70.3% (n=109) of probable harmful alcohol users had not sought help; of 
those seeking help for an alcohol problem, non-medical support was more frequently 
accessed than military medical support (Table 24).  A proportion of personnel reported that 
they had sought help but did not specify a help source.  Of those who screened positive for 
either CMD or PTSD, termed any mental health problem (28.4%, n=137), 57.6% had sought 
help (n=76 of 132 who reported their help-seeking status).  10.0% (n=46 of 460 personnel) 
had not sought help but were interested in receiving support for a significant stressful, 




Table 24.  Non-deployed Help-seeking Study - Mental Health and Help-seeking 
 










PTSD (3Sx) Non-Case 388 (87.6) 263 (67.8) 32 (8.2) 66 (17.0) 27 (7.0) 
PTSD (3Sx) Case 55 (12.4) 18 (32.7) 7 (12.7) 21 (38.2) 9 (16.4) 
CMD Non-Case 333 (74.8) 233 (70.0) 21 (6.3) 56 (16.8) 23 (6.9) 
CMD Case 112 (25.2) 48 (42.9) 18 (16.1) 33 (29.5) 13 (11.6) 
Alcohol Non-Case 288 (65.0) 172 (59.7) 27 (9.4) 60 (20.8) 29 (10.1) 
Alcohol Case 155 (35.0) 109 (70.3) 12 (7.7) 27 (17.4) 7 (4.5) 
 
Irrespective of mental health and alcohol status, 36.9% (n=164) of the sample (n=445) were 
help-seekers.  Of these, 20.0% (n=89) had sought help from non-medical sources; 8.8% 
(n=39) from military medical sources alone or in combination with non-medical sources and 
8.1% (n=36) had sought help from an unspecified source.  Respondents reported that they 
would prefer to receive help from friends and family followed by a mental health 
professional; the least preferred help source was the unit chain of command or an online 
therapist.  Preferred help sources were ranked in a similar pattern to actual sources of help 
with the exception of the unit chain of command, which constituted the second commonest 
source of actual support while being one of the least preferred sources (Table 25).  49.3% 
(n=219 of 444) of respondents reported having had contact with other people who were 
suffering from a mental health condition. 
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Table 25.  Non-deployed Help-seeking Study - Sources of Mental Health Support 
 
*Some personnel sought help from or specified more than one source 
 
Stigmatisation, Barriers to Care, Potential Discrimination and Personal Role in Mental 
Health Management 
 
Approximately three quarters of respondents endorsed three or more of the eleven items on 
the stigma/BTC scale.  The most frequently reported items were; ‘unit leaders might treat me 
differently’ and ‘unit members might have less confidence in me’ (both self-stigma).  A 
minority of personnel felt that ‘I would be blamed by my leaders’ (self-stigma), that ‘help is 
not available’ (BTC), that ’I do not know where to access support’ (BTC) and that ‘I would 
think less of a colleague if they knew that they were receiving mental health care’ (public 
stigma).  Overall, stigmatising beliefs related to the self were more commonly reported than 
both stigma related to others and perceived BTC. 
 
Of the RIBS items; two thirds of respondents reported that they would continue a relationship 
with a friend who had a mental health problem; around half would live nearby and work with 
someone who they knew had a mental health problem.  Around one third would be prepared 





*Actual Help Source n=164 n (%) *Preferred Help Source n=448 n (%) 
1 1 Friend or Family 79 (48.2) Friend or Family 368 (82.1) 
2 8 Unit Chain of Command 29 (17.7) Mental Health Professional 314 (70.1) 
3 2 Mental Health Professional 26 (15.9) RMO or GP 274 (61.2) 
4 4 Colleague 19 (11.6) Colleague 265 (59.2) 
5 3 Regimental Medical Officer or Doctor 14 (8.6) Other Medical Staff 265 (59.2) 
6 7 TRiM Practitioner 5 (3.1) Chaplain 256 (57.1) 
7 5 Other Medical Staff 5 (3.1) TRiM Practitioner 222 (49.6) 
8 6 Chaplain 3 (1.8) Unit Chain of Command 195 (45.8) 
9 9 Big White Wall Therapist Support 2 (1.2) Big White Wall Therapist Support 194 (43.3) 
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Overall, the majority of respondents viewed mental health support as helpful and that help-
seeking for a mental health problem required courage or strength.  Around a quarter of 
personnel felt that mental health problems tend to work themselves out without help.  Of 
those who screened positive for a mental health problem, over 90% felt that mental health 




Table 26.  Non-deployed Help-seeking Study - Mental Health, Stigmatisation and 









1 Int My unit leaders might treat me differently (463) 313 (67.6) 
2 Int Members of my unit might have less confidence in me (463) 312 (67.4) 
3 BTC The military supports Service members who have mental health problems (454) 301 (66.6) 
4 Int It would harm my career (463) 253 (54.6) 
5 Int I would be seen as weak (by those who are important to me) (464) 239 (51.5)  
6 Int It would be too embarrassing (465) 152 (32.7) 
7 Ext People with mental illness should not be given any responsibility (469) 143 (30.5) 
8 Int My leaders would blame me for the problem (463) 117 (25.3) 
9 BTC I don't know where to get help (468) 115 (24.6) 
10 Ext I would think less of a colleague if I knew they were receiving mental health treatment (464) 79 (17.0) 
11 BTC Mental health services aren't available (462) 61 (13.2) 
 
Rank  Intended Discriminatory Behaviour Towards People With Mental Health Problems (n). 
In the Future I Would: 
 
1  Continue a relationship with a friend who developed a MH problem (443) 292 (65.9) 
2  Live nearby to someone with a MH problem (444) 229 (51.6) 
3  Work with someone with a MH problem (445) 222 (49.9) 
4  Live with someone with a MH problem (441) 161 (36.5) 
 
Rank  Views of Personal Responsibility for Mental Health Management (n)  
1  Mental health support can be helpful for those who need it (455) 396 (87.0) 
2  It takes courage or strength to get treatment for a psychological problem (453) 366 (80.8) 
3  I would prefer to manage my problems on my own (455) 280 (61.5) 
4  Strong people can resolve psychological problems by themselves (455) 205 (45.1) 
5  Psychological problems tend to work themselves out without help (458) 122 (26.6) 
* Int= Internal/ self-stigma related to the self, Ext= External/public stigma related to others, BTC=Perceived barriers to Care 
 
Stigmatising Beliefs, Discrimination, Mental Health and Alcohol Use 
 
In logistic regression analyses, compared to military personnel who reported no mental health 
or alcohol problems, personnel reporting symptoms of CMD had a significantly increased 
odds of reporting nine of the eleven items constituting the stigmatisation and barriers to care 
scale.  The largest explanatory effects were associated with the beliefs that unit leaders might 
treat a person differently if mental health support were sought (Wald Test F = 19.79 
 193
p<0.001), members of the unit having less confidence in the person (Wald Test F = 16.84 
p<0.001) and leaders blaming the person for having the mental health problem (Wald F = 
21.72 p<0.001).  Among probable CMD cases, compared to mentally healthy personnel, there 
was a marginal but significant reduced odds ratio associated with reporting the belief that 
other people with mental illness should not be given any responsibility.  Personnel reporting 
caseness levels of probable PTSD symptoms had significantly increased odds of reporting 
eight of the eleven stigma/BTC scale items, the exceptions being the belief that other people 
with mental illness should not be given any responsibility, that the military does not support 
personnel with mental health problems and that mental health services were not available.  
The two most substantial beliefs were similar to those found among CMD cases.  These were, 
that unit leaders might treat a person differently if mental health support were sought (Wald 
Test F = 9.48 p<0.01) and that members of the might have less confidence in the person 
(Wald Test F = 9.69 p<0.01).  The third most substantial stigma/BTC item for PTSD cases 
was that seeking help would be too embarrassing (Wald Test F = 16.10 p<0.001).  The only 
stigma item significantly associated with reporting alcohol use potentially harmful to health 
was a more frequently reported belief that it would be too embarrassing to seek help for a 
mental health problem (Table 27). 
 
For the additional stigma scale items related to perceived personal role in managing mental 
health problems, only one item was associated with reporting probable PTSD and probable 
CMD symptoms.  Compared to symptom-free personnel those with probable PTSD and 
CMD symptoms had significantly increased odds of endorsing the belief that strong people 
can resolve psychological problems by themselves.  Those reporting alcohol use levels 
potentially harmful to health had significantly increased odds of reporting that psychological 
problems tend to work themselves out without help (Table 27). 
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For intended discriminatory beliefs, compared to those reporting no mental health symptoms 
or harmful alcohol use, those with higher levels of alcohol use reported significantly greater 
levels of willingness to continue a relationship with a friend who had developed a mental 
health problem and to work with someone with a mental health problem.  Neither probable 
PTSD nor CMD were significantly associated with this RIBS item (Table 27). 
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Table 27.  Non-deployed Help-seeking Study -Stigmatisation Items Stratified by Mental Health Status 
 
Stigmatising Beliefs About Mental Healthcare.  When considering seeking help for a 
stressful, emotional, mental health or family problem, rate each of the possible 
concerns that might affect YOUR decision to receive help.  

















Standard Stigma Scale Items 
My unit leaders might treat me differently 62.0 (129) 1 87.7 (100) 4.20 (2.32-7.91) 84.7 (94) 4.05 (1.66-9.86) 64.6 (106) 0.92 (0.59-1.44) 
Members of my unit might have less confidence in me 61.8 (128) 1 86.0 (98) 3.54 (1.94-6.48) 83.8 (93) 4.12 (1.69-10.01) 67.1 (110) 1.17 (0.74-1.84) 
The military supports Service members who have mental health problems 70.6 (144) 1 57.1 (64) 0.60 (0.37-0.96) 58.8 (30) 0.75 (0.40-1.41) 67.7 (109) 1.06 (0.68-1.66) 
It would harm my career 48.1 (100) 1 72.3 (81) 2.26 (1.39-3.68) 72.1 (80) 2.77 (1.39-5.52) 55.2 (91) 1.24 (0.81-1.89) 
I would be seen as weak (by those who are important to me) 42.8 (89) 1 71.1 (81) 2.85 (1.83-4.85) 70.3 (78) 3.04 (1.55-5.94) 53.9 (89) 1.29 (0.85-1.97) 
It would be too embarrassing 23.9 (50) 1 52.2 (59) 3.08 (1.92-4.94) 53.2 (58) 3.54 (1.91-6.57) 41.0 (68) 1.85 (1.19-2.89) 
People with mental illness should not be given any responsibility 35.4 (74) 1 23.5 (27) 0.58 (0.34-0.99) 30.4 (34) 0.62 (0.31-1.25) 26.8 (45) 0.70 (0.44-1.12) 
My leaders would blame me for the problem 19.7 (41) 1 43.4 (49) 3.23 (1.97-5.30) 41.8 (46) 2.42 (1.30-4.50) 26.7 (44) 1.34 (0.82-2.17) 
I don’t know where to get help 19.6 (41) 1 34.2 (39) 1.97 (1.22-3.20) 30.9 (17) 1.85 (0.97-3.55) 26.2 (44) 1.21 (0.75-1.95) 
I would think less of a colleague if I knew they were receiving mental health treatment 13.4 (28) 1 25.2 (29) 1.99 (1.14-3.48) 26.1 (29) 2.49 (1.27-4.90) 14.6 (24) 0.87 (0.49-1.53) 
Mental health services aren’t available 12.1 (25) 1 17.7 (20) 1.63 (0.89-2.97) 13.0 (7) 1.05 (0.45-2.50) 13.9 (23) 1.40 (0.76-2.58) 
Stigma Scale – Additional Items 
Mental health support can be helpful for those who need it 85.3 (174) 1 91.0 (101) 1.49 (0.69-3.24) 92.7 (102) 1.52 (0.51-4.47) 87.3 (144) 1.15 (0.60-2.21) 
It takes courage or strength to get treatment for a psychological problem 79.5 (163) 1 81.8 (90) 1.01 (0.55-1.83) 85.3 (93) 1.35 (0.58-3.18) 80.4 (131) 0.90 (0.52-1.55) 
I would prefer to manage my problems on my own 55.3 (114) 1 68.2 (70) 1.59 (0.97-2.61) 67.9 (74) 1.74 (0.90-3.38) 68.3 (112) 1.54 (0.99-2.40) 
Strong people can resolve psychological problems by themselves 41.3 (85) 1 50.9 (56) 1.68 (1.06-2.66) 55.0 (60) 2.63 (1.40-4.92) 50.0 (82) 1.37 (0.90-2.09) 
Psychological problems tend to work themselves out without help 23.6 (49) 1 26.1 (29) 1.20 (0.71-2.02) 33.3 (111) 1.80 (0.95-3.43) 34.8 (57) 1.91 (1.20-3.06) 
**Intended Discriminatory Behaviour Towards People With Mental Health Problems (RIBS). ‘In the Future I Would’: 
Continue a relationship with a friend who developed a MH problem 91.1 (123) 1 91.2 (73) 0.88 (0.31-2.47) 90.5 (67) 0.64 (0.19-2.13) 95.8 (114) 3.74 (1.03-13.64) 
Live nearby to someone with a MH problem 87.8 (101) 1 85.5 (59) 1.03 (0.42-2.50) 78.5 (51) 0.41 (0.15-1.14) 89.4 (84) 1.55 (0.68-3.87) 
Work with someone with a MH problem 81.8 (99) 1 81.0 (51) 0.74 (0.31-2.47) 77.0 (47) 0.59 (0.20-1.77) 90.7 (88) 2.59 (1.04-6.41) 
Live with someone with a MH problem 74.5 (73) 1 68.7 (46) 0.78 (0.40-1.54) 68.4 (39) 0.36 (0.27-1.61) 70.7 (53) 0.81 (0.41-1.62) 
* Personnel who reported neither GHQ-12 Score ≥4, PC-PTSD Score ≥3 nor AUDIT-C Score ≥8 
** Neither Agree nor Disagree Scores recoded to ‘missing’ so that agreement and disagreement proportions could be directly compared. 
***Adjusted Odds Ratio (AOR) - Adjusted for Rank, Age, Service Length, Sex, Relationship Status and Deployment in the Last Year 
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Overall, the adjusted odds of reporting greater levels of Stigma/BTC were no higher amongst 
those who had sought help for an emotional, family or stressful problem than those who had 
not (36.0%, n=58 vs. 29.2%, n=79, AOR 1.21, 95% CI 0.78-1.89).  When the sample was 
stratified by class of help, personnel who sought help from military medical sources were no 
more likely to report high levels of stigma than those who had not sought help at all.  
However, those seeking help from non-medical sources had significantly increased odds of 
reporting stigma compared to non-help-seekers, an effect that remained significant after 
adjusting for a range of socio demographic factors and deployment in the last year.  When the 
sample was stratified by interest in receiving help, those interested in receiving help or who 
were already help-seeking had significantly increased odds of reporting Stigma/BTC 
compared to non-help-seekers and those who were not interested in receiving help.  The 
greatest adjusted odds of reporting stigma/BTC (Wald test F=15.44 p<0.001) were found 
amongst those who were interested in receiving help but had not yet sought it. 
 
The adjusted odds of reporting higher levels of stigma/BTC were greater in those who had 
experienced contact with another person with a mental health problem.  Viewing mental 
health management as requiring higher levels of personal responsibility was also associated 
with significantly increased odds of reporting stigmatising beliefs.  Those who expressed the 
highest levels of potentially discriminatory views about people with mental health problems 
also reported significantly higher levels of Stigma/BTC than those reporting moderate and 
lower levels. 
 
When the sample was stratified by mental health status, the odds of reporting stigmatising 
beliefs were significantly higher in those reporting symptoms of either CMD and or PTSD 
but not amongst those drinking alcohol at potentially harmful levels.  Personnel who screened 
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positive for a mental health condition but had not sought help had the greatest adjusted odds 
of reporting stigma/BTC compared to the reference group (Wald test F=18.28 p<0.001).  
Compared to non-help-seekers who screened negative for mental ill-health, significantly 
higher rates of stigma/BTC were found amongst help-seekers who screened positive for 
mental health problems (Wald test F=8.85 p<0.01) (Table 28).  There was a statistically 
significant trend for growing levels of stigma to be reported from the lowest levels amongst 
non-help-seekers who screened negative for mental health problems, through moderate levels 
among negative screening help-seekers to positive screening help-seekers with the highest 
levels found amongst positive screening non-help-seekers (χ
2 
Test for Trend =25.23, 
p<0.0001). 
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Table 28.  Non-deployed Help-seeking Study - Stigmatisation Level, Help-Seeking and Mental Health 
 
*Middle and Lower Tertile of Stigma Scale Total Score 
**Upper Tertile of Stigma Scale Total Score 
***AOR - Adjusted for Rank (Junior, Senior and Officer), Grouped Age, Grouped Service Length, Sex, In a Relationship or Not and 








OR (95% CI) ***AOR 
Help Seeking n (%) 
Not Seeking Help 271 (68.3) 192 (70.8) 79 (29.2) 1 1 
Seeking Help Medical Sources 39 (9.8) 28 (71.8) 11 (28.2) 0.96 (0.45-2.01) 0.98 (0.45-2.13) 
Seeking Help Non-Medical Sources 87 (21.9) 47 (54.0) 40 (46.0) 2.07 (1.26-3.40) 1.74 (1.01-3.00) 
Interest in Help Seeking n (%) 
Not Interested in Help, No Help Sought 240 (53.8) 186 (77.5) 54 (22.5) 1 1 
Interested or Help Seeking 161 (36.1) 103 (64.0) 58 (36.0) 1.94 (1.25-3.02) 1.74 (1.08-2.80) 
Interested, No Help Sought 45 (10.1) 21 (46.7) 24 (53.3) 3.94 (2.04-7.61) 4.10 (2.03-8.30) 
Contact With Mental Health Problems in Other People n (%) 
No Contact 212 (49.8) 159 (75.0) 53 (25.0) 1 1 
Contact 214 (50.2) 134 (62.6) 80 (37.4) 1.79 (1.18-2.72) 1.73 (1.11-2.72) 
Resolving Mental Health Problems Requires Personal Responsibility n (%) 
Requires Less Personal Responsibility 159 (34.9) 126 (79.2) 33 (20.8) 1 1 
Requires More Personal Responsibility 296 (65.1) 186 (62.8) 110 (37.2) 2.26 (1.44-3.54) 2.27 (1.41-3.65) 
Discrimination Against Others With Mental Health Problems n (%) 
Lesser Discrimination 115 (26.4) 90 (78.3) 25 (21.7) 1 1 
Moderate Discrimination 170 (39.0) 121 (71.2) 49 (28.8) 1.46 (0.84-2.54) 1.47 (0.81-2.66) 
Greater Discrimination 151 (34.6) 90 (59.6) 61 (40.4) 2.44 (1.41-4.23) 2.66 (1.47-4.82) 
Mental Health Outcomes n (%) 
No Mental Health Disorder 328 (70.8) 249 (75.9) 79 (24.1) 1 1 
CMD and or PTSD 135 (29.2) 69 (51.1) 66 (48.9) 3.02 (1.98-4.60) 3.07 (1.95-4.84) 
Alcohol Outcomes n (%) 
No Hazardous Alcohol Use 295 (64.1) 204 (69.2) 91 (30.8) 1 1 
Hazardous Alcohol Use 165 (35.9) 113 (68.5) 52 (31.5) 1.03 (0.68-1.56) 1.08 (0.68-1.70) 
Screening for Mental Health Problems (CMD and or PTSD) and Help-Seeking n (%) 
Screened Negative No Help Seeking 215 (49.8) 166 (77.2) 49 (22.8) 1 1 
Screened Negative Help Seeking 87 (20.1) 62 (71.3) 25 (28.7) 1.37 (0.79-2.40) 1.25 (0.68-2.29) 
Screened Positive Help Seeking 74 (17.1) 41 (55.4) 33 (44.6) 2.73 (1.56-4.77) 2.49 (1.36-4.53) 
Screened Positive Not Help Seeking 56 (13.0) 26 (46.4) 30 (53.6) 3.91 (2.12-7.23) 4.22 (2.18-8.17) 
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Main Findings 
The association of help-seeking, potential stigmatising beliefs about seeking support, 
perceived barriers to care, mental health-related discrimination and mental health problems 
was investigated in a randomly chosen sample of non-deployed British Army personnel.  This 
represented the preparatory phase of the deployment cycle; there were a number of key 
findings.  Compared to other contemporary UK military surveys, the levels of mental health 
symptoms and alcohol use found in this study were substantial.  The study results suggested 
that around a third of those surveyed reported levels of alcohol use that were potentially 
harmful to health; approximately one quarter of personnel screened positive for probable 
mental disorder, reporting either symptoms of PTSD or common mental disorder.  For help-
seeking outcomes, of those who screened positive for probable mental health disorder, around 
40.0% had not sought any form of help or support despite the widely held view among the 
study participants that mental health support was helpful or necessary for mentally ill people 
and that the act of help-seeking required courage or strength.  Levels of help-seeking were 
substantially lower amongst probable harmful alcohol users than potential CMD or PTSD 
cases; around three quarters of those who screened positive for alcohol misuse had not sought 
any form of help.  The hypothesis tested in this study was that levels of help-seeking in a 
non-deployed setting, in this case a UK-based garrison, would be similar among military 
personnel reporting higher levels of stigma/BTC versus those who report lower levels.  The 
null hypothesis was rejected; for stigmatisation outcomes, high levels of Stigma/BTC were 
reported by three quarters of all respondents though overall, Stigma/BTC was no higher in 
help-seekers than non-help-seekers.  However, when the sample was stratified by mental 
health caseness, the presence of mental health symptoms appeared to act together with help-
seeking to affect stigma levels.  Raised levels of stigma/BTC were significantly associated 
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with greater potential intended discrimination and having had contact with mental health 
condition sufferers. 
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CHAPTER 8 - SECONDARY PREVENTION - MENTAL HEALTH, HELP-SEEKING 
AND THE EFFECT OF STIGMATISATION AND BARRIERS TO CARE AMONG 




A complex relationship exists between mental health symptoms, stigmatising beliefs about 
mental health and help seeking.  Detailed information about how these factors interact is 
scarce.  In order to examine mental health secondary prevention activity as it relates to the 
immediate post-deployment period, a detailed assessment of potential barriers to help-seeking 
were examined among 1636 members of the UK Armed Forces who provided study data 
immediately after deployment (T1) and again approximately six months later (T2).  
Stigmatising beliefs about mental health, help-seeking and perceived barriers to care 
(stigma/BTC) were assessed using an eight item scale previously used in studies of UK 
military personnel.  Symptoms of probable common mental disorder (CMD), probable post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and subjective stressful, emotional, relationship and family 
problems were evaluated at T1 and T2.  Help-seeking behaviour whilst deployed was 
assessed at T1 and post-deployment help-seeking at T2.  Alcohol use and subjective alcohol 
problems were assessed at T2 only. 
 
Reporting caseness on the mental health measures and re-instating potentially harmful 
alcohol use during the post-deployment period were both significantly associated with higher 
levels of stigma/BTC.  Prevailing levels of stigma/BTC corresponded to changes in mental 
health status observed over the period of follow-up.  Compared to those who were never a 
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probable mental health disorder case, recovered cases experienced significantly lower levels 
of stigma/BTC, whereas new onset mental health disorder cases reported significantly higher 
levels.  Stigma/BTC levels did not appear to be static; rather, they fluctuated in proportion to 
current levels of psychological symptoms.  Secondary prevention interventions related to 
mental health often use public health stigma reduction strategies which seek to promote 
engagement with mental health services through education.  If such approaches are 
undertaken, they should be made relevant to those experiencing worsening mental health, 
whereas those who have recovered from a mental-ill-health episode may be able to assist in 




As noted in the previous chapter, substantial numbers of military personnel who have mental 
disorders neither seek nor receive care, this applies to their civilian counterparts in equal 
measure (Wang et al., 2011) even when experiencing high levels of psychopathology (Oliver 
et al., 2005).  Osorio et al., 2012, demonstrated that during deployment, stigma/BTC were 
substantially higher during deployment with a marked reduction immediately post-
deployment.  The previous chapter suggested a substantial relationship between stigma/BTC 
and reduced help-seeking.  This chapter therefore explores in detail the relationship between 
stigma/BTC, mental health and help-seeking as personnel decouple from deployment and 
return to steady-state military life.  The current study had four aims.  In order to examine 
potential obstructions to implementing the detection component of mental health secondary 
prevention following deployment, this study sought to: 
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1.  Examine the relationship between symptoms of PTSD, common mental disorder 
(CMD) and stigma/BTC. 
 
2.  To assess whether changes in caseness on mental health measures bring about 
corresponding fluctuations in levels of stigma/BTC. 
 
3.  To understand how prevailing Stigma/BTC levels, current caseness on mental health 
measures and recognition of the presence of psychosocial problems interact to affect 
help-seeking; acknowledging the presence psychosocial problems was conceptualised as 
being a potential marker of the ability to recognise potential mental health problems in 
oneself. 
 
4.  To make recommendations about how best to deliver a mental health secondary 
prevention strategy in the form of a stigma/BTC reduction intervention. 
 




The sample for this study was comprised of members of the UK Armed Forces (UK AF) (the 
Royal Navy including the Royal Marines, British Army and Royal Air Force) attending post-
deployment decompression in Cyprus (Jones et al., 2011) after having deployed to 
Afghanistan in 2008/2009.  Participants were volunteers who had agreed to take part in a 
cluster randomised controlled trial (RCT) of a novel mental health training package (called 
UK Battlemind) which was designed to facilitate post-deployment readjustment (Mulligan et 
al., 2012).  This study received approval from the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence Research 
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Ethics Committee and the King’s College Hospital Research Ethics Committee.  All 
participants gave written informed consent.  Participants completed a pre-intervention survey 
whilst relaxing in a non-deployed military location approximately 24 hours after leaving 
Afghanistan and then again some four to six months later.  In addition to post-intervention 
outcome measures, at both time points, the surveys included a number of questions about 
stigmatising beliefs and barriers to care related to mental health, scales evaluating current 
mental health symptoms and levels of help-seeking; alcohol use was assessed at follow-up 
only as alcohol was prohibited during the six month deployment and, with the exception of 




Stigma/BTC were assessed using an abbreviated eight item stigma/BTC scale adapted from a 
13 item measure developed in US military research (Hoge et al., 2004).  This scale has 
previously been used in various forms to assess stigma/BTC among UK military personnel 
(Osorio et al 2012).  In order to ensure that the stigma/BTC scale was relevant to the study 
sample and to ensure that a potentially bulky questionnaire was kept as brief as possible, 
some modifications were undertaken.  Six items were retained from the original scale relating 
to public stigma, which included being treated differently, being seen as weak; barriers to 
care such as possible career harm, difficulty getting time off, not knowing where to get help 
and self-stigma related to potential embarrassment associated with help-seeking.  The 
adaptation included the deletion of three US-salient items that were assessed as having low 
relevance to UK military samples; these were cost of care, arranging transport and scheduling 
appointments.  The study team considered this to be appropriate, as in the UK military, 
logistical support such as transport is provided for, appointments are available on demand and 
care is free.  Four further items were deleted by the Battlemind study group as they were 
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endorsed at lower levels in deployment surveys previously conducted by the research team; 
these were, mistrust of mental health practitioners, perceptions that mental health treatment 
does not work, loss of trust if a mental health condition were to be declared and being blamed 
for having a mental health problem.  Two additional items were added into the scale which 
comprised concerns about confidentiality (BTC) and thinking less of colleagues (public 
stigma), both of which have been used to assess military samples (Sipos et al., 2012; Kim et 
al., 2012).  The researchers who carried out the modifications to the scale in preparation for 
the RCT reported that the adjusted questionnaire retained high internal consistency 
(Chronbach’s alpha=0.88 at baseline and 0.87 at follow up).  Respondents were asked to rate 
their strength of agreement with each stigma or BTC item using a five-point Likert scale.  
The response options were disagree and strongly disagree (scoring 1 and 2 respectively) 
neither agree nor disagree (scoring 3), agree and strongly agree (scoring 4 and 5 
respectively), which yielded scores ranging from 8–40 where higher scores indicated greater 
levels of stigma/BTC.  The stigma/BTC scale was then summed and tertiles were generated; 
lower and middle tertiles were combined to compare lower levels of stigma/BTC with the 
highest.  To assess change over the post-deployment period, stigma/BTC change scores were 
generated by subtracting T2 scores from T1 scores.  These were computed as tertiles so that 
larger increases in Stigma/BTC could be compared with little or no change and larger 
decreases.  To assess endorsement or non-endorsement of each stigma/BTC scale item, a 
binary variable was generated where agree and strongly agree responses were combined as 
were disagree and strongly disagree responses, while neutral responses that could not be 
allocated to an agreement category were deleted; a count variable was then generated. 
 
Mental health outcome measures included symptoms of common mental disorder (CMD) 
which were assessed using the 12 item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) (Goldberg et 
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al., 1997); endorsing four or more symptoms indicated CMD caseness on this measure 
(Goldberg and Williams, 1988).  Probable post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was 
assessed with the 17-item National Centre for PTSD Checklist for DSM IV (PCL-C) 
(Weathers et al ., 1994) using a cut off score of 50 or more to indicate probable PTSD 
caseness.  A variable representing any mental health problem was generated by combining 
probable PTSD or CMD caseness; this was carried out to assess the association of 
stigma/BTC and other variables with general mental ill-health.  Personnel were categorised 
according to changes in caseness status on the mental health measures from T1 to T2.  The 
categories were: 1. never a mental disorder case, 2. recovered case, 3. persistent case and 4. 
new case.  Current alcohol use was assessed using the 10 item Alcohol Use Disorders 
Identification Test (AUDIT), a validated screening tool used to identify potential alcohol use 
disorders (Babor et al., 2001).  Given the high prevalence of alcohol use disorders in the UK 
AF (Fear et al., 2007), a higher cut off score of ≥16 rather than ≥8 was used to indicate the 
presence of alcohol use potentially harmful to health.  This cut-off point has been used in 
previous UK military studies.  Alcohol use was assessed at follow-up only as it is prohibited 
during deployment and other than during a short period of rest and recuperation, all personnel 
had not consumed alcohol in the six months prior to first assessment. 
 
At T1, a single question asked about whether personnel had experienced a stressful, 
emotional, relationship or family problem while deployed and whether they had sought help 
for such problems while deployed.  This was termed a ‘subjective psychosocial problem’.  
The response options were; ‘I experienced a problem’, ‘I experienced a problem but I did not 
seek help’ and ‘No, I didn’t experience a problem’.  At T2, additional questions included; 
‘Since returning from [deployment] have you had a stressful/emotional or a 
relationship/family problem?’  For the purpose of analyses, stressful/emotional and 
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family/relationship problems were conflated into a single variable to signify subjective 
psychosocial problems.  The same question stem was used to assess subjective alcohol 
problems; ‘Since returning from [deployment] have you had alcohol problems?’ 
 
Participants were categorised according to whether they reported subjective psychosocial 
problems and whether they also reported mental health measure caseness using the combined 
PTSD or CMD measures.  This produced four categories: 
 
1.  No subjective psychosocial problems, not a case on the mental health measures. 
2.  Subjective psychosocial problems, not a case on the mental health measures. 
3.  No subjective psychosocial problems, a case on the mental health measures. 
4.  Subjective psychosocial problems, a case on the mental health measures. 
 
The same process of categorisation was applied to subjective alcohol problems and 
potentially harmful alcohol use measured using the AUDIT-10: 
 
1a.  No perceived alcohol use problems, no harmful alcohol use. 
2a.  Perceived alcohol use problems, no harmful alcohol use. 
3a.  No perceived alcohol use problems, harmful alcohol use. 
4a.  Perceived alcohol use problems, harmful alcohol use. 
 
Further questions were asked about help seeking behaviours occurring during the post-
deployment period.  In addition to asking if help had been sought, participants were asked to 
select help-sources from a list which included medical sources such as doctors and mental 
health practitioners, and non-medical sources such as welfare officers, friends, family and 
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Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) Practitioners.  The latter are military peers who have 
received specific training to deliver post-traumatic exposure mental health support 
(Greenberg et al., 2011).  Subjects were categorised according to whether they were 
experiencing symptoms of mental disorder and whether they were help-seeking.  This 
produced four categories: 
 
1b. Not a case on the mental health measures, not help seeking. 
2b. Not a case on the mental health measures, help seeking. 
3b. Mental disorder symptoms, help seeking. 
4b. Mental disorder symptoms, not help seeking. 
 




All analyses were conducted in the Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 20.  
Categorical data were initially explored to identify significant associations using Pearson’s 
chi squared test.  The effect of a range of independent variables, including mental health 
caseness, perceived psychosocial problems and help-seeking upon the dependent variables, 
represented by higher or lower levels of stigma and individual stigma/BTC scale items, was 
assessed using univariable and multivariable logistic regression to generate odds ratios (OR) 
with 95% confidence intervals (CI).  ORs and 95% CIs were adjusted for a range of observed 
confounding variables including socio-demographic factors; age, regular or reserve forces 
status, Service background, combat role, sex, rank, service length and individual augmentee 
(IA) status; IAs are those personnel who deploy alone or with small numbers of other military 
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personnel rather than formed unit personnel who deploy with known members of their 
peacetime unit.  Operational factors included previous episodes of operational deployment, 
levels of combat exposure and perceived better or poorer leadership at T1.  These analyses 
were repeated using a binary dependent variable comprised of increased stigma/BTC versus 
decreased Stigma/BTC in combination with minimal or no change at follow-up; for this 
evaluation, changes in mental health caseness during the follow-up period constituted the 
independent variable.  Numbers and percentages of those who returned a valid answer are 
reported in this study, whereas missing data are not; percentages and numbers may not sum to 
sample and sub-sample totals.  Statistical significance was p ≤0.05. 
Exclusions 
From a total of 2510 responders at T1, 1636 personnel supplied both initial and follow-up 
data.  Psychological symptoms and stigma levels were compared between non-responders 
and responders at follow-up and there were no statistical differences between the two groups 
in the baseline (T1) rates of probable PTSD (2.9%, n=25 vs. 2.3%, n=37, χ
2
=0.93 d.f.1, 
p=0.34), CMD (14.9%, n=129 vs. 15.5%, n=251, χ
2
=0.13 d.f.1, p=0.72) and reporting ≤3 
stigma/BTC scale items (21.5%, n=172 vs. 22.7% n=345, χ
2
=0.39 d.f.1, p=0.53).  It was 
therefore concluded that baseline (T1) stigma/BTC levels and mental health status did not 
influence non-response at T2 and that the T1 responses of non-responders at T2 could be 
dropped from analyses without substantially biasing outcomes.  Non-responders (n=874) 
were excluded from further analyses so that a direct comparison of those who supplied 
baseline and follow-up data could be undertaken (n=1636). 
 
Theoretically, the type of intervention delivered in the RCT could have had a modifying 
effect upon stigma/BTC levels.  To test whether this had occurred, adjusted logistic 
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regression analyses were conducted using the type of briefing intervention that the two 
samples were randomised to receive in the trial as the predictor and reporting ≤3 stigma/BTC 
items as the dependant variable.  Potential confounders were adjusted for, including, Service 
background, serving in a combat role, age, being in the reserve or regular forces, relationship 
status, IA status, number of previous deployments, levels of combat exposure and perceptions 
of leadership.  There were no significant differences in stigma/BTC levels between the 
randomised groups at baseline (AOR 0.93, 95% CI 0.70-1.22) and briefing intervention type 






The socio-demographic, military and operational characteristics of respondents were 
compared with whole force data where this was available (Defence Statistics, 2014) and 
found to be unrepresentative in several respects.  Certain groups were over-represented in the 
study sample including Royal Marines, males and combat personnel; under-represented 
groups included Royal Air Force personnel, those under 25 years of age and reserve forces.  
The rank structure of the sample was, however, similar to that of the whole UK AF.  Despite 
the potential for sampling bias, stigma scores falling above the upper tertile were not 




Mental Health Outcomes, Alcohol Use and Stigma/BTC 
 
At T1, 2.3% of personnel (n=37) scored positive for probable PTSD caseness compared to 
3.9% (n=63) at T2 (p<0.01); 15.5% (n=251) of personnel had symptoms of probable CMD at 
T1 compared to 14.1% (n=228) at T2 (p=0.27).  22.7% of personnel (n=345) endorsed ≥3 
Stigma/BTC components at T1 compared to 30.0% (n=462) at T2 (p<0.0001).  At follow-up, 
19.9% (n=317) of personnel were drinking alcohol at levels likely to be harmful to health 
(Table 30). 
 
Personnel reporting caseness levels of either CMD or PTSD had significantly greater adjusted 
odds of reporting stigma/BTC than personnel with fewer symptoms both at T1 (58.7, n=152 
vs. 29.5%, n=398) and T2 (67.3%, n=165 vs. 30.5%, n=412).  Those who reported potentially 
harmful levels of alcohol use had significantly greater adjusted odds of reporting stigma/BTC 
at T2 (51.7%, n=163) than those consuming alcohol at lower levels (31.7%, n=398) (Table 
32). 
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Table 29.  Help-Seeking and Stigma Study - Socio-demographic Factors. 
 
*Where valid comparison data relating to the whole of the UK AF was available from Defence Statistics 
** Personnel reporting stigma/BTC scores in the upper tertile at baseline measurement 
***Test statistic is for the distribution of upper tertile stigma scores among the various sub-categories 
Stigma/BTC response n’s and %’s exclude missing data 







, d.f., p 
Service (n=1636) 
Army 955 (58.4) 55.5 325 (34.7) 
χ
2
=0.27 d.f.2, p=0.88 
Royal Marines 640 (39.1) 
20.3 
213 (33.8) 
Royal Navy 38 (2.3) 12 (31.6) 
Royal Air Force 3 (0.2) 24.2 0 (0.0) 
Age Groups (n=1635) 
<25 645 (39.4) 28.2 204 (32.1) 
χ
2
=5.55 d.f.4, p=0.24 
25-29 463 (28.3) 22.9 171 (37.7) 
30-34 227 (13.9) 16.7 83 (36.9) 
35-39 197 (12.0) 
32.2 
61 (31.3) 
≥40 103 (6.3) 31 (31.0) 
Service Length (n=1619) 





=6.61, d.f.4, p=0.16 
2-4 Years 535 (33.0) 190 (35.8) 
5-12 Years 281 (17.4) 105 (37.8) 
13-21 Years 188 (11.6) 56 (30.1) 
≥ 22 Years 60 (3.7) 14 (23.7) 
Role (n=1634) 
Combat 776 (47.5) 34.0 247 (32.3) 
χ
2
=2.30, d.f.2, p=0.32 Combat Support 493 (30.2) 30.0 173 (35.7) 
Combat Service Support 365 (22.3) 36.0 130 (36.2) 
Engagement Type (n=1618) 
Regular 1552 (95.9) 90.9 524 (34.1) 
χ
2
=0.53, d.f.1, p=0.47 
Reserve 66 (4.1) 9.1 25 (38.5) 
Sex (n=1636) 
Male 1606 (98.2) 90.4 540 (34.2) 
χ
2
=0.00, d.f.1, p=0.97 
Female 30 (1.8) 9.6 10 (34.5) 
Relationship Status (n=1616) 





=0.78, d.f.1, p=0.38 
In a Long-Term Relationship 1127 (69.7) 387 (34.9) 
Rank (n=1634) 
Junior Rank 682 (41.7) 
60.2 387 (34.6) 
χ
2
=0.27, d.f.2, p=0.88 
Junior Non-Commissioned Officer 457 (28.0) 
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer 300 (18.4) 22.7 99 (33.3) 
2
nd
 Lieutenant to Major 188 (11.5) 14.0 
64 (33.3) 
Lieutenant Colonel and Above 7 (0.4) 3.1 
Previous Deployments (last 5 Years) (n=1614) 





=1.39, d.f.1, p=0.24 
≥2 936 (58.0) 328 (35.4) 
Time Deployed (n=1582) 





=3.26, d.f.2, p=0.20 Moderate (26-27 weeks) 544 (34.4) 167 (31.2) 
Longer (28-42 weeks) 488 (30.8) 164 (33.8) 
Individual Augmentee (IA) or Formed Unit (FU) Personnel (n=1513) 





=0.39, d.f.1, p=0.53 
FU 1294 (85.5) 430 (33.8) 
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Table 30.  Help-Seeking and Stigma - Mental Health Outcomes at T1 and T2 
 
 T1 Scores T2 Scores 
χ
2
, d.f., p 
Mental Health Outcome n (%) n (%) 
PCL-C Score <50 1589 (97.7) 1554 (96.1) χ2=7.13 d.f.1, 
p<0.01 PCL-C Score ≥50 37 (2.3) 63 (3.9) 
Endorsed <4 GHQ 12 Symptoms 1372 (84.5) 1391 (85.9) χ2=1.23 d.f.1, 
p=0.27 Endorsed ≥4 GHQ 12 Symptoms  251 (15.5) 228 (14.1) 
Endorsed <3 Stigma/BTC Components 1177 (77.3) 1077 (70.0) χ2=21.31 d.f.1, 
p<0.0001 Endorsed ≥3 Stigma/BTC Components  345 (22.7) 462 (30.0) 
 
Stigma/BTC Components and Mental Health 
 
The association between each of the eight stigma/BTC scale components and caseness on the 
mental health measures was assessed at T1 and at T2.  At T1, following adjustment for T1 
socio-demographic characteristics, operational factors and leadership levels, there was a 
significantly increased odds of reporting probable combined PTSD and CMD for all 
stigma/BTC components.  A similar pattern was seen at T2 after adjusting for T2 covariates.  
At T1, the two most commonly cited reasons for not seeking help were being seen as weak by 
other important people and being treated differently by leaders.  The least frequently 
endorsed components were not knowing where to get help and thinking less of a help-seeking 
unit member.  At T2, the rank order of stigma/BTC components was similar, though being 
seen as weak and being treated differently exchanged the top ranked position (Table 31). 
Subjective Psychosocial Problems, Mental Health Outcomes and Stigma/BTC 
 
Of 1628 personnel, 26.2% (n=427) reported that they had experienced a subjective 
psychosocial problem since returning from deployment and 24.6% (n=400) reported PTSD or 




Table 31.  Help-Seeking and Stigma - Itemised Stigma Responses 
 





















2AOR 95% CI Endorsed 
n (%) 
Public Stigma 
I would be seen as weak (by those who are important to me) 277 (69.6) 121 (30.4) 3.33 (2.33-4.74) 
398 (33.8) 
335 (73.0) 124 (27.0) 3.37 (2.30-4.92) 
461 (38.9) 
Not Endorsed 704 (90.4) 75 (9.6) 1 661 (92.2) 56 (7.8) 1 
Public Stigma 
My unit leaders/bosses might treat me differently 275 (69.3) 122 (30.7) 3.32 (2.31-4.77) 
397 (33.3) 
392 (74.4) 135 (25.6) 3.05 (2.08-4.46) 
531 (44.8) 
Not Endorsed 722 (90.8) 73 (9.2) 1 596 (92.0) 52 (8.0) 1 
Barrier to Care  
It would harm my career 200 (71.2) 81 (28.8) 2.33 (1.63-3.34) 
281 (23.2) 
309 (73.6) 111 (26.4) 2.83 (1.96-4.06) 
423 (35.8) 
Not Endorsed 819 (88.1) 111 (11.9) 1 688 (90.9) 69 (9.1) 1 
Self-Stigma 
It would be too embarrassing 165 (66.5) 83 (33.5) 3.85 (2.65-5.60) 
248 (22.1) 
229 (69.8) 99 (30.2) 3.43 (2.37-4.95) 
328 (28.9) 
Not Endorsed 783 (89.4) 93 (10.6) 1 727 (90.8) 74 (9.2) 1 
Public Stigma 
My visit would not remain confidential 170 (66.7) 85 (33.3) 3.95 (2.75-5.69) 
255 (20.4) 
212 (70.0) 91 (30.0) 3.97 (2.73-5.77) 
306 (24.5) 
Not Endorsed 894 (89.6) 104 (10.4) 1 855 (91.1) 84 (8.9) 1 
Barrier to Care 
There would be difficulty getting time off work for treatment 153 (68.0) 72 (32.0) 3.18 (2.19-4.63) 
225 (18.6) 
205 (68.5) 95 (31.7) 3.86 (2.67-5.58) 
301 (23.6) 
Not Endorsed 871 (88.7) 111 (11.3) 1 888 (91.6) 81 (8.4) 1 
Self-Stigma 
I would think less of a team member receiving mental health treatment 92 (73.6) 33 (26.4) 1.68 (1.06-2.68) 
125 (9.6) 
95 (73.6) 34 (26.4) 1.83 (1.14-2.93) 
130 (9.9) 
Not Endorsed 1002 (85.3) 172 (14.7) 1 1019 (86.8) 155 (13.2) 1 
Barrier to Care 
I don't know where to get help 25 (61.0) 16 (39.0) 3.53 (1.67-7.44) 
41 (3.1) 
46 (57.5) 34 (42.5) 5.10 (2.97-8.76) 
80 (6.0) 
Not Endorsed 1096 (85.6) 184 (14.4) 1 1095 (87.9) 151 (12.1) 1 
1AOR – Adjusted for socio-demographic factors (age, regular or reserve forces, individual augmentee vs. formed unit personnel, Service background, combat role, sex, rank, service length), operational factors (previous operational 
deployment, combat exposure) and perceived better or poorer leadership at T1. 
2AOR – Adjusted for socio-demographic factors (age, regular or reserve forces, individual augmentee vs. formed unit personnel, Service background, combat role, sex, rank, service length), operational factors (previous operational 
deployment, combat exposure) and perceived better or poorer leadership at T2. 




Table 32.  Help-Seeking and Stigma - Mental Health, Help-seeking, Alcohol Use and Subjective Mental Health 
 
*Middle and Lower Tertile of Stigma Scale Total Score. 
**Upper Tertile of Stigma Scale Total Score. 
1AOR – Adjusted for Service background, combat arm, age, engagement type, relationship status, individual augmentee vs. formed unit, rank and previous deployment. 
2AOR – Adjusted for combat exposure and previous operational deployment. 
3AOR – Adjusted for leadership at T1 for T1 stigma/BTC and T2 for T2 stigma/BTC. 
4AOR – Adjusted for all observed confounders. 
 *Lesser 
Stigma n (%) 
**Greater 
Stigma n (%) 









Mental Health Outcomes at T1 n (%) (Stigma Data Gathered at T1) 
No Mental Health Measure Caseness 1350 (83.9) 952 (70.5) 398 (29.5) 1 1 1 1 1 
Either CMD or PTSD 259 (16.1) 107 (41.3) 152 (58.7) 3.40 (2.59-4.47) 3.53 (2.65-4.71) 3.43 (2.61-4.51) 3.08 (2.33-4.09) 2.87 (2.16-3.81) 
Mental Health Outcomes at T2 n (%) (Stigma Data Gathered at T2) 
No Mental Health Measure Caseness 1351 (84.6) 939 (69.5) 412 (30.5) 1 1 1 1 1 
Either CMD or PTSD 245 (15.4) 80 (32.7) 165 (67.3) 4.70 (3.51-6.29) 4.65 (3.42-6.31) 4.66 (3.47-6.24) 4.00 (2.95-5.42) 4.00 (2.91-5.54) 
Alcohol Outcomes at T2 n (%) (Stigma Data  Gathered at T2) 
No Potentially Harmful Alcohol Use 1254 (79.9) 856 (68.3) 398 (31.7) 1 1 1 1 1 
Potentially Harmful Alcohol Use 315 (20.1) 152 (48.3) 163 (51.7) 2.31 (1.80-2.96) 2.33 (1.79-3.03) 2.37 (1.83-3.07) 2.24 (1.74-2.89) 2.08 (1.56-2.78) 
Subjective Psychosocial Problems and Help-Seeking During Deployment n (%) (Stigma Data Gathered at T1) 
No Problem - Did Not Seek Help 1191 (75.0) 813 (68.3) 378 (31.7) 1 1 1 1 1 
Experienced a Problem and Sought Help 122 (7.7) 76 (62.3) 46 (37.7) 1.30 (0.89-1.92) 1.30 (0.87-1.95) 1.27 (0.86-1.88) 1.20 (0.80-1.78) 1.21 (0.79-1.84) 
Experienced a Problem - Did Not Seek Help 276 (17.4) 159 (57.6) 117 (42.4) 1.58 (1.21-2.07) 1.57 (1.18-2.07) 1.59 (1.22-2.09) 1.44 (1.09-1.91) 1.44 (1.09-1.93) 
Help Seeking Post Deployment – Medical and Non-Medical  Sources n (%) 
No Help-Seeking 1424 (89.1) 925 (65.0) 499 (35.0) 1 1 1 1 1 
Help Source Included Medical Sources 68 (4.3) 43 (65.2) 25 (36.8) 1.08 (0.65-1.79) 0.97 (0.56-1.67) 1.11 (0.67-1.85) 1.00 (0.58-1.73) 0.92 (0.51-1.67) 
Sought Help Non-Medical Sources 107 (6.7) 58 (54.2) 49 (45.8) 1.57 (1.57-2.33) 1.55 (1.02-2.36) 1.57 (1.06-2.34) 1.57 (1.03-2.39) 1.65 (1.06-2.56) 
Interest in Help Seeking Post Deployment n (%) 
Not Interested in Help, No Help Sought 1287 (84.1) 844 (65.6) 443 (34.4) 1 1 1 1 1 
Interested and Already Help Seeking 173 (11.3) 101 (58.4) 72 (41.6) 1.36 (0.98-1.88) 1.30 (0.92-1.83) 1.38 (1.00-1.91) 1.34 (0.95-1.89) 1.35 (0.94-1.95) 
Interested, No Help Sought 70 (4.6) 33 (47.1) 37 (52.9) 2.14 (1.32-3.46) 2.02 (1.23-3.31) 2.12 (1.31-3.45) 1.21 (1.31-3.72) 2.14 (1.26-3.63) 
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Subjective Alcohol Problems, Alcohol Use Levels and Stigma/BTC 
 
5.5% of personnel (n=89 of 1613) reported that they had experienced alcohol problems since 
returning home, however, 19.9% (n=317 of 1592) scored positive on the alcohol measure for 
probable harmful alcohol use. 
 
Personnel in Category 3a and Category 4a reported significantly higher levels of stigma/BTC 
(52.1% for both groups, n=123 and n=38 respectively) than those in Category 1a, the 
reference group (31.2%, n=384).  Although Category 2a personnel reported higher levels of 
stigma/BTC than the reference group (54.5%, n=6), there were insufficient category numbers 




Table 33.  Help-Seeking and Stigma - Mental Health Outcomes, Subjective Psychosocial Problems, Alcohol Use and Stigma/BTC 
 
 
*AOR – Adjusted for socio-demographic factors (age, regular or reserve forces, individual augmentee vs. formed unit personnel, service background, combat role, sex, rank, service length), operational factors 
(previous operational deployment, combat exposure) and perceived better or poorer leadership at T2 
**GHQ 12 Symptom Endorsements ≥4 and or PCL-C Scores ≥50 
 
Mental Health Outcomes, Subjective Psychosocial Problems and Alcohol use during the 
T1 to T2 period 
Stigma/BTC Level 





Subjective Psychosocial Problems and Probable Mental Health Disorder Caseness n (%) 
Cat 1 No subjective psychosocial problems, **No Mental Health Measure Caseness 1133 (71.3) 811 (71.6) 322 (28.4) 1 1 
Cat 2 Subjective psychosocial problems, No Mental Health Measure Caseness 61 (3.9) 40 (65.6) 21 (34.4) 1.32 (0.77-2.28) 1.07 (0.57-2.00) 
Cat 3 No subjective psychosocial problems, Mental Health Measure Caseness 256 (16.1) 121 (47.3) 135 (52.7) 2.81 (2.13-3.71) 2.59 (1.89-3.53) 
Cat 4 Subjective psychosocial problems, Mental Health Measure Caseness 138 (8.7) 42 (30.4) 96 (69.6) 5.76 (3.92-8.46) 4.92 (3.22-7.52) 
Subjective Alcohol Problems and Probable Harmful Alcohol Use n (%) 
Cat 1a No perceived alcohol problems, AUDIT <16 1229 (79.3) 845 (68.8) 384 (31.2) 1 1 
Cat 2a Perceived alcohol problems, AUDIT <16 11 (0.7) 5 (45.5) 6 (54.5) 2.64 (0.80-8.71) 1.87 (0.46-7.49) 
Cat 3a No perceived alcohol problems, AUDIT ≥16 236 (15.2) 113 (47.9) 123 (52.1) 2.40 (1.81-3.18) 2.20 (1.59-3.02) 
Cat 4a Perceived alcohol problems, AUDIT ≥16 73 (4.7) 35 (47.9) 38 (52.1) 2.39 (1.49-3.84) 1.98 (1.16-3.38) 
Mental Health Caseness (CMD and or PTSD) and Help-Seeking Post Deployment n (%) 
Cat 1b No Mental Health Measure Caseness, Not Help Seeking 1040 (69.8) 741 (71.2) 299 (28.8) 1 1 
Cat 2b No Mental Health Measure Caseness, Help Seeking 81 (5.4) 59 (72.8) 22 (27.2) 0.92 (0.56-1.54) 0.97 (0.56-1.70) 
Cat 3b Mental Health Measure Caseness, Help Seeking 89 (6.0) 39 (43.8) 50 (56.2) 3.18 (2.05-4.93) 3.02 (1.83-4.97) 
Cat 4b Mental Health Measure Caseness, Not Help Seeking 279 (18.7) 118 (42.3) 161 (57.7) 3.38 (2.57-4.44) 3.10 (2.29-4.21) 
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Mental Health Measure Caseness and Changes in Stigma/BTC 
 
A comparison was made between, changes in either CMD or PTSD caseness and changes in 
stigma/BTC levels at both T1 and T2.  Of the non-cases at T1 (the reference group), 33.2% 
(n=392) reported an increase in stigma/BTC levels at T2.  Not being a case at T1 but being a 
case at T2, representing new caseness, was associated with significantly greater odds of 
reporting increased stigma/BTC at T2 (48.9%, n=66) compared to the reference group.  Being 
a case at T1 but not at T2, representing remission, was associated with a significantly reduced 
odds of reporting an increase in stigma/BTC at T2 (23.0%, n=34) compared to the reference 
group whereas caseness at both time points, representing persistent symptoms, was associated 
with levels of stigma/BTC at T2 that were similar to the reference group (38.7%, n=41).  The 





Table 34.  Help-Seeking and Stigma - Mental Health Outcomes and Stigma/BTC Change Scores 
 
 Stigma/BTC Change Scores (T1 to T2) 
*OR (95% CI) 1AOR (95% CI) 2AOR (95% CI) 3AOR (95% CI) 4AOR (95% CI) Mental Health Measure Caseness (GHQ 
≥4 or PCL-C ≥50) n (%) 
Decrease n 
(%) 
Minimal or No 
Change n (%) 
Increase 
n (%) 
No Caseness at T1 or T2 
1181 (75.2) 
403 (34.1) 386 (32.7) 392 (33.2) 1 1 1 1 1 
Caseness at T1 not at T2 
148 (9.4) 
66 (44.6) 48 (32.4) 34 (23.0) 0.60 (0.40-0.90) 0.66 (0.44-1.00) 0.57 (0.38-0.86) 0.60 (0.40-0.90) 0.63 (0.41-0.96) 
Caseness at T1 and T2 
106 (6.8) 
28 (26.4) 37 (34.9) 41 (38.7) 1.27 (0.84-1.91) 1.34 (0.87-2.05) 1.26 (0.83-1.90) 1.19 (0.78-1.80) 1.24 (0.80-1.93) 
No Caseness at T1 Caseness at T2 
135 (8.6) 
33 (24.4) 36 (26.7) 66 (48.9) 1.93 (1.35-2.76) 2.04 (1.40-2.98) 1.88 (1.31-2.70) 1.76 (1.21-2.54) 1.88 (1.27-2.78) 
*Dependant variable is increase in stigma/BTC at follow-up vs. decreased and minimal or no change. 
1AOR- Adjusted for socio-demographic factors (age, regular or reserve forces, individual augmentee vs. formed unit personnel, Service background, combat role, sex, rank, service length).  
2AOR – Adjusted for operational factors (previous operational deployment, combat exposure). 
3AOR – Adjusted for leadership at T2. 





Subjective Psychosocial Problems and Help-Seeking During Deployment 
 
Of 1601 personnel, 25.1% (n=401) reported that they had experienced subjective 
psychosocial problems during their deployment.  Of those reporting such problems, 30.9% 
(n=124) had sought help whilst deployed from either medical or non-medical sources.  Those 
who reported subjective psychosocial problems during deployment and who had sought help 
reported levels of stigma/BTC that were not significantly different to levels found among 
non-help-seekers who reported no such problems (37.7%, n=46 vs. 31.7%, n=378).  Those 
who reported problems during deployment but who had not sought help had significantly 
greater odds of reporting raised levels of stigma/BTC (42.4%, n=117) (Table 34). 
 
Subjective Psychosocial Problems and Help-Seeking Post-Deployment 
 
Since returning from deployment, 47.5% (n=149) of personnel who reported that they had 
experienced a subjective psychosocial problem had sought help; for subjective alcohol 
problems the rate was 57.3% (n=51) and for family or relationship problems, the post-
deployment help-seeking rate was 39.7% (n=106) (Table 37). 
 
Mental Health Caseness, Alcohol Use and Help Seeking Post-Deployment 
 
Since returning from deployment, 38.8% (n=33) of probable PTSD cases had sought help; for 
CMD caseness the rate was 25.4% (n=89) and for potentially harmful alcohol use the rate 
was 9.1% (n=27) (Table 37).  Given the limitations of the survey approach, it was not 
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possible to establish whether the person had sought help for the clinical problem or was help-
seeking and coincidentally scored positive on the survey measure. 
 
Post-Deployment Help-Seeking and Source of Support 
 
Amongst help seekers who were PTSD cases, military unit-based non-medical assistance, 
including the Padre and Welfare Officer, was the most frequently accessed category of 
support (54.6%, n=18), followed by partner, family and civilian friends (48.5%, n=16).  For 
CMD, personnel most frequently accessed partners, family and civilian friends (67.4%, n=60) 
and for those scoring positive for potentially harmful alcohol use, partners, family and 
civilian friends were the most popular help source along with military friends or colleagues 
(both categories 33.3%, (n=9)).  For subjective psychosocial problems and subjective alcohol 
problems, partner, family and civilian friends were the most frequently accessed sources of 
support; in all cases peer-delivered mental health support in the form of TRIM was least 
frequently sought out.  The results are shown in Table 35 where family and relationship 
problems and stressful and emotional problems are shown separately for interest as there 




Table 35.  Help-Seeking and Stigma - Help Sources 
 
Help Seeking 
Subjective Problem Reported After Returning 
Home n (%) 
















No Help Sought 165 (52.5) 38 (42.7) 161 (60.3) 52 (61.2) 261 (74.6) 270 (90.9) 
Sought Help From at Least One Source 149 (47.5) 51 (57.3) 106 (39.7) 33 (38.8) 89 (25.4) 27 (9.1) 
*Reported Help Source 
Partner, Civilian Friend, Family 61 (40.9) 17 (33.3) 62 (58.5) 16 (48.5) 60 (67.4)  9 (33.3) 
Military Friend or Colleague 54 (36.2) 15 (29.4) 31 (29.3) 11 (33.3) 28 (31.5) 9 (33.3) 
Regimental Medical Officer or Doctor 50 (33.6) 15 (29.4) 13 (12.3) 15 (45.5) 32 (36.0) 4 (14.8) 
Unit Commanders 31 (20.8) 8 (15.7) 23 (21.7) 15 (45.5) 33 (37.1) 5 (18.5) 
**Other Non-Medical Staff 27 (18.1) 6 (11.8) 18 (17.0) 18 (54.6) 32 (36.0) 2 (7.4) 
Mental Health Professional 37 (24.8) 6 (11.8) 7 (6.6) 15 (45.5) 27 (30.3)  5 (18.5) 
***TRiM Practitioner 13 (8.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (12.1) 6 (6.7) 0 (0.0) 
*Some personnel sought help from more than one source. 
**Padre, unit based Welfare Officer. 
***Peers trained to deliver post traumatic exposure mental health support. 
 
Post-Deployment Mental Health, Help-seeking and Stigma/BTC 
 
28.4% (n=322) of those in Category 1, asymptomatic personnel with no subjective 
psychosocial problems, which constituted the reference group, reported higher levels of 
stigma/BTC.  Category 2 subjects, asymptomatic personnel with subjective psychosocial 
problems showed similar proportions of raised stigma/BTC to those found among the 
reference group (34.4%, n=21).  Category 3 (symptomatic personnel with no subjective 
psychosocial problems) and Category 4 (symptomatic personnel with subjective psychosocial 
problems) subjects were both significantly more likely to report greater stigma/BTC than the 
reference group (52.7%, n=135 and 69.6%, n=96 respectively).  The significant associations 
remained after adjusting for socio-demographic characteristics, operational factors and 




Help-seekers who were not probable PTSD or CMD cases but who had sought help for 
subjective psychosocial problems (Category 1b) were no more likely to report higher levels 
of Stigma/BTC (27.2%, n=22) than the reference group who were non-help-seekers with sub-
caseness mental health (28.8%, n=299) (Category 2b).  Help-seekers who were mental health 
cases (Category 2c) reported significantly higher levels of stigma/BTC (56.2%, n=50) than 
the reference group and the highest levels were reported by symptomatic non-help-seekers 
(Category 2d) whose stigma/BTC levels were significantly higher than the reference group 
(57.7%, n=161) (Table 32). 
 
Stigma/BTC and Post-Deployment Source of Help 
 
Compared to stigma/BTC levels among post-deployment non-help-seekers (the reference 
group) (35.0%, n=499), those who sought help from any source (including medical staff) 
were not significantly more likely to report stigma/BTC (36.8%, n=25).  Help-seekers 
accessing non-medical sources alone had a significant increased odds of reporting 
stigma/BTC (45.8%, n=49) (Table 32). 
 
Help-Seeking Stigma/BTC and Interest in Receiving Help 
 
Personnel interested in receiving help for a subjective psychosocial problem but who were 
yet to seek help were significantly more likely to report stigma/BTC (52.9%, n=37) than the 
reference group who were those not interested in and not seeking help (34.4%, n=443).  
Those who were both interested in receiving help and who had accessed support were not 
significantly more likely to report stigma/BTC (41.6%, n=72) than the reference group.  The 
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The results of this study did not support the null hypothesis that symptoms of probable 
mental disorder would be similar among those reporting higher and lower levels of 
stigma/BTC at both assessment points.  Personnel who were classified as cases of probable 
PTSD, CMD or who reported potentially harmful alcohol use in the post-deployment period 
had significantly higher levels of stigma/BTC than non-symptomatic personnel and non-
harmful alcohol users.  The secondary research question was whether levels of stigma/BTC 
would have any substantial effect upon rates of help-seeking.  Recognising the presence of a 
subjective psycho-social problem was only significantly associated with raised stigma/BTC 
when caseness levels of mental health symptoms were present.  It is therefore proposed that 
substantive mental health symptoms are important in determining levels of stigma/BTC 
whereas recognising that one has a psychosocial problem might serve to augment 
stigma/BTC but is not necessary for raised stigma/BTC levels.  Underlining the importance 
of symptoms in relation to stigma/BTC, new onset mental health measure caseness and 
remission from caseness were both associated with increases and reductions in stigma/BTC 
respectively.  The results suggested that, in addition to the presence of caseness levels of 
mental health symptoms, being interested in receiving help or support, whilst not actually 
seeking it, was associated with substantial levels of stigma/BTC. 
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This chapter describes a study that sought to gauge the effect of tertiary preventative 
activities conducted during deployment.  An assessment of occupational functioning was 
conducted among UK Service personnel who accessed mental healthcare while deployed on 
combat operations.  Data were gathered in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2010 from 611 UK 
military personnel assessed by a deployed mental health team.  Two outcomes were assessed; 
firstly, the rate of return to duty (RTD) in the operational area and secondly, longer-term 
occupational fitness, adverse discharges and military offending following deployment.  The 
predictors of RTD and longer-term occupational functioning were assessed by linking 
deployment clinical records to personnel databases.  The groups most commonly assessed by 
the mental health team were younger personnel, males, junior ranks and those with a combat 
role.  After completion of care, 76.8% (n=436) returned to full duty with their operational 
unit; the remainder were evacuated home.  After controlling for potential confounders, 
predictors of evacuation included having a history of mental disorder among close family 
members, difficulty adjusting to the operational environment, exposure to greater levels of 
non-combat stress and threatening to or actually carrying out self-harm whilst deployed.  For 
longer-term occupational outcomes, 33.7% (n=149) experienced adverse occupational 
consequences in the four year period of assessment after returning home which, following 
adjustment for potential confounders, was predicted by greater levels of pre-deployment 
psychological vulnerability.  Compared to referrals from a medical officer, there was no 
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evidence that initiating a self-referral or being referred by a non-medical person affected 
longer-term occupational outcomes.  Tertiary prevention in the form of deployed mental 
healthcare effectively facilitates RTD for around three quarters of military personnel referred 
for assessment.  Around a third of personnel in receipt of deployment mental healthcare went 
on to experience negative longer-term occupational outcomes; such outcomes were mostly 




Given the substantial rates of return to duty (RTD) previously reported amongst UK AF 
personnel who received mental healthcare while serving in Iraq (Jones et al., 2010), the 
current study examined the effectiveness of tertiary prevention delivered by Field Mental 
Health Teams in Afghanistan.  This was felt to be particularly important as an internal 
briefing using the early results of the previous study detailed a number of recommendations 
to command about deployment mental healthcare.  It was deemed timely to carry out a 
reassessment using a broader definition of occupational outcome to determine whether the 
revised deployment healthcare arrangements had achieved any substantial positive effects.  In 
the previous study it was noted that the sample contained a large number of reserve forces 
personnel who, at the time of the study, could leave the military almost at will and may have 
affected the overall rates of early discharge in a substantial way. 
 
The Effect of Potential Barriers to Help-Seeking 
 
The deployed healthcare dataset provided an opportunity to examine a secondary research 
question regarding the effect of potential barriers to help seeking, which is a major strand of 
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this PhD thesis.  Effective rapid treatment for mental health problems experienced during 
deployment may contribute to operational effectiveness; however, although clinical care is 
readily available from deployed mental health practitioners, accessing such care requires 
personnel to overcome physical and psychological barriers to receiving mental health 
support.  As detailed in the introductory chapter, military personnel can be concerned about 
the potential adverse occupational consequences of declaring a mental health problem when 
deciding to seek treatment (Iversen et al., 2011).  During deployment this may be in part 
related to the path that an individual has to follow to consult with a mental health 
professional; this usually involves an initial consultation with a medical practitioner or, in 
their absence, a unit commander.  Self-referral or referrals made by a unit chaplain may be 
viewed subjectively as less concerning than a referral arranged by a unit commander as the 
latter could be viewed as making a potential mental health problem ‘public’.  As described in 
the introductory chapter, this could be associated with a perceived loss of status within a 
military unit and the possibility that leaders, and colleagues, might treat the individual 
differently.  The hypothesis related to referral source which was tested in the secondary study 
component was that self or chaplain initiated referral was associated with greater numbers of 
personnel presenting with spurious or non-mental health related conditions as they were not 
‘pre-screened’ prior to referral.  Given that these forms of referral might also be associated 
with reduced fighting spirit and positive commitment to the UK military, it was also possible 
that longer-term occupational outcomes might be worse among this group. 
 
Study Specific Methods 
Sample 
 
In order to establish the circumstances leading up to referral and the mental health and 
associated characteristics of those referred to the FMHT, data gathered during mental health 
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assessments conducted by FMHT clinicians among members of the three UK AF Services 
(Royal Navy (including Royal Marines), Army and Royal Air Force) deployed in 
Afghanistan were examined.  After excluding reserves and later referrals, where outcomes 
were yet to be formalised, the clinical records of 611 individuals referred between May 2006 





Evacuation home or RTD status recorded by FMHT clinicians constituted the short-term 
occupational outcome and was available for 93.0% of cases (n=568). 
 
Assessing the Predictors of Short-Term Occupational Outcome 
For each referral, FMHT clinicians recorded socio-demographic and military characteristics 
including self-reported combat exposure, referral source, diagnosis, subsequent treatment or 
therapy and whether personnel were ultimately evacuated or RTD.  In addition to self-
reported combat exposure, additional variables were examined both as individual items and 
with the items organised into two distinct groups; firstly, psychological vulnerability factors 
and secondly, non-combat operational factors. 
 
The ‘psychological vulnerability’ group was comprised of six self-reported items with an 
empirical link to poorer mental health.  These included previous receipt of mental health 
assessment or therapy (Larson et al., 2011; Leardmann et al., 2009) one or more parents or 
siblings in receipt of past or present mental healthcare, which was designated ‘family 
psychiatric history’(Dean et al., 2010), having a self-reported past history of traumatic 
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exposure before the current deployment (Breslau et al., 1999), lifetime episode(s) of 
deliberate self-harm (DSH) excluding the current deployment (Hawton et al., 2013), previous 
deployment mental health problems and recent substance or alcohol misuse (Hasin et al., 
2007; Paljarvi et al., 2009). 
 
A second, four item group constituting ‘non-combat operational stressors’ was formed which 
included self-reported difficulty adjusting to the operational environment, personal 
difficulties with the operational commander, welfare problems experienced by the family at 
home during the deployment period and experiencing relationship problems with one’s 
intimate partner while deployed. 
 
Items within the psychological vulnerability and non-operational stressor group were 
endorsed ‘present’ or ‘absent’ and were summed to produce a count variable so that 
comparisons could be made between those reporting lesser and greater numbers of category 
items.  Tertiles were generated to compare greater levels of exposure to the two groups of 
items with lower levels.  Personnel with scores in the upper tertile, which equated to 
reporting two or more items in each group, were compared with those reporting fewer (those 
in the middle and lower tertiles). 
Mental Disorder Categories 
 
Diagnostic categories were derived from in-depth clinical assessments carried out by FMHT 
clinicians; no psychometric scales were used.  A judgment was made by FMHT clinicians as 
to whether there was a substantial association between mental health symptoms and recent 
combat exposure, represented by acute (combat) stress reaction and new-onset PTSD, or 
whether such symptoms were associated with non-combat exposure, represented by 
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adjustment and other psychiatric disorders.  The meta-categories of disorder used in this 
study were combat exposure-related disorders, mood and anxiety disorders, general 
psychiatric conditions and no assigned diagnosis. 
 
Longer-term Occupational Outcomes 
 
To gauge the overall impact on longer-term occupational functioning over the four year post-
deployment assessment period, three categories of negative outcome were examined and 
conflated.  These were firstly, unplanned discharge from the military, secondly, reduced 
occupational fitness and lastly, indiscipline; these are described in full below.  The resulting 
composite variable was labelled ‘negative occupational outcome’ and was compared with 
neutral occupational outcomes represented by continued service or uncomplicated completion 
of the individual’s elective service term.  Additional positive outcomes were grouped with 
neutral outcomes and included promotion in rank or undertaking further operational 
deployment.  In the case of personnel who experienced both negative and positive outcomes 
(n=33), the most recent of these was categorised and used as the outcome variable.  Longer-
term outcome data was obtained by performing data linkage between individual entries in the 
clinical dataset and occupational information recorded in personnel databases obtained from 
Defence Statistics.  All outcomes were therefore record-based rather than self-reported. 
 
Long-term occupational fitness was defined by the medical employment standard recorded in 
the personnel record.  As described in the introduction chapter of this thesis, to regulate 
military occupational health, the UK AF utilises a system of medical classification (MoD, 
2006).  The system assigns each service person to a medical employment standard which is 
dependent on their physical and psychological health status (MoD, 2007; MoD, 2006) and 
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determines whether they can be deployed.  In the UK AF, medical employment standards can 
only be altered by a military doctor.  Broad categories of deployment restriction are used to 
protect the person while their illness or mental disorder is managed or discharge from the 
military is arranged (PULLHEEMS Pamphlet. 2007).  The standards are: fully deployable, 
deployable with substantial limitations and not deployable; to determine longer-term 
occupational outcome, the two reduced medical employment standards, representing an 
inability to fully carry out one’s deployed role, were combined and compared with the fully 
deployable category. 
 
Discharge from Service 
 
Two forms of post-deployment discharge were examined: first, a category of overtly negative 
outcomes including discharge on medical grounds, administrative or discipline-related 
discharge and all discharges that occurred before the minimum elective term of service had 
been completed.  The minimum required length of service is 4 years for Army, 3.5 years for 
Royal Air Force (RAF) and 4.5 years for Royal Navy (RN) personnel.  For the purpose of the 
study, any of these mechanisms of exiting from the military were designated ‘premature 
discharges’.  Second, all discharges occurring within the 12 months following return from 
deployment were examined.  Those personnel who came to the natural end point of their 
service were classed as normal service leavers.  Having completed a minimum elective term 
of service, personnel can apply to leave at any time.  In personnel records, this form of 
discharge is annotated premature voluntary release or ‘PVR’.  When the date of PVR was 
examined in the personnel records, in a small number of cases, the application to PVR had 
been submitted immediately upon return from deployment and may therefore have been 
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related to deployment mental health or adverse deployment experiences; this form of 




The third component of the negative occupational outcome variable was military offending.  
Offences were identified in the personnel record and were dichotomised into those where the 
person was convicted and punished by the unit commanding officer, which, when the type of 
offence was examined, generally constituted a less serious military offence, or serious 
offences resulting in conviction at court martial and any punishment resulting in loss of rank. 
 
For the final long-term occupational outcome variable, comparing combined positive and 





To evaluate the secondary research question regarding potential barriers to care, short and 
long-term outcomes were compared between referrals from unit commanders and all other 
referral sources.  In order to make this comparison, referral sources were grouped into three 
categories; those with little perceived occupational risk including self-referral and chaplain 
referrals; those with a moderate degree of negative occupational consequences, which 
included medical and welfare officer referrals and those with potentially the highest negative 





Personnel who were referred to the FMHT after September 2010, the date of data linkage 
(n=97), were not included in the analyses of long-term outcomes as insufficient time had 
elapsed for longer-term occupational outcomes to have developed and been recorded when 
data linkage was performed.  Reserve forces personnel (n=45) were also excluded as their 
discharge options are distinct from those of regular force personnel whereby they are not 
required to complete a fixed minimum term of military service and can effectively leave on 
request.  This study was approved by the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee 
(MODREC, No 0836/191 dated 03 December 2010). 
 
Analysis 
The Statistics Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 20) was used for the analyses.  The 
standard approach to analyses was taken whereby the associations of categorical data were 
initially assessed using Pearson’s chi squared (χ
2
) test and were further explored using 
logistic regression to generate odds ratios (ORs) with 95% confidence intervals (CI) which 
were adjusted for potential confounders.  Trends in the data were examined using chi squared 
(χ
2
) test for trend.  Statistical significance was defined as p≤0.05 throughout. 
Results 
Demographic Factors 
A comparison with whole force figures suggested that personnel consulting with the FMHT 
were statistically significantly younger (p<0.0001) (Table 36), more likely to be deployed in 
a combat role (p<0.0001), to be in the Army (p<0.0001) and to hold a junior rank (p<0.0001) 
(All p values are for Pearson’s chi squared test).  
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*Age Group (in 
Years) 
(n=606) 
18-24 305 (50.3) 28.2 
25-29 147 (24.3) 22.9 
30-34 79 (13.0) 16.7 




Combat 292 (47.8) 34.0 
Combat Support Arm 141 (23.1) 30.0 




Royal Navy 17 (2.8) a
 20.3 
Royal Marines 39 (6.4) 
Army 525 (85.9) 
a
 55.5 





Male 551 (90.2) 90.4 
Female 60 (9.8) 9.6 
*Rank Groups 
(n=611) 
Commissioned Officer 19 (3.1) 17.1 
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer 58 (9.5) 22.7 
Junior Non-Commissioned Officer 192 (31.4) 
60.2 
Private Soldier or Equivalent 342 (56.0) 
FU vs. IA 
Personnel 
(n=607) 











Individual Augmentee (IA) Personnel (Deployed alone) 154 (25.4) 
Previous Tours 
(n=600) 
None 249 (41.5) 
One or More 351 (58.5) 
Service Length 
(n=597) 
<4 Years 302 (50.6) 




In a Long-Term Relationship 189 (31.1) 




None 307 (54.6) 
One or More 255 (45.4) 
*p<0.0001 
a
 Characteristics varied with time over the period of data collection,  therefore an average number for 8 deployment years is shown 
b RAF and RN personnel recoded as Combat, CSA or CSS classified using the role of the unit that they were deployed with 
Reported percentages and numbers may not sum to sample and sub-sample totals due to missing data. 
 
Occupational Outcome Frequencies and Categories 
 
For short-term outcomes, 76.8% (n=436) of FMHT attendees successfully returned to full 
duties in their operational unit.  In the longer term, 66.5% (n=296) either continued to serve 
or had completed their elective service term without negative medical or administrative 
consequences, however, 33.5% (n=149) experienced a long-term negative occupational 
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outcome.  Of the negative occupational outcomes, 6.7% (n=10) of personnel were 
prematurely or administratively discharged; 2.7% (n=4) applied for premature release and 
were discharged within 12 months of referral to the FMHT; 9.4% (n=14) were medically 
discharged from service; 4.0% (n=6) were demoted; 6.7% (n=10) committed a serious 
disciplinary offence and 70.5% (n=105) were not deployable on medical grounds or were 
deployable with substantial limitations. 
 
Predisposing and Precipitating Factors for Occupational Outcomes 
 
No socio-demographic and military factors were significantly associated with RTD or longer-
term occupational outcomes.  Self-reported deliberate self-harm prior to deployment 
(p<0.01), family mental health history (p=0.01), experiencing problems with the operational 
commander (p=0.01), having difficulty adjusting to the operational environment (p<0.001), 
and threatening or carrying out an act of self-harm (p<0.001) were all significantly associated 
with evacuation from the operational area in univariable analyses (Pearson’s chi squared 
test).  When personnel had deployed for less than 14 weeks before referral, the mid-point of a 
standard deployment, they were significantly more likely to be evacuated (p<0.05).  There 
was a significant linear trend where, as time in the operational area increased, the likelihood 
of being evacuated reduced from 32.5% (n=26 of 80) in the first four weeks of deployment to 
13.8% (n=9 of 65) at 21 weeks plus (χ
2 
test for linear trend
 
=9.66 d.f. 1 p<0.01) (Figure. 5). 
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Figure 5. Rates of Evacuation (%) and Time Deployed in Weeks 
 
 
Reporting ≥2 psychological vulnerability items (p=0.05) and ≥2 non-combat stressors 
(p<0.001) significantly increased the likelihood of subsequent evacuation.  In the univariable 
analyses, recent combat exposure was associated with a significantly lower rate of evacuation 
(p<0.01) (Table 39). 
 
All factors assessed in relation to RTD were further evaluated for their association with 
longer-term occupational outcomes; in univariable analyses, none were found to be 
significantly associated with the exception of reporting ≥2 psychological vulnerability factors 
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* p<0.05 ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Reported percentages and numbers may not sum to sample and sub-sample totals due to missing data. 
 Short-term Occupational Outcomes Long-term Occupational Outcomes 
Factor n (%) EVAC RTD n (%) -ve +ve or Neutral 
Return to Duty  NA 436 (76.8) 323 (77.5) 104 (32.2) 219 (67.8) 
Evacuated from Deployment  132 (23.2) NA 94 (22.5) 34 (36.2) 60 (63.8) 
Time Deployed n (%) 
0-14 Weeks 295 (60.3) *79 (26.8) 216 (73.2) 222 of 382 (58.1) 81 (36.5) 141 (63.5) 
15 Weeks or More 194 (39.7) *37 (19.1) 157 (80.9) 160 of 382 (41.9) 44 (27.5) 116 (72.5) 
Psychological Vulnerability n (%) 
Previous Mental Health Assessment  180 of 565 (31.9) 49 (27.2) 131 (72.8) 147 of 444 (33.1) 55 (37.4) 92 (62.6) 
Family Mental Health History  113 of 529 (21.4) **35 (31.0) 78 (69.0) 89 of 417 (21.34) 29 (32.6) 60 (67.4) 
Previous Traumatic Exposure  106 of 563 (18.8) 30 (28.3) 76 (71.7) 83 of 441 (18.8) *36 (43.4) 47 (56.6) 
Previous Deliberate Self Harm  87 of 560 (15.5) *31 (35.6) 56 (64.4) 69 of 332 (20.8) 28 (40.6) 41 (59.4) 
Previous Tour Mental Health Problem  41 of 557 (7.4) 10 (24.4) 31 (75.6) 31 of 440 (7.1) 9 (29.0) 22 (71.0) 
Current Substance Use  13 of 564 (2.0) 2 (15.4) 11 (84.6) 8 of 443 (1.8) 2 (25.0) 6 (75.0) 
Psychological Vulnerability Count (Max Score 6) n (%) 
Upper Tertile (Scores ≥2) 153 of 566 (27.0) *46 (30.1) 107 (69.9) 134 of 488 (27.5) *52 (38.8) 82 (61.2) 
Non-Combat Operational Stressors n (%) 
Operational Environment Problems  250 of 564 (44.3) ***76 (30.4) 174 (69.6) 189 of 443 (42.7) 58 (30.7) 131 (69.3) 
Problems With Family at Home  143 of 559 (25.6) 37 (25.9) 106 (74.1) 97 of 441 (22.0) 31 (32.0) 66 (68.0) 
Problems With Partner at Home  137 of 561 (24.4) 37 (27.0) 100 (73.0) 112 of 486 (23.1) 36 (32.1) 76 (67.9) 
Problems with Operational Commander 128 of 566 (22.6) **40 (31.2) 88 (68.8) 94 of 444 (21.2) 27 (28.7) 67 (71.3) 
Non-Combat Operational Stressor Count (Max Score 4) n (%) 
Upper Tertile (Scores ≥2) 199 of 565 (35.2) ***65 (32.7) 134 (67.3) 140 of 443 (31.6) 42 (30.0) 98 (70.0) 
Operational Combat Exposure n (%) 
Exposed 228 of 565 (40.4) **39 (17.1) 189 (82.9) 190 of 442 (43.0) 63 (33.2) 127 (66.8) 
Current Deliberate Self-Harm n (%) 
Current DSH Threat or Act  148 of 567 (26.1) ***72 (48.6) 76 (51.4) 110 of 444 (24.8) 38 (34.5) 72 (65.5) 
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Short and longer-term occupational outcomes were compared across four mental disorder 
categories.  These were, disorders related to combat exposure, 24.1% (n=139) (combat stress 
reaction 17.0%; PTSD 2.3%; reaction to severe stress 4.8% of all disorders), anxiety or 
depressive disorders, 14.0% (n=81) (bipolar affective disorder 1.9%; panic disorder 2.1%; 
depression 5.5%; anxiety disorder 4.5% of all disorders), general psychiatric disorders, 40.3% 
(n=233) (adjustment disorder 29.1%; acute stress reaction 6.2%; neurotic spectrum disorders 
2.3%; alcohol misuse 0.7%; psychosis 0.5%; personality disorder 1.6% of all disorders) and 
no recorded diagnosis, 21.6% (n=125).  In unadjusted logistic regression, no category of 
disorder was significantly associated with evacuation when compared with personnel with no 
mental disorder with the exception of those diagnosed with anxiety and depressive disorders 
who were significantly more likely to experience longer-term negative occupational 
outcomes.  In adjusted regression analyses, the mental health disorder categories were 
associated with neither RTD nor longer-term occupational outcomes (Table 38).  The RTD 
rate remained high amongst those personnel who did not receive a psychiatric diagnosis but 
had fallen significantly from a RTD rate of around 90.0% in this category in Iraq (Jones et al., 
2010) to around 80.0% in the current study (χ
2




Table 38.  FMHT Casualties - Main Diagnostic Categories, Return to Duty and Reduced 
Occupational Outcome Rates 
 
*AORs Adjusted for: demographics, including, for age, rank, sex, relationship status, engagement type, service length, individual augmentee or formed unit 
personnel, combat arm, psychological vulnerability, non-combat operational stress, combat exposure, DSH threat or act, (longer-term outcomes adjusted 
additionally for evacuation from operations) 
Reported percentages and numbers may not sum to sample and sub-sample totals due to missing data. 
 
Predictors of Short and Long-Term Occupational Outcomes; Adjusted Analyses 
 
Following adjustment for observed potential confounders, family history of mental disorder, 
difficulty adjusting to the operational environment, exposure to non-combat operational 
stressors and threatening or actually self-harming whilst in the operational area were all 
significantly associated with evacuation (Table 41).  A history of deliberate self-harm prior to 
deployment, reporting ≥2 items from the psychological vulnerability scale and experiencing 
problems with one’s operational commander were no longer significantly associated with 
evacuation when adjusted for current DSH threats or acts.  Reporting current combat 
exposure was no longer significant after adjusting for non-operational stressors.  Spending a 
shorter amount of time in the operational area prior to referral was only borderline significant 
prior to adjustment after which it was not significantly associated.  Endorsing ≥2 
psychological vulnerability items was significantly associated with longer-term negative 
Mental Health Problem (n=578) 
Short-term outcomes 
n (%) RTD Evac OR (95% CI) *AOR (95% CI) 
No Assessed Psychiatric Condition 125 ( 21.6) 97 of 120 (80.8) 97of 120 (19.2) 1 1 
Related to Combat Exposure 139 (24.1) 104 of 134 (77.6) 30 of 134 (22.4) 0.82 (0.45-1.51) 0.80 (0.43-1.49) 
Anxiety or Depressive (Mood) Disorders) 81 (14.0) 55 of 75 (73.3) 20 of 75 (26.7) 0.65 (0.33-1.29) 0.60 (0.30-1.21) 
General Psychiatric Disorders 233 (40.3) 97 of 212 (73.6) 56 of 156 (26.4) 0.66 (0.38-1.14) 0.69 (0.39-1.21) 
Mental Health Problem (n=432) 
Long-term outcomes 
n (%) Negative Outcome +ve or neutral OR (95% CI) **AOR (95% CI) 
No Assessed Psychiatric Condition 87 (20.1) 22 (25.3) 65 (74.7) 1 1 
Related to Combat Exposure 113 (26.2) 38 (33.6) 75 (66.4) 1.50 (0.80-2.79) 1.29 (0.63-2.68) 
Anxiety or Depressive (Mood) Disorders) 54 (12.5) 25 (46.3) 29 (53.7) 2.55 (1.24-5.24) 2.12 (0.98-4.59) 
General Psychiatric Disorders 178 (41.2) 57 (32.0) 121 (68.0) 1.39 (0.78-2.48) 1.19 (0.65-2.19) 
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occupational outcomes in the adjusted analyses; however, previous traumatic exposure 




Table 39.  FMHT Casualties - Predictors of Occupational Fitness Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
Short-Term Occupational Outcomes OR AOR1 AOR2 AOR3 AOR4 AOR5 
Deployed for 0-14 Weeks 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Deployed for 15 or More Weeks 0.64 (0.41-1.00) 0.63 (0.40-0.99) 0.63 (0.39-0.99) 0.70 (0.44-1.11) 0.71 (0.44-1.13) 0.62 (0.38-1.02) 
No Previous Deliberate Self Harm 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Previous Deliberate Self Harm 2.12 (1.30-3.46) 2.33 (1.41-3.86) *2.24 (1.35-3.73) 2.07 (1.24-3.45) 2.16 (1.29-3.59) 1.32 (0.75-2.31) 
No Family Mental Health History 1 1 1  1 1 
Family Mental Health History 1.83 (1.15-2.91) 1.97 (1.22-3.19) **1.89 (1.17-3.07) 1.77 (1.08-2.90) 1.88 (1.16-3.06) 1.78 (1.06-2.98) 
≤1 Psychological Vulnerability Lower 1 1 
NA 
1 1 1 
≥2 Psychological Vulnerability Higher 1.66 (1.09-2.51) 1.84 (1.18-2.87) 1.66 (1.06-2.62) 1.77 (1.13-2.78) 1.34 (0.83-2.17) 
No Problems With Operational Commander 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Problems With Operational Commander 1.73 (1.12-2.69) 1.79 (1.14-2.82) 1.76 (1.11-2.78) ***1.77 (1.12-2.80) 1.59 (1.00-2.53) 1.37 (0.83-2.24) 
No Problems With the Operational Environment 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Problems With the Operational Environment 2.10 (1.41-3.13) 2.10 (1.38-3.20) 1.94  (1.28-2.95) ****2.01 (1.33-3.04) 1.10 (1.30-3.02) 1.64 (1.04-2.57) 
≤1 Non-Combat Operational Stressors 1 1 1 
NA 
1 1 
≥2 Non-Combat Operational Stressors 2.25 (1.51-3.35) 2.25 (1.49-3.40) 2.12 (1.40-3.22) 2.00 (1.29-3.11) 1.64 (1.05-2.56) 
No Current Combat Exposure 1 1 1 1 
NA 
1 
Current Combat Exposure  0.55 (0.36-0.84) 0.52 (0.33-0.81) 0.54 (0.34-0.85) 0.66 (0.41-1.07) 0.80 (0.49-1.29) 
No Current Deliberate Self-Harm Threat or Act 1 1 1 1 1 
NA 
Current Deliberate Self-Harm Threat or Act 5.78 (3.78-8.83) 6.11 (3.94-9.47) 5.99 (3.82-9.36) 5.68 (3.62-8.91) 5.88 (3.73-9.26) 
Long-Term Occupational Outcomes 
No Previous Traumatic Exposure 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Previous Traumatic Exposure 1.66 (1.02-2.71) 1.49 (0.88-2.51) 1.25 (0.71-2.21) 1.46 (0.86-2.48) 1.54 (0.90-2.64) 1.49 (0.88-2.51) 
Psychological Vulnerability Cluster 
Psychological Vulnerability 0-1 Item  1 1 
N/A 
1 1 1 
Psychological Vulnerability 2 or More  1.61 (1.05-2.49) 1.62 (1.01-2.59) 1.69 (1.05-2.72) 1.63 (1.01-2.63) 1.66 (1.02-2.70) 
AOR1 Adjusted for demographics, including, for age, rank, sex, relationship status, service length, individual augmentee or formed unit, combat arm (adjusted additionally for evacuation from operations for long-term outcomes) 
AOR2 Adjusted for demographics and psychological vulnerability 
AOR3 Adjusted for demographics and non-combat operational stress 
AOR4 Adjusted for demographics and combat exposure 
AOR5 Adjusted for demographics and DSH threat or act 
* Adjusted for psychological vulnerability with the previous deliberate self-harm component removed 
** Adjusted for psychological vulnerability with the family mental health history component removed 
***Adjusted for non-combat operational stressors with the operational commander problem component removed 
****Adjusted for non-combat operational stressors with the operational environment problem component removed 
Reported percentages and numbers may not sum to sample and sub-sample totals due to missing data. 
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Negative occupational outcomes occurred at a rate of 35.0% in the first year following 
discharge from FMHT care, 34.3% in year 1-2, 40.3% during year 2-3, 27.1% in year 3-4 and 
36.6% in year 4 (χ
2
=4.03 d.f. 4 p=0.40).  There was no evidence of a statistically significant 
trend in the data (χ
2 
test for trend=0.23, p=0.63) (Figure. 6) 
 
Figure 6.  Longer-term Occupational Outcomes and Period of Time since Assessment 
 
 
To examine whether the period following discharge from FMHT care influenced the 
association between the predictors that were found to be significantly associated with longer-
term outcomes, odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals were calculated for each predictor 
adjusting for time period since assessment by the FMHT.  Previous traumatic exposure and 
psychological vulnerability remained significantly associated irrespective of the effect of 
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Table 40.  FMHT Casualties - Predictors of Occupational Outcomes Adjusted for Time 
Since Assessment 
 
Predictors of Long-Term Occupational Outcome  *AOR 95% CI 
No Previous Traumatic Exposure 1 
Previous Traumatic Exposure 1.66 (1.02-2.70) 
Psychological Vulnerability 0-1 Item  1 
Psychological Vulnerability 2 or More  1.61 (1.04-2.48) 
*Adjusted for time since contact with the FMHT 
 
Referral Source and Occupational Outcome 
 
The most common source of referral was the Unit Medical Officer (n=377, 66.6%); 17.3% 
(n=98) came from the unit commander (high barrier); 11.5% (n=65) by self-referral (low 
barrier); 3.2% (n=18) from the chaplain (low barrier); and 1.4% (n=8) from a welfare officer 
(medium barrier).  The effect of referral source upon short-term outcomes was examined and 
no significant association was found.  17.3% (n=17) of those with greater potential barriers to 
surmount were evacuated, 24.2% (n=93) of moderate potential barriers and 26.5% (n=22) of 
lower barriers (χ2=2.58 d.f. 2 p=0.28).  The effect of referral source upon longer-term 
outcomes was examined and no significant association was found.  25.6% (n=20) of those 
with greater potential barriers to surmount experienced negative longer-term outcomes, 
moderate 34.9% (n=99) and lower 37.0% (n=30) (χ2=2.84 d.f. 2 p=0.24) (Table 41). 
 
Cases classified as having no psychiatric diagnosis were evenly distributed among the various 
referral sources.  Cases with no diagnosis assigned following assessment comprised 18.9% 
(n=18) of referrals from low threshold sources, 22.0% (n=84) of referrals from medium 
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Longer-Term Occupational 
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Medical Officer (377) 
Med 93 (24.2) 292 (75.8) 213 (67.2) 104 (32.8) 
Welfare (8) 
Self-Referral (65) 
Low 22 (26.5) 61 (73.5) 57 (65.5) 30 (34.5) 
Chaplain (18) 




The first study hypothesis was that assessment and/or management by the FMHT would 
return around three quarters of personnel to their operational unit where they would continue 
to serve.  This hypothesis was fully supported.  A secondary objective was to describe the 
predictors of reduced short-term and longer-term occupational fitness.  Evacuation was more 
likely to occur when greater numbers of operational stressors unrelated to combat were 
present.  These included difficulty adjusting to the operational environment, threatening to or 
actually carrying out self-harm whilst deployed and experiencing greater psychological 
vulnerability; specifically, having a close family member with a history of mental disorder.  
Although spending a shorter time deployed was significantly associated with evacuation in 
the unadjusted analyses, this effect became borderline non-significant in adjusted analyses.  
When compared with whole force data, FMHT attendees were significantly younger, more 
likely to hold junior rank, to be Army personnel and to have a combat role.  The second study 
hypothesis was that around three quarters of military personnel would be occupationally fully 
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fit and free from adverse occupational consequences at any time during the four years 
following return from deployment.  This hypothesis was not supported as around a third of 
personnel went on to experience a longer-term negative occupational outcome.  Although 
negative longer-term outcomes were unrelated to evacuation they appeared to be mainly 
related to pre-deployment psychological vulnerability.  The nature of the assigned mental 
health diagnosis was not associated with either short or longer-term occupational outcome.  
There was no evidence that referral source had any effect upon both short and long-term 
outcomes and self and chaplain referrals were not significantly associated with non-receipt of 
a mental health diagnosis.  
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CHAPTER 10 - TERTIARY PREVENTION - SHORT AND LONG TERM 
OCCUPATIONAL FITNESS FOLLOWING COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 
CARE AMONG UK MILITARY PERSONNEL 
Overview 
This chapter describes a study of tertiary prevention in the form of community based clinical 
care delivered to military personnel in the non-deployed setting.  In this setting, tertiary 
prevention is related to the ability of military personnel to undertake their military role after 
receiving intervention for suspected mental ill-health.  All United Kingdom Armed Forces 
(UK AF) personnel with suspected mental health problems are initially assessed by their 
medical officer and some are referred for assessment in a military Department of Community 
Mental Health (DCMH).  Assessments are carried out by healthcare professionals and 
personnel are assigned an occupational fitness grading on completion of care which reflects 
their ability to undertake specific duties including operational deployment.  Following mental 
health assessment or intervention, personnel who are deemed permanently medically unfit 
may be discharged from military service.  Little is known about the longer-term impact of 
referral for mental health assessment upon military occupational fitness after completion of 
care.  Socio-demographic, clinical, psychological and short-term occupational fitness 
information for new patients assessed in a military DCMH was recorded in clinical casenotes 
which were linked to a personnel database containing individual records of longer-term 
occupational fitness.  Short-term occupational fitness was recorded following 2979 episodes 
of care and longer-term occupational fitness grading recorded for 1205 personnel.  Adjusted 
logistic regression was used to assess the association between a range of predictor variables 
and both short and longer-term occupational fitness.  The latter was categorised as fully fit for 
deployment or not and whether individuals were still serving or had been discharged from 
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service, fit for service in a restricted capacity and discharge from service in adverse 
circumstances including discharge on medical grounds.  78.0% of personnel were graded as 
occupationally fully fit for deployment on completion of care and 62.8% remained fully fit 
when followed up.  Reduced occupational fitness rates were higher among DCMH referrals 
than among personnel in the whole of the UK AF at all time-points after completing the care 
episode.  Clinical factors such as diagnosis, type of intervention received, prior history of 
psychiatric care, previous episodes of deliberate self-harm and multidisciplinary team (MDT) 
involvement as opposed to management by a single clinician were the main determinants of 
short-term reduced occupational fitness.  MDT involvement and being in the Army were the 
main risk factors for longer-term reduced occupational fitness.  Female sex and having a 
history of past referral to psychiatric services were more marginally associated with long-
term occupational fitness.  When factors other than clinical features were adjusted for, 
deployment in the year prior to referral was associated with a lower rate of reduced 
occupational fitness.  In the UK AF, being referred for mental health assessment appears to 
be associated with reduced longer-term occupational fitness in around a third of those 
assessed or managed.  However, this effect might be similar among attendees with physical 
illness attending any secondary healthcare facility. 
Introduction 
The introductory chapter described the available evidence that occupational fitness is often 
associated with a range of negative economic, psychological and social outcomes.  By 
examining longitudinal occupational data, this study examined the short and longer-term 
occupational effects of receiving mental health treatment among non-deployed UK military 
personnel.  Based upon published data (Gould et al 2008), community-based military mental 
healthcare should return around 70.0% of those referred to full occupational fitness.  
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Secondly, as mental health status has been empirically linked to lower levels of occupational 
fitness, receiving mental healthcare within a military context should be associated with a 
higher annual rate of reduced occupational fitness than that found among the UK AF as a 
whole. 
Study Specific Methods 
Occupational fitness was assessed among new patients referred by military primary 
healthcare facilities to a DCMH providing care to military personnel located within the 
catchment area of a Royal Air Force base between Jan 2002 and Sept 2011.  Data were 
entered into a Windows-based Microsoft Access database designed to record socio-
demographic, clinical, psychological, intervention and occupational fitness or discharge 
information.  The database also functioned as a caseload management tool and was designed 
to produce information for ongoing clinical audit.  Data were entered from dropdown menus 
wherever possible to ensure that the input format was standardised and instructions for 
entering data were attached as labels to each entry field.  The dataset for the current study 
was exported into Stata version 11 using a direct transfer tool. 
Variables Considered 
Self- Reported Socio-demographic and Military Characteristics 
Relationship status was dichotomised as having no current partner and being in a short-term 
or newly embarked on relationship which was contrasted with being married, in a civil 
partnership, or in a long-term relationship.  Single parental status was represented by a 
dichotomous variable consisting of parents with a dependant child or children who were 
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living with a partner and those who had children but were not living with a partner.  Combat 
role was generated by grouping personnel into those who had a military role requiring them 
to engage directly with and fight the enemy (combat); providing close support to enable 
combat to take place (combat support) or those who provided logistic support for military 
units conducting combat operations (combat service support).  Operational deployment was a 
count variable and was restricted to personnel who had undertaken a combat, peace support, 
peace enforcement or peacekeeping deployment rather than an overseas exercise or routine 
overseas detachment. 
Clinical and Intervention Characteristics 
For clinical and therapeutic factors, the ‘intervention type’ variable consisted of three 
categories; 1. assessment and advice, which consisted of 1-2 sessions each of approximately 
one hour duration. 2. psychological intervention alone and 3. prescription of psychoactive 
medication with or without additional intervention.  Intervention intensity was coded 
according to the number of sessions received; brief intervention consisted of one to six 
sessions, intermediate intervention of seven to 12 sessions and prolonged intervention of 12 
or more sessions.  Multi-disciplinary team (MDT) cases were those patients who were 
managed by the DCMH team as opposed to being managed by a single clinician.  Deliberate 
self-harm (DSH) related to intentional self-injury of any cause.  Alcohol use was recorded by 
the assessing therapist as the number of units consumed each week at the point of referral.  
The World Health Organization system was used to classify consumption stratified by gender 
into three categories; for men, use was classified as within safe limits (≤21 units per week), 
hazardous use (22-49 units) and harmful use (≥50 units).  For women, usage was classified as 
within safe limits (≤14 units per week), hazardous use (15-35 units) and harmful use (≥35 
units) (Andrews and Jenkins. 1999).  Clinical diagnosis other than alcohol misuse was 
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assigned based upon International Classification of Mental Disorders Version 10 criteria 
(ICD 10, WHO, 1992) and disorders were grouped into broad descriptive categories for the 
purpose of the study.  A further category was generated for personnel who were not assigned 
a diagnosis following assessment.  The alcohol categories were combined with diagnosis to 
produce an alcohol co-morbidity variable.  Past referral to psychiatric services was recorded 
as being present or absent. 
Short and Longer-term Occupational Fitness 
1.  Short-term occupational fitness was measured on discharge from care and consisted of a 
dichotomised variable.  The categories were firstly, being medically graded as fully 
deployable and secondly, a combined category comprised of having a medically non-
deployable grading, a deployable with limitations grading or being medically or 
administratively discharged.  The second category represented any level of occupational 
impairment. 
2.  Longer-term occupational fitness was represented by the medical fitness grading after a 
period of six months post-discharge from the DCMH to four or more years post-discharge; 
the categories were; 1. being medically graded as fully deployable and 2. being medically 
non-deployable, deployable with limitations or being medically or administratively 
discharged.  To obtain information about longer-term occupational fitness, data linkage was 
performed between the clinical dataset and a personnel management database containing 
records of current medical fitness grading or the method and date of exit from the AF.  Data 
linkage was performed using a unique identifier, the person’s Service number.  The data 
linkage process was approved by the MoD Research Ethics Committee (Ref 0836/191 dated 




The socio-demographic, clinical, and psychological characteristics of personnel graded as 
limited deployable, not deployable or adversely discharged were compared with those who 
were either deployable with no limitations or who had completed their elective term of 
service with no medical restrictions. 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 3699 patients who were referred to the DCMH (Figure. 7).  To 
assess short-term occupational fitness, those who failed to attend (FTA) for initial assessment 
and those with no recorded occupational grading were removed from the dataset, generating a 
sample of 2979 personnel.  To evaluate long-term occupational fitness, in addition to the FTA 
and no recorded outcome categories, in the case of personnel with multiple referrals to the 
department, only the latest referral episode was retained and assessed in relation to 
occupational fitness.  To avoid overlap with short-term outcomes and to allow personnel the 
opportunity to regain a full fitness grading following DCMH management, cases where less 
than six months had elapsed between discharge from the DCMH and the date of data linkage 
were excluded.  This generated a sample of 2081 patients for whom information was 





















All analyses were conducted in Stata version 11.  Pearson’s chi squared test was used to 
assess the statistical significance of the association between predictor variables, including 
socio-demographic and military characteristics, clinical factors, psychological characteristics, 
intervention, and short and long-term occupational fitness.  Predictor variables that were 
found to be significantly associated with the two occupational fitness outcomes in univariable 
analyses were further assessed using logistic regression to generate odds ratios (ORs) with 
95% confidence intervals (95% CIs).  These were adjusted for potentially confounding 
variables in blocks and additionally for time since referral.  Block one was comprised of 
socio-demographic factors, block two encompassed operational factors, block three included 
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single block.  For non-binary categorical variables, between sub-category comparisons were 
made using multinomial logistic regression.  Interaction terms were created to assess 
interactions among factors that appeared to represent clinical and therapeutic complexity.  
Trends over time were assessed with chi squared test for trend. 
Potential Bias Related to Exclusions 
Although it was not possible to test for mental health status at baseline between those who 
attended for initial assessment and those who did not, Service background, gender, 
relationship status, rank and regular or reserve service type were not significantly different 
between attendees and non-attendees.  Personnel under the age of 25 years were significantly 
more likely to fail to attend than older personnel (χ
2
=14.73 d.f. 1 p<0.001). 
Bias arising from socio-demographic factors was assessed among those for whom longer-
term occupational fitness data was available and those for whom it was not.  Army personnel 
were significantly less likely to have longer-term occupational fitness data recorded than 
Royal Air Force or Royal Navy/Royal Marines (χ
2
=9.44 d.f. 1 p<0.01) as were reserve forces 
personnel (χ
2
=20.60 d.f. 1 p<0.001) and those not in a longer-term relationship (χ
2
=4.48 d.f. 
1 p<0.05).  Military rank was not significantly different between the groups.  The proportion 
of both men and women who were and were not followed up was not significantly different, 
those with a confirmed mental health disorder were significantly more likely to have an 
occupational record available (χ
2
=5.55 d.f. 1 p<0.05).  Multivariable logistic regression 
suggested that a single variable, being in the Army, was significantly associated with longer-
term outcome data availability (OR 0.41 95% CI 0.35-0.49).  A response weight was 
generated using the predict p Stata command using data availability as the dichotomous 
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dependent variable.  All subsequent analyses of longer-term occupational fitness were 




73.4% of the patients in the DCMH sample were from the RAF (n=2187), 23.7% were Army 
personnel (n=705) and around 3% were Royal Navy personnel (n=87).  96.2% were serving 
on a regular rather than a reserve forces engagement.  27.6% were women (n=823), 46.7% 
were in a long-term relationship (n=1337) and 13.8% were lone parents (n=395).  The age 
distribution of the sample was generally representative of the UK AF (Defence Statistics. 
2013); 67.5% (n=2007) were junior ranks or junior non-commissioned officers which 
compared with 60.2% in the UK AF.  The majority had non-combat roles, with 19.1% 
(n=566) serving in combat or close support roles.  56.2% of the patients had served for less 
than nine years (n=1450), 40.6% (n=1799) had undertaken operational deployment; 13.1% 
(n=327) had deployed in the year prior to referral (Table 42). 
Intervention and Clinical Characteristics 
54.7% of those referred subsequently received psychological intervention (n=1585), 32.3% 
were assessed, given advice and discharged (n=936) and 12.9% (n=374) were prescribed 
medication alone or in conjunction with other forms of support.  82.6% (n=2391) received 
brief intervention (1-6 sessions), 9.9% (n=287) received intermediate intervention (7-12 
sessions) and 7.5% (n=218) received prolonged intervention (12 or more sessions).  Around 
one fifth of all cases were managed by the multidisciplinary team (n=610); the remainder 
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(n=2369) were managed by a single therapist.  181 (6.1%) were referred following an act of 
deliberate self-harm and 361 (12.1%) had a prior history of deliberate self-harm; over half 
(n=1551) had a pre-military or during military service history of referral to psychiatric 
services.  22.9% of men (n=410) were consuming hazardous or harmful levels of alcohol 
compared to 21.5% of women (n=150).  385 (14.7%) of personnel had mental disorders co-
morbid with hazardous or harmful alcohol use.  The most commonly referred psychiatric 
disorder was moderate to severe adjustment disorder (37.1%, n=1105) followed by anxiety or 
mood disorder (28.2%, n=840); the least commonly referred problems were psychotic 
illnesses and personality disorders (1.0%, n=30) (Table 43). 
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χ2, d.f., p 
*Service (n=2979) 
Royal Navy/Royal Marines 87 (2.9) 66 (75.9) 21 (24.1) 
χ2=5.62 d.f. 2 p=0.60 Army 705 (23.7) 528 (74.9) 177 (25.1) 
Royal Air Force 2187 (73.4) 1729 (79.1) 458 (20.9) 
Engagement Type (n=2979) 
Regular Forces 2867 (96.2) 2235 (78.0) 632 (22.0) 
χ2=0.24 d.f. 1 p=0.88 
Reserve Forces 112 (3.8) 88 (78.6) 24 (21.4) 
Sex (n=2979) 
Male 2156 (72.4) 1698 (78.8) 458 (21.2) 
χ2=2.75 d.f. 1 p=0.10 
Female 823 (27.6) 625 (75.9) 198 (24.1) 
Relationship Status (n=2864) 
In a Long-Term Relationship 1337 (46.7) 1033 (77.3) 304 (22.7) 
χ2=0.31 d.f. 1 p=0.58 
Not In a Long-Term Relationship 1527 (53.3) 1193 (78.1) 334 (21.9) 
Parental Status (n=2864) 
Not a Single Parent 2469 (86.2) 1912 (77.4) 557 (22.6) 
χ2=0.83 d.f. 1 p=0.36 
Single Parent 395 (13.8) 314 (79.5) 81 (20.5) 
Age Group (in Years) (n=2960) 
17-19 Years 151 (5.1) 116 (76.8) 35 (23.2) χ2=7.18 d.f. 6 p=0.31 
20-24 Years 664 (22.4) 534 (80.4) 130 (19.6) 
25-29 Years 572 (19.3) 452 (79.0) 120 (21.0) 
30-34 Years 527 (17.8) 407 (77.2) 120 (22.8) 
35-39 Years 562 (19.0) 432 (76.9) 130 (23.1) 
40-44 Years 286 (9.7) 222 (77.6) 64 (22.4) 
≥45 Years 198 (6.7) 143 (72.2) 55 (27.8) 
Rank Groups (n=2974) 
Commissioned Officer 379 (12.7) 306 (80.7) 73 (19.3) χ2=4.21 d.f. 3 p=0.24 
SNCO (Sergeant and above) or Warrant Officer 588 (19.8) 444 (75.5) 144 (24.5) 
JNCO (Lance or Corporal Equivalent) 888 (29.9) 700 (78.8) 188 (21.2) 
Junior Rank 1119 (37.6) 869 (77.7) 250 (22.3) 
Role (n=2995) 
Combat 255 (8.6) 208 (81.6) 47 (18.4) χ2=3.30 d.f. 2 p=0.19 
Combat Support Arm 311 (10.5) 234 (75.2) 77 (24.8) 
Combat Service Support Arm 2389 (80.8) 1870 (78.3) 519 (21.7) 
Service Length (Grouped in Years) (n=2597) 
1-4 Years 793 (30.7) 624 (78.7) 169 (21.3) χ2=4.53 d.f. 4 p=0.34 
5-9 Years 657 (25.5) 523 (79.6) 134 (20.4) 
10-14 Years 406 (15.7) 312 (76.8) 94 (23.2) 
15-22 Years 510 (19.8) 383 (75.1) 127 (24.9) 
23+ Years 213 (8.3) 161 (75.6) 52 (24.4) 
≥1 Previous Deployment (n=2979) 
No Previous Deployments 1799 (60.4) 1393 (77.4) 406 (22.6) χ2=0.79 d.f. 1 p=0.37 
One or More Previous Deployment 1180 (39.6) 930 (78.8) 250 (21.2) 
Deployed in Last Year (n=2490) 
Not Deployed in last Year 2163 (86.9) 1668 (77.1) 495 (22.9) χ2=2.93 d.f. 1 p=0.09 
Deployed 327 (13.1) 266 (81.3) 61 (18.7) 
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Table 43. Clinical Management Characteristics and Short-term Occupational Fitness 
 





χ2, d.f., p 
Intervention Type (n=2895) 
Assessment and Advice 936 (32.3) 761 (81.3) 175 (18.7) 
χ2=240.03 d.f. 2 
p<0.001 
Psychological Intervention 1585 (54.7) 1338 (84.4) 247 (15.6) 
Medication 374 (12.9) 181 (48.4) 193 (51.6) 
Intervention Intensity (n=2896) 
Brief Intervention (1-6 sessions) 2391 (82.6) 1966 (82.2) 425 (17.8) 
χ2=101.28 d.f. 2 
p<0.001 
Intermediate (7-12 sessions) 287 (9.9) 187 (65.2) 100 (34.8) 
Prolonged (12 or more sessions) 218 (7.5) 128 (58.7) 90 (41.3) 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management (n=2979) 
Single Therapist 2369 (79.5) 1993 (84.1) 376 (15.9) χ2=254.76 d.f. 1 
p<0.001 
Multi-disciplinary Team Referral 610 (20.5) 330 (54.1) 280 (45.9) 
Referred Following DSH Attempt (n=2979) 
No 2798 (93.9) 2208 (78.9) 590 (21.1) χ2=23.41 d.f. 1 
p<0.001 Yes 181 (6.1) 115 (63.5) 66 (36.5) 
Alcohol Use (Not Primary Diagnosis) Men (n=1794) 
Safe limits (≤21 Units per Week) 1384 (77.1) 1105 (79.8) 279 (20.2) χ2=1.05  d.f. 2 
p=0.59 
Hazardous (22-49 Units Week) 233 (13.0) 188 (80.7) 45 (19.3) 
Harmful  (≥50 Units per Week) 177 (9.9) 136 (76.8) 41 (23.2) 
Alcohol Use (Not Primary Diagnosis) Women (n=696) 
Safe limits (≤14 Units per Week) 546 (78.4) 427 (78.2) 119 (21.8) χ2=0.54 d.f. 2 
p=0.76 
Hazardous (15-35 Units Week) 117 (16.8) 91 (77.8) 26 (22.2) 
Harmful  (≥35 Units per Week) 33 (4.7) 24 (72.7) 9 (27.3) 
Clinical Diagnosis (n=2976) 
No Psychiatric Diagnosis Assigned 424 (14.2) 391 (92.2) 33 (7.8) χ2=255.94 d.f. 7 
p<0.001 
Mild Adjustment Disorder 152 (5.1) 141 (92.8) 11 (7.2) 
Moderate to Severe Adjustment Disorder 1105 (37.1) 938 (84.9) 167 (15.1) 
Alcohol Use Disorder (Not Primary Diagnosis) 168 (5.6) 136 (81.0) 32 (19.0) 
PTSD or Acute Stress Disorder 140 (4.7) 99 (70.7) 41 (29.3) 
Neurotic Spectrum Disorder 117 (3.9) 82 (70.1) 35 (29.9) 
Anxiety or Mood Disorder 840 (28.2) 523 (62.3) 317 (37.7) 
Psychotic Illness or Personality Disorder 30 (1.0) 12 (40.0) 18 (60.0) 
Mental Health Problem Co-Morbid With Alcohol Misuse(n=2616) 
Not Comorbid 2231 (85.3) 1789 (80.2) 442 (19.8) χ2=2.96 d.f. 1 
p=0.09 
Comorbid 385 (14.7) 294 (76.4) 91 (23.6) 
Past Episode of Deliberate Self-Harm (n=2979) 
No History of DSH 2618 (87.9) 2093 (79.9) 525 (20.1) χ2=48.69 d.f. 1 
p<0.001 
History of DSH 361 (12.1) 230 (63.7) 131 (36.3) 
Past Referral to Psychiatric Services (n=2797) 
No 1246 (44.5) 1030 (82.7) 216 (17.3) χ2=29.57 d.f. 1 
p<0.001 





Of the patients who attended for assessment following referral (n=2979), 78.0% (n=2323) 
were graded as fully deployable on completion of care (short-term occupational fitness).  In 
the follow up group (n=1205), 62.8% (n=757) were graded as fully deployable at the point at 
which data linkage was performed (longer-term occupational fitness). 
Short-term Occupational Fitness – Univariable Analyses 
No socio-demographic characteristics were found to be significantly associated with short 
term occupational fitness (Table 42).  In univariable analyses, predictors of reduced short-
term occupational fitness upon completion of care included intervention type and intensity of 
intervention (p<0.001) where prolonged intervention and medication receipt were associated 
with poorer outcomes.  Other significant factors associated with short-term occupational 
fitness included referral following an episode of DSH (p<0.001), clinical diagnosis 
(p<0.001), MDT management (p<0.001), past episode of DSH (p<0.001) and past referral to 
psychiatric services (p<0.001) (Table 43). 
Long-term Occupational Fitness – Univariable Analyses 
Of the socio-demographic and military characteristics included in the univariable analyses, 
only being in the Army (p<0.001) and female sex (p<0.05) predicted reduced long-term 
occupational fitness.  Deploying in the year prior to referral was associated with a 
significantly reduced likelihood of experiencing longer-term reduced occupational fitness 
(p<0.05).  Royal Navy were present in such small numbers (n=6) that a robust assessment of 
RN personnel was not possible (Table 44).  
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Table 44. Longer Term Occupational Fitness or Adverse Discharge and Socio 
Demographic Characteristics 
Demographic Characteristic Deployable 
Non Deployable or 
Adverse Discharge 
χ2, d.f., p 
Service (n=1205) 
Royal Navy/Royal Marines 6 (0.5) 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 
*χ2=12.14 d.f. 
1 p<0.001 
Army 252 (20.9) 135 (53.4) 117 (46.6) 
Royal Air Force 947 (78.6) 619 (65.3) 328 (34.7) 
Sex (n=1205) 
Male 881 (73.1) 568 (65.5) 313 (34.5) χ2=5.13 d.f. 1 
p<0.05 Female 324 (26.9) 189 (58.4) 135 (41.6) 
Relationship Status (n=1177) 
In a Long-Term Relationship 578 (49.1) 362 (63.3) 216 (36.7) χ2=0.00 d.f. 1 
p=0.97 Not In a Long-Term Relationship 599 (50.9) 375 (63.4) 224 (36.6) 
Parental Status (n=1177) 
Not a Single Parent 1015 (86.2) 640 (63.8) 375 (36.2) χ2=0.67 d.f. 1 
p=0.51 Single Parent 162 (13.8) 97 (60.5) 65 (39.5) 
Age Group (in Years) (n=1198) 
17-19 Years 52 (4.3) 30 (59.7) 22 (40.4) χ2=0.59  d.f. 6 
p=0.74 
20-24 Years 253 (21.1) 157 (62.9) 96 (37.1) 
25-29 Years 237 (19.8) 161 (68.7) 76 (31.3) 
30-34 Years 221 (18.4) 137 (62.9) 84 (37.1) 
35-39 Years 244 (20.4) 150 (61.8) 94 (38.3) 
40-44 Years 114 (9.5) 72 (63.2) 42 (36.8) 
≥45+ Years 77 (6.4) 48 (61.5) 32 (38.6) 
Rank Groups (n=1205) 
Commissioned Officer 144 (12.0) 102 (70.9) 42 (29.1) χ2=2.39 d.f. 3 
p<0.07 
SNCO (Sergeant and above) or Warrant Officer 261 (21.7) 159 (61.6) 102 (38.4) 
JNCO (Lance or Corporal Equivalent) 375 (31.1) 221 (59.4) 154 (40.6) 
Junior Rank 425 (35.3) 275 (65.6) 150 (34.4) 
Role (n=1195) 
Combat 100 (8.4) 58 (59.8) 42 (40.2) χ2=0.35 d.f. 2 
p=0.70 
Combat Support Arm 119 (10.0) 76 (64.3) 43 (35.7) 
Combat Service Support Arm 976 (81.7) 622 (64.1) 354 (35.9) 
Service Length (Grouped in Years) (n=1160) 
1-4 Years 322 (27.8) 206 (64.9) 116 (35.1) χ2=0.71 d.f. 4 
p=0.58 
5-9 Years 318 (27.4) 209 (66.4) 109 (33.6) 
10-14 Years 179 (15.4) 120 (67.7) 59 (32.3) 
15-22 Years 251 (21.6) 152 (60.9) 99 (39.1) 
23+ Years 90 (7.8) 57 (62.7) 33 (37.3) 
≥1 Previous Deployment (n=1205) 
No Previous Deployments 663 (55.0) 416 (63.1) 247 (36.9) χ2=0.11 d.f. 1 
p=0.74 
One or More Previous Deployment 542 (45.0) 341 (64.0) 201 (36.0) 
Deployed in Last Year (n=950) 
Not Deployed in last Year 814 (85.7) 495 (61.4) 319 (38.7) χ2=5.07 d.f. 1 
p<0.05 
Deployed 136 (14.3) 96 (71.5) 40 (28.5) 
*For the difference between Army and RAF outcomes. 
**Weighted percentages and un-weighted cell counts are shown. 
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In univariable analyses, of the clinical and intervention characteristics, intervention factors 
were significantly associated with outcome (p<0.001) with prolonged intervention predicting 
poorer outcome.  In addition, MDT management (p<0.001), past history of deliberate self-
harm (DSH) (p<0.05) and past history of referral to psychiatric services (p<0.001) predicted 
reduced long-term occupational fitness or administrative or medical discharge in the longer-
term (Table 45). 
Adjusted Model Outcomes - Short-Term Occupational Fitness 
Following adjustment for confounding variables, several predictor variables were associated 
with short-term reduced occupational fitness.  There was a significant main effect for 
intervention type (AOR 1.26 95% CI 1.02-1.55); when examined as a categorical variable, 
compared with assessment and advice, treatment with medication was associated with a 
significantly increased probability of reduced short-term occupational fitness (AOR 1.88 95% 
CI 1.25-2.83) and psychological intervention with a better short-term outcome (AOR 0.65 
95% CI 0.48-0.88).  Although there was no significant main effect for intensity of 
intervention (AOR 0.28 95% CI 0.91-1.37), when examined as a categorical variable, 
intermediate level intervention (AOR 1.55 95% CI 1.07-2.24) was associated with reduced 
short-term occupational fitness compared to brief intervention.  There was a significant main 
effect for MDT discussion or management (AOR 3.85 95% CI 2.92-5.08), past history of 
DSH (AOR 1.53 95% CI 1.04-2.25) and past history of referral to psychiatric services (AOR 
1.72 95% CI 1.37-2.17).  There was a significant main effect for clinical diagnosis (AOR 
1.23 95% CI 1.17-1.30); in adjusted multinomial regression, a number of diagnostic 
categories were significantly associated with short-term reduced occupational fitness, 
including moderate to severe adjustment disorder, psychotic illness or personality disorder 
(PD), PTSD or acute stress disorder, neurotic spectrum disorders and anxiety and mood 
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disorders.  Of the non-psychotic, non-personality disorders, anxiety or mood disorder had the 
greatest adjusted odds of short-term reduced occupational fitness (AOR 5.21 95% CI 3.02-




Table 45. Intervention Characteristics and Longer-Term Occupational Fitness or 
Adverse Discharge 





χ2, d.f., p 
Intervention Type (n=1160) 
Assessment and Advice 341 (29.4) 213 (63.1) 128 (36.9) 
χ2=8.27 d.f. 2 
p<0.001 
Psychological Intervention 670 (57.8) 447 (67.3) 223 (32.7) 
Medication 149 (12.8) 72 (49.7) 77 (50.3) 
Intervention Intensity(n=1160) 
Brief Intervention (1-6 sessions) 938 (80.9) 603 (65.1) 335 (34.9) 
χ2=2.04 d.f. 2 
p=0.13 
Intermediate (7-12 sessions) 128 (11.0) 78 (61.4) 50 (38.6) 
Prolonged (12 or more sessions) 94 (8.1) 51 (55.0) 43 (45.0) 
Referred Following DSH Attempt (n=1205) 
No 1141 (94.7) 723 (64.1) 418 (35.9) χ2=3.30 d.f. 1 
p=0.07 Yes 64 (5.3) 34 (52.7) 30 (47.3) 
Alcohol Use (Not Primary Diagnosis) Men (n=743) 
Safe limits (≤21 Units per Week) 580 (78.1) 368 (64.9) 212 (35.1) χ2=0.68 d.f. 2 
p=0.51 
Hazardous (22-49 Units Week) 97 (13.1) 69 (70.4) 28 (29.6) 
Harmful  (≥50 Units per Week) 66 (8.9) 44 (68.6) 22 (31.4) 
Alcohol Use (Not Primary Diagnosis) Women (n=274) 
Safe limits (≤14 Units per Week) 213 (77.7) 127 (59.8) 86 (40.2) χ2=0.53 d.f. 2 
p=0.59 
Hazardous (15-35 Units Week) 47 (17.2) 25 (53.9) 22 (47.1) 
Harmful  (≥35 Units per Week) 14 (5.1) 7 (50.1) 7 (48.9) 
Diagnostic Category (n=1203) 
No Psychiatric Diagnosis Assigned 147 (12.2) 92 (62.7) 55 (37.3) χ2=1.11 d.f. 7 
p=0.36 
Mild Adjustment Disorder 60 (5.0) 38 (64.6) 22 (35.4) 
Moderate to Severe Adjustment Disorder 473 (39.3) 315 (67.2) 158 (32.8) 
Alcohol Use Disorder (Primary Diagnosis) 60 (5.0) 40 (67.4) 20 (32.6) 
PTSD or Acute Stress Disorder 69 (5.7) 41 (61.7) 28 (38.3) 
Neurotic Spectrum Disorder 61 (5.1) 35 (59.2) 26 (40.8) 
Anxiety or Mood Disorder 319 (26.5) 187 (59.1) 132 (40.9) 
Psychotic Illness or Personality Disorder 14 (1.2) 7 (48.5) 7 (51.5) 
Mental Health Problem Co-Morbid With Alcohol Misuse(n=1046) 
Not Comorbid 888 (84.9) 557 (63.7) 331 (36.3) χ2=0.04 d.f. 1 
p=0.84 
Comorbid 158 (15.1) 100 (63.6) 58 (37.2) 
Multi-Disciplinary Team Management (n=1205) 
Single Therapist 967 (80.2) 632 (66.0) 335 (33.9) χ2=13.83 d.f. 1 
p<0.001 
Multi-disciplinary Team Referral 238 (19.8) 125 (52.9) 113 (47.1) 
Past Episode of Deliberate Self-Harm (n=1205) 
No History of DSH 1058 (87.8) 676 (64.5) 382 (35.5) χ2=4.22 d.f. 1 
p<0.05 
History of DSH 147 (12.2) 81 (55.7) 66 (44.3) 
Past Referral to Psychiatric Services (n=1126) 
No 622 (55.2) 417 (67.6) 205 (32.4) χ2=12.23 d.f. 1 
p<0.001 




Table 46. Predictors of Short-Term Fitness– Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals 
Short-Term Occupational Outcomes OR AOR1 AOR2 AOR3 AOR4 
Intervention Type (n=2895) 
Assessment and Advice 936 (32.3) 1 1 1 1 1 
Psychological Intervention 1585 (54.7) 0.81 (0.65-0.99) 0.74 (0.58-0.95) 0.80 (0.63-1.01) 0.74 (0.58-0.95) 0.65 (0.48-0.88) 
Medication 374 (12.9) 4.64 (3.57-6.02) 4.49 (3.35-6.01) 4.56 (3.41-6.09) 1.98 (1.42-2.77) 1.88 (1.25-2.83) 
Intervention Intensity (n=2896) 
Brief Intervention (1-6 sessions) 2391 (82.6) 1 1 1 1 1 
Intermediate (7-12 sessions) 287 (9.9) 2.47 (1.90-3.22) 2.57 (1.93-3.42) 2.43 (1.81-3.25) 1.50 (1.10-2.05) 1.55 (1.07-2.24) 
Prolonged (12 or more sessions) 218 (7.5) 3.25 (2.44-4.34) 3.43 (2.50-4.71) 3.06 (2.22-4.22) 1.12 (0.78-1.60) 1.11 (0.72-1.71) 
Referred Following DSH Attempt (n=2979) 
No 2798 (93.9) 1 1 1 1 1 
Yes 181 (6.1) 2.15 (1.57-2.95) 2.18 (1.52-3.12) 2.08 (1.48-2.93) 1.53 (0.99-2.36) 1.54 (0.92-2.58) 
*Clinical Diagnosis (n=2976) 
No Psychiatric Diagnosis Assigned 424 (14.2) 1 1 1 1 1 
Mild Adjustment Disorder 152 (5.1) 0.92 (0.46-1.88) 0.69 (0.29-1.64) 1.04 (0.51-2.15) 1.03 (0.48-2.18) 0.79 (0.31-1.98) 
Moderate to Severe Adjustment Disorder 1105 (37.1) 2.11 (1.43-3.12) 2.11 (1.38-3.24) 2.06 (1.36-3.13) 2.01 (1.28-3.15) 2.02 (1.20-3.44) 
Alcohol Use Disorder (Not Primary Diagnosis) 168 (5.6) 2.79 (1.65-4.71) 2.84 (1.61-5.00) 2.47 (1.40-4.35) 2.13 (1.15-4.06) 2.08 (0.97-4.45) 
Psychotic Illness or Personality Disorder 30 (1.0) 17.77 (7.90-40.04) 13.09 (5.45-31.44) 13.08 (5.39-31.75) 10.09 (3.97-25.64) 5.42 (1.84-15.92) 
PTSD or Acute Stress Disorder 140 (4.7) 4.91 (2.95-8.16) 4.77 (2.73-8.33) 3.94 (2.18-7.12) 4.59 (2.56-8.25) 2.76 (1.26-6.08) 
Neurotic Spectrum Disorder 117 (3.9) 5.06 (2.97-8.61) 5.26(2.91-9.52) 4.70 (2.67-8.30) 3.56 (1.92-6.60) 3.33 (1.59-6.97) 
Anxiety or Mood Disorder 840 (28.2) 7.18 (4.90-10.52) 7.14 (4.68-10.89) 6.90 (4.60-10.36) 5.49 (3.48-8.66) 5.21 (3.02-8.90) 
Multi-Disciplinary Team Management(n=2979) 
Single Therapist 2369 (79.5) 1 1 1 1 1 
Multi-disciplinary Team Referral 610 (20.5) 4.50 (3.71-5.46) 4.77 (3.84-5.94) 4.18 (3.37-5.18) 4.96 (4.05-6.09) 3.85 (2.92-5.08) 
Past Episode of Deliberate Self-Harm (n=2979) 
No History of DSH 2618 (87.9) 1 1 1 1 1 
History of DSH 361 (12.1) 2.12 (1.66-3.71) 2.24 (1.72-2.91) 2.22 (1.71-2.87) 1.77 (1.28-2.46) 1.53 (1.04-2.25) 
Lifetime Referral to Psychiatric Services (n=2797) 
No 1246 (44.5) 1 1 1 1 1 
Yes 1551 (55.5) 1.67 (1.39-2.00) 1.72 (1.41-2.11) 1.74 (1.41-2.14) 1.22 (1.00-1.50) 1.72 (1.37-2.17) 
AOR1 Adjusted for Demographic Factors, including, for Service, Engagement Type, Sex, Relationship Status, Single Parent Status, Age group in years, Rank, Service Length group. 
AOR2 Adjusted for Operational Factors, including Combat Arm, Previous Operational Deployment, Deployed in the Last Year. 
AOR3 Adjusted for Clinical Factors, including, Illness Category, Intervention Type, Level of Intervention, Alcohol Use, History of DSH, Referral Following DSH, Past Referral to Psychiatric Services, MDT Discussion or Management 
AOR4 Adjusted for All Factors. 
*AOR for Clinical Diagnosis entered as a dichotomous variable (Diagnosis assigned or not) AOR 1.23 (95% CI 1.17-1.30) 
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Adjusted Model Outcomes - Longer-Term Occupational Fitness and Occupational or 
Administrative Discharge 
For longer-term reduced occupational fitness or adverse discharge, following adjustment for a 
range of confounding variables, being in the Army (AOR 1.71 95% CI 1.10-2.67) and MDT 
discussion or management (AOR 1.64 95% CI 1.05-2.59) were both associated with longer-
term reduced occupational fitness or adverse discharge from service.  Deployment in the year 
prior to referral was associated with a reduced adjusted odds of negative occupational 
outcome (AOR 0.50 95% CI 0.28-0.87), though this was borderline non-significant when 
adjusted for clinical factors.  Sex was associated with longer-term reduced occupational 
fitness or adverse discharge (AOR 1.60 95% CI 1.10-2.34), though adjustment for clinical 
factors rendered the association borderline non-significant (Table 47). 
Short-term Outcomes – Interactions 
 
MDT discussion or management had the largest adjusted odds ratio for reduced occupational 
fitness on completion of care and was also significantly associated with longer-term reduced 
occupational fitness or discharge.  It was hypothesised that more complex cases were 
managed by the multidisciplinary team and case complexity was associated with longer-term 
outcome.  For short-term occupational fitness, interaction terms were created for MDT 
discussion and management and factors thought to represent clinical complexity.  These 
were, 1. intervention type, 2. intervention intensity, 3. past episode of deliberate self-harm, 4. 
past psychiatric referral 5. diagnosis assigned or not, 6. current episode of DSH and 7. 
comorbidity with alcohol misuse.  Following adjustment for clinical factors found to be 
significant in univariable analyses, all interaction terms were significantly associated with 
short-term occupational outcome (Table 48).  For longer-term outcomes, interaction terms 
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were created using the same process.  Following adjustment for potential confounding 
variables that were significant in univariable analyses, MDT discussion and management had 
a significant interaction with intervention type, intervention intensity, past referral to 
psychiatric services, assigned diagnosis or not and co-morbidity with alcohol.  It was 
therefore concluded that the complexity of clinical presentation, represented by a range of 
clinical and therapeutic factors was associated with management by the MDT and was 




Table 47. Predictors of Longer-Term Fitness or Adverse Discharge – Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
* Limited data were available for Royal Navy personnel (n=6) - these were therefore dropped from the between-Service comparison. RAF rate of negative occupational outcome 34.6% (n=328), Army 46.4 (n=117). 
AOR1 Adjusted for Demographic Factors, including, for Service, Sex, Relationship Status, Single Parent Status, Age group in years, Rank, Service Length group. Engagement type (Reserves n=19) was not included as a potential confounder due to small numbers. 
AOR2 Adjusted for Operational Factors, including Combat Arm, Previous Operational Deployment, Deployed in the Last Year. 
AOR3 Adjusted for Clinical Factors, including, Diagnosis assigned or not, Intervention Type, Level of Intervention, Alcohol Use, History of DSH, Referral Following DSH, Past Referral to Psychiatric Services, MDT Discussion or Management. 
AOR4 Adjusted for Time Since Referral. 
AOR5 Adjusted for All Factors. 
Predictor Variable Category OR AOR1 AOR2 AOR3 AOR4 AOR5 
*Service (n=1199) Royal Air Force 947 (79.0) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Army 252 (21.0) 1.59 (1.32-1.90) 1.81 (1.32-2.47) 1.51 (1.05-2.17) 1.77 (1.27-2.46) 1.63 (1.23-2.17) 1.71 (1.10-2.67) 
Sex (n=1205) Male 881 (73.1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Female 324 (26.9) 1.35 (1.04-1.76) 1.64 (1.22-2.20) 1.44 (1.07-1.94) 1.27 (0.93-1.72) 1.35 (1.03-1.75) 1.60 (1.10-2.34) 
Rank Groups (n=1205) Junior Rank 425 (35.3) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JNCO (Lance or Corporal Equivalent) 375 (31.1) 1.30 (1.00-1.74) 1.20 (0.84-1.79) 1.39 (1.00-1.94) 1.43 (1.02-2.00) 1.31 (0.98-1.75) 1.36 (0.86-2.17) 
SNCO (Sergeant and above) or Warrant Officer 261 (21.7) 1.19 (0.86-1.64) 1.30 (0.68-1.72) 1.14 (0.78-1.66) 1.21 (0.83-1.77) 1.18 (0.85-1.63) 1.06 (0.54-2.10) 
Commissioned Officer 144 (12.0) 0.78 (0.52-1.18) 0.79 (0.54-1.87) 0.77 (0.48-1.25) 0.91 (0.57-1.44) 0.78 (0.52-1.87) 0.91(0.48-1.74) 
Intervention Type (n=1160) Assessment and Advice 341 (29.4) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Psychological Intervention 670 (57.8) 0.83 (0.63-1.09) 0.82 (0.62-1.11) 0.83 (0.60-1.13) 0.89 (0.62-1.29) 0.83 (0.67-1.02) 0.89 (0.57-1.40) 
Medication 149 (12.8) 1.73 (1.17-2.57) 1.22 (1.17-2.72) 1.86 (1.19-2.91) 1.48 (0.86-2.55) 1.82 (1.35-2.47) 1.79 (0.91-3.53) 
Intervention Intensity (n=1160) Brief Intervention (1-6 sessions) 938 (80.9) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Intermediate (7-12 sessions) 128 (11.0) 1.17 (0.80-1.72) 1.09(0.73-1.63) 1.07 (0.69-1.65) 0.91 (0.60-1.40) 1.15 (0.78-1.70) 0.75 (0.44-1.26) 
Prolonged (12 or more sessions) 94 (8.1) 1.52 (1.00-2.34) 1.51 (0.95-2.40) 1.35 (0.83-2.20) 0.94 (0.56-1.59) 1.50 (0.98-2.31) 0.71 (0.38-1.35) 
Alcohol Use Men (n=743) Safe limits (≤21 Units per Week) 580 (78.1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Hazardous (22-49 Units Week) 97 (13.1) 0.78 (0.48-1.25) 0.84 (0.50-1.40) 0.79 (0.45-1.37) 0.82 (0.46-1.46) 0.77 (0.48-1.24) 0.76 (0.38-1.51) 
Harmful  (≥50 Units per Week) 66 (8.9) 0.85 (0.49-1.47) 0.74 (0.41-1.34) 0.93 (0.50-1.76) 1.07 (0.38-3.06) 0.86 (0.49-1.50) 0.50 (0.13-1.96) 
Multi-Disciplinary 
Team Referral (n=1205) 
Single Therapist 967 (80.2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Multi-disciplinary Team Referral 238 (19.8) 1.73 (1.29-2.32) 1.73 (1.27-2.35) 1.78 (1.28-2.47) 1.54 (1.06-2.23) 1.70 (1.27-2.28) 1.64 (1.05-2.59) 
Past Episode of 
Deliberate Self-Harm (n=1205) 
No History of DSH 1058 (87.8) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
History of DSH 147 (12.2) 1.45 (1.02-2.06) 1.46 (1.00-2.12) 1.26 (0.85-1.88) 1.13 (0.71-1.80) 1.47 (1.03-2.01) 1.17 (0.68-2.02) 
Past Referral to 
Psychiatric Services (n=1126) 
No 622 (55.2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Yes 504 (44.8) 1.55 (1.21-1.98) 1.44 (1.11-1.88) 1.58 (1.19-2.10) 1.43 (1.09-1.88) 1.52 (1.18-1.96) 1.27 (0.89-1.79) 
Deployed in the Year 
Prior to Referral (n=950) 
Not Deployed 814 (85.7) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Deployed 136 (14.3) 0.63 (0.42-0.95) 0.61 (0.40-0.93) 0.43 (0.26-0.72) 0.69 (0.45-1.05) 0.64 (0.42-0.95) 0.50 (0.28-0.87) 
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Table 48. Interaction Terms and Occupational Fitness – Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds 






OR AOR1 OR AOR2 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Intervention Type 2.19 (1.94-2.47) 
*1.90 (1.71-2.11) 1.34 (1.17-1.53) 
*1.30 (1.11-1.53) 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Intervention Intensity 1.53 (1.40-1.69) 
**1.92 (1.67-2.22) 1.44 (1.22-1.70) 1.32 (1.08-1.62) 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Past Episode of DSH 3.89 (2.61- 5.78) 
***2.62 (1.58-4.37) 1.98 (1.03-3.80) 
***1.27 (0.63-5.59)  
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Past Psychiatric Referral 1.35 (1.11-1.65) 
****1.50(1.17-1.92) 1.78 (1.23-2.58) 
****1.61 (1.06-2.46) 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Diagnosis Assigned or Not 4.99 (4.00-6.09) 
†4.37 (3.48-5.48) 1.81 (1.34-2.45) 1.51 (1.05-2.19) 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Current Episode of DSH 3.27 (1.90-5.65) 
#2.31 (1.25-4.29) 0.95 (0.34-2.69) 0.59 (0.19-1.85) 
Multi-disciplinary Team Management x Alcohol Misuse Co-morbidity 0.88 (0.84-0.93) ‡0.88 (0.83-0.92) 2.58 (1.35-4.94) 2.54 (1.19-5.40) 
AOR1 - Adjusted for, Intervention Type, Intervention Intensity, Current Episode of DSH, Past History of DSH, Past Referral to Psychiatric 
Services, Diagnosis Assigned or Not 
AOR2 - Adjusted for Service Background, Sex, Deployed in the Last Year, Intervention Type, Past History of DSH, Past Referral to 
Psychiatric Services 
*Not adjusted for Intervention Type 
**Not adjusted for Intervention Intensity 
*** Not adjusted for Past Episode of DSH 
****Not adjusted for Past Referral to Psychiatric Services 
†Not adjusted for Diagnosis Assigned or Not 
# Not adjusted for Current Episode of DSH 
‡ Not adjusted for Co-morbidity with Alcohol 
 
Trends over Time 
The rate of full occupational fitness rose from a rate of 59.1% in the nine to eleven month 
period following discharge from the DCMH to a peak of 67.8% during the period of three to 
four years post discharge (Figure. 8); the trend over time was not statistically significant (χ
2
 
test for trend =2.27, p=0.13).  Medical or administrative discharge was highest in the early 
period of measurement (23.5%) and fell consistently over the follow up period to around 5% 
at four or more years post discharge; the downward trend was statistically significant (χ
2
 test 
for trend =5.25, p<0.05).  Rates of medical downgrading rose consistently over time from 
17.4% in the early period of measurement to 31.1% in the four year plus follow-up period; 
this trend was statistically significant (χ
2











This study examined short and longer-term occupational fitness among UK Service personnel 
treated for a range of mental health disorders in a military department of community mental 
health.  The first study hypothesis tested that clinical intervention delivered by military 
mental health services would return at least three quarters of personnel referred with mental 
health problems to work with no medical restrictions.  This hypothesis was fully supported.  
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non-deployed setting would promote long-term occupational fitness for role in around 80% of 
personnel.  This hypothesis was not supported; occupational fitness rates, including medical 
discharge, rose consistently and significantly over time after contact with the DCMH ended, 
affecting around a third of personnel during the follow up period from six months to nine 
years after completion of care.  The likelihood of medical or administrative discharge was 
highest soon after completion of the care episode then reduced consistently and significantly 
over time. 
The secondary objective of this study was to describe the predictors of both short and longer-
term occupational fitness following discharge from military mental healthcare.  Patients in 
receipt of psychoactive medication had poorer short-term occupational fitness rates than 
those who were assessed, provided with advice but not engaged in ongoing care; those who 
received psychological intervention had better short-term occupational outcomes than 
assessment only cases.  Multi-disciplinary team management, past episodes of deliberate self-
harm and past psychiatric referral or care were all significantly associated with poorer short-
term occupational fitness rates.  Diagnosis was also significantly associated with short-term 
outcome with some diagnostic categories, particularly psychosis, personality disorder, 
anxiety and depression having the lowest short-term occupational fitness rates. 
 
For longer-term occupational fitness, Army personnel and those who were managed by the 
multi-disciplinary team experienced poorer long-term occupational fitness as did personnel 
previously referred to or cared for by psychiatric services.  There were insufficient numbers 
of RN/RM personnel in the follow-up sample to adequately assess outcome.  Although 
intervention type was not associated with longer term occupational fitness or adverse 
discharge, there was some evidence, although inconclusive, that those in receipt of 
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medication had poorer outcomes than either those who were assessed and given advice but 
not ongoing care or those in receipt of psychological intervention.  A fifth of both men and 
women consumed hazardous or harmful amounts of alcohol; 15% had mental disorders co-
morbid with alcohol though neither alcohol consumption level nor co-morbidity predicted 
short or longer-term occupational fitness. 
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CHAPTER 11 – DISCUSSION – MAIN THESIS FINDINGS 
Overview 
 
Through a series of related investigations, this thesis explored three levels of prevention 
activity related to military mental health as currently practiced within the UK Armed Forces 
across all phases of the deployment cycle.  The following discussion reviews the main 
findings which will endeavour to set out a narrative account of how each study area relates to 
the three levels of prevention and how these in turn might influence and support military 
mental health.  Within the context of military mental health, suggestions will be made about 
how potential sources of mental health support can be exploited.  Where significant study 
design flaws exist, adaptations to the methodology will be suggested that might improve 
future evaluations, and finally, potential future areas of research will be proposed.  Summary 
recommendations are shown at the end of the discussion. 
Primary Prevention - The R&R Study 
 
R&R was the first element of primary prevention to be investigated.  One major caveat 
should be born in mind when interpreting the results of the R&R study and other thesis 
components in relation to levels of prevention.  Among UK Armed Forces personnel, given 
the sometimes stressful nature of military life, high levels of hardiness and moderately low 
levels of poor mental health are relatively common, particularly during deployment.  As a 
result, opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of primary prevention, and secondary 
prevention in particular are somewhat limited as the margins for improvement related to 




Mental Health Outcomes 
 
The rates of PTSD found in the R&R study are overall in keeping with those found among 
European, Canadian and Australian forces personnel, but are substantially lower than the 
majority of US forces published rates (Sundin et al., 2010) and are at the lower end of 
estimates for rates in non-US population studies (Nugent et al., 2013).  Relatively low levels 
of both CMD and PTSD were found despite participants reporting high levels of recent 
combat exposure.  The picture for alcohol use is less positive.  Around half of the study 
respondents reported that they drank hazardously in the year before they deployed and those 
surveyed on completion of R&R reported that they had consumed alcohol at potentially 
hazardous levels while they were at home.  Overall, levels of historical hazardous alcohol use 
and alcohol misuse at this level during R&R were similar, however, more extensive combat 
exposure was associated with greater levels of potentially hazardous alcohol use.  Linked to 
the latter was the finding that the cumulative effects of having spent more time in the 
operational area prior to R&R was associated with lower levels of satisfaction with R&R.  
Those who spent longer in the operational area prior to R&R reported significantly greater 
exposure to combat events and also significantly more functional impairment arising from 
mental health symptoms.  It is perhaps understandable that combat fatigue might have 
impaired the ability to engage with R&R since previous research has demonstrated a 
significant link between self-reported combat stress and current mental health symptoms 
(Riddle et al., 2008).  It might also explain why some personnel reinstated their alcohol use 
so rapidly during the brief period spent at home as they misguidedly sought to improve their 
state of mind.  It is unfortunate for two reasons, firstly combat fatigue and associated stress 
reactions may be predictive of poorer medium term mental health (Isserlin et al., 2008) and 
would therefore potentially benefit from primary prevention and secondly, R&R appears to 
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be less recuperative for those with greater operational exposure, the very group that R&R 
seeks to help the most. 
 
The Relationship of R&R to Mental Health 
 
Taking a period of R&R during deployment appeared to have no overall significant positive 
impact upon mental health upon return to deployment, this may have been related to the study 
design.  Only a small number of personnel completed pre and post-R&R measures and the 
absence of any substantial impact upon mental health may have been related to between-
subjects and between-sample group differences rather than R&R not having any mental 
health promotion effects as such.  To robustly assess the impact of R&R, it would of course 
have been preferable to conduct a randomised controlled trial to minimise the effect of 
potential sources of bias.  Withholding a welfare-based process in the control arm of the 
study would have been difficult to achieve as operational commanders and perhaps ethical 
committees would not have allowed such a study to take place.  Although it would be subject 
to some level of bias, it might be helpful to repeat the study in its current form using a strict 
within-subjects pre/post evaluation.  Any study of this kind would benefit from a longer-term 
follow-up element to assess whether any initial psychological impact was maintained.  The 
follow-up assessment could take place at the end of deployment, perhaps during 
decompression, to avoid the additional potential confounding effects of the post-deployment 
normalisation process and the positive mental health impact of returning home safely at the 




Satisfaction with R&R 
 
R&R was reportedly highly satisfying for at least 90% of respondents.  The satisfaction levels 
associated with the experience of R&R concord with the high levels reported in other 
operational mental health studies (Mulligan et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2011; Mulligan et al., 
2010; Fertout et al., 2012).  An indicator of the popularity of R&R was the finding that the 
majority of respondents would value R&R during future deployments and that it met their 
personal needs in relation to the current deployment.  Although taking R&R did not appear to 
have a positive mental health impact, the study results suggest that R&R is primarily an 
opportunity to rest and psychologically re-set; the high levels of endorsement of the aspects 
of R&R-related to social support and relaxation suggest that the majority of personnel may 
have experienced just such an outcome.  Although it seemed that R&R did not influence 
levels of mental health symptoms or the extent of alcohol use during R&R, personnel who 
were able to engage with some of the components of R&R reported better mental health and 
less hazardous alcohol use.  Given the cross sectional nature of the data, it was not possible to 
say whether better mental health and lower levels of hazardous alcohol use influenced the 
ability to engage with and derive satisfaction from R&R or if engagement promoted better 
mental health.  Despite these limitations, it is tentatively suggested that it might be helpful to 
prepare personnel to make the most of R&R through written or video-delivered educational 
material or verbal advice given prior to leaving the operational area to ensure that they are in 




Mental Health and the Components of R&R 
 
There were differential levels of association of mental health with the various sub-
components of R&R.  Greater satisfaction with travel was associated with lower rates of 
hazardous alcohol use during R&R.  It has been previously reported that travelling to and 
from Afghanistan is somewhat complex, the airbridge can sometimes be fragile and as a 
consequence, frustration with travel is substantial among UK military personnel (Burdett et 
al., 2011).  Furthermore, at the time that this study was conducted, the need to prioritise 
transportation for casualties out of the operational area may have resulted in areas of the 
aircraft being converted for use as a casualty treatment and transfer area, which may have 
disrupted scheduled air travel.  The complexity of organising air transport during combat 
operations means that personnel can sometimes spend long periods in passenger holding 
areas or be taken off a flight at a waypoint on the return home.  The collective effect of these 
factors may, therefore, have resulted in travel fatigue and possibly a frustrated state of mind 
for some when touching down in the UK.  It is possible that personnel may have attempted to 
mitigate these effects by using alcohol as a soporific or anxiolytic agent.  As noted in the 
introduction to this study, the findings regarding travel and its potential impact upon mental 
health is consistent with the civilian literature.  The mental health impact of adverse travel 
arrangements adds further impetus to the considerable efforts being made to improve 
transport to and from the operational area.  It might be useful to examine whether allowing 
personnel to take a brief period of rest before boarding the aircraft, without shortening the 





R&R, Operational Exposure and Social Support 
 
Although PTSD rates appeared to be unaffected by R&R, individuals who had experienced a 
greater frequency of thoughts of impending death and injury (which constitutes exposure to a 
potentially traumatic event, a necessary component of the PTSD diagnostic criterion A) 
reported significantly greater satisfaction with R&R as they returned to the operational area.  
R&R may have been an opportunity to access social support during which concerns about 
death and injury could be worked through in a physically and psychologically safe 
environment.  Indeed, among the six items constituting the individual elements of R&R 
which were endorsed by over 90.0% of personnel, three items were associated with relaxing 
and taking a break from physical demands and a cluster of three factors signified being with, 
feeling close to and gaining support from family and or friends.  Whilst communication with 
home support is possible during deployment, there is no evidence to suggest that such support 
is particularly helpful to deployment mental health (Greene et al., 2010); face to face contact 
during R&R may therefore fulfil a social support function.  Further evidence for the 
importance of the social support elements of R&R is the finding that personnel in long-term 
relationships derived significantly greater satisfaction from R&R than single or unattached 
personnel.  Furthermore, in addition to travel satisfaction, reporting greater levels 
disengagement from events in Afghanistan appeared to be associated with a reduced 
probability of reporting hazardous alcohol use and better mental health outcomes, with the 
ability to relax also contributing to better mental health but not increased alcohol use. 
R&R and Alcohol Use 
 
As reported previously (Jones and Fear, 2011; Rona et al., 2010),
 
alcohol misuse is 
substantially more common amongst UK AF personnel than in matched civilian populations.  
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UK combat deployments are designated as ‘dry’, that is, no alcohol is provided for UK 
military personnel during their time in the operational area.  This is primarily a safety 
measure, as all personnel are required to carry a weapon and many carry out safety-critical 
tasks while deployed.  A significant number of those taking R&R appeared to reinstate pre-
deployment drinking habits whereby levels of alcohol use quickly rose while personnel were 
at home and rapidly came to resemble the levels of historical use reported by those 
embarking on R&R.  Personnel who completed longer periods of deployment prior to R&R 
were especially likely to escalate their drinking to hazardous levels.  It is perhaps helpful to 
note that greater ability to cognitively disengage from Afghanistan appeared to be associated 
with lower levels of alcohol use and a strategy of limiting alcohol use during R&R should 
perhaps be encouraged among those completing longer periods of deployment prior to taking 
R&R.  Given that alcohol misuse is likely to prevent engagement with R&R, influencing 
R&R drinking behaviour might be an important area for future research.  It may be helpful to 
put in place a long term strategy as re-instatement of excessive alcohol use is likely to occur 
at the end of the operational deployment just as it does during R&R and may continue 
unchecked as personnel will not be subject to a return to enforced abstinence in the same way 
as those who have completed R&R. 
 
R&R – Alternative Study Design 
 
Personnel who agreed to take part in this study were about to return to the operational area 
after a brief period at home.  The level of combat and operational exposure reported by study 
respondents was substantial and deployment for those so affected represented a significant 
and unavoidable stressor.  Given that such exposure was so recent, levels of mental health 
disorder symptoms were low.  The anticipation of further combat and operational exposure 
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among time two respondents about return to the operational area may well have accounted for 
the lack of difference in mental health disorder symptoms pre- and post-R&R.  Although 
small numbers completed the survey pre- and post-R&R, taking R&R did not appear to 
influence mental health symptoms irrespective of whether comparisons were made between 
subjects or within subjects using a matched sample approach.  Although R&R represents a 
primary prevention approach which aims to minimise the potential adverse mental health 
consequences of deployment, it may be that focusing solely upon mental health when 
measuring possible R&R outcomes is not the most appropriate methodology and satisfaction 
alone may be an appropriate measure. 
 
To avoid the difficulties associated with conducting the survey in the R&R arrival/departure 
area, any future study might use a survey pre-placed in the deployment area within the 
operational unit so that each person proceeding upon R&R could complete a mental health 
survey in the lead up to embarkation and could then be given a combined R&R experiences 
and mental health survey immediately upon return to the operational unit.  Given that this 
would necessitate the use of named data to facilitate data linkage, special arrangements would 
need to be made to secure the data.  If the hardware and connectivity were available in the 
operational area, and current arrangements suggest that this might well be the case during 
future deployments, one method of conducting such research would be to use a laptop-based 
survey with data stored on a secure server.  Each person could be given a pseudo-anonymised 
login to protect anonymity.  If the appropriate supporting technology was lacking, other 
options would include installing a secure facility for the storage of paper-based surveys.  
Such a system was used to good effect in the OMHNE surveys described in this thesis.  In 
this instance, the researcher would need to be able to deploy to the operational area in order 
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to input and secure survey data on a regular basis.  With careful planning, either paper-based 
or electronic surveillance would be feasible. 
 
Potential Future Study Foci 
 
It may be that the provision of R&R, despite having the facilitation of psychological ‘rest’ as 
its main objective, might have little to do with improving mental health.  In other thesis 
components, such as the OMHNE deployment survey, R&R was deemed to be useful by the 
majority of respondents at two separate survey points and personnel who reported that R&R 
was useful experienced a positive influence upon mental health both in the OMHNE surveys 
and in the R&R study.  In addition to being a popular intervention, R&R may also have had a 
positive effect upon morale, in which case it would represent an important component of 
deployment mental health support when personnel found it both helpful and could engage 
with it.  The impact of R&R on deployment morale could be assessed in future studies. 
 
R&R – Alternative Delivery Models 
 
Given that only one model of R&R is provided by the UK AF, survey respondents were not 
given the opportunity to make a comparison with an alternative form of R&R.  There are a 
number of other ways that operational rest could be provided.  US Forces have adapted their 
R&R arrangements over the recent period of deployment and the current provision is very 
different to those in place for UK Forces.  The adapted process utilised by US Forces in 
Afghanistan is known as the “rest-in-place” programme which is located within brigade or 
regional areas of operation and is accessed by way of a four-day special liberty pass.  
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Previously, US personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan travelled out of operational areas to 
access a R&R pass programme in an area that provided numerous facilities including pool 
tables, rooms full of big screen televisions, swimming pools, miniature golf, a discothèque, 
trips to a shopping mall and deep sea fishing.  To qualify for access, personnel were required 
to serve on prolonged tours, so that those serving shorter length tours, irrespective of the level 
of combat exposure, did not receive R&R passes.  The revised arrangements were designed to 
facilitate rest and recuperation without leaving the operational area, thus maintaining 
operational efficiency, and to increase access for greater numbers of personnel (Stars and 
Stripes. 2012).  Given that the current UK R&R study suggested that personnel who misused 
alcohol during the period at home were less able to engage with R&R and appeared to derive 
less benefit from the process, there may be some benefit to be gained by personnel with a 
propensity to misuse alcohol from attending a US styled ‘rest in place’ facility.  Here their 
alcohol intake could be monitored and perhaps regulated.  However, personnel who are 
perfectly able to regulate their alcohol intake and derive maximum benefit from R&R would 
potentially be penalised by adopting such a process. 
 
UK military commanders sometimes suggest that providing R&R at home is logistically 
intensive, costly, reliant on an at best brittle route out of the deployment area and, although 
based on anecdotal report, that returning Service personnel have lost their ‘operational edge’ 
in that they are less effective in their operational role immediately post-R&R.  The current 
study outcomes do not support this view as personnel returning to theatre had similar levels 
of functional impairment to those embarking on R&R.  Historically, military forces have 
provided safe areas close to the operational zone in which personnel can periodically rest out 
of line before returning to combat or their operational duties.  The provision of cyclical rest 
periods was motivated by the observation that prolonged involvement in combat operations 
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was a substantial predictor of exhaustion and subsequent psychological breakdown 
(Anderson, 2012).  Certainly the timing of R&R seems crucial; respondents in the R&R 
survey who took their rest period at home later during deployment appeared to derive less 
benefit from the process.  It is of course possible that they were experiencing poorer mental 
health having been in the operational area for a longer period.  Providing R&R facilities close 
to the operational area might facilitate ease of access and flexibility in allowing personnel 
with greater levels of combat exhaustion to rest out of line; it would also help to minimise the 
potential impact of adverse travel experiences which were a substantial determinant of R&R 
satisfaction in the current survey.  Although from an operational command perspective, ‘rest 
in place’ is probably easier to manage, it does not allow for the potentially beneficial social 
support aspects of R&R that can result from contact with the family during the period at 
home.  Should rest in place be provided, it would require that facilities to contact home by 
mixed media channels be substantially expanded as this is may help offset some of the 
negative family effects of military separation if properly managed (Pincus et al., 2001).  This 
is an important consideration as R&R-derived social support appeared to be helpful to many 
respondents in the R&R survey and it would be degraded or lost completely if a rest period 
were to be taken close to the deployment location.  If a local rest model were to be adopted 
during future deployments, examining the social support component of the R&R survey and 
comparing it with a similar question embedded in a local rest survey would be a useful 
component of any future study.  Within the local rest area model, leave at home could be 
reserved for those completing lengthy tours.  The requirement to provide this for smaller 
numbers of personnel would allow for proper scheduling without the current problem of 
attempting to avoid ‘bunching’ of R&R, or the rest period being taken very early or late 
during the period of deployment when it is provided for all.  For some personnel, spreading 
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R&R across the period of deployment often gives rise to being forced to grant very early or 
late periods of leave at home. 
 
Primary Prevention - Third Location Decompression (TLD) Study 
 
The second major component of primary prevention examined in this thesis was the brief 
period of structured immediate post-deployment rest known as Third Location 
Decompression (TLD). 
 
TLD Study – Main Findings 
 
The UK AF policy of providing TLD is intended to promote re-adjustment following 
operational deployment so that attendees experience a smoother transition than those 
returning directly to their home location.  The outcome of the TLD study suggested that this 
may not have occurred.  In previous studies of TLD (Burdett et al., 2011, Jones et al., 2010, 
Fertout et al., 2011), when assessing satisfaction and perceived utility, the majority of 
personnel found TLD useful upon completion; the study authors cautioned that there was no 
guarantee that perceived helpfulness would predict better re-adjustment; this comment 
appears warranted.  Overall, TLD appeared to reduce the incidence of both PTSD and MPS 
and was also helpful in reducing overall levels of potentially harmful alcohol use. 
 
TLD in Heavily Combat Exposed Personnel 
 
The effects upon PTSD were apparent in those experiencing moderate levels of combat 
exposure and a positive effect upon general mental health was seen in those reporting low 
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levels of combat exposure.  There is no clear explanation for the failure of a socially 
supportive intervention based upon the promotion of rest and readjustment should have a 
differential effect moderated by combat and operational exposure, although increased levels 
of combat exposure have been linked to the development of PTSD (Hoge et al., 2004).  
Intuitively, personnel reporting high levels of these experiences might potentially benefit 
from the opportunity to ‘decompress’ and begin the cognitive processing of difficult 
deployment experiences before returning home.  The current study results suggest that those 
reporting moderate levels of combat exposure may have the most to gain from TLD 
attendance in terms of reduced levels of PTSD symptoms.  It may therefore be that personnel 
with more PTSD symptoms in the highest exposure group may be limited in their ability to 
engage with the TLD process; this may relate to intrusive PTSD symptoms and associated 
impaired concentration which might impede engagement with specific TLD activities.  For 
example, the mental health promotion briefing elements may have required active cognitive 
processes such as attention which may have been lacking in those preoccupied with traumatic 
stress symptoms.  Personnel may also have found avoidance behaviour, another cardinal 
feature of PTSD, to be a problem, particularly with respect to social interaction; in contrast, 
the low exposure group may have found TLD less relevant as they had fewer symptoms.  
There was some evidence in previous TLD utility studies
 
(Burdett et al., 2011) that the 
journey from the operational area to Cyprus was sometimes stressful and frequently subject 
to air transport delay.  Fatigue arising from transport problems may have compounded the 
effects of traumatic stress symptoms, which are more common among combat exposed 
personnel.  This might hinder the ability to process the briefing information and, crucially, to 




Commitment to TLD 
 
In the previous study of subjective impressions of TLD (Jones et al., 2011), personnel 
sometimes viewed the process as an impediment to homecoming rather than an important 
transition.  It is possible that this may have inhibited commitment to the process and reduced 
potential gains for some.  Intuitively, one possible solution to this might be to adopt a 
nuanced approach to the psycho-educational elements of TLD where lower combat exposed 
military units receive standard forms of briefing and units subjected to greater levels of 
combat exposure receive a briefing which focuses on PTSD symptom management and 
treatment seeking.  This message could be reinforced during the longer-term normalisation 
period conducted in the home garrison.  The UK’s post-deployment briefing was standardised 
in 2008 and it may well be that some personnel attending earlier TLD received less well 
formulated briefings which may have influenced some of the study findings. 
 
TLD and Alcohol Use 
 
Dealing with potentially harmful alcohol use is a major component of post-deployment 
psycho-educational briefs and alcohol use is managed in a controlled way during TLD with a 
view to demonstrating the effect it has after a prolonged period of abstinence.  In the UK 
Battlemind study which is highly structured, interactive and has a skills acquisition 
component, (Mulligan et al., 2012), the Battlemind was superior to standard briefing in 
reducing binge drinking when this was measured some four to eight months after attendance 
at TLD.  As a result of the trial, Battlemind elements have been incorporated in the UK AF’s 
standard TLD briefing package and this may have contributed to reduced levels of alcohol 




TLD and Leadership 
 
In earlier studies (Jones et al., 2012) it was demonstrated that leadership, morale and 
cohesion were strongly associated with good mental health.  In the current study, TLD had a 
benefit over and above good leadership.  When leadership was adjusted for in the regression 
analyses, TLD continued to have a significant effect for some groups; it is therefore 
suggested that TLD should form one important component of a suite of supportive post-
deployment mental health support interventions that may enhance the positive mental health 
effects of good leadership. 
 
Alternative TLD Models 
 
The evaluation of the psychological effects of TLD took place when it was a mandatory 
component of deployment for all personnel and there were no alternative immediate post-
deployment interventions with which to make comparisons.  The current model of TLD 
assumes that it is necessary to provide an operational pause at the end of deployment so that 
personnel can psychologically re-set before their return home.  There is considerable 
evidence that operational deployment increases the risk of poorer mental health for some but 
not all personnel (Smith et al., 2008).  However, there is a lack of evidence relating to the 
effect of the immediate homecoming experience upon mental health.  There is some limited 
evidence that returning from deployment can be difficult for some.  Relationship turbulence 
has been found to be relatively common post-deployment (Knobloch and Theiss, 2012) and 
both life events occurring during the immediate post-deployment period and the 
characteristics of the recovery environment are thought to be potentially important 
determinants of longer-term mental health (Schlenger et al., 1992).  Additionally, the risk of 
violent behaviour is increased among deployed UK military personnel who misuse alcohol or 
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develop symptoms of mental disorder (MacManus et al., 2012).  The available research 
therefore suggests that, if provided, future decompression models may need to take account 
of a broad range of re-adjustment issues. 
 
TLD Psycho-educational Components 
 
The provision of early intervention in the form of psychological debriefing is controversial 
and of questionable benefit (Sijbrandij et al., 2006) as is the use of psycho-education-based 
approaches (Wessely et al., 2008).  The current TLD provision contains a psycho-education 
component, however, this has not been tested against a control condition and, with the 
exception of the UK Battlemind briefing (Mulligan et al., 2012), the content of the briefing 
sessions were not empirically derived. In contrast to the results of a study of US post-
deployment Battlemind (Adler et al., 2009), there was no positive mental health effect for the 
psycho-education component among those reporting higher levels of combat exposure.  It 
may be that the content of the current post-deployment briefings delivered during TLD are 
relevant to all attendees but the timing of delivery is not optimal.  Personnel experiencing 
physiological arousal related to combat experiences may benefit more from such briefings 
when they have returned to the UK mainland and have had a chance to recover in a safe 
environment before settling into non-deployed life.  Psycho-education may, therefore, be 
more appropriately delivered to combat units later in the normalisation process where greater 
time can be allocated, additional strategies such as CBT or mindfulness approaches can 
perhaps be added and personnel have had an opportunity to begin processing potentially 
traumatic events.  It may also be the case that combat units may benefit from briefings 
tailored to their operational experiences.  Delaying any psycho-educational briefings would in 
this case have the additional benefit of building in time to formulate a mental health 
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management briefing which takes account of the nature of the individual unit’s deployment, 
including any combat or particularly stressful experiences. 
 
TLD was formulated partly out of the desire to ensure that the welfare needs of military 
personnel returning from deployment are catered for, but also out of fear that merely allowing 
personnel to embark on post-deployment leave could be seen as negligent if problems such as 
violence, alcohol misuse and mental breakdown were to be encountered.  Despite being well-
intentioned, the UK TLD model was not empirically derived and is but one among many 
models of decompression provided by coalition forces.  Nonetheless, unlike heavily combat 
exposed personnel, those whose deployment experiences are less impactful or who do not 
experience substantial combat may benefit from TLD in its current form.  It would therefore 
perhaps be unwise to abandon or modified TLD entirely as, although it appeared not to 
impact positively upon readjustment, it appeared to benefit the physical and mental health of 
many deployed personnel.  The pause in UK medium scale combat operations taking place at 
the time of writing gives a timely opportunity to re-examine, re-design and trial alternative 
TLD models.  It may be that the current UK TLD model is not the best approach to managing 
post-deployment transition and that coalition partner models should be considered when their 
research findings become available.  It is worth noting, however, that no evidence was found 
in this research that the mental health briefs or attendance at TLD overall were harmful. 
 
Primary and Secondary Healthcare During Deployment 
 
During operational deployment, large military units break down into smaller teams that are 
often distributed over a wide geographical area.  When this occurs, mental health support 
becomes the responsibility of local commanders who may or may not have access to 
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specialist psychological or welfare support.  The OMHNE deployment study examined 
primary and secondary prevention related to mental health using data derived from two 
operational surveys of UK military personnel deployed to Afghanistan some 18 months apart. 
 
There were a number of key findings; general mental health and mental health stigmatisation 
and perceived barriers to care levels were not significantly different at the two survey points 
despite the level of reported combat exposure having reduced significantly over time.  In both 
samples, sub-threshold PTSD symptoms and associated functional impairment were more 
prevalent in forward areas.  Direct operational mental health support in the form of 
memorable pre-deployment stress briefs, perceived good leadership and perceptions of good 
family support were associated with better mental health at both survey points, however, in 
both samples, those seeking help from both non-medical and medical sources were more 
likely to experience poorer mental health. 
Stability of Mental Health and Psychological Support over Time 
 
The substantially changed operational environment was expected to have an influence on 
mental health outcomes.  OMHNE A1 was conducted during intense offensive combat 
operations whereas the A2 survey took place in a marginally more benign and static 
operational area.  This was evidenced by a significant reduction in reported combat exposure, 
though the latter remained substantial; however, the A2 survey sampled a greater number of 
austere forward locations.  The potential lack of operational, welfare and medical support in 
these locations could potentially have had a substantial influence upon mental health 
(Shigemura and Nomura, 2002).  The results of the survey suggest that this may well have 
been the case for sub-threshold PTSD symptoms but not for common mental disorder.  It is 
therefore important to ensure that personnel operating in more dangerous, isolated locations 
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for prolonged periods of time are properly supported and offered every opportunity to access 
help when and if they require it.  Stable and relatively low levels of mental disorder were 
found in comparison to the outcomes of US deployed mental health surveys conducted under 
similar conditions (JMHAT 7,  2010) and those found in UK military population level 
surveys which included both deployed and non-deployed personnel (Sundin et al., 2010).  
Although psychological health was not significantly different between the two surveys, it 
continues the pattern of reduction from the rate reported in the first Iraq-based OMHNE 
survey.  The ‘healthy warrior’ effect (Wilson et al., 2009), where those who are medically 
unfit and those lost from service through natural attrition do not deploy, may have accounted 
for a share of this effect in the context of ongoing operations.  However, direct operational 
support may have contributed to improved mental health, such as the significant increase in 
the number of personnel who recalled a pre-deployment stress briefing and continued high 
levels of perceived good leadership.  It is notable that, although higher levels of each of the 
components of morale were reported by personnel in the first survey, the proportion of 
personnel reporting the highest levels of morale had risen significantly at the second survey 
point which may have influenced the mental health outcomes to some degree. 
 
Mental Health Stigmatisation During Deployment 
 
The level of mental health stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care remained high 
between the two survey points despite considerable effort being made by UKAF to promote a 
positive view of mental health through a number of active strategies such as education, poster 
and media campaigns.  The rate of mental disorder in those reporting mental health 
stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care is reportedly higher than in the non-stigmatised 
(Iversen et al., 2011) and it perhaps would have been more reassuring if stigma had reduced.  
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Despite the persistence of stigma, the study results suggest a mixed picture overall, since 
although help seeking from welfare sources had fallen significantly, medical help seeking had 
risen significantly.  Previous research has observed that stigmatisation is substantially higher 
during deployment than when it is measured immediately post-deployment (Osorio et al., 
2012) and the authors of the post-deployment study argued that although it may influence the 
decision to seek help, deployment stigma may help to reinforce operational hardiness.  The 
promotion of hardiness through stigmatisation may, however, give rise to adverse operational 
consequences given that functional impairment arising from untreated sub-threshold PTSD 
symptoms may act to reduce operational effectiveness.  Attempts to reduce stigma and 
promote help-seeking among personnel affected by such symptoms should continue so that 
personnel who may be functioning at a sub-optimal level can access help so that operational 




As discussed in the previous section, R&R was popular among deployed personnel, however, 
although R&R was deemed useful by the majority of personnel at both survey points and had 
some influence upon mental health, the latter became borderline non-significant when all 
observable confounders were accounted for.  The study findings therefore reflect the results 




As discussed in the introduction, in the UK AF, stress and mental health education takes 
place at various stages of deployment.  Although it was not tested as an individual component 
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of TLD, post-deployment psycho-education delivered at TLD may have had a positive effect 
upon mental health for some personnel.  To test the effect of pre-deployment preparatory 
psycho-education delivered immediately prior to embarking upon operations, a single 
question embedded in the OMHNE survey asked whether personnel remembered receiving 
such a briefing.  As noted in previous research (Greenberg et al., 2009; Mulligan et al., 2010) 
the OMHNE study results suggested that those who recalled receiving such a briefing had 
better mental health when potential confounding effects were adjusted for.  What the current 
study appears to suggest is that a memorable stress briefing has a positive mental health 
effect, however, the research did not directly test the content of such a briefing.  The rise in 
the proportion of personnel remembering pre-deployment stress briefings may reflect the 
primary preventative effort that has been invested by military commanders in supporting 
deployment mental health.  The data also reveal continued high levels of perceived good 
leadership and it is likely that good leaders will ensure that reasonable quality pre-
deployment stress briefs are delivered to their personnel so that they are in the best frame of 
mind to undertake the forthcoming deployment.  Where psycho-education in the form of 
Stress Management Training (SMT) has been subjected to rigorous evaluation, the available 
research suggests that it has either no sustained effect (Sharpley et al., 2008) or marginal, 
positive effects (Deahl et al., 2002).  The same is true for more specific forms of SMT, such 
as UK Battlemind training.  However, there is currently only a limited amount of robust 
evidence to suggest that psycho-education confers any definitive positive advantage over and 
above good military leadership, fostering unit morale and promoting unit cohesion.  Given 
that the provision of SMT is a mandatory element of the UK Armed Forces’ approach to 
maintaining good mental health amongst its personnel and forms a discrete component of the 
UK Armed Forces Mental Health Plan (Pinder et al., 2010), the use of pre-deployment SMT 
should be further refined and investigated.  This should include rigorous testing of its 
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component parts, which are currently standardised, and preferably a randomised controlled 
trial to assess the main psychological effects of receiving such an intervention. 
 
Leadership and Mental Health 
 
The low levels of mental disorder found in the OMHNE deployment surveys may have been 
in part due to the largely positive views of leadership and associated substantial levels of unit 
cohesion and morale.  Although leadership is chiefly a primary preventative activity in the 
context of mental health, for instance, good leaders may well seek to ensure that their 
subordinates receive pre-deployment psycho-education and that unit members feel able to 
offer mental health support when required, there are links with secondary and even tertiary 
prevention measures.  To ensure that their unit is in the best possible condition to deploy, 
effective leaders may have developed measures to make sure that they are adept at 
recognising psychological symptoms, for instance, by undertaking TRiM training (Whybrow 
et al., 2013).  They may also contribute to the ‘healthy warrior effect’ (Larson et al., 2008) by 
encouraging personnel with substantial untreated psychological symptoms to seek help prior 
to deployment.  As the non-deployed healthcare study results suggest, treatment prior to 
deployment may either improve symptomatic personnel’s mental wellbeing, making them fit 
for deployment or the mental health practitioner will ensure that those receiving ongoing 
mental health interventions will be medically protected from deployment until the outcome of 




Measuring Leadership Components 
 
It has been suggested that leadership style can impact mental health either positively or 
negatively and that it may play a significant role in military hardiness (Bartone, 2006).  Most 
studies conducted to date, including the current study, used brief measures of leadership that 
rely upon subordinates responding to statements regarding a narrow range of leader 
behaviours.  Such scales may not capture the true essence of leadership (Hackman and 
Wageman, 2007) which is thought to be complex and multi-dimensional (Walumbwa et al., 
2008).  It is difficult to be sure that the effect of leadership upon mental health is being 
robustly evaluated.  This is particularly true of the individual components of leadership which 
may well have differential effects in the context of mental health support.  For instance, if 
leaders are seen to ‘embarrass unit members in front of others’, which is one of the four items 
contained in the leadership scale, then it is unlikely that subordinates will feel sufficiently 
confident that reporting psychological symptoms will meet with a positive response.  
Furthermore, most study designs, including the current study, are cross-sectional, and it is 
difficult to adequately assess causality.  Prevailing mental health might influence subordinate 
views of leadership whereas psychological factors may well influence the ability of the leader 
to lead effectively (Macik‐Frey et al., 2009). 
 
It seems that there is a pressing requirement to develop a robust and comprehensive measure 
of leadership.  One of the key outcomes for those with substantial mental health symptoms is 
whether they can engage with helping services and, although multi-factorial, one of the major 
barriers to engaging with effective care is the presence of stigmatising beliefs about mental 
health and help-seeking (Cornish et al., 2014).  Although there is some evidence that leaders 
can help to reduce the impact of stigma upon help-seeking, there is a requirement to 
understand the mechanism by which leadership achieves this effect.  What may be needed is 
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a phased study that generates a meaningful leadership measure which could then be used to 
assess the effects of leadership upon mental health and stigma/BTC and help-seeking over 
time.  Further studies of the primary and secondary prevention characteristics of leadership 
are certainly indicated as good leadership is arguably one of the most important enduring and 
modifiable military mental health support interventions. 
 
Leadership and Secondary Prevention 
 
Most UK military studies regularly find that good leadership is reported at high levels, 
however, in the non-deployed help seeking study, the chain of command was the least 
popular potential source of help for mental health problems but was among the most 
commonly utilised sources of support.  Secondary prevention activity as a discrete 
component of leadership may need to centre on promoting the chain of command as caring 
and supportive toward those personnel with psychological symptoms while maintaining firm 
but fair discipline which is the bedrock of an effective military.  The non-deployed help-
seeking study results suggested specific help-seeking impediments to focus upon which 
leaders at all levels should be able to influence, these were; potential loss of trust, loss of 
confidence, embarrassment and being blamed by leaders.  Leaders may be in a position to 
promote better mental health through their awareness of the influence of current 
psychological symptoms among their subordinates.  In the post-deployment mental health 
stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care (stigma/BTC) and help-seeking study, 
stigma/BTC relating to fear of being treated differently and being seen as weak trebled in 
those personnel who were probable mental health disorder cases compared to mentally 
healthy personnel.  The study findings suggested that concerns about potentially diminished 
military functioning and fears of a negative reception should a mental health problem be 
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declared appear to become more pertinent at the point when mental health is worsening.  
Leaders at all levels should seek to combat such beliefs at every opportunity in order to 
facilitate timely help-seeking among those subordinates suffering with untreated 
psychological symptoms. 
Family Support During Deployment 
 
In the OMHNE deployment surveys, perceptions that family support was in place and that it 
was delivered at a satisfactory level were associated with better mental health at both survey 
points.  Previous studies have suggested that distress in the deployed person’s family is an 
important target for deployment mental health support and supportive stress-reduction 
interventions have been shown to improve family resilience when they are delivered 
successfully (Lester et al., 2012).  There is little evidence about the specific way in which 
family support impacts upon the deployed person’s mental health, however, irrespective of 
the actual level of family support, the OMHNE-based deployment study asked about the 
deployed person’s perceptions of support and the study findings suggest that any such efforts 
on the part of military commanders must be made visible to deployed personnel in order to be 
meaningful.  Of course, in the current study, objective measures of family support would 
have been helpful to better understand whether poorer mental health was related to actual 
lack of support or whether the study finding was simply about perceived shortcomings in 
support which may have been subject to psychological bias.  It may be crucial to fully 
understand how family support works as around 50.0% of personnel reported that family 
support was either lacking or absent.  The most common complaint received from deployed 
personnel was that insufficient information about the deployment was transmitted to families 
by members of the unit that remained behind in the home base (termed the ‘rear operations 
group’ or ‘ROG’).  Future studies should attempt to quantify the level and nature of delivered 
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support through the inclusion of an objective measure of family support and a qualitative 
component exploring the experiences of deployed personnel’s family members.  The 
resulting data could be used to generate a specific family support measure which could be 
used in studies to evaluate family support in relation to the deployed person’s mental health 
and compare actual support with the deployed person’s perception of such support.  Elements 
that might be important to assess further might include issues such as a lack of information 
for families about how the deployed military unit is faring, particularly for families living 
‘off-base’, and whether non-married partnerships actually receive poorer levels of welfare 
and general support as is currently perceived by some deployed personnel. A useful way to 
examine the effect of family support would be to compare a group who have no contact with 
their families and friends while deployed, such as an operational Royal Navy submarine and 
land-based personnel deploying on a mature operation where communication with home may 
be substantial. 
 
Welfare Support During Deployment 
 
The OMHNE deployment survey assessed the effects of operational, welfare and medical 
support provision in a range of locations including more austere environments.  The results of 
the survey suggested that a lack of access to welfare support was associated with greater 
levels of sub-threshold PTSD symptoms but not symptoms of common mental disorder.  The 
mechanism by which welfare support may have influenced acute stress symptoms or whether 
poorer mental health may have impacted upon perceptions of available welfare support was 
unclear.  Future studies should gather objective data regarding the levels of welfare support 
for personnel operating in more dangerous, isolated locations for prolonged periods of time 
and an in-depth evaluation of the components of welfare support that have a modulating 
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effect upon mental health should be established.  This is an important consideration as poorer 
mental health was associated with greater functional impairment and in the context of 
operational effectiveness, will be of great interest to operational commanders. 
 
Medical Support During Deployment 
 
The results of the OMHNE study suggested that help-seeking on operations was associated 
with poorer mental health, irrespective of whether support was received from non-medical 
sources such as friends, commanders or other welfare sources, or from medical sources, 
including primary care facilities and the field hospital.  The rates of reporting sick for medical 
reasons and admission to the field hospital both increased significantly from OMHNE A1 to 
A2, however, it is notable that the unit medical officer was the least popular source of mental 
health support in this survey.  Mental health symptoms were more prevalent amongst those 
reporting sick and stigmatisation and perceived barriers to care affected those with mental 
health symptoms to a greater degree.  A substantial proportion of deployed personnel may 
have been disinclined to seek help because of perceived psychological and physical barriers; 
it is therefore suggested that medical consultations are an important opportunity for primary 
prevention activity or for the detection of early symptoms (secondary prevention).  Firstly, it 
would appear that some effort will need to be made to ensure that personnel view the medical 
officer and associated staff as potentially helpful and accessible sources of support for mental 
health symptoms and secondly, that general medical staff feel equipped to deal with 






Psychological Symptoms, Stigmatising Beliefs and Barriers to Care (Stigma/BTC) 
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, secondary prevention is mainly about establishing 
procedures and strategies that seek to detect and treat pre-clinical risk factors in order to 
control the progression of potential and actual disorders.  As described in the introductory 
chapter, among the main impediments to the effective detection of mental ill-health and 
emerging symptoms is the influence of stigma/BTC.  In both the OMHNE deployment survey 
and in the non-deployed help-seeking study, levels of stigma/BTC were substantial and were 
more intense among personnel with higher levels of mental disorder symptoms.  A similar 
association between psychological symptoms and stigma/BTC was observed in the post-
deployment study, however, stigma/BTC levels were substantially lower immediately 
following deployment than in the deployed and non-deployed setting. 
 
The results of the post-deployment stigma/BTC study suggested a possible explanation for 
the differing levels of stigma/BTC found amongst those with and without caseness levels of 
psychological symptoms.  Mental health stigmatisation is known to be ubiquitous (Forbes et 
al., 2013) and previous research suggests that stigma/BTC levels are relatively constant in 
any population (Pescosolido et al., 2010).  All thesis components that measured stigma/BTC 
confirmed both of these findings, suggesting that military groups appear to harbour a 
consistent background pool of negative assumptions about the consequences of help-seeking 
when they are psychologically healthy which appear to become more prominent when 
psychological symptoms develop.  This was illustrated by the post-deployment study finding 
that just under a third of psychologically healthy personnel and those not using alcohol at 
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harmful levels reported raised levels of stigma/BTC; however, stigma/BTC levels appeared to 
double in the presence of AMD caseness and were also significantly associated with alcohol 
misuse in the post-deployment stigma/BTC study. 
 
Stigma/BTC, Symptoms and Problem Recognition 
 
Although mental health symptoms appear to be drive help-seeking (Harpaz-Rotem et al., 
2014), being aware of the need for additional support is also key.  The results of the non-
deployed help-seeking study suggested that when personnel acknowledged the presence of a 
psychosocial problem, they were more likely to have sought help, particularly when they 
were additionally experiencing higher levels of psychological symptoms.  In both the non-
deployed and post-deployment studies, there was some evidence that in relation to help-
seeking, stigma/BTC may well operate independently of, or in addition to, problem 
recognition as, in the non-deployed study, seeking support for a subjective psycho-social 
problem (implying problem recognition) was not significantly associated with raised levels of 
stigma/BTC; however, stigma/BTC were significantly associated with the presence of mental 
health disorder symptoms.  The study results suggested that stigma/BTC levels among help-
seekers with subjective psycho-social problems were similar to symptom free non-help-
seekers (the reference group) while symptomatic help-seekers reported significantly greater 
stigma/BTC than the reference group while the highest stigma/BTC levels were found 
amongst symptomatic personnel who had yet to seek help.  It may well be that a proportion of 
the personnel in the post-deployment study may have simply failed to recognise symptoms 
requiring additional support.  This is a problem noted elsewhere in the literature (Talebi et al., 
2013), particularly in relation to anxiety disorders (Johnson and Coles, 2013); indeed it has 
been noted that mental health literacy in the UK is generally poor (Jorm, 2000).  The non-
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deployed help-seeking study results suggested that symptomatic personnel were more likely 
to report discriminatory thoughts related to mental ill-health.  It therefore seems that a series 
of factors inter-relate in a complex way; problem recognition, psychological symptoms, 
stigma and potential discrimination all appear to play a part in the decision to seek help. 
 
The Critical Role of Psychological Symptoms 
 
In the post-deployment stigma and help-seeing study different levels of stigma/BTC were 
systematically linked to the presence or absence of probable mental disorder and alcohol 
misuse.  Recognising the presence of a subjective psychosocial problem was not significantly 
associated with raised stigma/BTC, while experiencing AMD caseness was.  In this case, 
although moderate background levels of stigma/BTC were present in the healthy and those 
with a psychosocial problem, AMD symptoms alone appeared to be necessary and sufficient 
for the highest levels of stigma/BTC to be present.  Evidence for the importance of mental 
health symptoms included the finding that stigma/BTC levels fluctuated with changes in 
probable mental disorder caseness over time.  New onset mental health caseness and 




Interest in Receiving Support 
 
The results of the non-deployed help-seeking study suggested that, in addition to AMD 
symptoms, being interested in receiving help or support, whilst not actually seeking it, was 
associated with substantial levels of stigma/BTC.  A similar outcome occurred in the post-
deployment stigma/BTC study.  Pre-contemplation has been shown to mediate help-seeking 
and attitudes to mental health support (Levant et al., 2013) and so, in order to encourage help 
seeking, it is possible that there may be some benefit in educating military personnel to 
recognise that increasing mental health symptoms, experiencing emotional or relationship 
stressors and being interested in receiving help are indicators that there may be some benefit 
in receiving mental health support.  Anti-stigma campaigns tend to deliver their messages in a 
blanket fashion to all military personnel, therefore, a more targeted approach aimed at those 
with higher levels of psychological symptoms may be more appropriate. 
 
Help-seeking and Fear of Medical Intervention 
 
Across the studies that measured stigma/BTC, irrespective of where personnel were located 
in the deployment cycle, help-seekers were more likely than non-help-seekers to experience 
poorer mental health and higher levels of stigma/BTC.  It may be that for some personnel, 
detection, and aspects of secondary prevention are in place; however, the study outcomes 
further suggested that many symptomatic personnel did not engage with potential help 
sources.  Low levels of help-seeking are commensurate with the findings of international 
surveys of mental health support among military personnel (Sareen et al., 2007).  The non-
deployed help-seeking study results suggested that experiencing psychological symptoms 
does not necessarily result in help-seeking; around a fifth of asymptomatic personnel 
nevertheless sought help for a family, stressful or relationship problem.  Previous studies 
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have reported a similarly complex association between perceiving a need for support, 
attitudes about mental health, and severity of symptoms (Mojtabai et al., 2011). 
 
Low levels of spontaneous help-seeking represent a challenge to effective detection as those 
most in need may well experience the greatest psychological barriers to care.  The results of 
the non-deployed help-seeking study revealed that, irrespective of symptom levels, there was 
a widely held view that psychological symptoms were undesirable, that effective mental 
health treatment was helpful, necessary and that resolving mental health problems required an 
effort of will on the part of the affected person.  Such views seemed to coalesce in those who 
wanted help but who had yet to seek it.  Previous research has indicated that the perceived 
utility of mental health services is a fundamental component in the decision to seek help 
(Bayer et al., 1997) while psychologically distressed people may actively avoid medical 
sources of help (Ye et al., 2013).  In keeping with the findings of previous research 
(Greenberg et al., 2003), help-seeking personnel in both the OMHNE, non-deployed help-
seeking and post-deployment studies were more likely to access non-medical rather than 
military medical sources.  In the post-deployment stigma/BTC study where non-medical 
sources were accessed at double the rate of sources that included formal medical assistance.  
The help-seeking and stigma studies all give clues about why the rate of help-seeking from 
medical sources is low in that seeking help from formal military medical sources appeared to 
carry a perceived occupational risk.  The post-deployment study results further suggested that 
personnel may have sought help from non-medical sources to help minimise stigmatisation 
and avoid a potentially negative occupational outcomes.  Seeking help from non-medical 
sources was associated with significantly increased levels of stigma/BTC which could imply 
that stigma/BTC may have been associated with making a conscious choice to access this 
source of support rather than medical. 
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Stigma/BTC Reduction Strategies – Alternative Realistic Views of Mental Healthcare 
 
Given the finding that stigma/BTC fluctuate with changing mental state, in relation to seeking 
support from formal medical sources, military personnel could be encouraged to view 
stigmatising beliefs as a series of thoughts rather than an objective reality.  One potential way 
of promoting engagement with medical and mental health services could be through the 
provision of accurate information delivered by way of mixed media such as leaflets, 
education, unit information campaigns and video.  Such public health strategies could include 
corrective information about the nature, function and effectiveness of military health services 
so that personnel are able to make more informed decisions about accessing medical services 
for mental health support.  Restorative mental health management relies on the ability of the 
help provider to intervene effectively to reverse or arrest the development psychological 
symptoms.  It could be argued that military medical personnel are well placed to deliver such 
an outcome.  Authors have described the comprehensive high quality clinical services that are 
generally well positioned and resourced to deliver evidence based therapies that could return 
those with substantial mental health symptoms to full functioning and therefore mitigate any 
adverse career effects (McAllister, 2006).  A substantial caveat is required which relates to 
the potential occupational risk associated with help-seeking in a military context.  The tertiary 
prevention, non-deployed healthcare study suggested that, following mental healthcare, no 
occupational impairment will occur for around two thirds to three quarters of personnel, but 
for the remainder, there is a definite risk of reduced occupational functioning, including 
medical discharge from service.  US research has also reported that fears about medically 
imposed restrictions can pose an actual threat by limiting deployment and restricting other 
work activities when help is sought (Seal et al., 2009).  Anti-stigma presentations and 
interventions should ideally contain a sensitively phrased message to this effect and medical 
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personnel should be honest and open about the potential career impact of a mental health 
referral while emphasising the potential negative consequences of persisting at work with an 
untreated mental health problem.  The post-deployment stigma/BTC study results suggested 
that stigma/BTC levels reduced significantly when psychological symptoms abated, 
reinforcing the notion that stigma/BTC are ideas rather than facts.  Willing volunteers who 
have recovered from a mental ill-health episode may therefore be in a good position to 
reinforce such a message and to communicate the potential for positive occupational 
outcomes to occur following mental health treatment or therapy. 
 
Mental Health Awareness and Training of Medical Providers 
 
The finding that medical officers and their supporting staffs were the least utilised of all the 
available potential sources of support across the deployed and non-deployed settings suggests 
that there may well be scope for improving aspects of both secondary and tertiary prevention.  
The inclusion in any medical consultation of a simple question about mental health might go 
some way to increasing engagement with helping services.  This would have to be couched in 
terms of a supportive, non-threatening enquiry as the people who it is intended to detect may 
well be experiencing heightened levels of mental disorder symptoms and associated 
stigma/BTC.  This proposal implies a training requirement for allied health professionals and 
combat medical technicians/assistants who have a lower level of medical training compared 




Stigma/BTC and the Effectiveness of Medical Help-Seeking 
 
All studies carried out for this thesis made use of restrictive measures of stigma/BTC which 
mainly focus upon psychological barriers to mental healthcare.  In future studies, the reason 
why symptomatic personnel choose to avoid potential sources of secondary prevention could 
make use of broader measures of stigma/BTC as they become available.  This might include 
the way in which stigma/BTC might impact upon social inclusion within military units.  
Secondly, having argued for the importance of promoting engagement with formal medical 
sources, it may be important to assess whether such sources of support are indeed more 
effective in the context of mental health than informal sources such as friends, family, unit 
commanders and welfare support.  Currently, this is unknown, however, if medical support 
proves to be the most effective source of secondary prevention, efforts will be required to 
establish how mental health interventions are best delivered in the primary care environment 
which constitutes the first point of contact for medical consultations. 
 
Help-seeking from Non-Medical Sources of Support 
 
Across the studies that assessed help-seeking, informal and non-medical sources of support 
were consistently more popular than formal medical support.  When asked to consider their 
willingness to access help from a range of potential sources, non-deployed help-seeking study 
respondents stated that they were least willing to engage with an online therapist and the unit 
chain of command was also widely unpopular while friends and family were popular.  
Distrust of the chain of command corresponds with the most common stigmatising belief that 
unit leaders might treat a person differently should they declare a mental health problem.  
Furthermore, it is commensurate with the finding that those who reported greater levels of 
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stigma/BTC were significantly more likely to endorse that they might discriminate against 
others on the grounds of mental health and presumably might expect others to behave in a 
reciprocal fashion toward them.  The post-deployment study results were also helpful in 
assessing why personnel might be distrustful of unit-based sources of help.  The rank order of 
stigma/BTC components was consistent between the initial post-deployment assessment and 
follow-up where loss of military credibility and trust featured prominently.  The rate of 
reporting a fear of being treated differently and being seen as weak trebled among personnel 
who endorsed mental health caseness compared to mentally healthy personnel.  Given that 
changes in stigma/BTC mirrored changes in mental health, it may well be that concerns about 
potentially diminished military functioning became more pertinent as mental health 
deteriorated.  It seems, however, that thoughts do not always translate into behaviour, as 
when help-seekers were asked about the sources of help that they had actually used, the unit 
chain of command was the second most frequently accessed source of support. 
 
Currently, there is little available evidence to compare outcomes between formal medical or 
unit based non-medical sources of support for military mental health problems.  Should non-
medical sources of support prove to be effective, then two possible interventions fall out of 
this; firstly, training in the management of mental health conditions for commanders and unit 
welfare staffs and secondly, education for families and friends about how best to support a 
military person who asks for help for mental health issues.  A pre- post-training comparative 
trial could helpfully test the effects of training by interviewing help-seekers before and after 




Stigma/BTC and the Military Chain of Command 
 
In the non-deployed help-seeking study, respondents were aware that military mental health 
services were available and two thirds felt that their mental health would be supported by the 
military, however, they remained fearful of being treated differently by commanders and 
peers.  It was therefore somewhat surprising that they were able to overcome their fears to 
seek support from the chain of command, which is very much in a position to adversely affect 
a military career, but can also be of great psychological benefit (Jones et al., 2012).  Of 
course, it may be that disclosing a mental health problem to the chain of command did not 
happen by choice.  In a civilian context individuals can simply supply their employer with a 
reason for short periods of sickness absence without consulting a doctor or by other forms of 
officially sanctioned absenteeism.  Military personnel are closely supervised and concealing a 
mental health problem is difficult and self-certification or sickness absence sanctioned by a 
civilian medical practitioner is usually notified to the chain of command so that an absence 
management plan can be initiated.  Whether help-seekers chose to access the chain of 
command or whether their mental help symptoms or functional impairment inadvertently 
brought them to the attention of their leaders is unclear.  What is apparent is that the unit 
chain of command may be well placed to provide mental health support to those experiencing 
symptoms though, to encourage help-seeking, they may have to state overtly that they will act 
in the individual’s best interest should they choose to come forward for help.  Military 
commanders may also wish to consider that effective mental health treatment is available 
from military sources and accessing care may help to avoid that which symptomatic 
personnel most fear, namely sanctions arising from reduced effectiveness arising from an 
untreated mental health condition.  Irrespective of whether the person had symptoms of CMD 
or PTSD, concerns about potential loss of trust, peers having reduced confidence in them, 
embarrassment and being blamed by their leaders if they sought help for a mental health 
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condition were commonplace.  To maximise opportunities for detection and risk-reduction, 
secondary prevention activity may need to centre on promoting unit-based sources of help as 
caring and supportive.  This is appears to be particularly important for those with 
psychological symptoms. 
 
Stigma/BTC and Psycho-Education 
 
Given that failure to recognise the requirement for additional support may be a crucial 
consideration when deciding whether to seek help.  It is of course worth considering whether 
respondents may have been influenced by the wording of the questions in the survey.  This 
could perhaps have been phrased more simply without reference to emotional, stressful, 
family or relationship problems; perhaps ‘do you have a mental health problem?’ could have 
been a more appropriate question, although responses could still have been prejudiced by 
having to accept that mental ill-health was present, interactions with stigma/BTC and so 
forth.  This potential shortcoming notwithstanding, the study findings may suggest three 
possibilities for future stigma/BTC interventions.  Despite their variable impact, described in 
the introductory chapter, education-based approaches could seek to promote symptom 
recognition, target the symptomatic and describe the route to the restoration of military 
functioning and better mental health.  There is a pressing need to assess the impact of 
education-based approaches to stigma reduction and to unpack the components of such 




Timing of Stigma/BTC-reduction Interventions 
 
Given that increases in stigma/BTC appeared to be associated with increases in overall levels 
of psychological symptoms, the timing of any stigma reduction strategy may be as important 
as the content.  Any public health-level intervention might best be delivered when personnel 
have completed the post-deployment transition in a static location where any post-
deployment psychological symptoms are emerging rather than in the deployed location or 
immediately post-deployment.  A specific message could be formulated for personnel with 
increasing mental health symptoms, perceived subjective psychosocial problems and for 
those who are interested in receiving help.  Information campaigns could suggest that 
emerging or unremitting psychological symptoms are indicators that mental health support is 
required, that some personnel may know that they have a problem but may not be seeking 
help on the grounds of misperceptions about the potential consequences of help-seeking.  
Given the consistent background levels of stigma/BTC identified in the various studies, it 
may be that, although laudable, eradicating stigma/BTC may not currently be a realistic goal.  
As a first step, any anti-stigma intervention might simply seek to return elevated stigma/BTC 
levels among those with new symptoms to those found among mentally healthy personnel.  
The timing of anti-stigma campaigns should be assessed in future comparative trials, 
preferably using RCT methodology.  The latter should have clear objectives stating the 
desired level to which stigma should be reduced. 
 
Help-Seeking and Secondary Detection 
 
That the majority of symptomatic personnel did not seek help in the various studies concords 
with findings from US civilian studies where the majority of mental disorder cases do not 
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receive treatment (Wang et al., 2005).  More recent studies suggest that among US military 
personnel, mental health help-seeking rates are improving, but remain obstinately low 
(Quartana et al., 2014).  The help-seeking rates detailed in this thesis are generally lower than 
rates reported in recent UK civilian studies (Brown et al., 2014), but are in keeping with UK 
military studies (Hines et al., 2014).  The rate of help-seeking for alcohol misuse was 
substantially lower than for mental health problems.  Secondary prevention relies on the 
ability to detect symptomatic personnel so that progression to mental disorder can be reversed 
or managed.  Psychological screening appears to be ineffective in predicting psychological 
breakdown, however, case finding through surveillance may be more helpful (Jones et al., 
2003).  Quite how such an approach would work in practice is not well articulated; therefore 
novel ways of facilitating help-seeking are required.  As psychological symptoms are by and 
large hidden, encouraging self-referral or delivering training in the detection of symptoms in 
others may constitute potential ways of achieving this. 
 
Operational Hardiness and Stigma/BTC 
 
Osorio et al. (2012) assessed a composite dataset, of which the post-deployment stigma/BTC 
study was a component, to demonstrate that deployment stigma/BTC levels were high while 
significant reductions in stigma/BTC occurred immediately post-deployment.  The authors 
suggested that deployment stigma might help to maintain ‘presenteeism’ where symptomatic 
personnel attempt to ‘keep going’ to complete their period of operational deployment.  The 
post-deployment study follow-up results suggested that stigma levels began to rise 
significantly during the months following deployment.  This may have been related in part to 
increases in overall levels of probable mental illness symptoms rather than being a general 
post-deployment effect.  The OMHNE deployment survey results appear to reinforce Osorio 
et al’s view that operational hardiness could be related to raised levels of stigma/BTC.  
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Further potential evidence for such a notion can be seen in the post-deployment study results 
where around two thirds of personnel who experienced subjective psychosocial problems 
while deployed completed their operational tour without seeking help.  Those experiencing 
such problems whilst deployed were significantly more likely to hold stigmatising beliefs 
than those who did not experience them.  Perhaps a case could be made for leaving 
deployment stigma/BTC untouched.  A strong cautionary note is required however.  Firstly, 
there are multiple health equality reasons for attempting to reduce stigma/BTC and promote 
help-seeking (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013).  The consequences of bolstering operational 
hardiness through not addressing or encouraging stigmatisation remain largely unknown.  
There may be scope to evaluate whether such an approach indeed exists and if it does, what 
are the longer-term psychological consequences for deployed symptomatic personnel who 
attempt to conduct themselves in a way commensurate with a hardiness agenda? 
 
Alcohol Use and Help-Seeking 
 
Consistent with other published military research, alcohol use was substantial among non-
deployed help-seeking study participants with a full third screening positive for possible 
harmful alcohol use using a high screening cut off score.  In keeping with previous military 
studies, alcohol misuse appeared widespread and help-seeking for such problems was 
infrequent; around 30.0% of alcohol misusers had sought help, mainly from informal sources.  
This figure is commensurate with the rate of help-seeking for alcohol problems reported by 
Iversen et al., (2010) which was based upon data obtained during 2006-2007.  Similar low 
rates of help-seeking among substance using young people have been reported in 




It seems that alcohol misuse is a stubborn and widespread problem that has not improved 
over a protracted period amongst UK AF personnel.  Previous UK studies have reported rates 
of hazardous alcohol use of around 67% using a cut off score of ≥8 on the 10 item AUDIT 
(Fear et al., 2007) and rates of 13% for alcohol use that might cause physical harm using a 
higher cut off score ≥16.  The substantial level of AUD classified using a substantial cut off 
score on the AUDIT-C in the non-deployed help-seeking study suggested that it was perhaps 
more problematic in a static Army garrison setting than has been demonstrated in prior 
studies of UK AF personnel.  This may be a reflection of the greater than expected number of 
young soldiers in the study, who are thought to be at greater risk of alcohol misuse (Jones and 
Fear, 2011) or to the use of a brief screening measure that can inflate the number of potential 
cases, mainly through the failure to differentiate between raised episodic consumption and 
sustained heavy drinking, whereby the two groups are conflated into one (Nordqvist et al., 
2004). 
 
In the non-deployed help-seeking study, Stigma/BTC levels were lower in alcohol misusers 
than in those reporting mental health problems and the study results suggested that personnel, 
as the literature suggests, may not seek help as they viewed their use as potentially 
embarrassing, but not of great concern (Cunningham and Breslin, 2004).  There are some 
clues as to why this might be the case.  Although largely unaffected by stigma/BTC, alcohol 
misusers reported significantly higher levels of potential embarrassment arising from help-
seeking than non-misusers and they were also more likely to feel that psychological problems 
would work themselves out spontaneously.  Military personnel appear to be remarkably 
resilient to the effects of alcohol.  Research findings suggest that functional impairment 
appears to be concentrated in those reporting only the highest levels of alcohol use (Rona et 
al., 2010).  Given that misuse levels reported in the non-deployed help seeking study were 
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lower than the levels assessed by Rona et al., although this was not assessed, few may have 
experienced any short-term negative impact and may therefore not have been motivated to 
reduce their alcohol consumption.  Further evidence for the tolerance of behavioural 
problems among alcohol users might be related to the finding that alcohol misusers were 
significantly more willing to work with and continue a relationship with a friend or colleague 
with a mental health condition. 
 
The post-deployment stigma/BTC study results reinforce the notion that alcohol misusers 
may simply fail to recognise that they have a problem.  It is notable that previous research has 
found that alcohol dependency is a severely publicly stigmatised condition (Schomerus et al., 
2011) which might promote secrecy and non-disclosure.  Unlike the non-deployed help-
seeking study results, there was some evidence that post-deployment alcohol use was 
stigmatised where stigma/BTC levels among personnel drinking alcohol in a potentially 
harmful fashion after returning from deployment were double those found among non-
misusers.  Self-recognition and disclosure of problematic alcohol use may well be the key to 
facilitating help-seeking.  This is potentially important as, in the post-deployment 
stigma/BTC study, alcohol misuse in the absence of recognition did not appear to drive help-
seeking.  Around one fifth of personnel had consumed potentially harmful levels of alcohol 
some four to six months post-deployment.  Although greater levels of use were not associated 
with higher levels of help-seeking, seeing oneself as having a problem seemed to have some 
effect.  Compared to AMD cases, the starkest difference in help-seeking rates between 
problem recognition and measured usage was for harmful alcohol use.  Overall, those 
personnel who felt that they had an alcohol problem were the most likely to seek help 




Which forms of support might be most appropriate and helpful to military alcohol misusers is 
currently unclear.  Alcohol misuse in the UK general population is a stubborn and enduring 
problem and with the exception of supply-reduction and cost escalation, few truly effective 
interventions are available.  Recent studies of empirically promising interventions such as 
alcohol use disorder screening and brief intervention in primary care have yielded somewhat 
equivocal results (Saitz, 2014; Heather, 2014).  In the post-deployment stigma/BTC study, 
there was some evidence that alcohol use was stigmatising as stigma/BTC levels among those 
with AUD were double those found among non-misusers.  Anti-stigma campaigns and 
alcohol use reduction strategies should therefore ideally contain a component that aims to 
encourage those who misuse alcohol to recognise that perceived barriers to care may be 
preventing them from seeking support and to encourage them to view their alcohol use as 
problematic and worthy of being managed.  If such a strategy is used, further studies are 
required to establish the optimum content of education-based alcohol interventions for UK 
military alcohol misusers.  Current trends suggest that education is likely to be used in the 
future as it is popular among military commanders despite evidence that it is largely 
ineffective.  Such strategies should ideally address the inhibiting effects of stigma/BTC upon 
alcohol related help-seeking and although stigma-reduction may not be ideal as there is an 
argument to say that alcohol misuse should be stigmatised, personnel should be encouraged 
to recognise when their negative views of helping services are preventing them from coming 




As described in the introductory chapter, tertiary prevention is mostly concerned with 
providing timely and effective treatment for those suffering with established mental health 
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disorders to return them to full fitness or to improve their quality of life.  The tertiary 
prevention studies were carried out both during deployment and in the home base and were 
concerned with evaluating whether clinical intervention for those seeking mental healthcare 
was effective in returning military personnel to their place of work and maintaining them 
within the operational area or in their non-deployed military role respectively.  In addition, 
the longer-term occupational impact of using the principles of forward psychiatry during 
deployment and an early return to work policy in the home base were assessed. 
 
Deployment Mental Health – Evacuation 
 
During combat deployment, the main aim of mental health support is to contribute to the 
effort to maximise the numbers of mentally fit personnel available for operational duties.  
This is achieved by providing robust therapy or management for those affected by 
psychological symptoms.  Management options can include removal from deployment for 
refractory cases so that care can continue in the home base.  Studies of non-UK national 
military forces suggest that the rate of any-cause medical evacuation from deployment can be 
substantial (Cohen et al., 2010) and a US study suggested that the rate of evacuation on the 
grounds of mental ill-health was large (Stetz et al., 2005).  Some studies suggest that 
evacuation might be associated with poorer long-term mental health (Harman et al., 2005) 
irrespective of whether it is undertaken for physical illness, injury (Forbes et al., 2012) or for 
mental health reasons (Turner et al., 2005).  Although evacuation can have longer-term 
psychological effects, it has been shown to bring about immediate and rapid improvement in 
presenting symptoms for substantial numbers of evacuated personnel (Rundell, 2006).  
Although longer-term mental health was not measured directly, no significant association 
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between evacuation, reduced occupational fitness and adverse occupational outcome was 
found in the deployment healthcare study. 
 
As noted earlier in this thesis, there is a paucity of international research into the longer-term 
effects of receiving mental healthcare during deployment and major international differences 
in how such care is delivered.  An earlier study conducted among UK personnel serving in 
Iraq suggested that evacuation home following mental health assessment or a trial of 
treatment was associated with a negative occupational impact in the longer term, however, no 
such association was found in the current deployment study.  In fact, FMHT care appeared to 
be effective in helping to maintain the fighting power of the deployed force by retaining three 
quarters of those referred to the FMHT within their operational unit.  The overall return to 
duty (RTD) rate was similar to the rate of 71.6% reported in the Jones et al 2010 study of 
mental health casualties in Iraq.  It is perhaps not surprising that in the deployment healthcare 
study, around 17.0% of personnel with no assigned psychiatric diagnosis were evacuated and 
in the operational context, may reflect poor tolerance of problematic behaviour by non-
psychiatric trained personnel.  Unit commanders and their staffs may therefore opt for the 
easier decision of returning a person to the UK rather than back to duty.  In this case, mental 
health assessment may have acted as a safeguard to establish whether there was a condition 
that could have been managed without recourse to evacuation.  For those with no assigned 
diagnosis, evacuation was often classified as being on welfare rather than psychiatric 
grounds. 
Adverse Discharge from Service and Other Negative Outcomes 
 
Although the rate of longer-term negative occupational outcome in the current study (33.5%) 
appeared marginally higher than the figure found amongst Iraq personnel overall (26.5%), the 
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latter was made up of various forms of discharge and did not include reduced occupational 
fitness or indiscipline.  It is striking that the rate of longer-term unplanned discharge in the 
deployed healthcare study was much lower than that found in the Jones et al 2010 Iraq study.  
In the latter there were 212 adverse discharges among 801 personnel in the two years 
following first contact with the FMHT, whereas 63 negative occupational outcomes were 
recorded in the same period among 445 personnel who provided longer-term outcome data in 
the current study.  In addition to the use of a more inclusive definition of negative longer-
term outcome in the current study, reserve forces were excluded and a three Service sample 
was used.  Furthermore, greater numbers of young, junior ranks featured in the current 
deployment healthcare study sample.  Substantial numbers of such personnel will be serving 
on short duration contracts and so will be more likely to complete their elective service term 
unhindered by reduced occupational fitness, whereas those on medium and long-term 
contracts will be more likely to encounter negative health effects and will have a far longer 
period within which to accrue negative occupational outcomes.  Conversely, the Iraq sample 
was composed of Army personnel only and included reserve forces who can leave the 
military almost on demand.  These differences notwithstanding, the outcomes suggest that the 
rate of adverse discharge has reduced markedly in recent years.  It was unclear whether this 
arose from better organised post-evacuation healthcare provision, better selection of 
personnel for deployment, or if other factors contributed to higher levels of retention in 
service. 
 
Although the current data suggests that a negative longer-term occupational outcome will 
occur for around a third of personnel referred to the FMHT, it does not give any indication 
about the specific long-term mental health effects of receiving deployed mental health care; 
occupational outcome merely functioned as a hypothesised proxy for mental health status.  
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Despite this shortcoming, the study results nevertheless suggest that military leaders should 
ascertain how best to offer support to deployment mental health casualties both during 
deployment and in the longer-term.  Recent studies suggest that experiencing greater levels of 
post-deployment mental health symptoms is associated with an increase in post-deployment 
violent offending (MacManus et al., 2013).  There is a tentative suggestion in the current data 
that in-service offending rates reported in the current study were remarkably low.  This could 
have resulted from poor recording of disciplinary offences and unfortunately it was not 
possible to establish what might have happened to personnel after they left service. 
 
Occupational Effects of Psychotherapy during Deployment 
 
The deployed healthcare study results suggested that diagnoses other than PTSD were the 
main focus of FMHT activity and given that pre-deployment training for deploying mental 
health personnel often focuses on short duration PTSD therapies, forward psychiatry 
principles should be developed for general mental health conditions particularly as non-
combat stressors appeared to have a substantial effect upon deployment mental health.  The 
study did not assess therapy and management in depth and future studies should assess the 
differential effects of varying forms of therapy and the effectiveness of treatments for 
different forms of mental disorder occurring in the context of deployment.  This may be 
critical as in the non-deployed mental healthcare study, those in receipt of medication and 
who had a more complex clinical presentation had the highest rate of reduced occupational 
fitness compared to those receiving other forms of therapy.  Although it is unlikely that 
treatment with psychoactive medication would be initiated for UK military personnel in the 
deployed setting, it would be helpful to have clear guidelines concerning the threshold for 
and determinants of evacuation for treatment at home. 
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The Management of Non-Mental Health Cases During Deployment 
 
The reasons for FMHT referral for personnel with no assigned psychiatric diagnosis was 
unclear.  Future studies should seek to explore in detail the events that precipitate referral for 
mental health assessment in the absence of psychiatric symptoms.  Developmental work and 
subsequent evaluation is required to determine the optimum strategy for managing personnel 
who are deemed not to have a mental health condition as they were as likely as those with 
mental health problems to experience negative long-term occupational outcomes.  It is 
probably unhelpful to use the medical evacuation route to remove personnel in this category 
from deployment and alternative, creative welfare, personnel or discipline-based approaches 
may be more helpful and appropriate both for the referred person and those who command 
them.  The determinants of long-term occupational outcome were far from clear for all those 
referred as the study did not assess how personnel were managed following their return from 
deployment.  Future studies should therefore attempt to evaluate the different forms of 
support delivered to personnel without mental health symptoms both during deployment and 
in the longer-term.  The latter probably applies to mental health casualties in equal measure. 
 
Tertiary Prevention and the Management of Vulnerability 
 
In the deployment healthcare study, greater psychological vulnerability was linked to 
increased evacuation risk, susceptibility to longer-term negative occupational outcome and 
has been shown to be important in other UK military research (Mulligan et al., 2012).  
Deliberate self-harm was a significant predictor of evacuation from deployment, although in 
the current study, DSH itself was not associated with negative longer-term occupational 
 320 
 
consequences.  This may support the notion that post evacuation management and healthcare 
arrangements have improved for UK AF personnel since the earlier study was undertaken in 
Iraq, perhaps allowing for greater levels of retention in service following deployment mental 
healthcare.  It may be that the substantial threat environment of Afghanistan has engendered a 
more sympathetic understanding of self-injurious threats and behaviour than was the case for 
personnel who undertook earlier deployments to Iraq.  Unfortunately, data were not 
sufficiently detailed to assess whether different forms of self-harm were less or more 
impactful, how they were related to current symptoms and whether they impacted upon the 
management strategy chosen by the FMHT.  Future studies may benefit from the inclusion of 





Referral Sources and Occupational Outcome 
 
It was hypothesised that personnel who consulted informally with the FMHT would be 
significantly more likely to be classified as having no psychiatric disorder compared to those 
who came through formal routes such as the unit medical officer and chain of command.  
This did not occur and informal were as likely as formal referrals to receive a mental health 
diagnosis.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that they fared any worse or better 
occupationally than mental health casualties.  To ensure that this was not a chance finding, 
future occupational mental health studies of this kind may need to compare the occupational 
outcomes for units operating a self-referral policy with those arising from deployed units 
utilising the formal referral route. 
 
Received UK military medical doctrine suggests that all referrals for mental health 
assessment should be routed through the unit medical officer.  During the period of the 
deployment healthcare study conducted in Afghanistan, this doctrine was adapted to provide 
a more flexible approach.  It is wholly possible that the self and chaplain referral route are a 
useful way of overcoming potential barriers to care which have been shown to impede access 
among substantial numbers of personnel who might otherwise benefit from support (Osorio et 
al., 2012) allowing personnel with early, more easily managed, mental health complaints to 
be dealt with effectively while offering a viable alternative to formal medical officer or chain 




The Effects of Non-Combat Stressors and Deployment Healthcare 
 
When deployed personnel referred to the FMHT experienced non-combat operational 
stressors, or found that adjustment to the operational environment was problematic, then 
evacuation was more likely following receipt of care.  Currently, the FMHT receives pre-
deployment training which, in the context of combat operations, aims to prepare staff to deal 
with combat stress reaction.  Given that non-combat stressors had a significant occupational 
effect, further research is required to investigate methods preparing or indeed, within an 
occupational medicine framework, selecting personnel for deployment.  If the effects of non-
combat stressors could be minimised, this could bring about better prospects of completing 
deployment without recourse to mental health support.  Personnel who appear to struggle 
with deployment life or who react unfavourably to non-combat stressors may require more 
intensive management by their seniors and officers which might negate the requirement for 
mental health assessment.  This is perhaps a finding worthy of consideration since non-
combat stressors are equally as likely to impact on the large numbers of military personnel 
who deploy on combat support missions to relatively safe austere environments, humanitarian 
missions, extended military exercises or routine deployments such as those undertaken by 
warships or submarines. 
 
The argument about the main focus of FMHT clinical activity could perhaps be extended.  
Although PTSD is undoubtedly a central outcome related to combat deployment and a focus 
of contemporary military research, the outcomes of the deployment healthcare study 
suggested that negative longer-term occupational consequences were unrelated to mental 
health diagnosis at the time of FMHT referral, although anxiety and depressive disorders 
approached a significant association with longer-term outcome.  This suggests that rather 
 323 
 
than perhaps viewing combat exposure and associated conditions as the main effort of the 
FMHT, forward psychiatry for general mental health conditions should be further refined 
especially in view of the impact of non-combat operational stressors reported above. 
 
Tertiary Prevention - Non-Deployed Mental Healthcare 
 
Short-Term Occupational Fitness 
The non-deployed healthcare study results suggested that socio-demographic characteristics 
were not significantly associated with short-term occupational outcome, which is somewhat 
surprising.  Previous research suggests that male gender, having a combat role and youth are 
known risk factors for poorer mental health in a military context (Iversen et al., 2008; Iversen 
et al., 2009); this finding has been replicated in international studies (Riddle et al., 2007).  
Studies of help-seeking in UK AF personnel suggest that women are more likely to seek help 
for mental health problems while commissioned officers are less likely to do so (Hines et al., 
2014).  Furthermore, younger military personnel are known to have poorer adherence to 
treatment (Seal et al., 2010).  That greater difference in short-term occupational outcomes 
was not demonstrated for patients with a combat role (Fear et al., 2010), between the three 
Services (Sundin et al., 2010) and among the sexes (Woodhead et al., 2012) was therefore 
unexpected.  Two socio-demographic factors, Service background and sex, were associated 




Socio-Demographic Factors, Long-Term Occupational Fitness and Adverse Discharge 
The study results suggested that Army personnel experienced poorer long-term occupational 
fitness compared to RAF personnel; there were insufficient numbers of RN personnel with 
long-term outcome data to perform robust analyses.  This  may not be altogether surprising as 
previous research has shown that Army personnel often have poorer mental health than other 
branches of the UK AF overall.  This may possibly be related to the greater proportion of 
combat personnel in the Army who undertake arduous military roles (Forbes et al., 2011).  
Additionally, there is a lower academic requirement to undertake non-technical tasks in the 
Army while technical trades predominate in the RAF.  As a consequence, the Army tends to 
recruit from areas of social deprivation which may inadvertently increase the level of risk 
related to childhood adversity (Buckman et al., 2013).  The study outcomes suggest that 
further work is required to establish how best to promote better longer-term mental health 
among Army personnel referred for mental health treatment.  Women were more likely to 
have poorer long-term occupational outcomes although this finding became borderline non-
significant when adjusted for clinical and therapeutic factors and may have been related to the 
greater levels of clinical factors associated with poorer occupational outcomes found among 
the women in this sample. 
Comparisons with Whole Force Occupational Fitness 
Across the UK AF, the overall annual rate of reduced occupational fitness arising from 
mental as well as physical ill-health, including recommendation for medical discharge was 
18.6% in 2013.  The rate was lower among RM/RN personnel (14.5%), among RAF 
personnel it was 14.3% and in the Army it was 21.5% (RAF Health Report 2012/13).  Other 
research conducted among UK military personnel has reported a far lower recorded medical 
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downgrading rate of 4.4% (Hayton, 2004) although this was found amongst an elite 
commando unit where levels of mental and physical fitness are known to be high (Sundin et 
al., 2010).  In the current study, among personnel referred for mental health assessment, the 
annual rate of reduced occupational fitness arising from both mental and physical conditions 
was approximately double the annual rate for the UK AF throughout the period of follow-up.  
It may be that referral for mental health assessment represents a substantial risk factor for 
long-term reduced occupational fitness as the overall rate of reduced occupational fitness 
compared unfavourably with available whole force data.  Whether other forms of secondary 
healthcare are associated with similar rates of reduced occupational fitness is unclear. 
In a self-report study which surveyed personnel with and without current medical symptoms, 
the any-cause medical downgrading rate was 12.4% among 2873 UK AF personnel (Rona et 
al., 2006).  Although the current study data were objective rather than self-report, the levels 
of medical downgrading were double the self-report study figure during the earlier periods of 
follow-up and almost treble the rate in the later period of follow-up post discharge from care. 
For medical discharge, an official health report describes an annual rate of 0.5% for the RAF, 
1.2% for the RM/RN and 1.6% for the Army.  Reviews of RAF medical and personnel 
records have generated annual rates of medical discharge of 0.2% for 1988, 0.3% for 1999, 
0.4% for 2000 and 0.5% for 2004.  Medical discharge has also been studied among members 
of the Parachute Regiment, an elite airborne infantry formation where a rate of 4.9% was 
found (Bricknell, 1999) and was largely attributable to parachute role-related physical injury.  
According to official Ministry of Defence figures, the crude rate of medical discharge 
between 2008/9 and 2012/13 was 0.9% for the RN/RM, 0.9% for the Army and 0.4% for the 
RAF.  Discharge for mental health reasons constituted 11% of all discharges for the RM/RN, 
14% for the Army and 18% of RAF medical discharges (Defence Statistics, 2012).  The 
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available data therefore suggests that medical discharge occurs at an annual rate of between 
0.2 to 1.6%.  Among the participants in current study, the annual medical discharge rate 
varied between 10.0% and 20.5% in the four early periods of evaluation (6 months to 2 years 
eleven months), and between 4.9 and 7.0% during the last two periods (three years to four 
years or more).  It appears that in addition to medical downgrading, compared to whole force 
data, mental health patients as a discrete sub-group appear to be at substantially increased risk 
of medical discharge from the Services. 
Predictors of Occupational Fitness – Clinical and Therapeutic Factors 
Short-Term Outcomes 
A range of clinical and intervention factors were significantly associated with reduced short-
term occupational fitness including the type of intervention received (medication, 
psychological intervention and assessment with additional advice), diagnosis and 
management by the multi-disciplinary team.  In keeping with previous research findings, a 
number of psychological and behavioural factors predicted reduced short-term occupational 
fitness on completion of care, including historical DSH (Green et al., 2011) and previous 
referral to psychiatric services.  Given that there was some evidence of interaction between 
MDT management and a number of clinical and therapeutic factors, it appeared that the 
overall complexity of clinical presentation may have been the single most important 
determinant of short-term occupational outcome. 
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Levels of Intervention 
In the non-deployed setting, one third of referred personnel were assessed, given advice and 
not taken onto a clinician’s caseload; around 88.6% of those who were not assigned a 
diagnosis received this form of intervention compared to 19.0%-35.7% of those with a formal 
diagnosis.  This approach appeared to be effective in the short-term with around 80.0% of 
personnel returning to work in an occupationally fit capacity.  In the longer-term around a 
third of personnel who were merely advised and discharged became occupationally unfit with 
longer-term occupational outcome rates not dissimilar to those who received a psychological 
intervention.  The rate of reduced occupational fitness was similar across diagnostic 
categories including among those with no assigned diagnosis.  When the various therapeutic 
interventions were graded by intensity, 83.0% of personnel received some form of brief 
intervention, which in most cases (80.0%) was provided by a single mental health 
professional without recourse to MDT involvement.  Although brief interventions appear to 
return substantial numbers of personnel to work in an occupationally fit capacity, mental 
health staffs may need to generate creative ways of maintaining therapeutic gains post-
discharge irrespective of the intensity and form of the initial intervention.  Rather than 
diagnosis per se, a range of clinical and intervention factors were significantly associated 
occupational fitness most of which appeared to be markers of the complexity of clinical 
presentation.  This aspect of the current study certainly deserves to be examined in future 
studies as it would be helpful to military clinicians to have some sense of the likelihood of 
both returning to duty and completing an elective term of service following different forms of 
therapy.  At present, such markers are not well articulated. 
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Past Psychiatric Referral 
In the non-deployed healthcare study, it was notable that 55.5% (n=1551) of referrals had 
previously sought help for a mental health problem; it was not clear whether this related to 
the pre-enlistment period or an episode of in-Service care.  Although it is but one factor 
among many in a complex causative process (Davydov et al., 2010), psychological 
vulnerability is known to be a risk factor for poorer mental health (Ryff and Singer, 1996).  
Although past referral was not significantly associated with longer-term reduced occupational 
fitness, it predicted a poorer occupational outcome in the short-term.  Research is required to 
assess whether substantial numbers of personnel are entering service with a history of mental 
health treatment and whether this finding is relevant to other DsCMH.  If psychiatric contact 
is taking place during service, medical planners may wish to consider how they might 
establish measures to minimise the occupational impact of recurrent referral to psychiatric 
services. 
Mental Health Cases with Mild or No Symptoms 
 
The results of the non-deployed healthcare study suggested that 14.2% of those referred to 
the DCMH did not have a mental health condition and a 5.1% had mild adjustment disorder; 
it is notable that 92.4% of these cases experienced full short-term occupational fitness on 
completion of care.  However, 37.2% experienced reduced longer-term occupational fitness 
or adverse discharge.  The data therefore suggest that around a third of the least unwell 
referrals to the DCMH experience a poor longer term occupational outcome.  It may be that 
people who are not assigned a diagnosis following assessment are dissatisfied with military 
service rather than ill and it is likely that longer-term reduced occupational fitness may be 
less related to their mental health and possibly more to a desire to leave the military by any 
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means.  The latter notwithstanding, it would appear that relapse prevention post-discharge 
from care is an important consideration irrespective of the assessed condition. 
The Management of Adjustment Disorder 
 
In the non-deployed healthcare study, 42.2% of personnel were assessed as having 
adjustment disorder, the milder form of which, as described above, was associated with both 
short and longer-term occupational fitness rates not dissimilar to those found among 
personnel without mental disorder.  The rate of short-term reduced occupational fitness 
doubled in cases of severe adjustment disorder compared to the milder form, although the 
rate of longer-term reduced occupational fitness was similar.  Adjustment disorder does not 
appear to be a unitary category of disorder.  The study outcomes suggested that adjustment 
disorder could be graded according to severity as the categories appear to have quite distinct 
occupational outcomes.  At present, no structured interventions or clinical guidelines for 
adjustment disorder exist and could be developed for use in military mental healthcare and 
probably more widely in a civilian context.  Given that adjustment disorders formed the bulk 
of DCMH referrals, there may be considerable scope for improving outcomes by managing 
severe cases more intensively.  For instance, when used as a component of work-based 
wellness schemes, behavioural activation techniques have been shown to shorten the length 
of sickness absence when delivered as an early intervention (van der Klink et al., 2003) and 
may be worth considering when managing adjustment disorder in a military context.  The 
military behavioural activation and rehabilitation course (MBARC) has shown promise in 
treating military patients presenting with common mental disorder (Wesson et al, 2014) and 
may be of use in cases of severe adjustment disorder. 
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Common Mental Disorder Management 
Cases of psychotic illness and personality disorder were infrequently seen but had the highest 
rates of reduced short-term occupational fitness.  Anxiety or mood disorders were the second 
most frequently assessed mental health problems and excluding psychotic illness, had the 
greatest adjusted odds of developing both short and longer-term reduced occupational fitness 
and adverse discharge.  Occupational interventions targeting workplace disability associated 
with common mental disorders, which constitute the bulk of DCMH patients, are not well 
researched (Henderson et al., 2011); however, there is some evidence that implementing a 
preventative intervention using cognitive behavioural and problem solving techniques can be 
effective among employees who are at high risk of sickness absence secondary to depression 
(Lexis et al., 2011).  This approach might be helpful as a relapse prevention strategy for those 
who have completed DCMH care for mood disorders, though such an intervention would 
require validation among military personnel.  In the current study, the optimal form of 
intervention for promoting longer-term occupational fitness was unclear.  Following 
adjustment for confounders, varying intensity of intervention appeared to have no significant 
impact upon longer-term occupational fitness although there was a borderline effect for 
medication being associated with poorer longer-term occupational outcome.  In the short-
term, medication was associated with significantly poorer occupational outcome while 
psychological intervention appeared to be associated with better outcomes.  The results of 
examining interactions in the data appeared to suggest that multi-disciplinary team 
management, a number of clinical risk factors and intervention interacted.  It therefore seems 
that further research is required to establish which therapeutic approach is optimal for 




In the non-deployed healthcare study, 22.9% of men and 21.5% of women consumed 
potentially hazardous or harmful amounts of alcohol; 14.7% had mental disorders co-morbid 
with alcohol though neither consumption level nor co-morbidity predicted short or longer-
term occupational fitness.  Hazardous and potentially harmful alcohol use are both common 
among UK Service personnel (Jones and Fear. 2011).  There is an ongoing debate about the 
role of alcohol in military culture as it has been shown to be associated with positive 
outcomes such as improved cohesion (Browne et al., 2008) and research within UK AF 
suggests that only at high levels of use do functional impairment, co-morbidity and increased 
mortality occur (Rona et al., 2010).  There is as yet no detailed published outcome data 
evaluating the long-term physical effects of heavy alcohol use during military service among 
UK veterans which, given the levels of in-service use, could be substantial.  Although various 
metrics have been used to classify hazardous alcohol use rates in studies of UK AF personnel, 
the data suggest that despite an estimated UK AF wide alcohol misuse rate of 67%, few 
personnel seek help from clinical services (Fear et al., 2007).  These outcomes confirm the 
suggestions in the various referenced studies that only a proportion of those misusing alcohol 
seek help and the findings of the current study suggest that this happens most frequently 
when alcohol misuse is co-morbid with a mental health condition rather than the primary 
diagnosis; 70.5% (n=158) of alcohol misuse cases in the non-deployed healthcare study were 
co-morbid. 
The Financial, Organisational and Personal Impact of Longer-term Reduced 
Occupational Fitness 
As well as representing a loss of investment for the UK AF, the elevated rates of medical 
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discharge among the military personnel in this study may have a substantial future financial 
and health impact for those affected, which can arise from the influence of stigma-related 
discrimination in the workplace (Sharac et al., 2010) or the direct occupational effects of 
mental illness (Butterworth et al., 2012).  Examining and mitigating the determinants of 
discharge from the military on health grounds is essential as a relatively small group of 
Service personnel, including those with symptoms of mental disorder, struggle to transition 
successfully out of the military (Ashcroft, 2014).  Adverse mental health outcomes following 
discharge from service are a cause for concern as discharge on completion of a military 
career represents a form of early retirement among a group who involuntarily leave their 
chosen jobs far earlier than their civilian counterparts and who will often be required to seek 
a second career.  Among civilian cohorts, early retirement for mental health reasons has been 
shown to occur at a younger age than for physical disorders, resulting in the greatest loss of 
working years among the various disorders that were evaluated (Knudsen et al., 2012).  An 
Australian study reported that early health-related retirement, including retirement on mental 
health grounds, resulted in substantially lower annual income than that received by full-time 
employed counterparts even when financial assistance was accounted for (Schofield et al., 
2011).  Some studies report a substantial adverse mental health impact resulting from early 
retirement, particularly among men (Buxton et al., 2005), while early retirement taken on 
health grounds may be associated with particularly poor mental health in the post-retirement 
period (Jokela et al., 2010). 
The rate of short-term reduced occupational fitness exceeded the rates of this outcome in the 
UK AF as a whole for any year for which outcome data was available.  This is not altogether 
surprising as risk factors such as deliberate self-harm, rules about holding a reduced medical 
category while taking psychoactive medication and so forth, will mean that the treating 
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clinician may have little choice but to invoke medical downgrading to ensure that a period of 
protection from deployment is in place for the treated individual.  What is more striking is 
that the rate of both reduced occupational fitness and medical discharge among military 
mental health patients is far greater than among the whole UK AF at all time-points post 
completion of the care episode.  The comparisons made between the study sample outcomes 
and the overall rates of occupational fitness in the whole force appear valid since the 




Although DSH was not included in the literature review, it emerged as factor in the clinical 
studies.  Research suggests that the rate of suicide among UK AF personnel is lower than the 
general population (Fear et al., 2009), assessment following an act of deliberate self-harm 
was not insubstantial among those referred to the DCMH for assessment, being a factor in 
around 6.1% (n=181) of referrals; the association between reduced short-term occupational 
fitness and DSH was borderline when other factors were controlled for.  It is perhaps not 
unsurprising that for cases involving DSH, reduced occupational fitness on completion of 
therapeutic contact occurred in around a third of cases.  All Service personnel have access to 
weapons, albeit in a controlled manner and the concerns about access to lethal force may be 
reflected in the reduced levels of occupational fitness on completion of care.  Referral 
following DSH did not function as a risk factor for longer-term reduced occupational fitness; 
those carrying out acts of DSH were statistically no more likely to be medically downgraded 
or administratively or medically discharged in the longer-term.  This finding seems logical as 
DSH risk management requires a period to elapse following completion of care for sufficient 
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confidence to be built prior to allowing full access to weaponry and the restoration of full 
occupational fitness.  It does not necessarily follow that DSH should persist in the longer 
term and this is reflected in the study outcomes. 
 
Relapse Prevention and Re-Referral 
 
The outcomes of the non-deployed healthcare study suggested that, although brief 
interventions employed by DCMH staffs are effective in returning people to work, some form 
of relapse prevention needs to be put in place post discharge.  At present, around one third of 
personnel appear to be at risk of reduced occupational functioning post-discharge from care.  
Quite what form this kind of intervention should take is not clear as it was not investigated in 
the current study.  Future development work in this area should seek to evaluate the impact of 
introducing such strategies to ensure that those who have received military mental healthcare 
have the best chance of sustained recovery and meaningful military employment.  There is 
some evidence that non-medical measures such as good social support and appreciation of 
individual effort at work by leaders can help to maintain people with mental health symptoms 
in work (van den Berg et al., 2010) although general preventative interventions delivered to 
low risk individuals have been shown to be somewhat ineffective (Saltychev et al., 2012).  
The study further suggested that over half of those referred to the community team had 
previously sought help for a mental health problem, although it was not significantly 
associated with longer-term reduced occupational fitness, it predicted a poorer occupational 
outcome in the short-term.  Given the potential personal and occupational burden of recurrent 
mental disorder, UK Defence Medical Services may wish to consider developing formal 
relapse prevention interventions to maintain psychological health following completion of a 
mental health care episode.  Furthermore, recurrent mental health referral should be carefully 
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evaluated in future studies in as wide a number of military mental health treatment centres as 
possible to assess whether it is a reliable precursor of poorer military functioning.  If this is 
found to be the case, recurrent referral could be used as an indicator that a more prolonged 
period of monitoring or planned early managed discharge from the UK AF may be required 
for those presenting with such a history.  As a final note on medical discharge, it may be that, 
far from being a negative occupational outcome, planned, properly supported medical 
discharge from the UK AF may be the most appropriate and helpful outcome for the person 
affected by unremitting mental health symptoms and military command more generally. 
Implications for Stigma Reduction Campaigns 
The findings of the non-deployed healthcare study have the potential to further extend the 
current understanding of military stigma.  The non-deployed help-seeking and post-
deployment stigma/BTC study results suggest that seeking mental health treatment in a 
military context appears to be associated with a fear of negative career consequences.  This is 
an important finding as stigma reduction programmes and positive mental health campaigns 
often attempt to combat fears of career impairment if mental health treatment is sought by 
down-playing potential adverse occupational consequences.  The results of the current study 
seem to indicate that the risk of such an outcome in the context of mental health help-seeking 
is substantial and in the longer term may affect a quarter to a third of all those who are 
referred for mental health assessment in a non-deployed setting.  Some modification to the 
central messages of military anti-stigma campaigns may be necessary as seeking mental 
health treatment appears to involve taking an occupational risk and contrary to positive 
mental health messages, does carry an increased possibility of a negative occupational 
outcome.  Perhaps this could be communicated in a sensitive way and should be balanced 
against the possibility that untreated mental health conditions may carry an even greater 
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occupational and personal threat which can carry over to one’s post-service life and affect 
one’s family. 
Tertiary Care - Concluding Remarks 
 
Maintaining positive treatment outcomes is particularly important for longer-term 
occupational fitness as substantial numbers of personnel referred to both the DCMH and the 
FMHT went on to experience reduced military occupational functioning or adverse 
occupational outcomes.  In both studies, longer-term risk factors were diffuse and targeted 
interventions might be more problematic to deliver than is the case for short-term outcomes 
although improving short-term outcomes may be help with occupational function in the 
longer-term.  For instance, would it be cost-effective for the Defence Mental Health Services 
attempt to put in place increased post-discharge support for all Army personnel treated for 
mental health problems when only a small proportion may benefit?  Similarly, a history of 
past psychiatric contact may be difficult to focus upon after discharge as it may only be 
visible to those directly involved in clinical care.  Arrangements could be made to monitor 
vulnerable individuals through their unit medical officer who would have access to any 
clinical reports detailing such a history.  More research is required to establish what aspects 
of past psychiatric contact predict occupational adjustment, particularly as this finding was 
borderline non-significant when fully adjusted and outcome may be related to inter-related 
factors rather than past psychiatric history per se.  A shortcoming of both the deployed and 
non-deployed healthcare studies was that no direct psychometric measures of mental health 
were obtained in either, therefore future studies of this kind might benefit from the inclusion 
of such measures and should ideally be longitudinal in design.  Given that around a third of 
mental health cases experienced reduced occupational fitness in the longer term, it is 
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suggested that a measure of occupational functioning be retained in future studies of military 
mental health treatment as operational effectiveness is a prime concern for most military 
commanders. 
Strengths and Limitations 
The R&R Study 
Before embarking upon a detailed discussion of the R&R study findings, it is necessary to 
consider certain aspects of the research to understand both strengths and limitations.  The 
study design was intended to assess personnel both pre and post R&R, however, because of 
considerable logistical problems that arose in the arrival and departure airport terminal, a 
different sample group was assessed before and after R&R with only a small matched group 
participating at both sampling points.  This limited the assessment of whether R&R 
substantially modified mental health symptom levels.  Additionally, because the period of 
survey was extended over a longer than planned time period as a consequence of logistical 
challenges, personnel were surveyed during two different operational phases.  Operational 
factors may have influenced the experience of R&R, for instance, personnel in the post-R&R 
survey group had completed a longer period of deployment and had experienced significantly 
greater levels of combat and operational exposure; as a consequence, they may have been 
more fatigued than the pre-R&R survey group.  The sampling strategy employed in this study 
was not random and sampling bias could not be offset by employing a random sampling 
procedure as taking R&R was mandated for all those completing deployments lasting for six 
months.  The characteristics of the R&R study sample differed from the broader UK AF in a 
number of respects, which may have biased the results to a degree; in addition to deployment 
length, the two survey groups differed significantly in the Service background proportions.  
The overwhelming majority of participants were from the Army so inferences cannot be 
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drawn about other types of rest such as shore-based leave for Navy personnel and brief 
periods of rest taken just outside the deployment zone in a safe area, known as operational 
stand-down.  The R&R survey element was generated specifically for this study and, despite 
making every effort to ensure that the questions had ecological validity, the questionnaire was 
only tested in a small pilot study though validated measures commonly employed in military 
mental health research were used wherever possible.  The use of PCA allowed for a detailed 
examination of the association between the components of R&R and mental health outcomes.  
Asking military personnel to supply personal information, which was necessary to match 
those who responded at both sample points, is known to influence levels of reported mental 
health symptoms; the use of identifiable information may have given rise to response bias 
(Fear et al., 2012).  In addition, the study data are largely cross sectional and it was not 
possible to adequately assess causality.  As reported in previous point surveys of deployed 
personnel, satisfaction with R&R was high; however, this does not mean that this will 
positively influence mental health outcomes.  Finally, the focus of this study is about the 
effect of R&R upon the deployed Service person not their family and friends and it is not 
possible to comment upon the effects of R&R among loved ones. 
 
As was the case with the discussion of the R&R study findings, it is important to interpret the 
TLD study outcomes with a number of caveats in mind. 
 
The TLD Study 
 
The TLD study had a number of strengths, chief among which was the use of IPTWs 
calculated from propensity scores to attempt to induce ‘pseudo-randomisation’.  This allowed 
me to conclude that TLD may have had an effect independent of confounding variables; in 
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effect, tentative causal inferences could be made as a result of employing this methodology.  
By applying IPTWs, it was possible to reduce the likelihood that the outcomes were heavily 
influenced by selection bias.  It was possible to account for the effects of a range of known 
confounding variables such as age and engagement type, so that any observed effects were 
more likely to have arisen from TLD.  It is possible that the assumption of unobserved 
confounding is incorrect and that there is unaccounted for or hidden bias.  Bias, which could 
be resolved by randomisation, might include that which arises from personnel avoiding 
undertaking TLD by choice or influence, or being channelled to undertake TLD by 
commanders.  Given that all variables used to calculate the PS were measured after TLD had 
been completed, it may be that the subjective impression of some variables such as the 
quality of leadership were subject to recall bias.  The time from the end of deployment to the 
follow-up point differed between the two groups (TLD attendees mean = nine months, 
standard deviation eight months and controls mean = 17 months standard deviation 11 
months); this potential confounder was included in the calculation of the propensity scores.  
This study examined the UK AF version of TLD which differs in length and content from 
that delivered by coalition partners; some caution is therefore advised when generalising the 
results to other models of TLD.  A small number of personnel also took part in the study of 
UK Battlemind described elsewhere in this thesis and there is a possibility that exposure to a 
different form of psychological briefing influenced the findings; the numbers were likely to 
have been small as the study group responsible for the cohort and the Battlemind research 
always seeks to de-conflict the various military studies that are undertaken.  As Royal Navy 
and RAF personnel were excluded from the analyses, it is not possible to generalise the 
findings to these personnel.  Finally, it is possible that the measures of post deployment 
adjustment were too crude, did not target important areas of homecoming and thus failed to 
measure positive adjustments other than those specifically asked about. 
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The Deployment Mental Health Support Study 
 
There were a number of strengths and weaknesses associated with the OMHNE study.  A 
major strength was that the survey sampled deployed personnel in their place of duty 
including forward locations, not just in the relatively safe large centres such as main bases.  
This study therefore probably reflects a robust view of deployment mental health for UK AF 
personnel.  Most studies that purport to examine deployment mental health do so by asking 
for retrospective accounts of deployment experiences which introduces the possibility of 
memory distortion.  Furthermore, the surveys that have been undertaken to date have rarely 
discriminated between personnel deployed in extreme or remote locations and those in safer 
areas.  Overall, the demographic profile of the two samples differed significantly on a number 
of key factors and, although an attempt was made to control for confounders in the 
multivariable analyses, it is possible that unobserved confounders or those not selected for 
inclusion a priori may have influenced the results.  As with any cross-sectional data, it is not 
possible to establish the direction of cause and it is acknowledged that the outcomes are 
associative rather than directional.  Finally, the sampling strategy was not random, however, 
the cluster-based pre-selection of visit locations based upon the requirement to include 
sufficient numbers of forward areas and representative personnel may have helped to offset 
some of the bias inherent in non-randomised sampling.  Although potentially at-risk groups 
were over-sampled, there were sufficient numbers of representative personnel in the general 





Secondary Prevention Studies 
 
Although some aspects of secondary prevention were assessed in the OMHNE study, the 
limitations of which were discussed previously, the bulk of the research findings were 
generated by the non-deployed help-seeking and post-deployment stigma/BTC studies.  The 
following discussion of secondary prevention should be considered with a number of caveats 
in mind.  The strengths of non-deployed help-seeking study included the random selection of 
personnel and achieving a high response rate.  The use of multiple assessment tools to assess 
the impact of mental health, stigma/BTC and associated factors may have helped to 
triangulate on potentially important areas rather than adopting a single, direct measure.  
Although the survey contained an explicit definition of help-seeking, it was not feasible to 
objectively verify actual sources of support through personnel or medical record searches, 
neither was it possible to confirm whether those accessing medical forms of support received 
a definitive evidence-based intervention.  Similarly, the quality and content of support 
received from non-medical sources, including the unit chain of command, chaplain and so 
forth remains unknown.  A major weakness of the study was the lack of follow-up data which 
restricted the analyses to a cross-sectional format.  This limited the ability to infer direction of 
cause and the outcomes remain associative.  Although high levels of potential mental health 
outcomes were found among study participants, two of the measures used, the PC-PTSD and 
AUDIT-C were psychological symptom screening instruments that may have produced 
inflated numbers of positive cases compared to the full instrument or a clinical interview. 
 
Similarly, a number of caveats should also be borne in mind when considering the results of 
the post-deployment stigma/BTC study.  The study had a number of strengths, chief among 
which was the use of longitudinal data.  Although the study was a secondary analysis of 
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intervention trial data, both the form of intervention and variable response rate at follow-up 
did not appear to introduce substantial bias.  Although non-responders at follow-up in the 
RCT were not included in the analyses, there were no differences in baseline levels of mental 
health caseness, subjective mental health, stigma/BTC and help-seeking while deployed 
between responders and non-responders.  It was possible to infer direction of cause given that 
stigma/BTC fluctuated with mental health status in a consistent way between the two sample 
points.  The main weakness associated with the data source was that it was originally used to 
evaluate the effects of a mental health intervention which, although it had an equivalent 
influence upon stigma/BTC in both groups, appeared to modify alcohol use and may have 
influenced the study findings indirectly.  Furthermore, the study sample was not wholly 
representative of UK AF characteristics; caution should be exercised when extrapolating the 
findings to the whole force.  The latter notwithstanding, amongst the various sub-categories 
that were assessed, levels of stigma/BTC were not substantially different.  As with any study 
that utilises self-report data, the assessment of mental health may not be as robust as the 
results of a structured clinical interview. 
Tertiary Prevention Studies 
 
There were a number of limitations which must be borne in mind when considering the 
outcomes of the tertiary care studies.  The deployment database was compiled by multiple 
mental health practitioners deployed to Afghanistan over a protracted period of time.  
Although the effects of subjectivity, varying levels of experience and training cannot be ruled 
out as potential sources of bias, diagnostic categories were derived from in-depth clinical 
interviews conducted mainly by experienced military clinicians specifically trained to deliver 
deployment mental healthcare.  Junior or inexperienced practitioners are not deployed unless 
they are deemed to be operationally competent and even then, they are generally supervised 
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by a senior clinician.  An alternative approach to clinical interview would have been to use 
questionnaire-based measures to determine psychological status, however, research suggests 
that results generated in this way cannot be directly compared to clinical interviews (Eaton et 
al., 2000).  Measures of illness severity which may have affected the results were not 
available and it is possible that personnel with more severe symptoms may have been 
evacuated more readily.  That said, there was no evidence that illness category was associated 
with longer-term outcome.  Although robust data linkage methods were used, the personnel 
databases may have been subject to inaccuracies, particularly for disciplinary data as 
information was entered by multiple users with different levels of training and seniority; 
however, all the data sources used were subject to regular audit and were given quality 
ratings.  The clinical data were entered as a medical record which should have been 
associated with high levels of diligence.  Neither this study nor any other study has used 
randomised controlled trial methodology, mainly because of the impossibility of performing 
such a study in operational conditions.  In these circumstances it is likely that the decision to 
return to the UK was not random and issues such as the perceived critical nature of the 
military role of the affected person, symptom severity and suicide risk may all have played a 
part in the decision to evacuate.  It is likely that only non-randomised data will ever be 
available on this subject.  A major limitation of the research is that it was not possible to 
establish whether mental healthcare was sought by personnel after they returned from 
deployment, which would of course have influenced occupational outcomes.  Although 
longer-term mental health outcomes were not measured in this study, occupational fitness is 
often associated with prevailing mental health and is an important outcome in an organisation 
that invests a great deal of resource and money in training its personnel. 
 
For the non-deployed healthcare study, similar comments to those related to deployment 
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healthcare concerning strengths and weaknesses are relevant.  Clinical interviews took place 
and real world fitness markers were used.  As the non-deployed healthcare study emphasised 
medical fitness as an outcome, the markers may have incorporated physical as well as 
psychological health conditions which may dilute the conclusions related to the mental health 
impact of receiving care.  It was possible to make comparisons with whole force medical 
fitness rates which also encompassed both physical and mental health outcomes.  A major 
shortcoming of the study was that it was impossible to establish data linkage for longer-term 
outcomes in 42.0% of cases.  Response bias related to socio-demographic factors did not 
affect the evaluation of short-term occupational outcomes; this may have introduced bias at 
longer-term follow-up which was corrected for using the application of a response weight.  
The latter notwithstanding, the reasons for failure to link data included incorrect recording of 
Service number, missing personal data, changes in the military data systems used to record 
occupational outcomes over time resulting in missing data and failure to record occupational 
outcomes in the personnel records.  The reasons for absent longer-term data appeared random 
rather than systematic.  The medical occupational fitness data were verified as being reliable 
by a third party responsible for producing official UK defence statistics.  The decreased 
levels of reduced occupational fitness relative to the rates in the whole force could have been 
partially explained by the study design.  The study analyses were conducted within-subjects, 
so the likelihood of each person being assigned a reduced standard of occupational fitness 
could have increased with time since discharge from the DCMH, whereas comparisons were 
made with between-subjects data collected from the whole UK AF which were cross-
sectional.  Caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions from such comparisons.  
The study was undertaken in a DCMH which was led by the Royal Air Force which may 
have influenced occupational fitness rates as, during the period of study, there were subtle 






R&R  Although subjectively useful and popular, R&R did not appear to have a significant 
global beneficial effect upon mental health.  Engagement with the R&R process was the key 
associate of better mental health and lower alcohol use.  Personnel about to take R&R and 
their families might benefit from formal advice about how to best to use R&R.  Minimising 
travel disruption from the operational area seemed critical to a positive R&R experience. 
 
TLD  Third Location Decompression did not appear to promote post-deployment re-
adjustment but appeared to promote better mental health for some personnel.  Given that 
some personnel benefited from TLD while others did not suggests that a nuanced approach to 
TLD is required and combat unit personnel in particular might benefit from a package 
tailored to their individual deployment experiences. 
 
Deployment Mental Health Support  Operational deployment does not appear to be 
associated with poorer mental health for the majority of personnel.  Forward deployment was 
associated with sub-threshold and probable PTSD symptoms which were significantly 
associated with functional impairment.  Mental health stigmatisation and barriers to care are 
substantial during deployment and are associated with poorer mental health.  Perceived good 
leadership and perceived satisfactory family support were both associated with better mental 
health.  Medical consultations appear to represent important occasions for detecting mental 




Non-deployed Secondary Prevention – Help-seeking  Around 40.0% of mental health cases 
and approximately 70.0% of alcohol misusers had not sought help or support.  Stigma/BTC 
levels characterised by perceived potential negative occupational and social consequences 
arising from help-seeking were highest amongst symptomatic personnel who were interested 
in receiving support and substantial among symptomatic help-seekers. 
 
Post-Deployment Secondary Prevention - Stigma/BTC  Higher levels of mental health 
symptoms and potentially harmful alcohol use were associated with elevated stigma/BTC.  
Moreover, mental health disorder caseness appeared both necessary and sufficient for 
elevated stigma/BTC when other factors were accounted for whereas psycho-social problem 
recognition was not.  However, the latter appeared to have an augmenting effect upon mental 
health symptoms in relation to stigma/BTC.  Being symptomatic and interested in receiving 
support appeared to be associated with raised stigma/BTC where the latter appeared to inhibit 
help seeking. 
 
Deployed Mental Healthcare  Around three quarters of deployed personnel who became 
mental health casualties in Afghanistan were returned to their deployed unit in a medically fit 
capacity.  Most adverse outcomes were related to impaired military functioning rather than 
attrition from service.  Evacuation to the home base was often unrelated to combat, such as 
home front stressors and failure to adjust to deployment.  Psychological vulnerability 
appeared to be the only predictor of poorer long-term occupational outcome.  Around a third 
of the mental health casualties went on to have some form of longer-term negative 
occupational outcome.  Self-initiated and chaplain’s referral appeared to allow personnel an 





Tertiary Mental Healthcare  Community-based military mental healthcare successfully 
returned around three quarters of referred personnel to full medical fitness for deployment.  
The rate of long-term reduced medical fitness was at least double that of the UK AF as a 
whole irrespective of diagnosis and the possibility of medical discharge was also substantially 
raised.  Complex clinical factors were the main risk factor for reduced short-term 
occupational fitness; for longer-term occupational fitness, being in the Army, being female 
and one’s case being managed by the multidisciplinary team were the main risk factors.  






1. The provision of Rest and Recuperation (R&R) during deployment should be further 
assessed for its impact upon mental health using a robust, within-subjects, longitudinal study 
design.  Alternatively, mental health outcomes could provide a secondary outcome while the 
impact of R&R on morale could be assessed as this may be an important indirect component 
of deployment mental health support.  Alternative models for providing R&R, such as rest-in-
place taken close to the operational area should be developed and assessed while leave at 
home may be best reserved for those completing lengthy tours.  The effect of R&R among 
family members should also be assessed to ensure that a comprehensive view of the mental 





2. TLD appeared to benefit the physical and mental health of personnel who experienced 
low to moderate levels of combat exposure while personnel in the highest combat exposure 
category did not appear to profit from the experience, however, it failed in its primary 
objective of promoting better post-deployment psychological readjustment.  Alternative 
empirically derived models of TLD should be formulated and tested using robust study 
designs.  In particular, post-deployment psycho-education should be further developed and 
evaluated for effectiveness and the optimum timing of delivery established. 
 
3. It is suggested that, when promoting TLD, commanders should be wary about making 
excessive claims that it promotes better re-adjustment as it did not appear to do so. 
 
Pre-deployment Stress Briefing 
 
4. Pre-deployment stress briefing appears to have a positive mental health effect when 
UK military personnel remember having received such an intervention.  Developmental 
research is required to establish the effective components of pre-deployment psycho-
education for military personnel and revised briefings should be subject to rigorous testing 






5. Perceptions of good leadership appear to be associated with better mental health 
among deployed personnel; however, the way in which the components of leadership interact 
with mental health and other factors is unclear.  Future studies should seek to determine 
which primary and secondary prevention components of leadership have the greatest impact 
upon mental health. 
 
6. Given that most current studies use brief measures of leadership, a robust and 
comprehensive measure of leadership should be either identified in the literature or a new 
measure be developed and tested in future studies. 
 
7. Further studies should be undertaken to determine whether leadership has a 
substantial anti-stigma effect and whether it contributes to mental health by facilitating 
engagement with helping services. 
 
8. Secondary prevention activity as a component of leadership may need to encourage 
appropriate help-seeking for mental health conditions by promoting the caring and supportive 
aspects of the chain of command.  Corrective messages delivered to prospective help-seekers 
should ideally focus on potential loss of trust, loss of confidence, embarrassment and being 





9. Among deployed personnel, perceptions of good family support appear to be 
associated with better mental health.  Future studies using objective measures of family 
support should evaluate how family support impacts upon the deployed person’s mental 
health. 
 
10. As around half of personnel surveyed during deployment reported that family support 
was lacking, future studies using qualitative methodology may help to deconstruct family 
support into its component parts and to understand the level of support required.  There 
appears to be a requirement for the MoD to develop family support measures and to make 
these visible to deployed personnel. 
Welfare Support 
 
11. The deployment survey suggested that reduced access to welfare support was 
associated with greater levels of acute stress symptoms though the mechanism by which this 
occurred was not clear.  Future studies should use mixed qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies to evaluate levels of welfare support and their mental health effects, 
particularly in austere locations. 
Secondary Prevention 
Sources of Mental Health Support 
12. Effective prevention relies on the ability to intervene effectively to reverse any 
adverse mental health effects and psychological symptoms.  Deployed medical help-
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providers appeared to be under-utilised in comparison to other forms of support.  Deployed 
general medical personnel may benefit from training in mental disorder detection and 
effective mental health interventions. 
 
13. Future studies should be undertaken to assess the differential effects of seeking help 
from medical and non-medical sources to establish whether greater effort is required to shift 
the focus of help-seeking from informal to formal medical sources. 
 
14. During deployment, seeking help from both non-medical and medical sources was 
associated with poorer mental health, suggesting that deployed health and welfare support is 
utilised by those with substantial mental health symptoms.  More research is required to 
establish the proportion of symptomatic personnel who choose not to access support and what 
can be done to improve their engagement. 
 
15. Among non-deployed personnel there was a view that mental health support is helpful 
and necessary which was particularly prevalent among personnel who wanted help but had 
yet to seek it.  Despite such opinions, seeking help from formal military medical sources was 
viewed as occupational risky.  It is therefore suggested that corrective information about the 
nature, function and effectiveness of military health services may help personnel to make 
more informed decisions about accessing medical services for mental health support. 
 
Help-seeking, Mental Health Stigmatisation and Barriers to Care 
 
16. Anti-stigma campaigns usually adopt a blanket approach to public health education 
aimed at all military personnel, however, a more targeted approach using a specific message 
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aimed at those with higher levels of psychological symptoms may be more appropriate.  The 
effect of such an approach should be assessed in future comparative trials.  Related 
recommendations include: 
 
a. Military stigma reduction strategies should target those who are at the point of 
becoming mentally unwell and education should seek to enable them to see 
substantial psychological symptoms as requiring and worthy of help or support. 
 
b. Anti-stigma strategies may best be delivered when military personnel are 
based in their home unit rather than their deployed location. 
 
c. Although a zero stigma rate may be the ultimate aim of any stigma-reduction 
campaign, anti-stigma interventions should initially seek to return raised stigma/BTC 
levels in the unwell to those found among mentally well personnel. 
 
d. Anti-stigma campaigns should seek to encourage the recognition of mental 
health disorder symptoms in oneself and others and maximum effort should be made 
to encourage those who misuse alcohol to view it as problematic and undesirable. 
 
e. Education should seek to inculcate and encourage interest in receiving help by 
describing the potential benefits of support and the nature and function of the 
effective military mental health services that are available. 
 
f. Willing volunteers who have recovered from a mental ill-health episode may 




17. Operational hardiness may be related to raised levels of stigma/BTC where 
symptomatic personnel attempt to ‘keep going’ when experiencing psychological symptoms 
to complete their period of operational deployment.  Further studies are required to determine 
whether such a strategy is used, to what degree, and what the mental health consequences of 




18. Alcohol misuse appeared to be widespread among the UK AF personnel who took 
part in the various surveys that measured alcohol use; unless co-morbid with a mental 
disorder, help-seeking for such problems was infrequent and mostly confined to non-medical 
sources.  Secondary prevention procedures should be developed to promote treatment 
engagement by encouraging alcohol misusers to view their drinking as problematic and 
worthy of intervention.  Should help-seeking rates rise as a consequence, further studies are 





19. The evaluation of tertiary prevention in the form of deployed mental healthcare using 
the principles of forward psychiatry suggested that although high rates of immediate return to 
duty are achieved, a long-term negative occupational outcome will occur for around a third of 
personnel referred to the FMHT.  To assess the specific psychological effects of 
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implementing forward psychiatry, future studies should be longitudinal in design and should 
seek to evaluate mental health outcomes while retaining a meaningful measure of military 
occupational functioning. 
 
20. Personnel with no assigned psychiatric diagnosis were among those evacuated from 
deployment by the FMHT.  It is probably unhelpful to use the medical evacuation route to 
remove this category of personnel from deployment and it may be that more creative welfare, 
personnel or discipline-based approaches could be more appropriately used in their 
management. 
 
21. The deployed healthcare study failed to assess in depth how personnel were managed 
both during and following return from deployment.  In addition, the non-deployed healthcare 
study outcomes suggested that among the neurotic spectrum disorders, cases of anxiety and 
depression had the worst occupational outcomes.  Future deployment healthcare studies 
should therefore attempt to evaluate the short and longer-term effects of different forms of 
support and therapy for a wide range of disorders, not just PTSD and acute stress 
reaction/disorder. 
22. As re-referral was common among respondents in the non-deployed healthcare study 
and longer-term reduced occupational fitness affected around a third of personnel, military 
mental health services may require some form of relapse prevention to be put in place post-
discharge from the DCMH, particularly for cases of common mental disorder.  Future 





23. Future mental healthcare studies should assess in detail the management of cases of 
deliberate self-harm occurring pre-, post- and during deployment and how such behaviours 
relate to both short and longer-term occupational adjustment both in the deployed and non-
deployed settings. 
 
24. The deployment tertiary prevention study further suggested that those personnel who 
consulted informally with the FMHT were no more likely to experience a negative short or 
long term outcomes than those referred through formal routes and were as likely to receive a 
diagnosis as those arriving through formal routes.  Future military healthcare studies may 
need to contain an element where the mental health and occupational outcomes for military 
units operating a self-referral policy are compared with those arising from units utilising a 
formal referral route. 
 
25. Tertiary prevention in the form of mental healthcare was assessed by evaluating data 
obtained during mental health assessments conducted in community mental health clinics.  
No direct standardised, valid and reliable mental health measures were gathered.  Future 
longitudinal studies of both non-deployed and deployed mental healthcare would benefit 
from the inclusion of psychometric measures in addition to the standard clinical interview. 
 
26. A major target for tertiary prevention is alcohol misuse.  In the non-deployed 
healthcare study, most alcohol misuse cases occured in conjunction with mental disorder 
rather than as cases of primary alcohol disorder.  More work is required to identify measures 
that are effective in identifying and engaging clinically significant alcohol cases in therapy.  
If such a strategy can be found, effort will be required to identify effective treatment 




27. Given that it was the most common diagnostic category in the clinical studies, 
structured interventions or clinical guidelines for adjustment disorder should be developed as 
none currently exist.  To enable the evaluation of such interventions, adjustment disorder 
should be categorised according to the severity of presentation. 
28. Over half of those referred to the DCMH had previously sought help for a mental 
health problem.  Recurrent mental health referral should be further evaluated in future studies 
to assess whether it is a true precursor of poorer military functioning; it could then be used as 
an indicator that a more prolonged period of monitoring, or even early managed discharge 
may be required post-discharge from the DCMH for those with such a history. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Through a series of progressive investigations, I set out to assess prevention as it relates to 
military mental health at various stages of deployment.  The research focused upon the 
various strategies currently used by the UK Armed Forces to optimise operational 
effectiveness by minimising the effects of poor mental health.  It is of course self-evident that 
there are numerous additional supportive strategies and interventions that could have been 
used in addition to those which I assessed.  It is therefore the challenge, as with all research, 
to seek out and evaluate novel and creative approaches to mental health support.  The main 
immediate challenge is to translate the findings and recommendations of the current research 
into practice, given that the impact of research is perhaps more important than the findings 
themselves.  One major promising occupational intervention is individual placement and 
support (IPS) (Bond et al., 2012) which research suggests is an effective occupational 
intervention for mental illness (Becker et al, 2014) that may be highly relevant to the young 
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adult population of the UK AF (Bond et al., 2014).  There is clearly great scope for extending 
the current mental health support efforts of the UK AF and it would be wise to seek to ensure 
that such developments are accompanied by a comprehensive evaluation of their impact 
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Appendix 1. R&R Experiences Scale 
 
As you have recently had R&R and we would like to hear about your experiences. 







I could relax and switch off from feeling in danger     
I got a break from the physical demands of being 
on tour 
    
I saw family/friends     
I did not worry about work or my unit back in 
Afghanistan 
    
I could chill out     
I forgot about work     
I did not feel rested by the end of R&R     
I got as much support as I wanted from my 
family/friends 
    
I could switch off and did not think about what 
was happening in Afghanistan 
    
I felt recharged and had more energy by the end 
of R&R 
    
I did not think about work at all     
I talked about what I have been doing on tour 
with my family/friends as much as I wanted 
    
It was difficult to kick back and do nothing at 
home 
    
On R&R I felt close to the people that matter to 
me 
    
I was able to get a good night’s sleep     
I could do relaxing things     
I did not try to get news about what was 
happening back in Afghanistan, e.g. by watching 
the news or using facebook 
    
I have recovered physically     
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I found the journey back to the UK frustrating     
I lost too many of my R&R days as a result of 
being delayed on the journey back 
    
The journey back to the UK had a negative 
impact on my experience of R&R 
    
I did not feel rested by the end of R&R     
 Excellent Good Poor 
How would you rate your experience of the 
journey back to the UK? 








Overall, how satisfied are you with your 







 Excellent Good Fair Poor 
How would you rate the experience of R&R? 
    
 All of my 
needs 
were met 
Almost all of 
my needs were 
met 
Only a few of 
my needs were 
met 
None of my 
needs were met 
How much did R&R meet your needs? 
 
    
 
 
 Yes, I got to 
do everything 
I wanted 
I got to do most 
of what I wanted 
No, I only got to 
do a little of 
what I wanted 
No, I didn’t get 
to do anything I 
wanted 
Did you get to do what you wanted to do on 
R&R? 











Overall, how satisfied are you with the 
experience of R&R? 
    
 Yes, definitely Yes, I think so 




If you were deployed again, would you like 
R&R on that deployment? 





Appendix 2. The Operational Mental Health Needs Evaluation (OMHNE)  
         Questionnaire Number 
 
Date of completion: 
 
 
This questionnaire asks about your deployment experiences and your health and wellbeing. ALL your 
answers will be treated in the strictest confidence and the results of this survey may help the UK 
Armed Forces improve the care of deployed personnel.  All the answers you provide will be looked at 
together with those of others and we will NEVER name any individual no matter what answer they 
provide and no matter how senior the person who wants to know is. 
 
Answering the questions 
 
To answer a question, select the response that you wish to make and fill in the square, like this: 
 
Yes   No If you make a mistake, correct it  Yes  No 
    by putting a cross through your 








Surname @@@@@@@@@@@@          First name @@@@@@@@@@@..@. 
Date of birth @@@@@@@@@@..          Service number @@@@@@@@@@.. 
Home telephone no@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@. 
Email address@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ 
1Service: RN  RM  ARMY  RAF 
                
 
2Are you: Regular Forces  Mobilised Reserve Forces 
            
 
3Have you deployed with your parent unit? 
Yes         
No, but I deployed with some members from my parent unit  
No, I didn't know anyone that I deployed with    
 






AB    
LH    
PO to WO1   
Mid to Lt Cdr   
Cdr & above   
Navy 
Pte/Mne   
LCpl to Cpl   
Sgt to WO1   
2nd Lt to Maj    
Lt Col & above   
Army/RM 
AC/LAC/JT   
Cpl    
Sgt to WO   
Plt Offr to Sqn Ldr  






18-19 years   
20-24 years   
25-29 years   
30-34 years   
35-39 years   
40-44 years   
45-49 years   
50+    years   
 
6Service Length: How long have you served for? 
 
Less than 1 year  
2-4 years              
5-12 years            
13-22 years          





7Sex: Male    Female 
   
 
8Marital Status, are you? 
 
Married        
Living with a Partner      
In a Long Term Relationship     
Single & not in a Long Term Relationship   
Separated       
Divorced       
Widowed       
 
 
9Do you have children? Yes No 
 
Under 18 years      




THEATRE LOCATION AND ACTIVITY 
 
10How many operational tours of more than 30 days duration have you undertaken so far in your military 
career? (NOT INCLUDING THE CURRENT TOUR) 
 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Iraq Tours          
Afghanistan Tours         




11During THIS DEPLOYMENT, how many FULL weeks have you been in theatre? 
 
0-4 weeks   Please write 
5-8 weeks   the number of 
9-12 weeks   full weeks here: 
13-16 weeks   
17-20weeks   
21-24 weeks   
25-28 weeks   
29-32 weeks   
32+ weeks   
 
12How many FULL months have you spent on operational deployment in the last 3 years? 
 
Less than 5 months  
5-8 months   
9-12 months   
13-16 months   
17-20 months   
21-24 months   
25-36 months  
 
13
During THIS DEPLOYMENT, where are you mostly located? What was your main role in 
theatre? 
 
Mostly Check Points     
Mostly Patrol Bases     
Mostly Forward Operating Bases   
Mostly Main Bases     
Mostly working alone, or with only a few 
UK personnel, with Afghan military forces  
 
14 During THIS DEPLOYMENT, how long in total have you spent outside your base in a hostile 
area? (i.e. patrolling, surge operations, convoys etc.) 
 
Never Up to 1 Week 1 Week to 1 Month More Than a Month 




15What is your MAIN role during THIS DEPLOYMENT? (please tick only ONE box) 
 
 Combat Arm  (e.g. Commando, Infantry or Armour and including support arms 
such as  medics, engineers or signals serving with a combat unit) 
 Combat Support Arm (e.g. Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Air, Intelligence, JCBRN) 
 Combat Service Support (e.g. Logistics, REME, Medical Personnel, AGC, 
MP) 
 




16During THIS DEPLOYMENT, how often have you believed that you have been in serious danger 
of being injured or killed? 
 
Never Once or Twice  Sometimes  Many Times 



















Received small arms fire      
Encountered enemy sniper fire      
Seen dead or seriously injured friendly forces personnel      
Received incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire      
Had a mate injured or killed who was near you      
Had an improvised explosive device (IED) or booby trap explode near you      
Had a shell, grenade, rocket or missile that failed to explode land near you      
Equipment shot or blown off or were shot/hit but protective gear saved you      
Shot at the enemy with your personal weapon      
Engaged in close quarter battle with fixed bayonet      
Been wounded or injured      
Cleared/searched homes or buildings, caves or bunkers      
Encountered hostile or aggressive reactions from civilians      
Been threatened and unable to respond because of the rules of engagement      
Provided aid to the wounded      
Seen injured or sick women or children who you were unable to help      
Handled or discovered human remains      
 
 
18During THIS DEPLOYMENT have any of the following occurred? 
 
        Yes  No  NA 
 
Birth of your child               
Death or serious illness of a relative, loved one or child           
Spouse or partner left you              
Had serious financial problems              
Had problems with your children              
(Reservists) Been concerned you might lose your civilian job          
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19 If you have had any sleep problems IN THE LAST MONTH please can you tell us how you rate 
them? 




















































      
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 






















      
If you have a sleep problem, does it 
INTERFERE with your daily functioning? 
(e.g. tiredness, operational duties, 
memory etc.) 
 

























20How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
During THIS DEPLOYMENT: Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
I feel a sense of comradeship (or closeness) between myself and other 
people in my unit 
    
I am able to go to most people in my unit when I have a personal problem     
My seniors are interested in what I do or think     
I feel well informed about what is going on in my unit     
 
 
21During THIS DEPLOYMENT my Commanders do the following: 
 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always 
Embarrass juniors in front of other unit members      
Accept extra duties or tasks for the unit in order to impress their 
superiors 
     
Treat all members of the unit fairly       
Show concern about the safety of unit members       
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22Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements, which relate to life within 




Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Morale within the unit has generally been high     
The unit has been motivated and enthusiastic     
The unit has been operating efficiently     
I have felt good about being part of this unit     
 
23Did you receive a stress brief prior to THIS DEPLOYMENT? 
Yes  No 
  
24Did you take a period of R&R OUTSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN during this deployment? 
Yes  No 
  
25If you did take R&R, did you find this useful? 
Yes a Lot  A Little  No  Did Not Take R&R 
                          
26Did you take more than one period of R&R at home during this deployment? 
Yes  No 
  
 
27For the longest period of R&R that you took, how many days did you spend at home or in your 
R&R location? 
 
7 days or less   




28During THIS DEPLOYMENT, how would you rate your health? 
Excellent      Very Good  Good    Fair   Poor 
                  
 
29How many times have you reported sick during THIS DEPLOYMENT? 
 
0   
1   
2-4   
5+   
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30These questions ask about your General Health  
 
Within the LAST FEW WEEKS, how often have you: 
 
Been able to concentrate on whatever you’re doing? 

















Lost much sleep over worry? 

















Felt that you were playing a useful part in things? 

















Felt capable of making decisions about things? 

















Felt constantly under strain? 

















Felt that you couldn’t overcome your difficulties? 

















Been able to enjoy your normal day to day activities? 

















Been able to face up to your problems? 

















Been feeling unhappy or depressed? 

















Been losing confidence in yourself? 


















Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 


















Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered? 























31STRESSFUL EVENTS - Here is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in relation to having 
experienced dangerous, stressful or horrific traumatic experiences.  How much have you been bothered by these 
problems in the PAST MONTH? 
 Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts or 
images of a stressful experience? 
     
Repeated, disturbing dreams of a stressful 
experience? 
     
Suddenly acting or feeling as if a stressful 
experience were happening again (as if you were 
re-living it)? 
     
Feeling very upset when something reminded you 
of a stressful experience? 
     
Having physical reactions (e.g. heart pounding, 
trouble breathing, sweating) when something 
reminded you of a stressful experience? 
     
Avoiding thinking about or talking about a stressful 
experience? 
     
Avoiding activities or situations because they 
reminded you of a stressful experience? 
     
Trouble remembering important parts of a stressful 
experience? 
     
Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy?      
Feeling distant or cut off from other people?      
Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have 
loving feelings to those who are close to you? 
     
Feeling as if your future will somehow be cut 
short? 
     
Having trouble falling or staying asleep?      
Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts?      
Having difficulty concentrating?      
Being super alert, watchful or on-guard?      




32If you experienced any of the problems listed above, how DIFFICULT have these problems made 
it for you to do your work, take care of things or get along with other people? 
 
Not difficult at all Somewhat difficult Very difficult Extremely difficult I have no 
problems 
               
     
33During THIS DEPLOYMENT how many days have you not been available for full duty because of 
illness? 
 
0   
1   
2-4   
5-9   
10+   
 
34Have you been admitted to the Field Hospital during THIS DEPLOYMENT? 
 





35During THIS DEPLOYMENT, have you had any injuries from any of the following? 
 
Fragment   Blast    
Round    Vehicle Accident  
A Fall    Other    
 




36Did these injuries result in any of the following? (Please mark all that apply) 
 
Being dazed, confused or seeing stars   Concussion (e.g. headache, dizziness)  
Not remembering the injury    Head Injury     
Losing consciousness (knocked out)   None of these     
 
37If you were knocked out, for how long (approximately)? 
 
Less than 5 Mins 6-30 Mins 31 Mins – 1 Hour 1 Hour to 1 Day  More than 1 
Day 
 
                  
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38Were you wearing a helmet at the time? 
 
Yes  No 
               
 
39ON THIS DEPLOYMENT have you been medically examined following a head injury? 
 
Yes  No 




40During this deployment how concerned have you been that you might be involved in an IED 
incident? 
 
Slightly Concerned    Somewhat Concerned Very Concerned 
                                        
41Have you been involved in an incident where you have been exposed to an exploding IED? 
 
Never Once  2-4 Times 5-9 Times 10+ Times 
                           
 
42If so, what type of IED was it? 
 
Suicide    
Pressure Plate   
Command Wire   
Remote Control   
Unknown    
 
43Have you been in the point position during a foot patrol or in the point vehicle during Counter 
IED drills? 
 
Never Once  2-4 Times 5-9 Times 10+ Times 
                           
 
44Have you ever been in point position during IED drills and missed a device which subsequently 
seriously injured or killed someone? 
 
Yes  No 
               
 
45Have you been involved in a friendly forces IED casualty incident? 
 
Yes  No 
               
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HEALTH AND WELL-BEING 
 
46During THIS DEPLOYMENT, have you experienced a significant stressful, emotional or family 
problem? 
 
Yes  No 
               
 
47During THIS DEPLOYMENT, have you received any help for a significant stressful, emotional or 
family problem at any time? 
 
Yes  No 
                    TRiM      
 
48Who did you receive this help from?   48aDURING THIS TOUR, I have been 
TRiMmed 
A Friend       or interviewed by a TRiM interviewer? 
Unit Chain of Command (excluding the Medic)    Yes  No 
TRiM Practitioner                       
Other Medical Staff (Nurses/MA/CMT)    48bIf yes, did TRiM lead to you 
seeing a 
Regimental Medical Officer or Doctor    medic, mental health professional or 
chaplain? 
Chaplain        Yes  No 
Mental Health Professional                     
 
49Would you CURRENTLY be interested in receiving help for a stressful, emotional or family 
problem? 
 





50Here is a list of concerns that you might have when considering seeking help for a stressful, emotional, 
mental health or family problem.  Please rate each of the possible concerns that might affect YOUR decision 




Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I don't know where to get help 
    
People with mental illness should not be given any responsibility 
    
There would be difficulty getting time away from being on duty for an 
appointment  
   
It would be too embarrassing 
    
It would harm my career 
    
Members of my unit might have less confidence in me 
    
My unit leaders might treat me differently 
    
I would be seen as weak (by those who are important to me) 
    
I don't trust mental health professionals 
    
My visit would not remain confidential 
    
I would think less of a team member if I knew he/she was receiving 
mental health treatment  
   
My leaders discourage the use of mental health services 
    
I have had previous bad experiences with mental health professionals 




51How long have you been with your current spouse or long term partner? 
 
  Not Applicable (please go to question 58 about family support) 
 
Up to 1 year   
2-4 years   
5+ years   
52Is your spouse or long term partner in the military? 
 
Yes  No 




53If yes, are they currently deployed? 
 
Yes  No 
               
 
54How satisfied are you with your marriage or long term partnership? 
 
Extremely Satisfied   
Satisfied    
Dissatisfied    
Extremely Dissatisfied   
Not Applicable    
 
55Are you currently planning divorce or separation? 
 
Yes  No 
               
 
56Is your spouse or long term partner planning divorce or separation? 
 
Yes  No 
               
57So far, what impact do you think THIS DEPLOYMENT has had on your marriage or relationship? 
 
No Impact    
Positive Impact    
Negative Impact   
Not Applicable    
 
58Has the military provided any reassurance or support to your FAMILY (parents, siblings, partner 
or spouse) whilst you have been on THIS DEPLOYMENT?  (e.g. phone calls or visits, arranging 'get 
togethers' with other service families, newsletters etc) 
 
Yes, it is sufficient   
Yes, but it is not sufficient  
No     
 
  
If not sufficient please describe the reasons why not: 
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59So far, what impact do you think THIS DEPLOYMENT has had on your children? 
 
  I have no children (please go to question 60) 
 
No Impact    
Positive Impact  
  
Negative Impact   
 
YOUR CAREER INTENTIONS 
 
60Which best describes your CURRENT career intentions? (Select one option) 
 
I plan to stay in for as long as possible or until retirement          
I plan to extend my present term of service but not necessarily until retirement       
I plan to leave on completion of my current term of service         
I have already handed in my notice/Premature Voluntary Release (PVR)         
I am going to hand in my notice/PVR in the very near future         
I have recently withdrawn my notice/PVR           
 
61Please indicate how much you DISAGREE or AGREE with the following statements about THIS 




Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
It has had a positive effect on my life     
I deal with stress better because of this deployment     
I feel pride from my accomplishments during this deployment     
This deployment has made me more confident in my abilities     
This deployment improved cohesion in my unit     
I am confident that I will return home healthy after this 
deployment 







We may wish to contact you later. We will NEVER use your information for non-research purposes and no 
one outside the research team will EVER be told about your answers or given your contact details. 
 
 
I want to be contacted at a later date: 
 
Yes  No 










End of the Survey, thank you for your help 
 
